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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FOREIGN POLICY EVALUATION AND THE UTILITY OF INTERVENTION
by
Graham Slater
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor
This dissertation identifies and explains the factors contributing to the
presence and severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders, or gross errors in strategic
judgment resulting in significant harm to the national interest, since the Second
World War. It hypothesizes that the grand strategy of preponderance and the
overestimation of military power to transform the politics of other states have
precipitated U.S. foreign-policy blunders since 1945. Examining the Vietnam War
and Iraq War as case studies, it focuses on underlying conditions in the
American national identity and the problematic foreign policy decision-making
(FPDM) that corresponds to this bifurcated hypothesis, termed the
overestimation/preponderance theoretical model (OPM). Four indicators
operationalize the OPM: (1) how U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the
capacity of military power to transform the political dynamics of the target state
through intervention; (2) and (3) how U.S. actors and institutions affected the
capacity of the partner state and hostile state and nonstate actors; and (4) how
the foreign policy was justified and rationalized within the leadership of
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government and to the general public as it encountered disconfirming
information.
In each case, the grand strategy of preponderance instituted a bounded
rationality of mission in the FPDM stage and the operationalization stage that
precluded the inclusion of an unfavorable outcome. In each case, U.S. foreign
policymakers greatly overestimated the capacity of the partner state to establish
security and legitimacy and underestimated the capacity of hostile actors to
mobilize and threaten the partner state. However, these preference-confirmation
biases diametrically contradicted the assessment that victory would be easy to
achieve; U.S. foreign policymakers promulgated this corresponding
overestimation/underestimation even while inflating the threat far beyond what
the actual threat to the national-security element of the national interest
represented. The subsequent implementing of this inverted calculation created a
national-security national interest where none was extant, then significantly
harmed that new interest via intervention. This tactical application of the grand
strategy of preponderance facilitated the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. foreign
policy by creating monsters in order to have monsters to slay, consistent with the
ideological tradition of the imperative of crusade in the modern history of
American foreign relations.
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CHAPTER 1
The Strategic-Tactical Gap in U.S. Grand Strategy

In Italy for 30 years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror,
murder, and bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo
da Vinci, and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly
love—they had 500 years of democracy and peace, and what did
that produce? The cuckoo clock.
Harry Lime, The Third Man

Imagine a student of international relations were to have fallen asleep in
1945 only to awaken in 2015, and were given only two facts during their
debriefing on the happenings of the previous seven decades: that the United
States chose to maintain its global military and political presence even after the
cessation of the hostilities of the Second World War, and that the United States
remained the preeminent power in the international system at the end of the
seven decades. How would we suppose the student would respond to the
question, "How would you expect the United States to have fared in its most
ambitious foreign entanglements?" Even the most cognizant sleepwalker would
be dumbfounded to learn that the United States never achieved victory in any of
its most notable conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan, among others. 1
The student might respond to this counterintuitive scenario by presupposing one
of either of two trains of thought: that the outcomes of the conflicts to which the
state dedicated its most substantial financial and human foreign-policy resources
were not as inextricably linked to the fate of the U.S. position in the international
1

What constitutes "victory" is one of the key questions the dissertation addresses. In none of
these conflicts did U.S. foreign policymakers achieve the objectives that would have been
considered "victory" at the outset of hostilities.
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system as policymakers had assumed, or that the state managed to excel so
tremendously in other areas that this excellence rendered faltering in many of its
most costly military engagements relatively superfluous.
Either response would be correct, and both lead to the same two
conclusions: the United States maintained its privileged position in the
international system in spite of its most costly foreign entanglements rather than
because of them, and U.S. foreign policymakers could stand to improve their
choice and/or prosecution of their most significant foreign policies. The tragic,
and perhaps ironic, character of modern U.S. foreign-policy history is that it has
managed to maintain its systemic dominance even while faltering in every major
war since the Second World War. This confounding puzzle embodies the
enigmatic research question of this dissertation: how and why has the most
powerful nation in the history of the world managed to perpetuate this
paradoxical series of blunders even while maintaining its preeminent position in
the international system?
The common adage in the social sciences that the most germane
research asks big questions and gives simple answers informs the fundamental
objective of this dissertation. It poses a big question: why have many of the most
ambitious and costly US foreign policies fallen far short of their objectives since
the Second World War? It offers a simple, bifurcated hypothesis: U.S.
policymakers overestimate the capacity of the overwhelming material power of
the United States to transform the politics of other states, an error
operationalized via the grand strategy of preponderance. Implicit in this approach
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is the dismissal of 'American declinists' that view the United States as a waning
power as China and others overtake its preeminence in the international system. 2
The approach is at once in denial of American declinism and in opposition to
some of the most fundamental foreign-policy assumptions and impulses of the
American foreign-policy establishment during the previous seven decades. Just
as on an individual basis a faulty set of logical assertions can lead a state into a
problematic foreign-policy endeavor that results in success, so too can a grand
strategy reliant on problematic assertions create great harm to the national
interest without significantly altering the overwhelming power endowment of that
same state.
In order to evaluate a particular foreign policy or grand strategy as a
whole, the researcher must take into account the motivations for action, the
foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) process, and the outcome; omission of
any of these three fulcra risks evaluative distortion and, subsequently, permits
the repeat of like errors in future foreign affairs. If the first lesson of history is that
we do not learn from history, such is only given in the absence of effective,
progressive historical analysis. The case studies presented are examined not to
present new research on what happened, the subject of each having been
examined ad nauseum in innumerable scholarly and popular volumes. Rather,
they are invoked and dissected through the lens of the overarching research
question and the assertions of the hypothesis. While there is always some new

2

For a discussion of trends in the balance of power, see Robert Wade, “Emerging World Order?
From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF,” Politics & Society
Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 2011): 347-378.
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piece of empirical evidence even for a thousand-year-old case study, and thus
further research can always reveal a better understanding of it, the primary
objective here is not to reinvent the understanding of either case, but instead to
situate them in relation to the overall research context and to better understand
the process of the FPDM that led to each resulting in blunder. Within IR literature,
the dissertation contributes primarily to the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis
(FPA), particularly FPDM. Although it addresses policy first and grand theory only
occasionally, it relies on some of the basic realist assumptions in international
affairs, especially in relation to the concept of intervention. While the focus is on
the United States, the lessons learned from the volume will provide insight into
international affairs more broadly.
The overall purpose of the dissertation is to explore foreign policy blunders
as a dependent variable and present and test the hypothesis, further delineated
in Chapter 3. Chapter 2 presents a framework for foreign policy evaluation (FPE),
an endeavor largely ignored by both the academic and policymaking
communities in spite of its perennial relevance to the scholarly field of IR and to
policy practitioners. Chapter 4 details the methodological approach, primarily
made up of the case study, of which there are two. The following two chapters
examine the case studies, and the concluding chapter lays out the findings of the
study. This introductory chapter acquaints the reader, in a general sense, to the
research agenda and the justification for its intended significance within IR
literature, to which the dissertation makes four original contributions.

4

First, it formulates a sui generis FPE framework. Second, it presents an
archetypal definition of the concept of the foreign policy blunder. Third, it
presents a hypothesis to the central research question of what factors have
contributed to the prevalence and severity of U.S. foreign policy blunders since
the Second World War. Fourth, it empirically explores two blunder case studies
designed to answer that question. Each of the four original contributions to the
literature builds from the foundation of the others; they are thus designed to
function as more than the sum of their parts. No policy can be assessed in a
vacuum, neither methodologically nor in the absence of correlated decisions,
objectives, and outcomes. Nevertheless, foreign policies tend to be judged in an
ad-hoc manner by policymakers, in popular discourse, and, most surprisingly, by
IR scholarship.
Despite the plethora of literature on the subject of foreign policy, there
exists no scientific framework for FPE that even remotely approaches a
comprehensive consensus. Instead, studies involving FPE remain plagued by
"analytical and conceptual anarchy," as described by David Baldwin. 3 Indeed,
publications directly addressing the difficulties involved in FPE often exert more
energy lamenting the virtual impossibility of it than attempting to build a
foundation on which to develop a fungible set of metrics. A framework for FPE
will be presented in Chapter 2 to help fill this gap in the literature, to provide an
invaluable analytical tool to policy practitioners, and to construct the theoretical

3 David Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy," Annual Review of Political Science No.
3, 2000, 167.

5

and applicable foundation for the subsequent examination of foreign-policy
blunders.
The foreign-policy blunder represents one of four general categories into
which any given foreign policy's outcome can be classified, along with success,
failure, and mixed-result (presumably the most common outcome). While
success, failure, and mixed-result outcomes all deal directly with the result of the
policy, the blunder represents a type of failure in which the FPDM process suffers
from significant biases, oversights, or other decision-making shortcomings. The
purpose of establishing criteria by which to assess foreign policy is simple:
scholars and policymakers alike will forever find it problematic to understand
previous policies, improve upon current policies, and plan for future policies
without agreed upon metrics for assessing the utility of different aspects of
different policies. Efficacious design and implementation of current and future
foreign policies requires recognition of the costs and benefits of current and
previous policies, across policies, rather than simply on an ad-hoc, individual
basis.
To assess the policy of Containment as successful based solely on the
fact that the Berlin Wall eventually fell tells us little about the intricacies of the
policy that might have made it more or less effective (or efficient—a nontrivial
distinction). The public invocation of President Ronald Reagan as the champion
of victory in the Cold War is a regular fixture of the discourse of Republican
lawmakers, yet hardly acknowledges the full picture of that enduring conflict.
Likewise, the utility of establishing FPE metrics is not to reduce the import of

6

foreign-policy outcomes into Manichean classifications, but rather to dissolve
every aspect of the policy down into criteria that can provide analytical tools for
understanding the utility and efficacy of the policy in question.
In the case of the foreign-policy blunder, the investigation focuses heavily
on the FPDM process and less so on the outcome, given that we know by default
at the outset of our retrospective analysis that the policy was a failure. Beyond
providing an essential practical tool to policymakers and theoretical tool to
scholars, an FPE framework also permits a conceptual introduction to the idea of
the foreign-policy blunder, defined here as a gross error in strategic judgment
resulting in significant harm to the national interest. This definition, as well as the
corresponding two case studies, incorporate problematic foreign-policy impulses
(the pursuit of preponderance), faulty strategic decision-making (imprudent
estimations of the politically transformative utility of military power), and
unfavorable outcomes that significantly harm the national interest (blunder). The
dissertation will explore the correlation between these three components.
Since the Second World War, U.S. foreign policy has revolved around an
axis of key assumptions that define and perpetuate American exceptionalism by
way of the entrenchment and proliferation of U.S. power and interests abroad.
For better or worse, the global engenderment of U.S. power has unsurprisingly
ensconced these assumptions as the source of that engenderment. More
surprising, however, has been the myopic impulse to link grand strategy with the
relative position of the state in the international system with seeming disregard
for the media through which these assumptions might be most effectively
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employed. Whether or not the prevailing grand strategy of American
preponderance will best facilitate the maintenance of American power remains
an open question, and will remain so as long as the United States can claim the
mantle of the preeminent great power in the international system.
Given that the United States appears poised to remain the world's
preeminent, if not hegemonic, state for the foreseeable future, the more relevant
questions now address not the subtleties of how the overall balance of power will
shift in the coming decades, but how to employ whatever American power exists
in relation to the problems and opportunities abroad in advance of the national
interest. In fact, this should always be any state's paramount preoccupation, from
the mightiest Leviathan to the tiniest Lilliputian. For even if the U.S. share of
world material and ideational power alters dramatically over the course of the
next few presidential administrations, a seemingly unlikely development, the
thoroughgoing foreign-policy conundrum will nonetheless remain how to apply
whatever power endowed to it. This distinction is far from superficial: the case will
be made throughout the course of these chapters that power itself as a tool for
affecting the internal dynamics of other states has been greatly overestimated by
U.S. policymakers since 1945.
The most intractable foreign-policy outputs tend to be those most
associated with the elements of a state's foreign-policy objectives considered by
foreign policymakers to be most necessary to advance the grand strategy of the
state. A foreign policy assumption, or an element of grand strategy that is taken
as given, therefore holds an inherently fundamental position in the foreign policy
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of a state to the extent that it can be defined as a necessity. The unquestionable
assumptions embedded in the FPDM process thus form the conduit for any
desired foreign-policy outcome. Many of the predominant assumptions taken for
granted in U.S. foreign policy distinguish it from that of any other state.
This somewhat self-induced exceptionalism can only be partially attributed
to material factors such as the uniqueness of American history or the prevalence
of relative American power during the previous two centuries. Much of it, perhaps
an immeasurable amount but significant nonetheless, can be attributed to
enduring ideational characteristics and preferences. In other words, the United
States can be understood as an exceptional state to the extent that it considers
itself an exceptional state. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared on
television in 1998, "We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see
further than other countries." 4 Although every state considers itself exceptional,
and thus justifies its legitimacy to rule over its citizenry, the United States is the
only state since the virtual demise of National Socialism in 1945 to promote its
own exceptionalism with such obstinately pervasive intent. This intent can be
defined most consummately as manifesting through the grand strategy of
American preponderance.
The assumptions inherent in the prevailing grand strategy of American
preponderance form an amalgam that fixes the United States in an exceptional
position in the minds of U.S. foreign policymakers. Several of the most ascendant

4 Micah Zenko, "The Myth of the Indispensible Nation," Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/the-myth-of-the-indispensable-nation/
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of these assumptions collectively construct the point of departure for the
hypothesis delineated in Chapter 3: 1) The cultural, geographical (resource
endowment; distance from competing powers), and historical traditions of
American exceptionalism demand an exceptional foreign policy most expediently
operationalized via a grand strategy of American preponderance; 2) the
persistence of American preeminence signifies the success of the pursuit of
American preponderance; 3) the extension of the U.S. security perimeter to a
global ambit promotes U.S. interests overseas and defends the nation from
attack, 4) maintaining overwhelming military force discourages revisionist powers
from attempting to challenge U.S. authority; and 5) this overwhelming military
force permits the transformation of the political landscape of other states. The
first four assumptions form the bedrock of the hypothesis; the fifth operationalizes
the research question. As will come to light, the hypothesis contends that many
of the implications of these assumptions precipitate the presence and severity of
U.S. foreign-policy blunders.
Foreign-policy blunders are not unique to post-WWII United States. Until
the future-perfect global liberal utopia is achieved in consummate totality, the
international system shall remain in a sort of adolescence, in which every state
will occasionally find blunder seeking glory. However, the case of the modern
United States is in fact exceptional in several distinguishing ways. Its salience, if
we wish to examine foreign-policy blunders as a dependent variable, draws from
several significant hallmarks. First, it has dominated the international system
since 1945, challenged only by a Soviet Union that we now know was destined
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for political-economic catastrophe. Its unrivaled prominence on the world stage
thus finds a parallel in its unrivaled relevance to international relations, at least
for the foreseeable future. Second, the postwar international order established by
the United States, its allies, and its institutions and imposed by the full force of its
globally deployed military ordained the most peaceful global environment in
modern history, at least in terms of major-power militarized interstate disputes
(MIDs). Third, U.S. foreign policy since WWII, in relative-power terms, finds no
equal in the history of the world in terms of the rapid rise of its share of the
world's power. Fourth, this unprecedented rise came in spite of every major
conflict in which the United States has been militarily employed resulting in a
stalemate or an outright failure. Contrasted with the unmitigated success of the
"total surrender" by the empires of the Third Reich and Imperial Japan, the
unmitigated stalemates and failures of subsequent wars since that epic
achievement boggle the mind of the IR scholar. What accounts for the
discrepancy between the rise of the United States as the unrivaled power in the
international system and its recurring foreign-policy blunders constitutes the
subject matter of this dissertation?
How can a state maintain such a dramatic disparity of power even while
faltering in its most expensive, ambitious foreign conflicts? To address this
question, the two case studies focus on the two most costly—in financial, military,
and political terms—American wars since the Second World War, the Vietnam
War and the Iraq War. The purpose is not to compare the two, but rather as an
autopsy on the strategic failure of the FPDM that led to these interventions. The
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following chapter situates FPE within IR literature and presents a formula for its
functionality. It explores the what, or what the blunder consists of and why it
should be classified as such. The subsequent chapter presents the OPM, a
theoretical model of why U.S. foreign policy has consistently produced blunders
of such magnitude since the Second World War. The OPM addresses the why
and how; the theory of what factors contribute to the presence and severity of
blunders in U.S. foreign policy since the Second World War.
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CHAPTER 2
Toward a Process for Foreign Policy Evaluation

Every foreign policy decision is meant to achieve its aims; however,
complete success is extremely rare, and there is a spectrum of
achievement ranging from mostly successful to unintentionally
provoking the precise opposite reaction to what was anticipated or
intended. 5
Valerie Hudson

The alternative to the status quo is the prospect of repeating the
whole anguishing process of arriving at decisions. This explains to
some extent the curious phenomenon that decisions taken with
enormous doubt and perhaps with a close division become
practically sacrosanct once adopted. The whole administrative
machinery swings behind their implementation as if activity could
still all doubts. Moreover, the reputation, indeed the political
survival, of most leaders depends on their ability to realize their
goals, however these may have been arrived at. Whether these
goals are desirable is relatively less crucial. The time span by which
administrative success is measured is considerably shorter than
that by which historical achievement is determined. In heavily
bureaucratized societies all pressures emphasize the first of these
accomplishments. 6
Henry Kissinger

Valerie Hudson states simply that "every foreign policy is meant to achieve
its aims," while acknowledging that the potential of "unintentionally provoking the
precise opposite reaction" is a perpetual possibility in the opaque disorder of

5

Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2014), 44.

6

Henry Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” Daedalus Vol. 95, No. 2 (Spring
1966), 503-529.
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international relations. In spite of her simplistic characterization that policies are
supposedly intended to rationally pursue objectives, Hudson understands as well
as anyone that the opposite can just as often be true: "Whether these goals are
desirable is relatively less crucial" than the process that produces the goals and
the manifold media employed to achieve them, in the words of realpolitik abettor
Henry Kissinger, perhaps the most central figure in the modern history of U.S.
foreign policy. It goes without saying that foreign-policy tools are employed to
achieve foreign-policy objectives. But just as discernible to any observer is the
phenomenon that the outputs of the sausage-making factory of FPDM
sometimes bear little resemblance to the inputs used in the process. In a state as
large and powerful as the United States, in which power is substantially diffused
into geographical, corporate, interest-group, and ideological factions, this
phenomenon is as evident as in virtually any other state. Kissinger is correct in
pointing out that the United States is "heavily bureaucratized," and thus its
foreign policymakers are beholden to a multiverse of foreign-policy inputs.
What constitutes the national interest—a subject tackled in more detail in
Chapter 4—can therefore be far more muddled than our state-for-granted-taking
indoctrination into realist intuition would suggest. While this dissertation scarcely
cites constructivist literature, instead mostly relying on a tradition of intransigent
realist doctrine in its interpretation of international relations, the constructivist
creed recurs as often in the ideational battlefield of the pliant conception of the
national interest as in any other. Furthermore, compounding the malleable nature
of the national interest in the enormous, power-diffused United States is the
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inherently ideological nature of the American self-conception and the
transnational idea of what constitutes Americanism. This subject will be taken up
in earnest in Chapter 3. What follows in this chapter is a description of the FPE
literature gap in general terms and a prescription for its reinforcement. This
bulwark will later inform the evaluation process with particular respect to the
United States in the case study chapters.
What Hudson's encyclopedic primer Foreign Policy Analysis illuminates is
the necessity of the disambiguation of the FPDM sausage-making factory for any
analysis concerned with the understanding of any foreign policy, regardless of
the approach taken or the methodological path desired. In other words, to
understand how FPDM operates in any scenario, we must apply the "kitchen
sink" philosophy to the problem we wish to understand, dissecting it along as
many lines of examination as possible. Hudson thus expands the traditional three
levels of analysis of the individual, the state, and the international system into
more than ten levels of analysis, advocating an FPA that is multidisciplinary,
multifactorial, multilevel, and agent-oriented rather than structurally determined.
The justification for this dissemination of lenses of analysis is simple: "The single
most important contribution of FPA to IR is to identify the point of theoretical
intersection between the most important determinants of state behavior: material
and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human
decisionmakers." 7 FPA does not deny that states are important actors in the
international system, but rather seeks to investigate further into the human
7

Hudson 2014, 8.
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decision-makers states are made of, who follow a whole host of motivations, be
they informed by cognitive, bureaucratic, ideological, interest-group, or any other
of a long series of input factors. While this dissertation borrows heavily from
particular realist tenets, especially in skepticism of attempts at liberalizing other
states militarily, it promotes a method of FPA investigation that avoids the
theoretically abridged parsimony of realism in favor of multifactor, agent-oriented
explanation. As will be further detailed in the methodology section, the research
design will not adhere strictly to any one approach or theoretical bent, instead
attempting to use useful tools where applicable, whatever paradigm they derive
from.
The agent at the center of our inquiry is, of course, the statesman, whom
we often view with idolatry, in the case that we admire them, or villainy, in the
case that we do not. But attempting to understand leaders as if they were gods or
demons all but prohibits prudent scrutiny of FPDM. The point of intersection
between material and ideational factors is the human decision-maker, rather than
a god, demon, or rational-choice automaton—this goes for tyrants in other states
as well as our sometimes-adored and sometimes-abhorred elected leaders in
democracies. To this end, Philip Tetlock demonstrates that 20 years of
commentary and forecasting by the supposed 'expert political judgment' of the
punditry and public-intellectual class of leaders and statesmen reveals that those
charged with prognosticating future sociopolitical events are no better than the
ordinary layperson. Tetlock poses the same question offered in this chapter:
"Why should political observers be insulated from the standards of accuracy and
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rigor that we demand of professionals in other lines of work?" Just as scholars
tend to view with disdain the supposedly subjective nature of FPE, Tetlock was
discouraged by academicians who thought he "showed suspect scientific
judgment in choosing good political judgment" as his subject of inquiry. In setting
out to "objectify good political judgment by identifying standards for judging
judgment that would command assent across the spectrum of reasonable
opinion," he reaches a paradoxical conclusion: "The net result is a double irony:
a perversely inverse relationship between my prime exhibit indicators of good
judgment and the qualities the media prizes in pundits—the tenacity required to
prevail in ideological combat—and the qualities science prizes in scientists—the
tenacity required to reduce superficial complexity to underlying simplicity." 8
We do well to remember that human beings run states, and human beings
are inherently fallible, irrational creatures driven by myriad cognitive and social
impulses and cues far beyond the capacity of any one mind or group of minds to
control. Are statesmen hedgehogs, foxes, tyrants, or dunces? Do leaders of a
democracy consistently, rationally pursue a defined national interest in their
interactions with other states and statesmen? Thousands of years of empirical
evidence provide four affirmative, somewhat contradictory answers to the first
question—they come in all shapes and sizes, and can quickly morph from one to
the other under the intense stresses of statecraft. The answer to the second
question seems to be either sometimes or most of the time. Most democratic

8

Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton
University Press, 2005), 4.
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leaders appear to pursue a (somewhat/relatively) clear national interest most of
the time. When they veer from this barometer, they invite the possibility of a
blunder. Among the multitudinous reasons for this deviation (assuming it is
intentional) include domestic political considerations, selfish personal reasons,
refusal to incorporate disconfirming information, refusal to admit defeat, or
adherence to ideational doctrines, assumptions, or preferences that supersede
the reality of the policy. If the deviation is entirely unintentional, the policy can of
course still result in blunder, for many of the same reasons. Whether poor
judgment results from negligence, ideology, hubris, obstinacy, oligarchical
loyalties, domestic political exigencies, or outright despotism is one of the critical
questions of understanding foreign policy blunders.
The other, related question is whether the relevant statesmen act wittingly
or unwittingly in pursuing a policy that is known to have a low likelihood of
success. If leaders lack sufficient information to produce a prudent decision, or if
the alternatives available grant them no viable prudence, the decision itself
cannot be assessed to be blunder-inducing, and thus the failed policy cannot be
assessed to be a blunder. A blunder requires an imprudent decision, or a gross
error in strategic judgment, whether brought about by ulterior motives, willful
ignorance, or the short-term denigration of the national interest as the state is
reduced into the most common denominator of political expedience, the currency
most valuable to any policymaker, without which they can gain no purchase on
any policy, foreign or domestic. Before beginning to explore the hallmarks of
foreign-policy blunders, why they occur, and how to predict and avoid them, we
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must first assemble an introductory set of guidelines and metrics for how to
evaluate foreign policy in general, and thus build a foundation from which to
extrapolate the characteristics and processes that lead to their manifestation and
define their place in international relations.

The case for foreign policy evaluation
The complications implicit in evaluating foreign policy defy quantification.
FPE has therefore been largely avoided in scholarly analysis. In fact, much of the
literature on FPE tends to focus on those complications in a manner so as to
dismiss the plausibility of the endeavor altogether. In short, the commensurate
perspective on the subject seems to be a resignation to the ineluctable fact that
the difficulties involved in FPE render it a profligate pursuit and perhaps even
anathema to scholarship due to its assumed normative and/or counterfactual
tendencies. Among the countless apprehensions discouraging scholars from
taking up the task exist several legitimate, fundamental hurdles. First, FPE has
been approached with skepticism because few policies fall clearly into one
category or another, instead tending to exhibit both successful and unsuccessful
characteristics. Second, the unpredictable, anarchical global environment in
which international relations play out renders decision-making an imperfect
science, even when provided with perfect information and an unambiguous
understanding of the national interest, which is rarely, if ever, the case. There are
sometimes no viable alternatives available to the foreign policymaker, and even
the most sagacious decisions may end in utter catastrophe depending on how
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circumstances or objectives change, as they invariably do. Third, foreign
policymakers may be motivated to distort or conceal the true motivations for a
given foreign policy, especially in a democratic society in which the citizenry can
vote leaders out of office from the confines of the ballot box, complicating the
efforts of the investigator to meander through the rhetoric to unveil veritable
motivations for foreign-policy choices.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the dynamics of international
relations are so fluid and interconnected that an optimal outcome at one moment
in time may transform into a suboptimal or even significantly harmful outcome
days, months, or years into the future. Supplying missiles and small arms to the
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan was an unmitigated success: the Red Army tucked
its tail and withered away into the Soviet Union from the mountains of
Afghanistan with nothing to show for it but thousands of combat deaths, a
stagnant economy, and a bruised reputation from which the Russian Federation
has yet to recover even decades later. That celebrated event precipitated the
unmitigated disaster to detect and prevent the most catastrophic terrorist attack
in U.S. history, perpetrated by the same Mujahedeen from their same cavernous
stronghold. While extreme in its consequences, this example sometimes appears
more illustrative of the rule than the exception. The United States allied with
China during World War II only to “lose China” (as well as 'Indochina') into
Communist hands in its aftermath, resisted colonialism only to assume its guise
in the Middle East and elsewhere as the sun began to set on the British Empire
and Pax Britannica gave way to Pax Americana, and allied with Saddam Hussein
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against Iran only to fight two wars to contain and then remove the defiant dictator
from power. The historical evidence supports the unpredictability factor.
Given these sticking points, the avoidance of focusing on policy evaluation
may be understandable. Nevertheless, none of these reasons for trepidation
excuse the scholarly community from formulating an adequate framework for
FPE. On the contrary, promulgating a unified approach to FPE would take
advantage of one of the most perennial opportunities to help bridge the 'theorypolicy gap' so many in academia and policy hasten to regret. Policy-related
theory can only claim value to the extent that it claims relevance to policy, a
prerequisite often lacking in scholarship focused on building theory for the sake
of theory building. Disputing Stephen Walt’s declaration that “evaluating foreign
policy is hard,” a contention he found sufficiently revelatory as to merit publishing
an essay on the subject with the same phrase as its title, may be an onerous
task. 9 But more onerous still would be the acquiescence that no such endeavor is
possible, an omission in the literature that continues to obfuscate the
understanding of foreign policy.
Many scholars have danced around the dearth of literature on FPE,
problematizing it rather than attempting to de-problematize it. Indeed, the most
popular angle from which to breach the subject seems to be a focus on its virtual
impossibility to breach. John Clark, while acknowledging FPE's complications,
suggests three stages in evaluating the effectiveness of foreign policy: setting

9 Stephen M. Walt, “Evaluating Foreign Policy Is Hard,” Foreign Policy, June 20, 2011,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/evaluating-foreign-policy-is-hard/
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standards by which to judge, understanding the impact of policies as they are
implemented, and comparing outcomes to standards. Focusing on creating
standards, Clark laments the difficulty of overcoming the complexity of even
identifying foreign policy goals, let alone judging the efficacy of their
implementation and the outcomes, intended or unintended, that result from the
interaction between the policy as constructed and its implementation in the target
environment. Compounding the difficulty in identifying the intricacies of foreign
policies and the convolution of attempting to evaluate them in a standardized
fashion is the dilemma of how to assess whether a foreign policy has served the
national interest when even that concept proves slippery: “Even traditional
realists would have to agree with this position, since they sometimes
acknowledge that national leaders do not in fact always adopt policies which they
find to be in the national interest.” 10 If this is the case, it precludes the
acceptance of the national interest as given, and thus complicates the evaluation
of foreign policies as they support or hinder the national interest. While
acknowledging that what exactly constitutes the national interest is difficult to
ascertain, Chapter 4 examines the concept of the national interest in detail,
offering a definition of the term based on a conglomeration of commonly utilized
definitions.
David Baldwin takes the baton from Clark’s analysis, regretting that
although “specifying conditions for success or failure of foreign policy behavior is

10 John F. Clark, “Evaluating the Efficacy of Foreign Policy: An Essay on the Complexity of
Foreign Policy Goals,” Southeastern Political Review Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1995), 571.
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arguably one of the most, if not the most, important topic to be studied,” scholarly
attention to it “is not commensurate with its importance.” 11 Baldwin exposes
shortcomings in some of the common assumptions about statecraft, such as the
assumption that military force tends to be effective, and proposes a preliminary
set of FPE criteria. Featured most prominently among them are costs to the user,
which are often overlooked in evaluative analysis; costs to the target; stakes for
the user; stakes for the target; the question of "adequacy," or whether the cost
incurred relates optimally to whatever is achieved; inclusion of a scaled approach
to degrees of success or failure as opposed to a dichotomous (success/failure)
approach; and the magnitude of stakes in question, from the most obscure policy
initiative to an existential total war to guard against the destruction of the nationstate. Like Clark, one of Baldwin's main preoccupations is how to set standards
for what exactly constitutes an "effective" foreign policy. Clark’s and Baldwin’s
analyses construct a fruitful foundation from which to begin a more optimistic
vision for FPE. Delineating the difficulties of the task provides a helpful point of
departure for an examination of how to limit these difficulties and develop
corresponding solutions.
John Vasquez proposes a few points of axis around which FPE can
revolve, envisioning common social-science techniques as a conduit for
understanding and evaluating foreign policy in two ways: producing general
knowledge of how international relations function with respect to the foreign

11 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science
3: 2000, 167.
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polices of states and analyzing the consequences of foreign policies once they
are decided upon and carried out. The former informs how an analyst might
extract from the conduct of international relations which foreign policies can be
viable, while the latter facilitates evaluating the efficacy of any given foreign
policy. 12 Like others, Vazquez has difficulty transcending the temporal factor: a
good decision may lead to a bad outcome, and even a good outcome can
become bad with time. Although useful as another step on the path toward FPE,
the reader volume edited by Vazquez focuses only on one administration,
President Reagan’s, limiting its scope. Furthermore, the various authors
presenting chapters in the book do not follow consistent criteria, precluding the
utility of the volume as more than the sum of its parts. The disparate
investigations thus result in a series of disconnected studies that are useful in
evaluating particular policies of the era, but not in establishing an overarching
vision of how to evaluate foreign policy with a coherent formula. This
individualistic approach to FPE is characteristic of the literature on the topic. The
first objective of the dissertation is to address that gap in the literature. The
following section offers a basic framework for FPE. This framework will be
utilized to evaluate each case study.
The two case studies, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, evaluate the
decision and execution of an extensive military intervention. While there is no
limit to the amount of evaluations available to the researcher on military conflicts,
the evaluation of the utility of military conflict is an underdeveloped science.
12

John Vazquez, Evaluating U.S. Foreign Policy (Praeger, 1986).
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Baldwin describes the scarcity of literature on the varying applications of military
power and coercion: While "many studies address the question of whether
economic sanctions work, very few address such questions as the following:
Does military force work? Does diplomacy work? Does propaganda work?
Despite the paucity of such studies, conventional wisdom holds that military force
usually works." Despite this perception, "the literature on military force contains
few discussions of the meaning of success." 13 If there is a shortage of literature
on the efficacy of military force, why does conventional wisdom hold that it
usually works? This seems a surprising conclusion given that there must be a
loser in every war, and sometimes (perhaps often) even two losers, in the case
that neither party achieves its aims and the conflict ends in stalemate.
By the same token, if there is not even an adequate literature on what
success in a military engagement consists of, how can the scholarly community
come to any conclusion as to its general efficacy, much less the definitive
conclusion that it is decidedly efficacious most of the time? This sort of scholarly
lacuna goes beyond the hypocritical to the irresponsible. Especially in the nuclear
age, determining what success is made of becomes even more problematic. If
both the United States and the Soviet Union can reduce the enemy into the
apocalyptic rubble of nuclear Armageddon in a number of hours, what would
success look like? If the United States had five functioning cities left at the end,
and the Soviets one, would that constitute victory? In more current terms, if the
United States were to go to war with China, and remain more or less intact while
13

Baldwin 2000, 177.
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destroying every major Chinese city, and thus its largest import market, could the
United States be considered victorious? Can you win a conflict and yet be far
worse off at the end of it? Baldwin's tongue-in-cheek quip, "The operation was
successful, but the patient died," rings true here. As soon as a conflict
commences, the standards for success immediately change. The new set of
interactions resulting from "the fog of war" presents challenges and opportunities
that can only be completely known in the presence of war. Even a strike against
an enemy, designed specifically to be limited in scope, will likely provoke some
type of response by the enemy. Thus, any act of conflict almost automatically
entails an immediate upping of the ante, even if designed to be easily diffusible.
Many wars have begun in such fashion. Look no further than the Gulf of Tonkin.
Robert Jervis describes the illogical mentality involved in the mutually assured
destruction (MAD) of Cold War calculations:

First, it is zero-sum. One side must come out ahead of the other;
one or the other must retain more military power and be less slow
to recover. Thus every war must have a winner. Second, the
judgment involved is a relative one—the position of each side is
being compared with that of the other. This stress on relative
advantage fits nicely with the normal conception of power in
international politics. Starting with Thucydides, scholars have
argued that power makes no sense when viewed in absolute terms
because the outcome of the conflict, especially military conflict, will
be determined not by the absolute size of the armies involved but
by their relative capabilities. When deterrence by punishment is
crucial however, it is the absolute level of destruction that a state
faces and can inflict that controls its behavior. While the conclusion
that military victory is possible follows from the definition employed,
such a conclusion is remarkably apolitical. It does not relate the
costs of the war to the objectives and thus ignores the question of
whether the destruction would be so great that the winner, as well
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as the loser, would regret having fought it. Holders of this view,
then, fall into the trap that Clausewitz warned about of seeing war
as an end in itself instead of as a means to national goals. 14

When Hans Morgenthau published an essay in 1976 entitled "The Fallacy
of Thinking Conventionally About Nuclear Weapons," he was unwittingly making
a case for FPE by suggesting that a) metrics for success are unclear and often
change and thus b) scientific discussion about what metrics ought to consist of
and where their confines ought to be parsed is needed. 15 Jervis performs the
same task. If a way of thinking about conflict "does not relate the costs of the war
to the objectives and thus ignores the question of whether the destruction would
be so great that the winner, as well as the loser, would regret having fought it,"
then that way of thinking will find little value in praxis, condemned forever to the
frivolity of theoretical abstraction. Though IR literature has long been concerned
with whether and to what extent nuclear weapons turn traditional balance-ofpower calculations inside-out, similar theoretical problems would also arise from
a discussion of other weapons that question traditional power calculations, such
as the modern (globally oriented) application of the ancient weapon of terrorism,
which can rely on globalization's vulnerabilities and technology's (including the
potential use of nuclear weapons) opportunities. If we are to accept Clausewitz's
contention that war is but "the continuation of policy by other means," then it
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follows that it must be held to standardized interpretations of successful and
unsuccessful policies, whatever the means used to achieve foreign-policy ends
may be, military or otherwise.
In the same way that there exist countless studies on particular military
engagements but not enough on the efficacy of military power in general, many
studies examine a particular event, time period, administration, institution, or any
other single line of analysis without taking into account the broader picture or
utilizing consistent criteria of evaluation. There is no shortage of examples to
illustrate this deficiency. Some revolve around a particular time period or branch
of government. U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy Mistakes, for example,
examines “mistakes, in the form of bad decisions” made by presidents. Although
it covers the literature from the past 50 years, it admits that “this research has not
explicitly identified a vantage point around which the answers to these questions
revolve.”

16

This observation confirms one of the main purposes of the

dissertation, pursuing a vantage point for exploring the causation of blunders
across time in U.S. foreign policy. Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes, though
somewhat biased and non-scholarly, exemplifies some of the popular vitriol
against U.S. intervention overseas by looking at overzealous OSS and CIA
operations.

17

Willard Matthias takes a similar line in America’s Strategic

Blunders, surveying flawed or absent intelligence and its impact on strategic
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blunders from 1936-1991. 18 Many books focus on the normative, institutional, or
utilitarian motives for hegemony, or whether or not the United States is indeed
imperialistic.
Some analyses attempt to position poor decisions made by leaders on
particular dependent variables, such as groupthink, financial considerations,
domestic political pressures, regions, or ideology. Some focus on two particular
variables, such as Michael Grow’s presidential/regional U.S. Presidents and Latin
American Interventions. 19 The same literature gap applies to blunders in foreign
policy. The strategic-tactical gap cuts both ways: sometimes, tactical moxie
becomes entirely undermined by strategic ineptitude, as with Thomas Ricks’
characterization of the Iraq War: “Unsurpassed tactical success combined with
unsurpassed strategic failure.” 20 Tactical failures can just as easily accompany
strategic success. The broader problem has been compounded by the fact that
even individual assessment operations have achieved neither general adequacy
nor coherence across missions. The military’s ability to assess ongoing
operations is so poor that in 2010, nine years into the Afghanistan War, the head
of the International Security Assistance Force Afghan Assessments Group simply

18 Willard Matthias, America’s Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security
Policy (Pennsylvania State University, 2001).
19
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2008).
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2006).
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stated “our metrics suck.” 21 In the interest of better metrics, the following section
presents a rubric for FPE. This rubric will be operationalized in the two case
studies to follow.

Criteria for evaluating foreign policy
Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives
The degree to which objectives are met should be the point of departure
for any FPE metrics. As previously stated, what constitutes the national interest
defies consensus, problematizing whether it even exists ontologically, and
whether it is even knowable epistemologically if it does in fact exist ontologically.
If states, at least in their intention, act rationally to maximize their utility function,
then the objectives of any foreign policy can be said to be employed to pursue
the national interest, at least in theory, and the attainment of a given set of
objectives can be evaluated in conjunction with that national interest. The fact
that not all foreign policies further the national interest—and there is no doubt
that they do not—does not dictate the assertion that policymakers are not at least
attempting to pursue the national interest, at least a majority of the time.
This is not to suggest that foreign policymakers invariably pursue the
national interest. Decisions are often arrived at via parochial, bureaucratic,
interest-group, or personal/groupthink pressures that circumvent or otherwise
trammel the national interest. In short, objectives will be evaluated according to

21 Jonathan Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail: It’s Not Just the Metrics,” Naval
College War Review Vol. 64, No. 4 (Autumn 2011), 90.
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their fulfillment and their correlation to the promotion of a relatively knowable,
stable, and clearly enunciated national interest, in addition to being evaluated
according to their official stated goals. This distinction is important because it is
assumed that there sometimes exist goals beyond what the official stated goals
enunciate. Likewise, it will be assumed that the objectives of a given foreign
policy are knowable, even if they carry the potential to change according to the
needs of the state, the political preferences of statesmen, or complications in the
target environment.
Quite often the objectives of a given foreign policy and how they correlate
to the grand strategy of the state are clearly pronounced in policy documents
such as a National Security Statement, which tends to deal with grand strategy
more broadly, or more specific foreign-policy documents, such as foreign-policy
bills sponsored by an administration and authorized by Congress with regard to a
particular problem (for example, terrorism and the Patriot Act) or state (for
example, Iraq and other AUMFs). Sometimes, however, the genuine thinking in
the minds of foreign policymakers proves mercurial to the researcher, and
documents such as declassified transcripts of presidential cabinet or advisor
meetings must be employed where possible. Even assuming perfect information
for the researcher, which is impossible, President John F. Kennedy's quote on
the confusion of statecraft illustrates how even the policymaker can get lost in his
own thoughts: "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the
observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself... There will always be the dark
and tangled stretches in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those
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who may be most intimately involved." 22 If the esteemed decision-maker finds
difficulty explaining his own thoughts to himself, imagine the complications
involved in the bumbling scholar pouring through fields of documents whose
content the theory-practice gap renders alien absent any real-world experience in
high-stakes policymaking.

Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences
Unforeseen, unintended, ignored, or neglected consequences are
distinguished from objectives in order to differentiate the achievements a policy
seeks to fulfill from the ramifications the implementation of that policy can effect.
The Criterion of consequences takes a broader perspective than the Criterion of
objective fulfillment. Although it is unlikely that a policy can achieve none of its
objectives and still positively affect the national interest, it is quite feasible that a
policy can achieve all of its objectives and still be harmful to the national interest.
For example, support for Saddam Hussein against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War
accomplished the objective of draining resources from the Iranian state, but by
default strengthened a dangerous dictator that would eventually turn his Soviet
tanks on American ally Kuwait. Likewise, in both the Gulf War and the Iraq War
the primary military objectives were achieved swiftly and comprehensively, but
far-reaching complications leading to further entanglements arose in the form of
first leaving the Saddam Hussein regime in power and later the development of

22 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown, and
Company, 1971), iv.
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the insurgency and influx of jihadists after March 2003. These examples illustrate
that this Criterion not only paints with a broader brush in scope, but also in time:
today’s foreign-policy success may prove to be the harbinger of foreign-policy
disaster in later years. The consequences of a given foreign-policy action, be
they positive, negative, or neutral, provide context to the evaluation of how
effective a given foreign policy is in terms of objective fulfillment and impact on
the national interest.

Criterion III. Political, financial, and military cost
Political cost in this analysis specifically refers to political capital as it
relates to a state’s reputation and position of prestige in the international system,
distinct from a strategic consequence that may be inherently political. For
example, one of the undesired consequences of the decision by the Bush
administration and the U.S. Congress to remove Saddam Hussein from power by
force in 2003 was the eventual enablement of Iran to take the helm of Iraq’s
security infrastructure and leadership in the battle to expel ISIS from Mosul, Tikrit
and other Iraqi cities and towns, itself a product of the Shia solidarity between the
countries the invasion reinforced, even despite the recent brutal war between
them on the interstate level. This effect was compounded by the fact that
invading Iraq in the first place and disbanding the army left no force capable of
protecting the country from itself or its neighbors.
The damage done to the U.S. reputation in the Gulf region and
internationally can be assessed as part of the political cost of the campaign, as
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can the empowerment of Iran and other political adversaries that would benefit
from the action. The utility of distinguishing cost from consequences is the ability
to measure political resources, such as leverage with partnering actors and
favorability among the public in the region, expended from the actual policy
events and processes that result, either directly or indirectly, from the foreign
policy. The key distinction is that cost is intended to measure a fungible resource,
in this case political capital, while consequences intend to measure the actual
strategic results of an action. The former largely addresses perception, while the
latter functionally addresses actual policy events and processes that can be
heavily influenced by perception.
The first step in measuring financial cost is the level of resources and
assets expended in terms of implementing the policy. This could include the
operating cost of sending an army to invade and occupy a foreign country in the
case of a military intervention or the cost foregone in terms of reduced trade or
exports due to sanctions on a target state. The second step is to account for the
economic effect of the results of the action. For example, the first step carried
astronomical costs for the United States during the Second World War, while the
second step resulted in pulling the country out of depression and forming the
political and military foundation for an institutional framework that would establish
it as the world’s foremost industrial and military power, perhaps even to the point
of hegemony. In other words, the economic benefits of the Second World War far
outweighed even the enormous cost of the conflict for the United States. The
same could not be said of the Vietnam War, which damaged the U.S. economy
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and brought about virtually no economic benefit, other than to U.S. defense
contractors, the interests of whom clearly did not overlap with the national
interest in that particular case. The financial burden to the taxpayer of the Iraq
War is staggering and still being incurred more than a decade later.
Military cost refers specifically to the cost of military operations in terms of
military capabilities. Soldiers, tanks, aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and so forth
require enormous financial resources to equip, maintain, and replenish. Contrary
to strict economic or financial resources, military resources cannot always be
replaced. When the armies, navies, and air forces of Nazi Germany and Imperial
Japan were all but destroyed by the Allies in the Second World War, they were
never replaced, as both countries were occupied by the victors and pursued a
pacific, non-military (corporate) path to restoration of their former glory. However,
both countries rebuilt and eventually surpassed prewar economic productivity,
illustrating the fungibility of financial resources as opposed to military hardware.
Another example with a different result that illustrates the same principle was the
U.S. ability to rebuild its armed forces after the Vietnam War due to its robust
economic capabilities, the location of the war at a great distance from the
homeland, and the continued desire (after a brief respite) on the part of citizens
and policymakers to maintain the nation's global military presence. Great military
resources come at great financial expense for every nation, but financial
resources can sometimes be replenished where there exists economic
productivity, as they are a necessary but insufficient condition for the creation or
replenishment of military resources.
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Criterion IV. Availability and consideration of alternatives
Even during the most instantaneous threat developments, policy
alternatives are always considered. Just as no individual policy can be evaluated
with total disregard for other related polices, an alternative cannot be evaluated
without taking into consideration the attractiveness of other alternatives.
Policymakers must confront a staggering array of dynamic threats to national
security, making up policy as they go along while attempting to follow a unified
grand strategy, itself a difficult task even assuming that a unified grand strategy
indeed exists. Although alternatives that were never chosen are counterfactual,
this does not prevent us from estimating what the consequences of a different
alternative may have been. Economists make a steady habit of this and there is
little reason to think the same procedure would be useless in terms of foreign
policymaking. Colin Dueck's Reluctant Crusaders describes the utility of
counterfactual analysis:

Each case study will be framed in terms of broad strategic options
or alternatives: not only those that were in fact chosen, but also
those that could have been. For example, after 1945 the United
States adopted a strategy of containment, and most of the literature
on the period has tried to explain why that alternative was chosen.
But any attempt to explain the adoption of containment is at least
implicitly a claim as to why another alternative—such as
neoisolationism—was rejected. Counterfactuals simply make
explicit the causal claims that are already implicit in any such study.
There is, of course, good reason to be skeptical of farfetched
counterfactuals; this is a method that must be used with care and
precision. One way to ensure such precision is to refer only to
policy alternatives that were credible or plausible at the time.
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Another is to apply generalizable theories to the historical case, and
then deduce what sort of outcomes each theory would predict.
These two restrictions bring both historical plausibility and
theoretical rigor to our investigation. With these restrictions, the
careful and theoretically informed use of counterfactuals actually
adds to our search for a generalizable theory, and to the effective
number of observations in a given case study. 23

Nevertheless, when policymakers shuffle through different options in their
search for the foreign policy most likely to induce an optimal outcome, they must
do so without knowing with certainty what its ramifications will be, just as the
scholar cannot produce with absolute certainty a picture of what another
alternative would have resulted in. Even as some scholars specifically concerned
with the limitations of FPE characterize retroactive FPE as anathema to rigorous
social-scientific procedure, countless others engage in exactly that endeavor with
regard to specific policies. That there is no consensus on how to address the
problem holistically signifies neither that it has not already been done in
innumerable essays nor that no such consensus can be developed. It merely
represents yet another oversight in the literature characteristic of the 'theorypolicy gap.'
We can safely assume that Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program
would not have posed a threat to the United States had the dictator not been
overthrown, since we now know with absolute certainty that no such program
existed. Although the intelligence presented to the Bush Administration on the
subject turned out to be faulty, this may have had as much to do with preference
23 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy
(Princeton University Press, 2006), 55.
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biases in cherry-picking intelligence as with the actual intelligence gathered.
Indeed, these biases have now been well documented, and are highlighted
throughout the chapter on the Iraq War. Thus the argument that this factor ought
not be incorporated into an analysis of the efficacy of the decision to invade Iraq
falls flat. In retrospect, as before the ill-fated decision, the policy failed, and was
destined for failure given that the war was launched on false pretenses,
rendering any cost-benefit analysis on that aspect of the policy superfluous. That
the prosecution of the war was riddled with tactical deficiencies does little to veil
its strategic ineptitude. Thus, using this particular example, an analysis of the
policy informs its evaluation in such a way as to obviate its assessment as a
failure and, more specifically, a blunder. The cost—estimated by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to be neutral or negative due to Iraqi oil
revenue—as well as the consequences of empowering Iran, inciting Islamist
fundamentalism in a country in which it had been wholly suppressed, and stoking
national and regional sectarian tensions were far from impossible to predict.
FPDM cannot be imagined as an exact science, nor can its evaluation. But this
does not justify its evasion in the foreign policy literature.

Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes
No foreign policy is ever pursued in a vacuum. Thus every policy, even to
the extent that it is distinguishable from another, must be evaluated in the context
of other polices. 'Inter-subjectivity,' to borrow a constructivist term, is one of the
fundamental underpinnings of international relations. U.S. interventions in Latin
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America and Africa during the Cold War were not so much geared to affect local
political battles per se as they were to affect the broader ideological and political
war against Communism and balance-of-power competition with the Soviet
Union (whether they actually performed this function is a matter of conjecture).
The extent to which a particular policy, such as support for the removal of
Salvador Allende from power in Chile, can be thought to have been efficacious
directly relates to how that particular political battle affected the overall Cold War
landscape.
Scope can be delineated along three main levels: the grand-strategic
level, with an axis point of the overarching national interest of the state vis-à-vis
other states in the international system; the intermediary level, through which a
policy toward a given state or region is developed and applied; and the tactical
level, whose lens focuses on the particularities of the implementation of the
intermediary policy. For example, the decision to escalate the Vietnam War,
initiated during the JFK Administration and indoctrinated during the LBJ
Administration, addressed an intermediary problem contextualized by the grand
strategy of Containment Policy, settled upon years earlier by the Truman
Administration. The tactical pitfalls of the war, such as the alliance with an
unpopular government, a war plan innocuous in its pursuit of a determined, welltrained, well-equipped, and experienced guerilla fighting force, the pollution and
manipulation of battlefield information up the chain of command, and the myopic
application of traditional military weaponry to an insurgent battlefield laden with
canopy jungle, represented the impotence of the strategy’s viability.
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Though the grand-strategic, intermediary, and tactical levels of analysis
intertwine, their delineation permits the disambiguation of a foreign policy by
stipulating its context relative to its target environment. The Vietnam case
demonstrates the relevance of stakes: although the United States dropped more
ordnance on Vietnam than during the entire Second World War, there was very
little at stake in the country in terms of strategic value. In other words, the nation
paid an enormous price for a war with relatively insignificant stakes, illustrating a
mad logic that incentivized a way of thinking about the conflict that only scarcely
utilized percipience. Strategy and tactics can transcend various levels of scope:
the latter is by definition the means to the ends of the former, regardless of the
scope involved. The grand strategy of Containment, for example, employed the
tactic of intervention; intervention itself was a strategy that employed the tactics
of attrition and pacification in Vietnam.

The foreign-policy blunder
What constitutes a blunder in foreign policy? Dictionaries define the word
"blunder" to signify a careless mistake often caused by confusion or lack of
sufficient forethought. 24 As mentioned in the previous section, a blunder is
defined here as a gross error in strategic judgment resulting in significant harm to
the national interest. It implies both an unfavorable outcome for the state in
question and poor decision-making on the part of the foreign policymakers
involved. This definition is predicated on four foundational necessary but
24

Collins English Dictionary, for example, defines a "blunder" as "a stupid or clumsy mistake."
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singularly insufficient conditions: (1) failure to meet objectives; (2) significant
harm to the national interest; (3) cost; and (4) predictable fallacy (based on the
available alternatives and extant information at the time of the decision). These
correspond to four of the five criteria for FPE, omitting context, which is relevant
but not essential to the classification of a blunder. In the dangerous and
unpredictable bedlam of international relations, even the most astute, cautious,
prudent, and isolationist statesmen invariably encounter foreign-policy failures at
some point during their tenure as caretaker of the national interest at the
international level. The kaleidoscopic potential hindrances to a state achieving its
international objectives defy quantification.
Nonetheless, these can be divided into dichotomous categories:
miscalculation or other misuse of state capabilities by foreign policymakers, and
surprises or resistance from foreign states or nonstate actors in the application of
those capabilities abroad. In the former case, even the most well intended
statesmen may fall victim to the urge to ostentatiously assert the objectives of the
state and imprudently pursue the national interest in such a fashion as to invite
misfortune. Some of the most obvious and commonplace pitfalls in the latter case
include unforeseen challenges such as foreign alliance formation, sudden shifts
in the objectives of other states, hostile regimes assuming power in newly
antagonistic states, and either incremental or rapid disturbances in the
distribution of power in the international system. All instances of the latter case
relate to an overarching theme in the study of interstate relations: that of change
in the international system. This is a phenomenon that has unfortunately been
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largely ignored by realism and only haphazardly explained, if enthusiastically
embraced, by liberal theory. 25
Foreign-policy failures of the first order can be further divided into two
types: an invention or distortion of the foreign threat confronted, and a
miscalculation of the capabilities of the state to carry out its objectives. Perhaps
the most catastrophic foreign-policy failures of a state combine both mistakes
into a compounded chain of decision-making errors that maximize the response
of hostile actors in the target environment while minimizing the influence the
originator state may have on them. For example, Operation Barbarossa
overestimated Nazi capability to overtake the whole of Russia, mighty though the
war machine of the Third Reich had proven to be up to that point in hostilities. At
the same time, it underestimated the will of the Soviet soldier to fight and, once it
found its momentum, the ingenuity of Soviet industry to produce military
technology that would challenge Nazi experimentation in modern weaponry, as
the Soviet T-34 tank did to the German Panzer. During the same conflict,
Imperial Japan overestimated the capability of the Japanese Navy and Air Force
to rule the Pacific, even while emulating Nazi hubris in underestimating the will of
the “decadent” American populace to withstand hardship and the eventually
overwhelming juggernaut that U.S. military industry became once it hit full stride.
Though Nazi war planners were aware of the existential threat opening a second
front would undoubtedly invite, just as Japanese war planners knew that they

25 K.J. Holsti, “The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory,” Institute of International
Relations (University of British Columbia, 1998), 2.
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would probably not be able to dominate the United States in the Pacific on a
long-term basis, foreign policymakers in each state coalesced around the
impetus to proceed disregarding these known admonitions.
The fact that careful calculations as to the capabilities of the originator
state and the target environment were made, many of them accurate, does not
absolve war planners from the folly of their strategy. In fact, the wisdom of
knowing the substantial potential for failure clearly provided little foil against
which to counterbalance the strategic hubris involved in these two particular
cases. Knowing that failure of state objectives was a likely outcome and lacking
the judgment to pursue other policy alternatives formed the inept bedrock of
botched decision-making that allows us to now consider these miscalculated
actions as quintessential foreign-policy blunders, as opposed to simple mistakes
or sound policies that unpredictably failed. In developing a sui generis conceptual
framework of blunders, subsequent analysis will use the preordainment of extant
knowledge as to the high probability of foreign-policy fallacy as an essential tool
in blunder classification.
Those of the “hindsight is 20-20" camp who would characterize utilizing
the predictability factor in defining blunders as normative and/or irresponsibly
counterfactual omit a key factor in its operationalization: many instances of
foreign policy exist in which the primary protagonists fully grasp the high
probability of consequences detrimental to the national interest and pursue the
preponderant course of action in spite of this awareness. Empirical evidence
abounds as to the existence of policymakers consciously formulating and
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subsequently implementing a foreign policy known to have a high probability of
failure, for a variety of reasons, in both democracies and totalitarian regimes
alike. The dissertation seeks out those reasons, but before launching into a quest
to understand why blunders occur, we must first agree upon a rubric for what
blunders consist of. We can characterize the aforementioned awareness of a
high probability of failure in the pursuit of a foreign policy as the first of four
necessary but insufficient conditions of a blunder. The phenomenon of why
policymakers continue policies already proven to fall short of objectives permits
an especially intriguing line of research.
Foreign-policy outcomes therefore define both the extent to which a
foreign policy achieves its objectives and the consequences to the national
interest, as even the most obtuse decisions can result in a favorable outcome,
and even the most prudent decisions can land a state in disastrous
circumstances. To this end, the “hindsight is 20-20” school has quite rightly
instituted the necessity to account for the decision, the outcome, and the relation
between the two. To be classified as a blunder, a foreign-policy decision must
produce an outcome in which both a) the majority of the primary objectives are
never met and b) the action clearly leads to a chain of events that undermine the
national interest as it relates to the policy chosen.
The outcome must be in discordance with the objectives decision-makers
sought, not only those sold to the public (especially in a democracy) or those
commonly or popularly accepted as the policy’s muse. Second, as with the case
of most of the chief protagonists of the Iraq War insisting to this day that it was
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the right decision, we should take neither the rallying cries nor the post facto
public words of policymakers as synonymous with their analysis. Instead, public
justifications for the policy should be used as one of a number of determinants in
qualifying what exactly the objectives of the protagonists were, some of which will
inevitably contradict their own justifying words, a schism sometimes detectable
through psychoanalytic and discursive techniques promoted by the FPA literature
that attempt to split through public rhetoric.
Obstacles to implementation can also come from the home state. For
example, in pursuing the League of Nations, President Woodrow Wilson
presented his case to the world and to his nation that only an international
community of interdependent, pacific states could ensure the peace and
prosperity of every individual state. It took another generation and more than
50,000,000 lives lost for that dream to take one step closer toward becoming a
reality. Whether the ineptitude of the formation of the League of Nations was a
failure or not depends on whom you ask and whether you attribute it to the
president who promoted it or the Congress that prevented it, but it certainly was
not a blunder. Even in some blatant cases of policy failure, such as the U.S.
embargo on Cuba over the last several decades, if we are to assume that regime
change in Havana was the overarching objective, we find the classification of
blunder evasive given the low cost on the part of the home state. Although costs
were incurred in prestige, inter-American relations, and loss from trade, few U.S.
dollars and lives were expended.
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The third necessary but insufficient condition for the classification of a
blunder is therefore substantial cost involved in implementing the policy as well
as the results of the policy. As stated in the previous section, costs can be
divided into political, military, and financial. Political cost refers to political capital
as it relates to a state’s reputation and position in the world. In general terms, for
example, the Vietnam War displayed to the world that the American military,
even when fully applied, could be defeated by a peasantry of insurgents in a
peripheral state, and the Iraq War provoked a strongly negative reaction among
U.S. allies and among most citizens of the region. As mentioned in the previous
section, financial cost can be measured in terms of the financial resources
expended to implement a policy, i.e. the operating cost of sending an army to
invade and occupy a foreign country in the case of military intervention. An
expensive policy can still be cost-effective if it provides access to markets or
other economic opportunities to the state, just as a less expensive policy that
induces limited economic growth can be cost-ineffective.
The fourth necessary but insufficient condition for the classification of a
blunder is predictable fallacy, based on the available alternatives and extant
information at the time of the decision. The mettle and judiciousness of any given
statesman are forged by their ability to select the sagest in a series of inevitably
imperfect alternatives. While it is easy to denounce a decision once it has failed,
it is equally easy to absolve policymakers of any wrongdoing as a result of the
decision having been difficult. In any other profession other than statecraft, be it
corporate, professional sports, or otherwise, leaders are evaluated based on their
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performance, not based on their intent. Far too often in the social sciences we
exculpate leaders from their blunders because we assume that they create
decisions based on a desire to serve the national interest and an exhaustive,
objective examination of the facts. However, this is a dramatic oversimplification
of how leaders behave.
Chapter 3, which offers a model for a way of thinking that precipitates and
exacerbates U.S. foreign policy blunders since the Second World War, contends
that U.S. leaders often stray from the national interest, either because of an
unwitting distorted understanding of it or because of an intentional manipulation
of it. A description of what constitutes the national interest is found in the
methodology chapter. The OPM model and the discussion of the national interest
further address the problem of how to evaluate the selection of alternatives in
FPDM. Let us hope that our elected officials, who ostensibly often resemble the
parsimonious hedgehog rather than the adaptable fox, can be trained from their
own errors with increasing adroitness. Until then, however, we must develop a
variety of approaches for evaluating their decisions and the subsequent
outcomes of those decisions.
The scarcity of literature on FPE and the avoidance and skepticism of its
merits is not an isolated occurrence in the IR literature. Dismissal of practical
scholarship and adherence to paradigmatic zealotry represent a way of thinking
in the social sciences that deviates from its supposed purpose of bettering
society through a more complete understanding of how social processes tend to
work and thus how they can be improved upon through self-reflection and social
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progression. Miles Kahler repined in a 1997 article that "the environment of
postwar professionalization and demand for research from government
consumers virtually eliminated any search for an audience beyond one’s
colleagues and the modern prince and dampened normative inquiry," chastising
a 1953 academic conference which promoted the elitist perspective that “the
primary tasks of the institutes must be to influence the minority that shapes public
opinion." 26 Similarly, Paul H. Nitze rues that "most of what has been written and
taught" on political science since WWII has been "of limited value if not
counterproductive." 27
Ask any realist to defend their austere interpretation of international
relations, and the inevitable refrain echoes, “I do not pretend to suggest that this
is the way it ought to be. I only claim to accurately describe how it is." While this
is indeed a fair description of realist theory, and this dissertation relies heavily
upon many of its assertions, this adulatory capitulation to the indefatigable
confines of reality as it has been absolves the researcher of any obligation to
contribute to society by taking part in it. Furthermore, adherence to nonnormative academic doctrine has not prevented policy practitioners from
incorporating realist philosophy, if there is such a thing, into their political
calculations. Richard Ned Lebow, for example, asserts that, “realism is not just
another arcane academic doctrine,” but rather has been used by American
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Miles Kahler, "Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory After 1945," in
Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theory
(Westview, 1997).
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policymakers of all sorts “to defend their least palatable polices: coups,
bombings, interventions, and support of oppressive dictatorships,” even while
admitting that, "international relations theory is ignored by most policymakers." 28
The perception of academics as sycophants of esoteric circularism has
been painstakingly earned at every juncture over the previous seven decades: a
full 80% of IR literature is paradigmatic, regardless of whether it falls into realism,
liberalism, constructivism, Marxism or other of the 'critical' perspectives. 29 During
the Cold War, dozens of schools and paradigmatic approaches resulted from the
thermonuclear explosion of scholarship that characterized the postwar years.
Parochial terms in academe the laity would never recognize began to blossom.
Behavioralism, neofunctionalism, the English School, game theory and rationalchoice modeling, structuralism and historical materialism, the neorealist
synthesis, phenomenalism, transfactualism; the list of paradigms grew to become
virtually infinite, one theoretical scion sprouting from the other, but one thing
remained constant: they spoke mostly unto themselves. Patrick Thaddeus
Jackson's separation of the mind-world dualism of neopositivism and critical
realism from the mind-world monism of analyticism and reflexivity illustrate the
mind-bending complications involved in IR social-scientific simplification. 30

28 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 16.
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This convoluted parochialism leads many to the conclusion that “the Ivory
Tower exists for a good reason,” but “the separation from the world of decisions
and consequences has gone too far in international relations," in the words of
Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic. The "good reason" they cite is the creation
of knowledge for knowledge's sake, objectively and without bias; the "too far" is
the aloof detachment of that knowledge to practitioners and the laity. As an
alternative, they propose four lines of "policy-relevant research:" general theory,
most commonly appearing in the annals of International Organization, World
Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and American Political Science Review;
empirically focused theoretical analysis, broken further into area studies and
theory-driven empirical puzzles; case-specific analysis; and direct policy analysis
and advice. Noting that few theories of significant value have arisen since the
Cold War, with the notable exception of Democratic Peace Theory, Lepgold and
Nincic echo others in eschewing "deep, often ritualized rivalry among theoretical
schools" in favor of embracing the concept that "relevant scholarship implies no
necessary compromise of professional scholarly standards." 31
To be clear, there must be a 'theory-policy gap.' Without one, honest
scholarship proves impossible as its links to governments, think tanks, corporate
interests, or other interest groups preclude its objectivity. Joseph Nye, invoking
Machiavelli’s remembrance that "it is risky to try to speak truth to power when
you are in the midst of the struggle for power," states simply: "There is much to

31 Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory
and the Issue of Policy Relevance (Columbia University Press, 2001), 4.
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be said for the view that universities are unique institutions, but the imagined
trade-off between corruption and relevance need not be so acute." 32 Stephen
Walt calls this the "rigor-relevance trade-off," cautioning specifically against the
wholesale embrace of rational-choice modeling, noting that, "rational choice
theory has yet to produce a substantial number of important new hypotheses or
well-verified empirical predictions." 33 It seems a fair conclusion that many of the
old paradigmatic debates simply resurface in new formulations, as advocates of
particular schools and viewpoints attempt to attach their approach to the
definition of the term "scientific" as concomitantly as others will believe and
accept. Pedantic didacticism, from this pint of view, consists of the potpourri of
epistemological regionalism that blurs the parameters of the ontological frontiers
we rely upon to formulate a coherent language currency, without which we are
left bankrupt to grasp at straws.
In reality, no approach holds a monopoly on what we define as scientific,
and as with most intellectual inquiries, adding them all up and dividing them by
the number of inputs can reliably produce something as near as possible to the
truth. Many a dissertation has been published on the philosophy of science and
the metatheoretical developments of IR literature, and this is not one of them;
however, this truncated foray into the doctrinaire is required in order to situate the
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research agenda into the IR literature and justify the policy-driven advent of its
accession. Little theory is engaged in this work, although it is relied upon
implicitly; likewise, it intends to inform IR theory by presenting secondary
empirical evidence in the light of original analysis. This omission of course
excludes the argumentation herein, which is described as a model and a theory
in its own right, and constitutes the subject of the subsequent chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Historical Progenitors of Preponderance and the OPM Model
It is better to be alone than in bad company. 34
George Washington

He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does
not become a monster... for when you gaze long into the abyss, the
abyss also gazes into you. 35
Nietzsche

Grand strategy and American preponderance
Since the Second World War, U.S. foreign policy has revolved around an
axis of key assumptions that define and perpetuate American exceptionalism by
way of the entrenchment and proliferation of U.S. power and interests abroad.
The engenderment of U.S. power has unsurprisingly ensconced these
assumptions as the source of that engenderment. If the United States has
continued to dominate the international system, so the thinking goes, then
whatever strategy has been employed during that time must be succeeding.
More surprising, however, has been the myopic impulse to link grand strategy
with the relative position of the United States in the international system with
seeming disregard for the media through which these assumptions might be
most effectively employed. To what extent a great power should exert itself on an
34
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international level remains an open question, and will remain so as long as the
United States can claim the mantle of the preeminent state in the international
system. Indeed, one of the great debates in IR literature is where exactly the
point of utility maximization falls on the isolationism-imperialism spectrum. A
superpower's downfall in overextension can just as easily come about by way of
isolationism, especially in the era of globalization. Given that the United States
appears poised to remain the world's preeminent, if not hegemonic, state for the
foreseeable future, the more compelling question is not whether but how to
employ and deploy American power. 36
This research makes no claim as to the merits or demerits of offensive or
defensive realism, nor does it take serious interest in the debate over how U.S.
power has changed relative to other international powers in the last seven
decades. It accepts that international relations are still largely nested within the
basic realist principles of the zero-sum game and the quest to maximize the utility
function in order to pursue a relatively fixed national interest, and it asserts that
the national interest has been pursued imprudently by U.S. policymakers since
the Second World War due to the continued adherence to the grand strategy of
American preponderance after 1945. The methodological implications of the term
'American preponderance' are detailed in the next chapter, which addresses the
research design. The term is here defined as the grand strategy that assumes a
global scale for the U.S. national interest, considers potential threats anywhere in

36 Robert Wade, “Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the
World Bank, and the IMF,” Politics & Society Vol. 39, No. 3 (September 2011), 347-378.
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the world as potential existential threats to U.S. national security, and attempts to
proliferate American interests, security, and institutions globally so as to
engender U.S. power and prevent the engenderment of potentially hostile
powers. Inherent in the hypotheses of this dissertation is the implication that this
grand strategy negatively affects the national interest, in simplistic terms because
it pursues trouble rather than avoiding it. The term shares much in common with
the grand strategy referred to as American primacy, which focuses primarily on
maintaining the privileged relative power position of the U.S. state in the
international system. "American preponderance" explicitly avoids the problematic
terms "empire" and "hegemony," the former too vague and its literature often too
vitriolic; the latter describing a slightly more aggressive (perhaps imperialistic)
foreign policy than that which American preponderance means to presuppose.
The most intractable foreign-policy outputs tend to be those most
associated with the elements of a state's foreign-policy objectives considered by
foreign policymakers to be most necessary to advance the grand strategy of the
state. A foreign policy assumption, or an element of grand strategy that is taken
as given, therefore holds an inherently fundamental position in the foreign policy
of a state to the extent that it can be defined as a necessity. The unquestionable
assumptions embedded in the FPDM process thus form the conduit of any
desired foreign-policy outcome. In a state as large, powerful, and decentralized
as the United States, these assumptions become even more significant, because
the state's foreign-policy institutions cannot easily be reversed by a sudden
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change in leadership or public opinion. 37 Further compounding the significance of
U.S. foreign-policy assumptions is the phenomenon that many of the paramount
assumptions taken for granted in U.S. foreign policy distinguish it from that of any
other state. The United States can therefore be understood as an exceptional
state to the extent that it considers itself an exceptional state in that a state is
what its citizenry and leaders believe it is, at least to the extent that it is powerful
enough to exert those beliefs on the international system.
The idea of innate American exceptionalism, proliferated throughout the
American zeitgeist since the inception of the U.S. nation-state in the 18th
century, represents a notion common among policymakers and the citizenry
alike. Throughout the centuries, but particularly since the Second World War,
innumerable quotes by statesmen similar to that of Albright's "indispensible
nation" declaration have solidified the concept in the collective American milieu.
Although every state considers itself exceptional in some fashion or another, and
thus justifies its legitimacy to rule over its citizenry and sometimes even the
citizenry of other states, the United States is the only state since the virtual
demise of National Socialism in 1945 to promote its own exceptionalism with
such obstinately pervasive intent. The galvanization of this intent has been
manifested by way of the grand strategy of American preponderance since the
37 The United States is a 'weak state' due to its republican decentralization of power relative to
more authoritarian or otherwise centralized states. Although the executive branch has exerted
itself more forcefully in recent decades, especially in foreign policy, the power of the purse still
resides in the Congress, a branch whose members must answer directly to their local (parochial)
constituencies. For example, Congress regularly forces the military to purchase products and
services it does not want, largely because of the entrenched local interests of the militaryindustrial complex (military bases and hardware-production facilities that benefit local
economies).

56

Second World War. This research contends that American preponderance has
served as the grand-strategic fulcrum around which all other grand-strategic
options have been considered since the Second World War.
We can begin to extrapolate the key facets of this particular grand strategy
by defining it in terms of the definition of grand strategy itself, which some have
disambiguated to the point of arguing that no grand strategy exists in the United
States, if in any state at all. This research assumes that an identifiable grand
strategy exists in every prominent state, and takes the commonly utilized
definition of the term put forth by Barry Posen: "A political-military, means-end
chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.” 38 This
security can be military or economic, material or ideational, but is always related
to the perception of the citizenry that its material interests and ideational
ambitions are being pursued by their leaders in concert with the national interest
(a citizen must feel secure in order to achieve security, a feeling pervasively
mercurial in the heart and mind of the modern American). Christopher Layne
provides a slightly more detailed definition, defining it as "a three-step process:
determining a state's vital security interests; identifying the threats to those
interests; and deciding how best to employ the state's political, military, and
economic resources to protect those interests." 39
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A third definition by John Lewis Gaddis envisions "the process by which a
state relates long-term strategic ends to means under the rubric of an
overarching and enduring vision to advance the national interest."

40

Distinguishing between the prewar origins of American preponderance and its
postwar evolution permits an understanding of the ideational motivations for its
ossification in American political-military doctrine during the Second World War
and its perpetuation through the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the Fall of the
Berlin Wall, and the post-9/11 world. Each of these landmarks signifies the
beginning of an era in which U.S. foreign policymakers might have pulled back
from a hyper-vigilant foreign policy, but instead decided to remain entrenched in
its monistically preponderant commitments and ambitions overseas.

The origins and evolution of American preponderance
The territory and idea of America and what it means to be American has
been proliferating since long before the forces of human civilization managed to
combine the two into a nation-state. From their outset, the American colonies had
no choice but to expand into the frontier in search of land to conquer and
resources to exploit if they aspired to establish a foothold on the North American
continent. This instilled a spirit of expansionism into the American soul by linking
survival with territorial and material enlargement. This phenomenon strengthened
rather than withered as the eventual United States prospered and defended its

40 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro et. al., The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the
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national claim against the theretofore-impenetrable British Empire. Between the
Civil War and the First World War, U.S. grand strategy evolved and shifted
between differing objectives and various levels of intervention in foreign affairs.
Constituencies began to emerge in the Democratic and Republican bases,
separated initially between northeastern manufacturers that favored selective
interventionism in the periphery to protect markets, primarily represented by
Republicans, and southern farmers who traded with core countries and were
disinterested in expansionism, primarily represented by Democrats. While late
18th century Democrats did not pursue expansionism to the same extent as their
Republican counterparts, they did not oppose it enough to provide a sufficient
political fissure that would have precluded it. 41 In the last three decades of the
19th century, even as domestic territorial and industrial expansion took place an
at unprecedented rate, the state began consolidating its bureaucratic institutions
for expansion abroad. The civil services, Foreign Service, and military were all
professionalized and strengthened. While Europeans carved up colonies in Africa
and Asia, America participated to a degree but was reluctant to take such an
exuberant role in colonial plunder, an American-European discrepancy that
would cause tensions between the allies during both World Wars (as well as
within American identity itself). ‘Imperial isolationism’ balanced against ‘collective
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internationalism’ in American politics, and ultimately melded into a continual tugof-war between expansionism and isolationism. 42
Attempting to corral both the impulse to expand abroad and the reluctance
to become mired in the troubles of the world, the United States at the turn of the
20th century developed what has been described as ‘reticent expansionism,’ by
which the nation would delve into foreign entanglements and markets
discriminately and wherever an opportunity seemed politically and economically
viable. 43 As material expansion moved westward and ultimately overseas,
ideological expansion inevitably accompanied it, most demonstrably in the
conceptualization of “Manifest Destiny.” This idea, perhaps the most defining of
late 19th century America, planted the seeds of global expansionism in the
American mind: “It meant expansion, prearranged by Heaven, over an area not
clearly

defined,”

and

consolidated

previously

disparate

ideological

predispositions into an enlarging America, advocated to some degree by every
early prominent American leader by nature of the frontier borders of the country,
into a neatly packaged justification to proliferate the nation and thus the state. 44
Still in the lull of a relatively isolationist stance in the interwar period after
an (albeit successful) intervention in Europe that many Americans nonetheless
came to regret, the American public was unwittingly stirred into a global conflict
42 Charles Beard, The Rise of American Civilization: America in Midpassage, vol. 3 (New York:
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once again with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The ‘sleeping giant’ that
awoke on December 7, 1941 has yet to go back to sleep. A relatively small and
outdated standing army was hurriedly whipped into service and enlarged,
accompanied by an immediate and truly transformative astronomical increase in
industrial military hardware production. As a result of the unprecedented rise of
American power overseas in the destruction and subsequent occupation of
Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, US leaders decided that the need to remain
in fixed positions abroad to preclude another foreign attack was paramount,
especially in order to counterbalance against the Soviet Union’s impending rival
expansion.
While the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Second World War more broadly
provided the catalyst for militarization and the formation of a global defense
system, the threat from wartime ally Soviet Union cemented the need to employ
a more active role in international politics. According to Melvyn Leffler, postwar
planning “always presupposed American hegemony over the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans,” and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that “the further
away from our own vital areas we can hold our enemy through the possession of
advanced bases,” the greater the opportunity to prevent it from violating
American sovereignty. 45 Leffler further explicates that the standard postwar
attitude among U.S. foreign policymakers was one in which "given their country's
overwhelming power, they now expected to refashion the world in America's
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image and create the American century." 46 The roots of American preponderance
began to bear trunks.
By the time the United States entered hostilities in earnest in the aftermath
of the attack at Pearl Harbor, the historical, political, ideational, economic,
bureaucratic, institutional, interest-group, and military-industrial seeds of
American preponderance had been sufficiently sewn so as to permit the
flourishing of an American superpower. Though ideology, “much like imperialism
and liberalism, other protean concepts frequently bandied about in serious
historical and political discourse, is hard to pin down,” it is nevertheless too
important to be ignored; the same must be said of culture, a distinct concept with
some similar traits. 47 One ambitious attempt at literary conglomeration of the
panoply of discordant factors colluding to formulate the overarching objective of
American preponderance takes form in Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in
America. 48 This sociological approach to Americanness and Americanism pieces
together causes and consequences of what Hartz describes as an American
faith, a liberal tradition so ingrained that it formed “one of the most powerful
absolutisms in the world.” According to Hartz, the “American way” consolidated a
political homogeneity that led to “a messianism in the traditional American
liberal,” depicting foreign cultures as apostasy and consistently begging for
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Americanization: “Americanism, when it does not retreat, goes abroad.” The
United States, “governed by an irrational Lockianism,” alienates outsiders and
non-conformists so much as to “transform eccentricity into sin.” Tocqueville
likewise observed that “the main value of political democracy is that it generates
restless activity and superabundant energy in society and thereby makes it more
prosperous.” 49 This “superabundant energy” can perhaps become problematic
when applied internationally to an anarchical environment. Exuberance in oneself
carries with it an inherent impulse to project it onto others so that they also may
revel in that zealous rapture.
The significance of Hartz’s book rests within its description of a distinct
Americanism that interacts with trepidation and often hostility with contending
ways of life. His discussion of an American absolutism, based though it may be
on liberal principles, segues into other works that have taken the baton in a
different direction. If there is a ‘liberal tradition’ or ‘liberal absolutism’ in America,
what Ikenberry describes as a 'liberal Leviathan,' one of the media for carrying
that tradition through differing historical circumstances, popular preferences, and
presidential and Congressional regimes inevitably becomes ideology, the everfungible most common denominator in the construction of the national self-image
and the institutional preferences through which that image is advanced in foreign
affairs. Although many consider the 'national interest' the most fungible variable
in delineating foreign policy, opportunities to mold the perception of what

49 Tocqueville is being paraphrased here by Jon Elster in Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 24.

63

constitutes the national interest abound, especially in a nation with a gargantuan
international presence, and that malleability is where ideology takes flight, as
evasive as its measurability may be. Christopher Layne argues that ideology
creates an aggressive U.S. foreign policy more than any other factor, dictating an
inward-outward imposition of American will internationally rather than waiting to
respond to events as they form and affect the national interest, quoting officials
such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who believed that the country could only
be safe “to the extent that its total environment is safe.” But rather than
expediting American security and prosperity, this ideology actually invites danger.
In Layne's words, “Each new defensive perimeter is menaced by turmoil on the
other side of the line.” 50

The change-continuity debate and grand strategy in the postwar years
Two overarching questions on U.S. grand strategy have lingered among
scholars since 1945. First, did the United States build the postwar order on
standard national-interest grounds or ideational liberal grounds? And second, to
what extent has U.S. grand strategy shifted and evolved in response to the global
environment between 1945 and the present day? The answer to the former is
both, and the answer to the latter is very little. Even if the United States indeed
erred on the side of isolationism up until 1941, it abandoned that prescription for
foreign-policy ailment almost entirely after the Second World War. And even if

50 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present
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that event did permanently transform U.S. foreign policy in a substantially more
outward trajectory, it nonetheless did so with all the trappings of preponderance
having been already extant in the solipsistic American identity, if mostly in a
dormant sense, for at least a century. Regardless, what emerged in 1945 was a
nation eager to exert its power on a scale never before seen in history; that is to
say, a truly global scale. Although more has been written about U.S. foreign
policy than any other topic in the history of IR literature, the postwar consensus
of the grand strategy of preponderance has remained relatively consistent
throughout the previous seven decades. The debate over U.S. grand strategy
has therefore devolved into the particularities of that settlement (when and under
what circumstances policy tools such as 'regime change' should be pursued,
rather than if) and whether the United States built the postwar order on standard
national-interest grounds or ideational liberal grounds. In some ways, both
arguments descend to semantics. Fortunately, IR scholarship excels in that
endeavor.
John Ikenberry propounds the viewpoint that although the United States of
course never drifted too far away from its national interests when constructing the
postwar liberal order, it indeed built that order on the liberal principles of
democracy, free markets, and adherence to international laws, rules, and norms
that protected the weak and legitimized the strong. Citing enduring features of
American political culture that provided a foundation for the multilateral liberal
world order, such as a universalist creed, a strong belief in institutions and the
rule of law, the multiculturalism of American society, and a nationalism built upon
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civic rather than ethnic foundations, Ikenberry envisions a United States that got
less than it bargained for and offered more leadership than it wanted in the
postwar years. 51 Having done so, it still managed to successfully employ both
Containment policy and the creation of a "democratic club" that alienated
outsiders and provided incentives to its members. 52 Ikenberry recognizes that the
Cold War reinforced the solidarity of the Western world order, but denies that it
was entirely dependent on it. The United States simply offered inclusion into its
'club' of security alliances, open markets, multilateral institutions, capitalism, and
democracy, and in exchange for relinquishing dominance to the United States
other powers gained access, partnerships, and legitimacy. As such, the Fall of
the Berlin Wall did little to change that international institutional bargain, and the
post-Cold War global environment should therefore have been just as receptive
to the liberal hegemon as it had been for the previous five decades.
Those with a more critical perspective on the postwar order, such as
David Skidmore, offer a contending train of thought that accepts many of the
pretenses of Ikenberry's analysis but takes issue with "the depth of America's
postwar commitment to multilateralism, the role that the Cold War and its passing
played in shaping U.S. attitudes toward international institutions, and the sources
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and prospects for America's recent unilateralist turn."

53

Some observers,

including Ikenberry, link the "unilateralist turn" of the Bush Administration to the
neoconservative progenitors of the Bush Doctrine, calling it a "radical" shift away
from the traditional constraints of the multilateral postwar order, eventually
heralding "the end of the neoconservative movement" when the Iraq War
descended into chaos in 2004. 54 Timothy Lynch and Robert Singh, in defending
the Bush Doctrine, present it as in line with decades of U.S. foreign policy rather
than a momentary aberration in it. 55
In contrast to Ikenberry, Skidmore contends that without the strategic
necessities of the Cold War, the 'institutional bargain' that held the postwar order
together evaporated, leaving the United States "less willing to provide collective
goods through strong international institutions" and other states "less likely to
defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal
multilateral constraints." 56 Bruce Cronin summarizes the inherent paradox of
balancing the national interest with facilitating global order: "The leading state
serves to insure systemic stability by creating universal rules and institutions and
by providing collective goods. Yet, the hegemon is also concerned with its
narrower, self-regarding interests that may require the exercise of power outside
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of multilateral constraints." 57 Joseph Nye envisions this paradox as the existential
manifestation of the stalemate occurring when a hegemon is too powerful to be
challenged by others, yet not powerful enough to achieve its objectives alone. 58
Others focus on the extent to which unilateralism has shifted over the
course of subsequent administrations in the latter years of the Cold War and the
years following its end. Robert Kagan, for example, describes changes in the
overall balance of power to explain the rift in the lead-up to the Iraq War between
the United States and Europe. 59 Alternatively, Samuel Huntington highlights
unilateralist tendencies in the Clinton Administration. 60 David Lake likewise
argues that U.S. policymakers have never given more than modest weight to
European dissent. 61 While these arguments are relevant, they address the
particularities of U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, rather than the nature of
U.S. foreign relations more broadly. Regardless of what aspect of U.S. diplomatic
history one might wish to focus on, Arthur Schlesinger reminds us that "there is
no older American tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs than unilateralism." 62
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Curiously, he invokes Ikenberry in questioning why this is the case, given that
most Americans remain multilateralist about many individual foreign-policy
preferences. This discrepancy becomes somewhat less curious when we
acknowledge that there are many catchall policies the public tends to disagree
with despite agreeing with many of the tenets found within them, as is the case
with, for example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. 63
Those who associate U.S. hegemony during and after the Cold War with
the more liberal tenets of its reign, rather than more self-interested ambitions,
tend to portray the Cold War and its aftermath as a relatively peaceful struggle
that eventually triumphed in Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," or final
enshrinement of liberal democratic capitalism as the only accepted form of
governance. However, this imagination of the postwar liberal order, partly based
on the decrease in direct militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between great
powers (there were virtually none) ignores a gigantic thorn in the side of that
order: it witnessed "the greatest accumulation of armaments the world has ever
known, a whole series of prolonged and devastating limited wars, an abundance
of revolutionary, ethnic, religious, and civil violence, as well as some of the
deepest and most intractable ideological rivalries in human experience," in the
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words of John Lewis Gaddis. 64
The "stability of the bipolar world" Kenneth Waltz referenced was anything
but stable for citizens of the developing world, caught between the forces of
Communism, capitalism, and neutrality, none of which guaranteed safety or
precluded meddling from one side or the other. 65 For the "empire of liberty," as
Odd Arne Westad termed the United States (in the tradition of Thomas
Jefferson), the Cold War was part of a continuity stretching from George
Washington to George W. Bush: "From its inception the United States was an
interventionist power that based its foreign policy on territorial expansion." 66 It
was only logical therefore that it do everything within its power to withstand its
bipolar competitor by any and all means necessary. Gaddis, in contrast,
characterizes the Cold War as a one-off for international relations from which
little can be gleaned in the larger picture. This contention mirrors the contention
between Ikenberry and those of his ilk and Skidmore and those of his. The case
for continuity is more compelling. Robert Litwak juxtaposes the Cold War policy
of Containment with the containment of 'rogue states' such as Iran, Iraq, North
Korea, and Libya after the Cold War, further highlighting the transcendence of
U.S. foreign policy through major historical landmarks in international relations
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that might have otherwise offered the chance to reexamine the status quo. 67 This
is but one example; one could also point to military spending, interventions, the
expansion of NATO, and the Iraq War, among other policies, that signify
continuity since 1945 rather than evolution.
Jack

Snyder

examines

realist,

cognitive,

and

domestic-political

explanations for why the United States charted the course of preponderance in
the postwar years even when it often seemed contrary to the national interest.
Although realism is wary of foreign entanglements, in large part due to the
balancing blowback that often forms a counterweight to aggressive foreign
ventures, some see expansionism as producing more fecundity than tribulation.
However, the author rightly points out that expansion invariably encounters
diminishing returns at some unidentified point, as neutrals and/or foes balance
against expansion and administrative costs of conquered territories and peoples
rise. In the cognitive explanation, policymakers codify expansionist maxims that
transcend disconfirming experiences, and in the domestic-political explanation
expansionism harms the overall national interest while benefitting certain
segments of the political economy that exercise influence over Congress and the
presidency. Snyder proposes an alternative explanation that spins off of the
domestic-political approach, whereby "logrolling" or backscratching by interest
groups coalesces around an expansionist policy as a compromise whose
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benefits outweigh its costs for particular constituencies. 68 His approach falls
within the purview of the body of literature that conceives of the national interest
as malleable rather than fixed.
While the true motivations for a state's behavior can never be known with
absolute precision, the United States has been remarkably consistent in its
reservation of the right (or perhaps the privilege) to intervene anywhere in the
world it perceives its interests to be at stake. The development that tips the
balance toward the perspective that preponderance drives U.S. foreign policy
first, engaging in veritable liberal foreign relations only selectively, is the simple
fact that it has never capitalized on its favorable position at particular moments
(at the end of the Cold War, for example) to facilitate a truly liberal world order in
which it behaves only as the protagonist and never as the antagonist. At every
watershed moment, U.S. leaders have instead redoubled efforts to assert
Americanism to a further extent than ever before. As early as 1944, decisions
were made that welcomed the oncoming Cold War by characterizing the Soviets
as dangerous aggressors (which they quite well may have been); after the Cold
War the decision was made to enlarge NATO rather than incorporate a fractured
Russia; after 9/11 the Bush Administration aggressively pursued unilateralism in
its prosecution of the war against terrorism and the Iraq War. At every critical
historical juncture since 1945, the vantage point of U.S. leaders has been to
consolidate and expand relative power, rather than solicit cooperation from

68

Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1991).

72

potential adversaries. The irony of this perspective is that the United States has
done so via the imposition of a quintessentially liberal world order. The 'arsenal of
democracy' lives up to its name.

Preponderance after the Cold War
The end of the Cold War presented the United States with an
embarrassment of riches and a corresponding question of impending
significance: given that it had successfully emerged from the bipolar world as the
sole superpower in the international system, what position should it now take with
regard to the former Soviet Union and other powerful states? What do you do in
international relations when you have achieved global dominance? Continue on
with business as usual? Or capitalize on the 'unipolar moment' to inculcate global
beneficence and establish a lasting liberal order once and for all? In keeping with
its time-honored traditions, the United States did both. In a sense, this was the
same question the nation asked itself at the triumphant conclusion of the Second
World War (the notable difference being the imminent threat of Communism and
the expanding sphere of influence of the Soviet Union). The answer to that
question was as unambiguous as it was consistent with postwar grand strategy:
continue to do what works. Even foreign policies that end in failure are usually
justified by their progenitors, and those that end in success render the policies
that supposedly ushered in that success even more immutable than they would
otherwise be given the gravitational persistence of institutional resistance to
vicissitude.
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In 1990, Charles Krauthammer characterized the new balance of power
with the Soviet Union flailing thusly: "The immediate post-Cold War world is not
multipolar. It is unipolar," as "the center of world power is the unchallenged
superpower, attended by its Western allies." 69 He argued for an international
activism to exploit the unique opportunity, labeling neoliberal institutionalists
"utopian" and conservative isolationists "naive." 70 Paul Kennedy described this
'unipolar moment' as unique in all of history: "Nothing has ever existed like this
disparity of power." 71 Despite that exaltation, he warned that this unprecedented
power did not render imperial overstretch innocuous, as well as questioning
whether that power discrepancy in fact represented a new unipolar world. 72
Somewhat curiously, some of the same scholars rejoicing in the enormous
resource endowment of the United States have also been those cautioning
against arriving at the assumption that this either gives that power free will in the
international system or that this endowment will last forever. Leffler, for example,
describes American power in 1945 as totally unrivaled in history: "At the end of
the war the United States had two-thirds of the world's gold reserves and threefourths of its invested capital. More than half of the entire world's manufacturing
capacity was located in the United States, and the nation was turning out more
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than a third of all goods produced around the world. It owned half of the world's
supply of shipping and was the world's largest exporter of goods and services.
The gross national product of the United States was three times Soviet Russia's
and more than five times Great Britain's." 73 His argument is nonetheless one of
prudence.
With this newly disproportionate share of world power, what were the ideal
grand-strategic preferences of the leader of the 'new world order?' John Kohout
consolidates grand strategy options at the end of the Cold War into three general
categories: noninterventionism, unipolarism (that most closely related to
preponderance in his typology) and multilateralism, conceptualizing each in
terms of "the international system, characterization of security interests,
evaluation of strategic assets, and specification of a strategic approach." 74 On a
more time-expansive level, Paul Miller delineates five enduring "pillars" of U.S.
grand strategy dating back to the early 20th century: “Defending the American
homeland from attack, maintaining a favorable balance of power among the great
powers, punishing rogue actors, and investing in good governance and allied
capabilities abroad,” in addition to pursuing the democratic peace through
economic interdependence and concomitant alienation of nondemocratic
states. 75 Miller attributes several foreign-policy errors, such as the Vietnam War,
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alliances with dictatorships in developing countries, and failing to understand the
jihadist threat to ignorance of most issues other than those dealing with greatpower politics and the overall balance of power. This attribution is particularly
relevant to the case studies.
As we will see in later chapters, this overreliance on the balance of power
leaves the United States vulnerable to 'hot' threats as U.S. leaders choose
instead to focus on 'cold' threats. Max Boot, for example, has documented the
rise of American power in conjunction with U.S. participation in small peripheral
wars and questioned why the U.S. military continues to place overwhelming
concentration on high-intensity conflicts, even after experiences in Bosnia,
Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 76 Miller's work singles out
three principle threats to U.S. grand strategy: autocratic states, failed states and
the rogue occupiers operating in their space, and what David Kilcullen terms the
"global Islamist insurgency." 77
Although U.S. foreign policymakers do pay some attention to these
threats, the United States often employs the same tools against them that were
designed to fight interstate conflicts, as U.S. foreign policymaking institutions
never fully evolved beyond the Cold War or, for that matter, the Second World
War. On the one hand, great-power politics remain a threat to U.S. interests in
the form of a resurgent (in ambition, if not in capabilities) Russia, a rising (in both
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ambition and capabilities) China, and the emergence of domestically oriented
populism. On the other hand, the 'hot' wars the U.S. is now fighting, primarily the
war against Islamist fundamentalism, can take little from the policies and
institutions oriented toward addressing issues of great-power politics. The
discrepancy between the strategies and tools needed to address great-power
politics and those required to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental
degradation, and other non-traditional security problems continues to present
challenges to foreign policymakers. The Iraq War is the prime example of
erroneously responding to a low-intensity nonstate security problem via statestate conflict.
Posen offers the following typology, as shown in Table 1: 78

Table 1: Competing visions of grand strategy
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Posen has characterized U.S. grand strategy since the Cold War as "Liberal
Hegemony," chiding it as "unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful"
in lamenting that "the United States has grown incapable of moderating its
ambitions in international politics," proposing instead the alternative that he terms
"a grand strategy of restraint." He explains what led to settling upon this form of
'Liberal Hegemony:'
Four factors helped make Liberal Hegemony the victor. First, with
the collapse of Soviet power the United States became the most
capable global power in history. Nothing stood in the way. Second,
the Western liberal model was triumphant. History vindicated the
rightness of our system and made it in our eyes the appropriate
model for others. Third, the Cold War ended with U.S. forces
“manning the ramparts” around the world. Insecurity and disorder
beyond the ramparts quickly created demands from within and
without to move them outward. Fourth, the United States had built
giant organizations to wage the Cold War and squadrons of
national security experts to manage them. Most organization
theorists will tell you that organizations never want to go out of
business; if they succeed at their first task, they will try to find
another. For these reasons, a more rather than a less ambitious
strategy emerged after the Cold War, even before the September
11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States, which supercharged
the whole effort. 79
Posen's description of U.S. national security expanding to a global scale,
"Insecurity and disorder beyond the ramparts quickly created demands from
within and without to move them outward," closely resembles that of Layne's,
“Each new defensive perimeter is menaced by turmoil on the other side of the
line," whereby the national-security boundaries of the state are expanded beyond
79 Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press,
2014), xii.
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the state itself. In promoting his grand strategy of "Restraint," Posen offers a
thorough

case

against

the

status

quo

of

'Liberal

Hegemony.'

This

characterization embodies a substantial subsection of U.S. grand-strategy
scholarship that varies in terminology but finds concordance in substance. In true
academic fashion, this terminology differs according to the author, and use of the
term 'preponderance,' though displaying conceptual overlap with grand-strategic
terms such as 'primacy' as it does with many others, is nonetheless nontrivial.
The

following

chapter

further

disambiguates

'preponderance,'

'primacy,'

'hegemony,' and other similar terms, but here the concept is introduced in
relation to the established context.
Leffler was the first scholar to explore the idea of a U.S. grand strategy of
'preponderance' in his 1992 book, A Preponderance of Power: National Security,
The Truman Administration, and The Cold War. His exhaustive survey of postwar
declassified internal government documents illustrates in great detail the grandstrategic thinking of U.S. foreign policymakers in the early years of the Cold War.
It was Paul Nitze, a high-level foreign-policy official who served in various
capacities under multiple administrations that declared: "To seek less than
preponderant power would be to opt for defeat." This quote is the ancestral
provenance of the term. Nitze's absolute view on total global victory was mirrored
by his unambiguous view on the Soviet threat. In a speech in Milwaukee he
stated simply: "By the Spring of 1947 all but the most blind could see what the
Russians were up to and that the policy of attempting to continue into the
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postwar world the wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union was bankrupt." 80
Robert Worley compares preponderance with primacy, contrasting the two
similar means-oriented approaches with the strict intention-oriented balance-ofpower Containment approach, which ceded more territory to the enemy and
aligned more with defensive realism than offensive realism. 81 Leffler describes
what the word "preponderance" meant to postwar strategic planners:

Preponderance did not mean domination. It meant creating a world
environment hospitable to U.S. interests and values; it meant
developing the capabilities to overcome threats and challenges; it
meant mobilizing the strength to reduce Soviet influence on its own
periphery; it meant undermining the appeal of communism; it meant
fashioning the institutional techniques and mechanisms to manage
the free world; and it meant establishing a configuration of power
and a military posture so that if war erupted, the United States
would prevail. If adversaries saw the handwriting on the wall, they
would defer to American wishes. 82

Leffler largely looks favorably upon the 'Wise Men' that built postwar grand
strategy, but does chastise them for overemphasizing the importance of the
periphery in the emerging bipolar world. 83 Given that the Cold War's "long peace"
among the great powers collaterally littered the developing world with widespread
violence and civil disarray as the two superpowers hashed it out for control of the
80
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hinterlands, this rebuke seems fitting. 84 In "From Preponderance to Offshore
Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," Layne further investigates the
grand strategy of preponderance, echoing others in illustrating the lack of policy
change at the end of the Cold War: "The Soviet Union's collapse transformed the
international system dramatically, but there has been no corresponding change
in U.S. grand strategy." He explicates the exegesis of the grand strategy of
preponderance:

The United States has pursued the same grand strategy,
preponderance, since the late 1940s. The key elements of this
strategy are creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order
based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power,
and on American values; maximization of U.S. control over the
international system by preventing the emergence of rival great
powers in Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic
interdependence as a vital U.S. security interest. The logic of the
strategy is that interdependence is the paramount interest the
strategy promotes; instability is the threat to interdependence; and
extended deterrence is the means by which the strategy deals with
this threat. 85

Layne, borrowing from Leffler, argues convincingly that this is the most accurate
way to consolidate decades of polysemic U.S. grand strategy into one definitive
term. His verbiage is more explicit and comprehensive than Leffler's because his
research is more ambitious with specific respect to the term "preponderance:"
Layne's central purpose is discerning the particularities of modern U.S. grand
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strategy, while Leffler's approach is more ecumenical in nature. Layne
subsequently propounds his theory of "Extraregional Hegemony," by which the
United States pursues hegemony in Europe, Asia, and the Persian Gulf,
attempting to dominate each of these regions for ideological (rather than
objective-security) motivations. 86
Within the broader literature on U.S. preponderance, his characterization
of U.S. grand strategy uses neoclassical realism as a point of departure but
describes it as more expansive than John J. Mearsheimer's, which sees the
United States as hegemonic only in the Western Hemisphere; more intentional
than Posen's, which sees it as somewhat ephemeral; and ideologically motivated
by the 'Open Door' tradition rather than being structurally determined or given by
default objective-realist parameters. The definition of "preponderance" given
earlier in the chapter, while borrowing heavily from Layne and Leffler, specifies a
sui generis meaning, given the distinct research agenda of this dissertation and
its evolution of the term beyond what others have described. This meaning is
further specified in the following chapter on methodology.
Layne also acknowledges the successes of U.S. grand strategy,
continuing as it has to dominate the international system up to the present day,
as well as recognizing that there is little reason to believe any other great power
would behave differently under the same conditions. 87 Indeed, this dissertation,
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while arguing for the existence of both imagined and real exceptionalism in U.S.
foreign relations, makes no counterfactual claim as to the preclusion or
inevitability of how a state with a different culture might behave under similar
conditions (as mentioned, it does argue that U.S. foreign relations are
ideationally and culturally determined to a large degree). Rather than focusing on
the failure of grand strategy since 1945 (which on the whole would be a
precarious assertion), Layne's argument rests on the notion that preponderance
is unsustainable.
While this dissertation embraces the unsustainability argument, it further
argues that the United States has enjoyed preeminence since 1945 in spite of its
more ambitious foreign policies, rather than because of them. The failure of the
two case studies, two of the most ambitious foreign policies in modern history,
brings this contention to the fore. In light of the success of the U.S. state on the
whole since 1945, whether measured by demographics, GDP, or international
appeal, it would be overly simplistic to characterize U.S. grand strategy since
1945 as a failure, even while many of the most ambitious foreign entanglements
have been. For in spite of the fact that the Chinese economy is steadily creeping
up to the size of the American economy, the refrain "Someday I want to be an
American" still rings truer to the aspiring developing-country emigrant than that of
"Someday I want to be Chinese." The subsequent chapters seek to gain
purchase on why the most prominent U.S. foreign policies keep failing, even
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while the U.S. state flourishes. In the words of Richard Haas: "Given its
considerable

endowments

underperforming."
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preponderance and the individual failed policies examined in the case studies is
the central interchange of the dissertation.
The dissertation thus largely evades the Marxist and historical-materialist
literature that predicts the demise of the 'American Empire' and assumes that
'elites' have somehow hijacked the national interest to serve the material
interests of the 'transnational capitalist class.' This is not the case: the ideational
impulses described herein are not 'elite'-driven, but rather inherent in the selfimage of the American and thus the self-image of the American state. Some
have attempted to compare or differentiate the dominance the United States
wielded after the Second World War and after the Cold War to historical empires,
previous pursuits of hegemony, imperialism, or prior world orders such as the
Pax Britannica. Use of the term 'imperialism,' a somewhat subjective concept that
tends to fall into too-often-normative literature that aims to label U.S. foreign
policy as imperial in order to subsequently brand it immoral, provides some use
here in terms of empirical research but little in the way of conclusions. For
example, Kelly Denton-Borhaug examines in U.S. War-Culture, Sacrifice, and
Salvation the "ineradicable link between sacrifice and war culture solidified in the
rise of the nation state:"

88 Richard Haas, Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order
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Such a definition of religion connects with the thinking not only of
ancient poets and statesmen (Juvenal wrote, 'Now we suffer the
evils of a long peace. Luxury hatches terrors worse than wars'), but
also modern philosophers and social scientists who have proposed
that war is a positive way to maintain national health and communal
purpose. Thus, Hegel: 'War has the higher meaning that through
it... the ethical health of nations is maintained.' Likewise, Max
Weber proposed that caritas and true loyalty to the nation-state
requires the shedding of blood as a seal of the sanctity of this
relationship. The death of the warrior achieves a 'consecrated
meaning,' and confers dignity upon the coercive power of the state.
The murky, yet deep-seated ties between war and religion are
strong, enduring and as a result, largely invisible and outside the
awareness of many, perhaps even most people. 89

The author investigates the nexus between the adoration of military service,
sacrifice, and leadership and the development of national identity, a nexus
perhaps more evident in the United States than any other industrialized nation on
Earth—indeed, it is a common complaint among today's military members that
civilians blindly "support the troops" while evading the responsibility to truly
understand what it means to serve, as well as that of taking the time to learn
about foreign policy in such a way as to vote with the balance of informed
opinion.
American militarism is not only a perception but an empirical reality:
Richard Ned Lebow notes that the United States has been the most aggressive
state since 1945 when measured by war initiation. 90 The subject of the ideational
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discordance between the civilian's perception of American militarism and the
soldier's experience in war has received increasing attention in the years since
9/11, an era which has included America's longest-ever war in Afghanistan, a
seemingly

endless

war

in

the

war

against

terrorism,

and

the

full

professionalization of an active-duty military for the first time in American
history—no draft now tempers the war enthusiasm of the civilian population
absolved from the hardships of deployment. The civilian-soldier experienceperception gap is compounded by the lack of politicians with a personal stake in
the wars in which the nation is now engaged. At the height of the Iraq War, for
example, there were a grand total of two children of U.S. Senators and House
Representatives serving as enlisted soldiers. 91
While the total amount of soldiers to have served in the wars since 9/11
now numbers in the millions, the vast majority of Americans do not serve. This
leaves civilians and Congressmen unable to conceive of the wars they
perpetuate in real terms, relegated instead to imagining the war on terrorism and
other conflicts in purely abstract terms. Retired Lieutenant Colonel William Astore
describes what remains as "'Support our troops' as a substitute for thought," an
oft-embraced characterization of the desultory nature of civilian understanding of
war's purpose and drudgery in military literature. 92 Astore attributes never-ending
war as the "new normal" to this phenomenon, along with "defining the world as a
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global battlefield," "threat inflation," and "the embrace of the national-security
state by both major parties," all themes the case studies examine in detail. While
the voice of the war-weary colonel or general (usually retired) has found
increasing attention in scholarly and popular literature since 9/11, it also
represents a rift in civil-military relations that dates back decades. In spite of the
common perception that military leaders constantly push civilian leaders into war,
quite the opposite is often the case, given that those who have experienced war
understand its complexities and tragedies far better than the ordinary civilian or
politician. Indeed, the story of Colin Powell's purpose in the Bush Administration,
as well as the rift within the military over how many troops to send into Iraq,
transcend this perception gap. Common sense did not prevail in 2003 because
military and intelligence leaders were politicized, in contrast to their respective
stated purposes as institutions.
While the model presented in this chapter indeed recognizes significant
cultural influences as determining factors in the establishment of preponderance
as the prevailing grand strategy alternative since 1945, it also concedes that
culture cannot be measured in totality, but only in its particular recognizable
manifestations as they codetermine national identity, national purpose, and thus
grand-strategic preferences, along with many other factors. While the imperialist
literature is not without some use, the more compelling arguments have been
those that accept the unique traits of the American self-image and position in the
world while acknowledging their similarities with the behavior of other great
powers. For even if the voices of Kennedy, Krauthammer, and Schlesinger are
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correct in assessing that U.S. postwar power, especially after the demise of the
Soviet Union, was at least for a time unrivaled in history, so too are the voices
(Kennedy still among them) that warn against assuming that such power can last
forever. Layne's premise for shifting from preponderance to his preferred grand
strategy of offshore balancing rests partially upon the impending decline in U.S.
share of relative world GDP. Even those who are not 'declinists' must agree that
share will diminish, if not relinquish preeminence, at some indefinite time in this
century. And while there is no perfect consensus on the particularities of exactly
how U.S. power has been deployed since 1945, the historical record and
scholarly literature placing U.S. grand strategy in the sphere of preponderance is
undeniable.

The enduring American paradox
At the precipice of the American encounter with the world is an enduring
paradox.

William Appleman Williams wrote in 1959, that "America's

humanitarian urge to assist other people is undercut—perhaps even subverted—
by the way it goes about helping them." 93 Williams described the 'Open Door'
theme in the history of U.S. foreign relations as "America's version of the liberal
policy of informal empire or free-trade imperialism." 94 Part of his argument lay in
the fact that Secretary of State John Hay's 'Open Door Notes' demanded free
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access to China among the great powers just as the American frontier began to
run out of room, providing fodder for the contention that the American way of life
is codependent on expansion. According to the official history of the State
Department, this "became the official U.S. policy toward the Far East in the first
half of the 20th century." 95 What Williams termed "imperial anticolonialism" was
later expounded by Gaddis, who describes "the gap Americans had allowed to
develop between aspirations and accomplishments. We had preached selfdetermination but objected when others sought to practice it; we had proclaimed
the virtues of economic freedom even as we sought to impose economic
control." 96 In the same essay, Gaddis also notes that "few historians would deny,
today, that the United States did expect to dominate the international scene after
World War II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear
and present antagonist." 97 It likewise had no intention of capitulating that
dominance when the Berlin Wall fell and it still has yet to do so.
Although cultural characteristics and ideational traditions are indeed "hard
to pin down," in the words of Michael Hunt, to ignore them is to leave a seismic
chasm in the space between grand strategy and our understanding of how it is
settled upon with regard to the national interest, processed, and operationalized.
Hunt makes his case for this lens of investigation:
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At the end I am no less aware of those difficulties and am
thoroughly convinced of the truth of Gordon Craig’s observation of
over a decade ago: ‘To establish the relationship between ideas
and foreign policy is always a difficult task, and it is no accident that
it has attracted so few historians.’ But the subject is too important to
be left in a state of neglect like a surly invalid relative whose
justified claims to attention we honor only infrequently and even
then perfunctorily. [U.S. foreign-policy ideology] gained coherence
and appeal in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and by the
beginning of our century its elements had coalesced into a
powerful, mutually reinforcing body of thought that had gone far
toward dominating the thinking of those most concerned with
foreign-policy issues. This strengthened since WWII. In accounting
for the supposedly novel situation the United States has come to
occupy, historians have focused their attention—almost invariably
in narrowly drawn studies—on changes in strategic thinking, the
needs of the economic system, elite interests and influence, the
role of the presidency, the workings of bureaucratic politics, and the
interaction of foreign policy with domestic politics. It is time that
ideology, construed in broad historical terms, received its due. 98

Hunt's characterization of U.S. foreign-policy studies as appearing "almost
invariably in narrowly drawn studies" that focus on singular, insular levels of
analysis supports the direction and purpose of the dissertation. Furthermore,
there is perhaps no state in the international system whose foreign relations are
so inextricably tied to ideology than that of the United States. For regardless of
the fact that it is often the common perception that the United States pursues
aggressive foreign policies in the interest of the "bottom line," or oil, or for
practical security considerations, the impact of ideology on the most ambitious
foreign engagements since 1945 has been unmistakable. While it is far from
singular in the creation of preponderance, the influence of militant liberalism has
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been the most obvious ideational contributor to this grand strategy in the modern
history of the United States. Paradoxically, the impulse to expand and the
impulse to spread liberalism by punishing nonliberal states and welcoming liberal
ones have contrasted with pervasive isolationist tendencies over the course of
the previous two centuries. Colin Dueck has cleverly termed the statesmen
perpetuating this paradox "reluctant crusaders:"

Americans have often been “crusaders”—crusaders in the
promotion of a more liberal international order. But Americans have
also frequently been “reluctant”—reluctant to admit the full costs of
promoting this liberal international vision. These two strains within
the American foreign policy tradition have not only operated
cyclically; they have operated simultaneously. In this sense, the
history of American grand strategy is a history of “reluctant
crusaders.” The Bush administration’s present difficulties in Iraq are
therefore not an isolated event. Nor are they really the result of the
president’s supposed preference for unilateralism. On the contrary,
the administration’s difficulties in Iraq are actually the result of an
excessive reliance on classically liberal or Wilsonian assumptions
regarding foreign affairs. 99
What much of the relevant literature omits, and what Dueck astutely recognizes,
is that the tug-of-war between militant liberalism and isolationism is not just
manifested temporally, but in fact the two function "simultaneously." To be sure,
there have been fits and starts of expansionism and isolation according to
particular circumstances, events, and leaders, but never has either been wholly
absent from the proceedings of U.S. foreign relations, even if the pendulum has
been swinging far to the militant liberalism side since the total victories achieved
in the Second World War. Dueck describes how the incorporation of "idealistic,
99 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy
(Princeton University Press, 2006), 2.
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expansive" components in American grand strategy interact with international
conditions:

Liberal assumptions encourage American officials to define
American goals in unusually idealistic, expansive, and global terms.
At the same time, the tradition of limited liability discourages
Americans from making concrete sacrifices toward that liberal
vision. The result tends to be that expansive goals are pursued by
quite limited means. These twin cultural legacies also incline
American grand strategy in opposite directions from international
pressures. Whereas domestic cultural forces tend to constrain U.S.
strategic behavior abroad, and pull it in a more “liberal” direction,
international conditions tend to stimulate American involvement
overseas, while forcing unwanted compromise on liberal principles.
The result is a persistent tug of war between international
pressures and U.S. strategic culture: a cyclical tension that drives
the story of American strategic adjustment over time. 100
While his point is that international conditions pull American liberalism in a
nonliberal direction, he unwittingly exposes the dichotomy of American foreign
relations. The paradox of militant liberalism also plays out on the international
level: state-endogenous liberalism must by default engage in militancy because it
is incapable of peaceful relations with nonliberal societies. At the same time,
ideational national-security considerations often supersede liberal ones, as with
the case of support for dictators that disavowed Communism during the Cold
War. Thus international conditions can pull American foreign policy toward liberal
or anti-liberal interventionism depending on the dictations of domestic political
mandates. In other words, the "second image" works in forward and when
"reversed," and neither American domestic politics nor American foreign relations
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can be understood in a vacuum. 101 The United States is, at its core, an
international state. Nevertheless, it is also at its core ideationally self-contained.
Thus, the ultimate grand-strategy paradox: Americans define themselves by what
makes them American, yet define their purpose in the world by the extent to
which they can engender that Americanism abroad. There can be no static
perfection within this paradox; hence the plethora of scholarly terms attempting to
define and describe this "liberal leviathan," or "benevolent hegemon," or "empire
by invitation," or "reluctant crusader..."
Dueck identifies "nationalist, realist, progressive, and internationalist
subcultures" that also operate in U.S. grand strategy, and in hypothesizing that
the grand strategy of preponderance precipitates the recurrence of foreign-policy
blunders, this dissertation does not mean to suggest that no contending
approaches are present in U.S. grand strategy. But when the most powerful state
in the international system makes slight adjustments, the impact on international
relations is profound: the preeminence of American power means that even a
foray into interventionism carries great consequences for itself, the target state,
and international relations more broadly—the two case studies in question were
monumental foreign-policy undertakings by any standard IR measure; yet, they
hardly registered at home for those who were not directly affected by the conflict
in comparison to what civilians directly caught in a war zone experience. The
battle at home was always ideational—only the soldiers involved in the Vietnam
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War and Iraq War experienced the conflict first-hand. But for the state intervened
in, the stakes are always existential. When the Leviathan’s wake approaches the
boat of the Lilliputian, its ripples will be felt long and wide.
In his study examining "the pathological beliefs of fear, honor, glory and
hubris," Christopher Fettweis attributes the self-imposed responsibility to assert
Americanism globally to "an inflated sense of the possible, overestimation of
possibilities, and underestimation of cost." 102 He describes the paradox of power:
"A set of particular perils accompanies great strength that make blunders more
likely as well as more consequential. The stronger a country gets, the more
mistakes it seems to make. Great power also exacerbates the conditions that
contribute to misperception." Thus he finds it unsurprising that "foreign policy
blunders, both large and small, have been a constant feature of the modern
presidency, from the Bay of Pigs through Vietnam to Iraq."

Finally, observers of international politics have long understood that
a paradox exists concerning threats and danger. While growing
strength should make states feel safer and more secure, the
opposite often occurs. The perception of threat tends to expand
alongside power, leading strong states to recognize new dangers
that they had not seen before. The stronger a country is, the more it
fears, whether there is reason to or not. This paradox certainly
affects the modern United States, which since the end of the
Second World War has adopted the role of both the world’s premier
power and its supreme worrier. It has consistently detected more
danger in faraway corners of the world than any other country,
including its closest allies. Washington could find little support for its
contention that the vital interests of the West were at stake in
Southeast Asia in the 1960s, for example, or in Central America
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two decades later. The threat from international communism went
away, but that heightened perception of threat lingered on: Since
the end of the Cold War, fear has inspired a belief that the world is
a fundamentally dangerous place, which led to the tragically
unnecessary invasion of Iraq. Today, despite the fact that the
United States faces no serious threats (a counterintuitive point that
will be explained in the pages to come), post-Cold War US
policymakers tend to see danger everywhere and are quick to act
first and think—if at all— later. 103

After all, only one letter separates "worrier" from "warrior." In Promised Land,
Crusader State, Walter McDougall divides U.S. grand strategy temporally
between an "Old Testament" and a "New Testament." The Old Testament
consisted of 1) liberty at home; 2) unilateralism abroad; 3) an American system of
states; and 4) expansionism, while the New Testament consists of 1) progressive
imperialism; 2) Wilsonianism; 3) containment; and 4) global meliorism, "or the
belief that America has a responsibility to nurture democracy and economic
growth around the world." 104 The initial set of guidelines were engineered to
shape America domestically while preventing outside influence, while the new set
of guidelines are designed to shape the rest of the world either in an American
image or for America's benefit.
A distinction must be made here between shaping the world in an
American image, which implies the spread of American values and institutions,
and shaping it for American benefit, which implies no more than the pursuit of the
national interest, which would not distinguish it from any other state pursuing its
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respective national interest. The objective of expanding Americanism and the
objective of disproportionately affecting the international system to the point of
domination must be considered as separate ambitions in U.S. grand strategy;
that said, each features prominently in the history of U.S. foreign relations, and
there is of course significant overlap between them. In giving his own take on the
multitude of differing, often contradictory shifts in U.S. grand strategy over the
centuries, McDougall offers a brief synopsis of the challenges in summarizing
and characterizing in scholarly terms its tendencies and directions:

Instead, historians invariably frame several categories in hopes of
containing the mélange of words and deeds of our forebears.
Thomas A. Bailey listed six "fundamental foreign policies," including
isolation, freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, PanAmericanism, the Open Door, and peaceful settlement of disputes.
Bradford Perkins thought material self-interest, republicanism,
individualism, and popular sovereignty shaped our young nation's
diplomacy. To Robert Ferrell, its three basic principles were
independence, free trade, and continental expansion. To Cushing
Stout, they were isolationism, republican expansion, and the setting
of an example of freedom for others. Paul Varg identified two
competing frameworks, one economic and the other ideological, but
observed that in practice neither impulse blinded the Founding
Fathers to the need for "a hard headed pragmatic approach." Felix
Gilbert likewise traced the realist and idealist strains in U.S.
diplomacy to the incentives that attracted colonists to America in
the first place: the desire for economic betterment and the utopian
dream of a better society. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., detected cycles in
American history traced by the "warfare between realism and
messianism, between experiment and destiny." Henry Kissinger
saw abiding dualities between isolationism and globalism, idealism
and power politics, while Michael Kammen called us a "people of
paradox" who (at least "at our best") pursue "a politics of 'utopian
pragmatism.'" Edward Weisbrand saw the U.S. foreign policy norms
as self-determination, a feisty us-versus-them attitude toward the
world, and a belief that war is justified only in self-defense. Finally
(but the list could go on), Michael Hunt thought that three "core
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ideas" shaped our foreign affairs: the quest for national greatness
and liberty, belief in a strict racial hierarchy, and suspicion of
revolutions in spite of our own revolutionary heritage. For an
allegedly isolationist people, Americans seem to have a hearty
appetite for foreign policy doctrines! As Eugene V. Rostow summed
us up: "We embrace contradictory principles with equal fervor and
cling to them with equal tenacity. Should our foreign policy be
based on power or morality? Realism or idealism? Pragmatism or
principle? Should its goals be the protection of interests or the
promotion of values? Should we be nationalists or internationalists?
Liberals or conservatives? We blithely answer, 'All of the above.'" 105

While over the course of the previous four centuries, "all of the above" seems an
apt depiction, a certain set of assumptions, contentions, and objectives have
solidified since 1945 that carry with them a potential to deleteriously affect the
national interest; in fact, they seem to have done so. Reinhold Niebuhr observes
in The Irony of American History, “If virtue becomes vice through some hidden
defect in the virtue; if strength becomes weakness because of the vanity to which
strength may prompt the mighty man or nation; if security is transmuted into
insecurity because too much reliance is placed upon it; if wisdom becomes folly
because it does not know its own limits—in all such cases the situation is
ironic.” 106 Niebuhr further delineates four distinct contradictions in the American
personality: “The persistent sin of American Exceptionalism; the indecipherability
of history; the false allure of simple solutions; and, finally, the imperative of
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appreciating the limits of power." 107 The irony of American preponderance
continues an age-old struggle for identity in the self-image of the American mind.
To summarize, the seven decades succeeding the most monumental
foreign-policy accomplishment in U.S. history have produced a set of problematic
foreign-policy assumptions uniquely emblematic of U.S. grand strategy: 1) The
ideational, geographical (resource endowment), and historical traditions of
American exceptionalism demand an exceptional foreign policy most expediently
operationalized via a grand strategy of American preponderance; 2) the
persistence of American preeminence signifies the success of the pursuit of
American preponderance; 3) the extension of the U.S. security perimeter
throughout the globe promotes U.S. interests overseas and defends the nation
from attack, 4) maintaining overwhelming military force discourages revisionist
powers from attempting to challenge U.S. authority; and 5) this overwhelming
military force permits the discouragement or removal of hostile regimes and
stability or installment of friendly regimes. The first four assumptions form the
bedrock of the hypothesis; the fifth operationalizes the research question.

The OPM
This dissertation asks why many of the most important U.S. foreign-policy
campaigns have fallen short of their objectives or failed altogether since the
Second World War. It hypothesizes that the pursuit of preponderance and the
assumption that hard (coercive military) power can transform the politics of other
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states precipitate and exacerbate U.S. foreign-policy blunders. The hypothesis
posits that when policymakers overestimate the capacity of American power to
transform the politics of other states, the likelihood of a foreign policy resulting in
a blunder increases. It concomitantly hypothesizes that the prevailing grand
strategy of American preponderance since the Second World War, despite
sustained resistance from those advocating a more guarded foreign policy,
precipitates the frequency and severity of foreign-policy blunders. (This two-part
hypothesis is at times referred to individually and at times in plural; this signifies
the same thing). As mentioned, the theoretical model is referred to as the OPM.
To test the two hypotheses, the dissertation will contrast data collected
illustrating what effect U.S. policymakers expected from the application of U.S.
power in the preparation for a particular foreign-policy mission and the actual
results of those interventions. The phrase transformation of foreign politics
implies an effort by U.S. foreign policymakers to redesign the infrastructure of the
political leadership and alliance distribution in the target state in a manner
thought to be more favorable to U.S. interests.
The OPM is composed of four primary contentions. These contentions
constitute the corresponding data Indicators attempting to establish inferences
connecting U.S. foreign-policy blunders to the OPM. First, it presupposes that the
modern thrust of American preponderance, beginning with the Second World
War and continuing to the present, continues a cultural and ideological tradition
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dating back to the founding of the nation. 108 The budding postwar indoctrination
of American preponderance perpetuated a foreign policy that justifies the pursuit
of "monsters" via American exceptionalism and justifies American exceptionalism
through the need to pursue those monsters. The prevailing status quo is an
American military presence in virtually every corner of the globe that seeks to
prevent the emergence of threats before they materialize, rather than responding
to threats as they emerge. This produces an imperative of action in the mind of
the U.S. foreign policymaker that assumes that with great power comes the
capacity to transform the politics of other states via intervention.
Second, the OPM asserts that the eagerness on the part of U.S. foreign
policymakers to dictate the conditions of the political leadership infrastructure of
other states facilitates a corresponding overestimation of the capabilities of
partner states and nonstate actors. As intervening foreign policies are paired with
the domestic policies of local state or nonstate actors, an assumption of the
applicable agency of U.S. power corresponds to an assumption of agency on the
part of local partners. Eagerness to "have a dog in the fight" in areas of instability
can lead to dismissal of concerns over the viability, popular support, and
capabilities of available state and/or nonstate partners. This deficiency is
prominently evident in the case studies. A state endowed with enormous relative
power such as the United States is afforded the luxury of creating a grand
strategy and imposing it, or attempting to impose it, on other states in the system.
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However, the implementation of this grand strategy can find significant obstacles
when interference in another state is part of the means to achieve these grandstrategic ends. Furthermore, the emphasis on the holistic view of the international
system and its balance of power, a view paralleled by IR scholarship, neglects
tactical considerations relating to the implementation of grand strategy with
regard to the capabilities of the partner state and the capabilities of hostile state
or nonstate actors in the target state. Traditional IR's reluctance to look "within
states" omits cultural differences between states that intervening militaries
inevitably encounter. Each of the case studies exhibits many of the hallmarks of
a great power employing the assumption that power innately contains the ability
to rearrange and control the political composition of other states, as well as an
inability to accurately detect and respond to micro-level, culturally sensitive
issues during the course of intervention.
Third, the tendency to inflate the capabilities of partner governments and
nonstate partners corresponds to an underestimation of the capabilities of
adversaries in target states. Analyzing contentious politics in relative terms, an
increase in the power of adversarial actors correlates directly with a decrease in
the power of friendly actors, just as the inverse is true. Numerous scholars and
policymakers point to "ungoverned spaces" as one of the primary threats to U.S.
and allied national security. However, Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas
contend that the term “ungoverned” is a misnomer, given that there is no
populated area anywhere in the world that has no sense of hierarchy and no
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sense of governance. 109 For example, Afghanistan under the Taliban was not
ungoverned; on the contrary, the Taliban imposed a strict set of laws and
regulations over the population. In Vietnam and Iraq, while U.S. foreign
policymakers did eventually recognize the persistence of hostile actors, they did
so greatly underestimating their capacity to control and affect the local
population, en exercise pivotal in the outcome of the conflict. Describing an area
governed by a hostile actor as "ungoverned" misrepresents the nature of the
threat by dismissing the roots of the hostile actor's regulatory imposition over the
alternatively governed area.
Fourth, the OPM contends that U.S. foreign-policy blunders suffer from a
scarcity of operational learning facilitated by substantial information biases in the
collection of mission intelligence both in the decision-making stage and in the
operational stage. This obstacle to efficacious decision-making reveals a
discrepancy between strategic objectives, be they grand-strategic, theater-wide,
or

mission-specific,

and

tactical

expedience.

Many

standard

operating

procedures are so maladaptive that updated versions of doctrinal manuals make
few adjustments based on realities on the ground. For example, according to
multiple military commanders, the 2014 version of the Army's counterinsurgency
manual contained many of the same shortcomings and faulty assumptions as the
2006 version. 110
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The impulse to invent, inflate, or otherwise distort threats correlates to the
impulse to dictate the terms of international relations by imagining a constant
production of threats to the American way of life that only the United States can
confront. This constant drive to crusade against the evils of the world develops
into a bounded rationality of mission, in which the emphasis on crusading against
threats transcends the nature of the threat itself, whereby the act of pursuing
monsters becomes preeminent in the minds of policymakers and the actual
threats facing the nation become diluted even as others are inflated. Threats are
codified as existential even when they are not, and the response to them is
therefore more comprehensive and militant than it would otherwise be. One is
more reluctant to capitulate to an enemy that one has already labeled as 'evil.' In
the words of George Kennan, "There seems to be a curious American tendency
to search, at all times, for a single external center of evil, to which all our troubles
can be attributed, rather than to recognize that there might be multiple sources of
resistance to our purposes and undertakings, and that these sources might be
relatively independent of each other.” 111 This bounded rationality of mission
encapsulates misperceptions into policies in a way that prevents the accurate
assessment of a foreign policy both before and after implementation.
One of the most prominent features of U.S. grand strategy over the course
of the last seven decades has been the reliance on the outward projection of
power rather than the utilization of power to respond to threats as they
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materialize. For U.S. foreign policymakers, this was the paramount lesson of the
Second World War: we cannot wait for threats to reach our shores; we must
confront them before that moment can arrive. From President Eisenhower to
President Bush, this has remained unchanged for seven decades. 112 While many
assessed the 'Bush Doctrine' as a fundamental realignment of U.S. foreign
policy, this is not an accurate assessment of American foreign relations. When
President Bush warned, "The United States can no longer solely rely on a
reactive foreign posture as we have in the past... We cannot let our enemies
strike first," he mischaracterized the modern history of U.S. foreign policy. 113 The
'Bush doctrine' of 'preemptive strike' was merely a more explicit version of a longimplicit grand strategy.
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CHAPTER 4
Methodology

Eclectic scholarship is marked by three general features. First, it is
consistent with an ethos of pragmatism in seeking engagement with
the world of policy and practice, downplaying unresolvable
metaphysical divides and presumptions of incommensurability and
encouraging a conception of inquiry marked by practical
engagement, inclusive dialogue, and a spirit of fallibilism. Second, it
formulates problems that are wider in scope than the more narrowly
delimited problems posed by adherents of research traditions; as
such, eclectic inquiry takes on problems that more closely
approximate the messiness and complexity of concrete dilemmas
facing “real world” actors. Third, in exploring these problems,
eclectic approaches offer complex causal stories that extricate,
translate, and selectively recombine analytic components—most
notably, causal mechanisms—from explanatory theories, models,
and narratives embedded in competing research traditions. 114
Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil

This dissertation contains several distinct components, each representing
a separate yet correlated section. Each section addresses in its own way the
central research question of what factors have contributed to the presence and
severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders since the Second World War. This
chapter forms a bridge between the first three chapters and the subsequent three
chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the general problem of reoccurring blunders in
U.S.

foreign

policy

since

the

Second

World

War.

Its

corresponding

methodological section here briefly discusses its significance to the research.
Chapter 2 presented a sui generis framework for FPE. Its corresponding
methodological section here frames the conceptual underpinnings of that
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framework, enabling the case studies to be operationalized along conceptualdata lines. Chapter 3 presented a theoretical model on why and how U.S.
foreign-policy blunders have continued to reoccur since the Second World War.
Its corresponding methodological section here operationalizes its assertions in
order to set up the case studies in a hypothesis-testing format. The fourth and
final section of this chapter relates that hypothesis-testing with what conclusions
might be drawn from the collection of chapters in the dissertation as whole.
The FPE framework presented in Chapter 2 offers comprehensive,
fungible standards for the evaluation of foreign policy, detailing the techniques
and metrics involved in this process. This framework is designed to test the
outcome, or what, of any given case study. Its primary purpose is to evaluate the
effect of the case study on the national interest of any given state (in these cases
the United States). The OPM presents assertions relating to factors it argues
have contributed to the presence and severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders
since the Second World War. This theoretical model is designed to test the
factors behind a case study's outcome, or the why and how of what caused the
case study to end in blunder. The two case studies offer both the justification for
the classification of blunder and an examination of its causes based on the OPM.
Each case study chapter is thus divided into two parts: Part I processes the case
study through the FPE framework; Part II processes the case study through the
OPM. The following sections operationalize the research questions, assertions,
and key terms presented in the first three chapters in order to define the research
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agenda and construct a point of departure for the subsequent case study
chapters.

Methodological approach
The above quote by Katzenstein and Sil informs the basic philosophy of
the research approach as one of "analytic eclecticism" in that it will value
pragmatic functionality over paradigmatic parochialism. Arthur Stinchcombe
asserts that one can effectively “borrow whatever works to build a theory for
wherever one needs it” and that “the same advice can be applied to methods.”115
In their metaphorical discussion of “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics,”
Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco argue that “to progress scientifically, the
social disciplines require their own philosophy of science trained on explanatory
strategies, possibilities, and obligations appropriate to human and social
reality.” 116 In other words, human problems require a multidimensional approach
that hard-scientific or excessively positivistic paradigms lack. As Valerie
Hudson's research demonstrates, the human decision-maker is the interlocutor of
the material/ideational intersection. Though this dissertation does not address
comparative politics literature, as the research question examines U.S. foreign
policy specifically, it will draw on the comparative method, defined by Lijphart as
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“a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables,” a useful
method given the multidimensional approach used. 117
The case studies will employ a qualitative research design relying on
primary and secondary sources. Archival research of official U.S. documents,
such as national security statements, speeches, public transcripts, and memoirs
of foreign policymaking officials, offers an accounting of what policymakers were
thinking in terms of objectives, how they estimated the capacity of American
power to transform foreign politics, and why they intended to intervene in each
case. The case studies transcend temporal eras, thereby accounting for changes
in public opinion, leadership, and other more transient variables. The general
approach to data analysis will follow a process-tracing model that seeks to
diagnose the course of a blunder from the origins of a decision through its
incremental evolution and implementation. Process tracing, defined by Collier as
“the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light
of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator,” 118 provides the
most salient archetypal medium for examining how faulty decisions come to be
made and implemented.
The dissertation will lightly incorporate IR (primarily realist) grand theory
and policy precedents into the analysis of the impact of the assertions of the
hypothesis on blunders in a way as to provide a harmony of consciousness,
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neither “unconscious” nor “overconscious” in the classification of Giovanni Sartori
in his dichotomous evasion of positivism and embrace of the researcher as “a
man at work and aware of the assumptions and implications of whatever he is
about.” 119 As a qualitative research design constructed to better understand
human decision-makers, the approach will require substantial interpretation and
data contextualization on the part of the researcher, whose job is to triangulate
and situate the data in reference to the hypothesis and the overarching research
objectives.
While there is some debate in IR over whether to focus on variables or
cases in comparative analysis, as “variable-oriented studies mainly aim at
establishing generalized relationships between variables, while case-oriented
research seeks to understand complex units,” the approach here follows the
assumption by Della Porta and Keating that “both approaches are legitimate.”120
The aim is to understand both “complex units” and the correlation between
variables. According to Luker, the purpose of social science methods is to
develop “a set of guidelines about how to conceptualize and execute a
systematic and rigorous intellectual inquiry into something that lets you get as
close to the ‘truth’ as possible.” 121 The ‘truth’ is best pursued not through the
methodological myopia of “mastering esoteric facts or techniques, but in making
119
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connections across traditional boundaries—going wide rather than deep.” 122 In
selecting a number of methods and factors that crisscross various pieces of the
foreign-policymaking puzzle, this research aims to go wide rather than deep. In
doing so, it values an intuitive research process over paradigmatic formality,
consistent with the general suggestion put forth by W. Phillips Shively. 123 In
seeking richness, however, it does not attempt to evade the responsibility of
rigor; each case study indeed requires a substantial direction of data and
investigatory resources.
Elster reminds us that “the social sciences, like other empirical sciences,
try to explain two sorts of phenomena, events and facts,” with a fact being merely
“a temporal snapshot of a stream of events,” and an event representing a
protracted course of action symbolic of widespread social phenomena. 124 This
dissertation seeks to explain a particular type of event, the foreign-policy blunder,
by way of gathering a series of essential facts. The ultimate goal of this research
is to establish causal mechanisms between the decision-making process of
policymakers and U.S. foreign-policy blunders. While causal mechanisms “make
no claim to generality” and are explanatory rather than invariably predictive, they
nevertheless hold value in predicting the increased likelihood of an event given
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certain conditions and circumstances, if not the occurrence of the event itself. 125
The difficulty and value in any description, explanation, or prediction vary
depending on the question posed, and all three will be examined in this study.
King, Keohane and Verba link the value of empirical research to the ability to
extrapolate general inferences about a series of events or processes, thereby
producing some amount of probabilistic explanatory power. 126 By attempting to
define and describe the conditions and grand-strategy assumptions that may
lead to blunders in foreign policy, the dissertation thus means to produce an
explanation of what factors increase the likelihood and severity of blunder in any
given U.S. foreign policy.
The hypothesis posits that where American power to transform the politics
of other states is overestimated, U.S. foreign policymakers will be more likely to
overplay their hand and invite the possibility of a blunder. It concomitantly
hypothesizes that the prevailing grand strategy of American preponderance since
the Second World War, despite sustained resistance from those advocating a
more guarded foreign policy, precipitates the frequency and severity of foreignpolicy blunders. The argument is therefore more geared toward descriptive
probability than direct causation. The research design has been formulated with
the purpose of understanding and explaining the conditions, calculations, and
decision-making processes that increase the probability of the outcome of a
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blunder. Blunders in U.S. foreign policy since WWII will constitute the dependent
variable, with the Vietnam War and the Iraq War representing the case studies.
The OPM will be operationalized based on four Indicators, assessed qualitatively,
to examine the interaction between U.S. foreign-policy objectives and
contentious local politics in the area of intervention.
The four OPM Indicators will be the following: first, in order to assess how
U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the capacity of U.S. power to affect the
politics of other states, secondary sources, doctrinal codes, policy statements,
other official documents, and declassified materials will be examined in order to
establish a picture of what that capacity was estimated to be. Second, the U.S.
ability to control, bolster, and refine the partner/host state (the South Vietnamese
government and the reconstituted Iraqi government after the invasion) will be
assessed through an examination of process-tracing accounts. Third, the ability
to limit the power and influence of local adversaries will be assessed through the
evaluation of their capabilities throughout the course of the conflict. Fourth, policy
rationalization and operational learning will be evaluated throughout the timespan
of the foreign policy in question, offering a picture of how U.S. policies adapt to
changing circumstances and new information, with the expectation that the
pursuit of preponderance fueled the dismissal of relevant disconfirming feedback
and the corresponding perpetuation of strategic blunder.
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Discussion of the national interest
Chapters 2 and 3 refer to both the objective-realist interpretation of the
national interest as relatively fixed and knowable and a more subjective
interpretation of the national interest as somewhat more volatile and, to a certain
degree, pliable. This dissertation accepts both perspectives; both have merit and
both are operative in terms of this research design. The FPE framework
presented in Chapter 2 presents metrics for objectively identifying the value of
any given foreign policy. This value measures the cost and outcome of the policy
with the objectives according to the national interest of the state. While the
concept of the national interest has been molded, questioned, manipulated, and
discarded ad nauseum according to the tendencies of any individual scholar, this
research aims to utilize as objective a definition of the term as possible, which is
not to say entirely objective; indeed, part of the OPM contends that it has been
manipulated (by statesman and citizen alike) to fit the grand strategy of
preponderance, which deviates from the actual national interest. At the same
time, the actual national interest depends in part on the perceived national
interest, and can therefore be determined by it to a certain extent. However, this
determination has limits, and cannot completely break free from the confines of
objective and/or enduring assumptions as to what the national interest consists of
in terms of defining national identity and the purpose of a given state as it
clashes with the international system. To lose our barometer in totality would
preclude even a rudimentary understanding of how objectives in foreign policy
interact with the process of their pursuit.
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Thus, it is incumbent upon the researcher in this case to not only
distinguish between the perceived national interest and the more enduring,
objective components of it, but also to investigate, describe, and interpret the
interaction between one and the other. This task is positioned at a pivotal point in
the research design. Without it, juxtaposing particular objectives nested within a
specific foreign policy against the umbrella of grand-strategic objectives at the
higher level of foreign-relations abstraction is rendered null. Because of this
fundamental imperative, we take the time here to engage in what the term
signifies. Nevertheless, while it occupies a position as an essential subject in the
FPE process and the OPM model, the nuances of the term are not the subject of
this dissertation, nor is this research in any way attempting to reinterpret or even
interpret it for constructivist or otherwise 'subjectivist' ends.
Therefore, in order to circumvent the controversy surrounding the term's
multifarious assimilations into divergent parochial hideouts of IR scholarship, this
research uses the standard realist assumptions inherent in its implied
significance in the process of evaluating it in relation to the three case studies as
a point of departure. However, even accepting an obsessively standard definition
of such a contentious term would require a circumstantiation of its connotations,
a truncated iteration of which we turn to now. As Benjamin Frankel astutely
summarizes, "The debate over what constitutes the national interest is as old as
the nation-state itself.”127 This quite accurate assertion could be interpreted along
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two axis points: what it does consist of, from an objective point of view, and what
it ought to consist of, from a normative or evaluative point of view. One half
cannot wander far from the other: realist and constructivist must meet
somewhere in order to find enough common ground to inform the other of their
fatuity. Their battleground is the policymaking sphere, even if that sphere ignores
them both.
What is traditionally thought of to be the irreducible factor in comprising
the national interest is the physical security of the nation-state, without which all
matters of the state seem peripheral by comparison. When the enemy is at the
gates, other internal exigencies of the state can wait. If there can be a corollary to
accompany the existential security of the territorial nation-state at the most
irreducible level, it would be the material capabilities in men, money, and
munitions that can defend, purchase, or otherwise secure the borders from
attack, in addition to expanding them whenever possible. If state security is the
irreducible objective, then material capabilities represent the irreducible currency
generally thought to be capable of facilitating that objective. For the typically
parsimonious realist, then, the national interest can be determined in terms of
strict power dynamics measured in the material capabilities of the state, the most
common denominator in securing its borders and maintaining or expanding its
power.
Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, describes the national interest as he
described international relations in general, as a conduit through which relative
power is to be pursued in international politics, employed in international conflict,
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and perceived in international prestige. Morgenthau, Kissinger, and others of the
realist IR canon chastise the liberal school of thought that attaches moral virtue
and its dissemination to the development of an international society of states in
favor of the realpolitik necessary in estimating and pursuing the existential
necessities of national security, labeling Wilsonianism or liberalism or meliorism
or other perceived trivial misadventures into the fantastical adolescent and
providing a reminder to make choices based on thousands of years of empirical
reality rather than a future-perfect chimerical imagination. 128
In National Interest (1970), Joseph Frankel bifurcates the national interest
literature between whom he terms 'objectivists' who focus on a relatively fixed
national interest as an explanatory variable, assuming its traditional definition in
understanding how it affects FPDM, and 'subjectivists' who imagine a malleable
national interest that constantly fluctuates as it is molded by policymakers and
altered by shifting public preferences. 129 Constructivists unsurprisingly fall into
the latter category, problematizing the abbreviated realist definition of the
national interest just as they would other theoretical maxims of the paradigm.
While a more objective picture of the national interest would rely on quantifiable
measurements such as land mass, population size and demographics, weaponry
(particularly nuclear weaponry after the advent of the nuclear age), geography,
economic productivity, and financial reserves, subjective factors include regime
type and stability, ideology, nationalism, alliance formation, cultural preferences,
128
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religion, and national identity. Though the subjective factors might be thought of
as more of a modern or critical interpretation, both categories have been
examined by policymakers and scholars for centuries: consider Clausewitz and
his admiration for armies abundant in morale, a quality whose measure eludes
quantifiable exactitude.
Even at the latter stage of 1970 in the trajectory of IR as a scholarly field,
Joseph Frankel stated simply, “Unfortunately the theories of international
relations supply no clues for our search of the meaning of the national interest as
a whole.” 130 In much the same fashion as scholars have forsworn attempts at
delineating what constitutes success and failure in foreign policy, IR has
remained provincial on the subject of defining the national interest, limiting the
development of the applicability of the term beyond the paradigm level. In calling
for unification of a more sophisticated understanding of the concept across the
field as a whole, Frankel implied that the problems preventing it up to the point of
his publication could be surmounted by more precise scholarly phronesis.
The inevitability of this task has since been called into question. Scott
Burchill shifts the focus from a unifying vision of the national interest to a survey
of how each respective conventional (realism, liberalism), progressive (English
School, constructivism) and critical (Marxism, feminism) approach conceptualizes
the term. He concludes via a thorough investigation that the disambiguation of
the term can only exist at the paradigm level or below, as the distinctions each
makes in its ontological assumptions cannot transcend the epistemological on an
130
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IR-wide scale. 131 This and other works problematize the term to a reduction that
can only serve parochially paradigmatic endeavors.
The purpose of discussing the fits and starts of the disambiguation of what
it means when the national interest is applied to the analysis of foreign policy is
not to show that an understanding of it is impossible—indeed, this dissertation
assumes that it is possible—but rather to demonstrate that its most concrete
definition may omit important variables that relate to what it is and how it can be
changed by circumstances, events, leaders, and public preferences, as well as to
acknowledge the extensive literature on the subject that challenges its generic
definition. Taking these contributions into consideration produces the, heretofore
mentioned, definition of the national interest: the collection of primary policy
objectives commonly held to advance the relative power and prestige of the
nation-state vis-à-vis other nation-states in the international system. The
advancement of the national interest relies on the state constructing and
pursuing achievable objectives by utilizing scarce foreign-policy resources to
enhance the security and prosperity of the state. Power is conceptualized here
as the military and political ability to achieve policy goals in foreign affairs, via
coercion or otherwise (the common adage that 'power' signifies the ability to
convince or coerce others to do what they would not otherwise do is relevant
here).
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The evolution or devolution of that military and political power relates
directly to the decisions foreign policymakers arrive at in the pursuit of the
national interest. The term prestige is delineated concurrently with power to
recognize and incorporate the significance of perception among other states in
the system that strictly material political and military power definitions neglect.
While military force and political coercion capabilities may be the point of
departure for any discussion and estimation of one state’s power relative to
another, the utility of military and political power cannot be defined in strictly
quantitative terms in a globalized world containing far more liberal democracies
than previous centuries. The extent to which states perceive another’s intentions
must be integrated into the definition of power in order to account for balancing,
threat perception, and other factors that relate to interstate relations, since they
can enhance or restrict the utility of material capabilities. Indeed, Democratic
Peace Theory comes as close to any theory as a law with IR; it relies heavily on
the power of perception.
Thus the disambiguation of the term 'national interest' necessitates
several questions: a) what does it consist of in general state terms; b) how is the
national interest defined by the leaders of any given state; c) are states capable
of pursuing a standard set of grand-strategic national-interest objectives over a
period of decades and administrations; d) if so, do they in fact do so? The
dissertation accepts the realist assumption that the national interest is, for the
most part, knowable and relatively fixed, but rejects the assumption that it is
given by default in material terms. It is generally knowable in the sense that it can
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be clearly defined (or clearly enough to study it scientifically), and relatively fixed
in that what is beneficial to a state is unlikely to change drastically (or quickly)
over the course of time and across varying administrations.
However, the extent to which the national interest can be manipulated is
generally underestimated by realist doctrine. Indeed, the OPM presupposes that
leaders either unwittingly or knowingly pursuing policies detrimental to the
national interest much more often than is commonly assumed. This
phenomenon, which problematizes the rational-choice approach to FPDM,
suggests that ideological preferences, interest groups, sudden or slowly
developing fits of national rage (9/11-Iraq War), or the tendencies of individual
leaders can potentially mollify some of the more tangible foreign-policy inputs.
This is not to suggest that realism advocates policies that harm the national
interest—indeed, many realists opposed the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and
other blunders simply because of the perception that they violated realist doctrine
and thus the national interest—but it does begin to disestablish the indefatigable
fixation of what constitutes the national interest.

Grand strategy
Grand strategy and the foreign policies it implements form a medium for
the pursuit of the national interest. It envisions the national interest on the largest
possible scale and codifies specific objectives thought to employ that national
interest in the most effective (if not efficient) means possible. Conjuring up the
particularities of grand strategy, a favorite novelty exercised by every presidential
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administration in the first months of office, is a relatively painless process. Grand
strategy details lofty objectives, generalized threats, and simplified media for
addressing threats and propounding the national interest. Along with specific
foreign policies, it is for the most part presidential-driven. While Congress
ultimately must sign off on the most costly foreign-policy programs, presidential
direction has increasingly become the standard-bearer for foreign policy,
especially given that the country has not declared war a single time since
December 8, 1941. In the words of Christopher Fettweis: "Presidents are more
than merely the most important actor in that process— they essentially run it
single-handedly, making the most important decisions virtually free of
interference from pesky outsiders such as the public or Congress. Although the
founders of this country envisioned an active, perhaps even leading role for the
legislative branch, over time the executive has essentially taken over the foreign
affairs of the United States." 132 While establishing the rhetoric to delineate grand
strategy is a relatively painless process, its implementation rarely is, and the
yawning fissure that can come about between the ideals of grand strategy and
the muck of foreign policy invite blunder in many forms.
Documents describing grandiose grand-strategic ambitions thus tend to
utilize magisterial elocution and idealized framing in the expression of defining
the American purpose in the world. In practice, international relations play out in
an extremely complex web of interconnected and constantly turbulent alliances,

132 Christopher Fettweis, Making Foreign Policy Decisions (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2015), Kindle Edition, Kindle Locations 123-131.
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rivalries, and unpredictable conditions. The picture-frame discourse that the
average American is exposed to through the State of the Union Address, soundbite electoral campaigns, truncated press briefings, and simplified media reports
present a Manichean worldview that mirrors both theory and policy in what
Thomas Schelling has aptly described as "the retarded science of international
strategy." Schelling's reminder that "pure conflict, in which the interests of two
antagonists are completely opposed, is a special case" and therefore most
strategic considerations are "not concerned with the efficient application of force,
but with the exploitation of potential force" (emphasis in the original) calls into
question the manner in which statesman and citizen alike tend to understand
international conflict. 133
Although Schelling's analysis addressed international conditions at the
height of the Cold War, they remain as relevant today, as not much has changed
in terms of the simplified nature of foreign-policy discourse, at least in the public
arena. In reality, totalitarian conflicts in which the victor state utterly dominates a
loser state, as was the case with the annihilation of regimes in Germany and
Japan and the construction of new democratic states in their stead, disappeared
from international conflict almost entirely (at least among the great powers) at the
close of those hostilities. However, U.S. grand strategy remains focused on
conflict in these terms and has shifted only partially in applying force against
Islamist fundamentalism, continuing as it does to rely on the terms of conflict
similar to those of the Second World War. Conceiving of conflict in these terms
133
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has severely stunted the ability to confront adversaries that do not fit that mold,
Vietnamese guerillas and Islamist fundamentalists chief among them.
A more realistic objective in international relations is represented by what
Herbert Simon has termed 'satisficing,' a portmanteau of 'satisfying' and
'sufficing,' in which the frailty of human cognition limits its capacity to process
even a rudimentary series of interconnected events and conditions, thereby
devolving cognitive decision-making duties to the pursuit of satisficing in place of
satisfaction. 134 If the ultimate goal of any state is 'maximizing the utility function'
of its relative power and capacity vis-à-vis other states, recognizing this bounded
rationality is essential in constructing and employing theories and policies that
accept the presupposition of this satisficing. This cognitive limitation parallels the
practical limitations of attempting to implement policies in search of grandstrategic objectives in the chaotic bedlam of international relations—even the
most adept statesmen are subject to the anarchy of the international chessboard.
Human frailty and international anarchy are two phenomena often cited by realist
theory to constrain the extent to which a state should be willing to become
embroiled in international conflict. However, this admonition has been largely
ignored by U.S. policymakers for seven decades. The assumption that power
equates to the capacity to control the politics of other states comes about at the
expense of an accurate understanding of the fungibility of international power
itself.

134 Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, "The Logic Theory Machine: A Complex Information
Processing System," IRE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1956), 61-79.
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The work of Simon and Schelling illustrates the mercurial nature of the
outcome of the national interest and its classification as successful, unsuccessful
or, more than likely, mixed-outcome, as they relate to the objectives of the state.
But before the national interest is ever pursued, a state must capture, define, and
disseminate its meaning, and this is a process unto itself, especially in a large,
power-decentralized state such as the United States. The process of defining the
national interest is beholden to a number of bureaucratic, interest-group,
groupthink, and political pressures. When Kissinger says of pursuing the goals of
the national interest that "whether these goals are desirable is relatively less
crucial" than leaders' "ability to realize their goals," he describes a FPDM
environment in which the arts of consensus and implementation often take
precedent over the science of what the national interest actually consists of.
Research by Daniel Drezner suggests a differentiation between bureaucratic
institutions that are insulated from others and those that are embedded in larger
institutions. 135 Those that are embedded have less of a chance of influencing
foreign policymaking through the maintenance of their original mission, while
more insulated institutions can stand a better chance of holding onto their original
mission purpose, but are less able to wield influence in the formulation of foreign
policy.
Not only are domestic-institutional and international-structural constraints
ubiquitous in the chambers of power, but once a particular policy problem

135 Daniel Drezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy,” American
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 2000), 733-749.
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reaches the upper-echelon decision-making group, which typically consists of
only a dozen or fewer leaders, there still remains a great deal of decision-making
to hash out. 136 A number of studies examine this most intimate of conflict
definition and response processes, Irving Janis' concept "groupthink" chief
among them. 137 Janis' 1972 classic describes a process whereby members of
policymaking leadership circles value membership in the group over the purpose
of the group to the extent that group members undermine personal doubts to
avoid

dissention

and

demonize

both

internal

dissenters

and

external

adversaries. 138 Graham Allison’s 1971 Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis presciently explores the complexity of FPDM, a work whose
title takes inspiration from President John F. Kennedy’s quote, “The essence of
ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the
decider himself.” Allison contrasts the “rational actor” model alongside his
alternative “organizational behavior” and “governmental politics” models, given
that the rationalist model by default relies on an omission of key facts. 139 Rather
than normatively assessing varying approaches, Allison demonstrates that
different analytical lenses inevitably transpose differing facts according to their

136 Valerie Hudson describes a high-level decision-making circle in which there are fewer than a
dozen members throughout her previously cited textbook Foreign Policy Analysis.
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own theoretical assumptions, thereby ambiguating the process of studying FPDM
depending on the approach utilized.
These studies highlight that even at the late stage of high-level FPDM,
foreign-policy outputs can still be affected to a substantial degree by FPDM
leaders and the dynamics of their small groups. Even considering the domesticinstitutional and international-structural confines of their area of decision-making
operation, there is still much to be formulated in terms of the national interest as
it relates to a particular policy issue. Furthermore, foreign policymakers
sometimes do stray from those institutional and structural confines, for a whole
variety of reasons. Taken together, the pressures of defining the national interest,
developing a consensus, and implementing a particular policy leaves a number
of vulnerable decision-making fulcra that may fall victim to any number of highly
unpredictable problems.
The OPM contends that U.S. foreign-policy blunders exhibit predictable
signs of vulnerability and decision-making error at each of these fulcra. By
pursuing a grand strategy of preponderance, U.S. foreign policymakers seek out
conflict rather than avoiding it, thereby exposing the state to a host of threats that
are not existential to the national security of the state. By assuming that power
inherently contains the ability to dictate the politics of other states, they
miscalculate the utility and applicable limits of power. And by focusing on the
ideational motivations for conflict, they conflate hard power and political power as
well as conflating universal human (liberal) assumptions and the cultural
dynamics of individual conflicts in areas of intervention. By incorporating
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simplified platitudes into grand strategy and projecting them in the process of
intervention, foreign policymakers by default muddle the preferences of local
citizens and political actors in the target area. When the Vice President proclaims
that American invaders of a Muslim country "will be greeted as liberators," he
falls victim to this exact blunder-inducing assumption.
The extent to which the intervening state can affect and control local
political dynamics is operationalized via the phrase transformation of the politics
of other states through intervention by way of either a) destruction of the existing
political power structure through regime change and replacement with a new
regime or b) bolstering the extant regime to render it capable of protecting its
citizens, maintain support of its population through legitimate rule, and advance
the national interests of the intervening state. The phrase implies an effort by
U.S. foreign policymakers to redesign the infrastructure of the political leadership
and alliance distribution in the target state in a manner thought to be more
favorable to U.S. interests. This dissertation seeks to assess how U.S. foreign
policymakers estimated the ability of the United States to transform the politics of
other states against what that ability was in reality in the case of the two foreignpolicy blunder case studies. This phrase signifies a number of specific
implications in relation to the OPM.
First, the OPM contends that the United States has been hypersensitive in
the perception of overseas threats to the point of gross exaggeration of those
threats. This perception correlates with an impulse to act decisively to disable the
threat before it can metastasize into American allies or onto American shores.
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One of the media for this phenomenon is the manifestation of disapproved states
as threatening states in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. The bridge from
characterizing a state or its regime as unfortunate to characterizing it as a threat
seems to be more accessible in the United States than in any other state in the
international system. While this may be partially determined by the enormous
resource endowment of the United States as the world's greatest power, the
OPM makes no contention that the hyper-aggression of the United States is due
entirely to its disproportionate share of the international balance of power. It does
contend that this enables an aggressive foreign policy, but does not accept that it
is its primary driver. Instead, U.S. foreign policymakers have displayed an
eagerness to characterize an unfavorable regime as a threat and subsequently
characterize the United States as the only state with the will and ability to initiate
a resolution to the threat via intervention. In some cases, this cannot be done
through a negotiation or simply partnering with a faction within the country, but
requires a destruction and reconstruction of the state itself.
This necessity of action is thereby judged by U.S. policymakers to require
a rearrangement of local power dynamics that cannot be achieved through the
extant institutions of the state. This is either because a) there may be a friendly
state but that state is insufficient to achieve U.S. objectives or b) hostile actors
are either threatening the state or in control of the state. It is the policy of every
state to support friendly states and oppose threatening ones. But the United
States has taken on a preponderant role as the caretaker of Western liberal
capitalism and opposer of states unwilling to yield to that "new world order." By
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virtue of the classification of regime type as inherently threatening when
nondemocratic, the United States has precluded the ability to partner with
nondemocratic governments even when it is in the national interest of the United
States to do so.
By the same token, it has also disobeyed this self-imposed dictation by
also partnering with tyrants when it is perceived to be in the national interest. The
Cold War witnessed this hypocrisy on a monumental scale, as the United States
eschewed both democracy and human rights with respect to regimes and leaders
willing to oppose Communism. The U.S. decision to abide by Democratic Peace
Theory only selectively not only signals to potential democracies that they may in
fact not enjoy the support of the United States in the future but also signifies to
nondemocratic adversaries that this schizophrenic application of foreign policy
undermines the basic tenets of rational-choice theory and therefore the
foundations of deterrence, that most sacred of implied international safeguards.
Second, U.S. foreign policymakers assume that the United States wields
the power, whether military or political or a combination of both, to control the
state or area in question in such a way as to effectively dominate its political and
military institutions and other institutions and duties of the state, either through
proxy or by invasion. This implication directly addresses the central research
question. Can one state, especially if granted an abundance of power, control the
political dynamics of another through intervention? U.S. foreign policymakers
have foreseen the possibility to transform other states in an American likeness
since successfully accomplishing that task during the immediate aftermath of the
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Second World War. But the success of reconstructing postwar Germany and
Japan has not been met in other places, specifically states without the same
traditions of a robust, functional, democratic state, reverence toward state
institutions, a commanding sense of solidarity among citizens, virtually no
language, religious, or sectarian fault lines, and an extraordinary level of
productivity, education, health, and standard of living.
If the 'greatest generation' found glory in conquering Imperial Japan and
Nazi Germany, the two subsequent generations it spawned have spearheaded a
new American adventurism that has been met with mixed results. A further
discrepancy between the Second World War and the Korean, Vietnam, Persian
Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars is that they were simply enacted in policy and
enshrined in memory as policing actions against hostile actors in protection of the
friendly populations of each state. The United States has not declared war on
another state since the last time its people were physically threatened at Pearl
Harbor (with the exception of the 9/11 attacks, which provoked two U.S. wars but
no declaration). This is partly due to the fact that the Executive Branch has
sequestered much of the FPDM involved in initiating foreign conflict, but also to
the way in which Americans have come to accept war as an everlasting feature
of American foreign relations. The isolationist United States of the interwar period
metamorphosed in the trial by fire of the Second World War into a permanent
monster-slaying crusader whose dyspathetic tentacles detect danger at every
corner of the globe. The assumption that the United States can transform other
states to induce its own security continues to inform its grand strategy.
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It is further assumed that with the support of the United States, the local
partner state, whether extant or created via intervention, can sufficiently perform
its domestic duties of statehood in addition to advancing the national interests of
the United States, and that the national-security considerations of the policy
problem are such that the need to act is absolute and the risks of inaction are too
great for it to be considered a viable alternative. To reiterate, the OPM presents
assertions relating to factors it argues have contributed to the presence and
severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders since the Second World War. This
theoretical model is designed to test the factors behind a case study's FPDM
development and outcome, or the why and how of what caused the case study to
end in blunder. It hypothesizes that when U.S. policymakers overestimate the
capacity of American power to transform the politics of other states, the likelihood
of a foreign policy resulting in a blunder increases. It concomitantly hypothesizes
that the prevailing grand strategy of American preponderance since the Second
World War precipitates the frequency and severity of foreign policy blunders.

Indicators
Indicator I. How U.S. foreign policymakers estimated U.S. power to affect the
politics of other states
This Indicator tests to what degree U.S. policymakers believed they could
affect the politics of the state in question. It can begin to be ascertained through
public and internal statements made by policymakers at the highest levels of
government, most notably the president and his upper-echelon administration
officials and advisors. If U.S. foreign policymakers are exaggerating the ability of
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U.S. political and military power to transform the politics of other states, that
estimation will contrast with the local effects of intervention. High-level FPDM
figures are especially important in understanding the larger picture in foreign
policy because they set the tone for the discussion of a particular issue, wield the
largest television audiences, receive the most attention in the press, and are
charged with setting foreign affairs and leadership of the military institutions of
the state. Statements by Congressmen, transcripts from Congressional hearings,
and public speeches and declarations of policies by members of the Senate and
House of Representatives offer a further glimpse into the zeitgeist of the
American public, as these individuals are constantly campaigning and tend to
rely on their seat for well-being, unlike the president and his officials who tend to
find wealth and fortune through books, speeches, and other similar avenues.
Public opinion polls offer a picture of how the average person views a particular
issue, but are sometimes subject to dramatic change over short periods of time,
and are thus more useful in charting that change rather than providing a
snapshot at an exact moment in time.
Gauging the confidence level of the political and military leaders of the
state can best be understood by an examination of the statements and
documents involved with a particular issue. For example, if policymakers spend a
majority of their time discussing what ought to be done with respect to a given
country or a particular issue, rather than if anything ought to be done at all, this
type of language implies that the state does indeed wield the power to affect that
particular issue in a transformative fashion. Correspondingly, if policymakers
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spend much of the time discussing an issue in terms of how to implement an
intervention rather than observing and estimating the perceived power and
tangible capabilities of adversaries in the area of intervention, we can assume
that the potential threat from local adversaries is estimated to be quite low.
Furthermore, policymakers often make such statements outright, such as
characterizing the military or political threat of a foreign adversary as minimal
(this oft-invoked tool for mitigating the concerns of war-wary citizens ironically
contrasts with the inflation of the threat of the adversary, a phenomenon evident
in each of the two case studies—if the enemy can be so easily defeated, why
should the citizen be concerned about the threat it poses?) Officials often find a
clear explanation for this paradox evasive, and thus their explanations can often
confound the public, especially in the aftermath of the conflict, when the "rally
around the flag" effect subsides.

Indicators II and III. The U.S. ability to control, bolster, and refine the partner/host
state; the ability to limit the power and influence of local adversaries
Successful intervention requires either an infusion of resources to a
friendly extant state or removal of a hostile extant state and installation of a new
state. Therefore, the success of an intervention is inextricably tied to the ability of
the new or bolstered state to perform its duties in two critical areas: the
monopolization of violence, by way of protecting its citizens, and maintenance of
support among the population, through which it claims its legitimate mandate to
govern. Indeed, these are the two most fundamental functions of any state.
These two Indicators will be assessed through an examination of the strength
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and legitimacy of the partner state throughout the course of the intervention. If
the intervention succeeds in sufficiently propping up the partner state to the
extent that it can protect its people and establish legitimacy, the objectives of the
intervention as related to the national interest of the intervening state are more
likely to be met. Without a functioning state, the intervening state is unlikely to
achieve its objectives, since there is no medium through which to advance its
national interests. Likewise, the extent to which the power and influence of local
adversaries can be reduced or eliminated corresponds to the ability to prop up
the allied regime.

Indicator IV. Operational learning and policy justification
This Indicator will be examined along two dimensions. Vertically (in terms
of the FPDM hierarchy), it examines feedback integrity from the lowest tacticaloperational environment up through the highest levels of FPDM. Horizontally (on
the

FPDM-implementation-feedback-messaging

spectrum),

it

examines

rationalization/justification integrity as intervention policy is debated and settled
upon internally and then framed and messaged first privately within government
and

then

publicly

to

the

American

people.

Feedback

integrity

and

rationalization/justification integrity are evaluated across the timespan of the
conflict in order to gauge the coherence and transparency of the policy and the
justification for its investment in political, financial, and military resources. Jervis
reminds us that "decision makers are faced with a large number of competing
values, highly complex situations, and very ambiguous information, and therefore
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the possibilities and reasons for misperceptions and disagreements are
legion." 140 This is true even in the absence of information-processing biases.
When these biases are present because of already extant ideational preferences,
they become compounded as the reality, the policy as it relates to the national
interest, and the message are processed through the FPDM chain. Stephen
Walt’s tweak on neorealist theory to juxtapose balance of threat with balance of
power yields utility here as well in presenting perception as a crucial medium of
interaction that complements the speed and timing of the hard power
pendulum. 141

Case studies
Each case study chapter is divided into two parts. Part I processes the
case study through the FPE framework. Part II processes the case study through
the OPM. The case studies were chosen because they are all considered
quintessential blunders by the definition given in Chapter 2. This does not excuse
the researcher from presenting the codification behind that classification, which is
delineated in Part I in each of the case studies. The central research question
poses an inquiry about the problem of recurrent blunders in U.S. foreign policy
since the Second World War. Virtually every one of the largest foreign-policy
campaigns it has pursued since that event has fallen short of its objectives. It
thus follows that the most grandiose in ambition and severe in result should
140
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constitute the case studies of that research question. While the potential criticism
that pursuing such a mountain of data across two gargantuan events in U.S.
foreign-policy history may leave the research a mile wide but an inch thin is
understandable, the justification for the research design is clear. Every research
agenda depends on the nature of the research question. The research question
posed here addresses a holistic problem in U.S. foreign policy over the course of
seven decades. It must, therefore, cover the most significant foreign-policy
events over that time period. It is far from coincidental that these events are
classified as blunders. This is precisely the purpose of the research.
While many a dissertation can claim to conjure up mastery of obscure
subject matter unlikely to ever reach the audience of the layperson, this research
purposively explores a holistic topic relevant to the average citizen and presents
it in a clear and concise manner that the average person can understand. This is
not to argue that an erudite exploration detailing the ancient mating rituals of the
extinct peoples of the central Amazon basin has no epistemological significance
for the general public. But it is a fundamental objective of this research to
address the 'theory-policy gap' by 'asking big questions and giving simple
answers.' It is the hope and expectation of this research that it will not only
facilitate future research on FPE and FPDM but also engender a better
understanding of why U.S. foreign-policy blunders have continued to occur in
such magnitude since the Second World War and why virtually every major
campaign since that event has fallen short of its objectives. As this is a qualitative
research design, its vehicle for success relies on a triangulation of a multitude of
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documents in concert with one another. It is not enough to understand each
research question, chapter, section, or document ad hoc. The rigor of the
research design will be measured by the ability of the researcher to organize and
interpret the substantial data of each case study in line with the research
questions, hypotheses, and Indicators.

Data collection and interpretation
The research follows a qualitative research design that is designed to
establish a correlation between foreign-policy inputs and foreign-policy
outcomes. It seeks to establish links between the presence of positively identified
OPM Indicators and the presence and severity of U.S. foreign-policy blunders. It
is not meant to demonstrate direct causation, but rather to establish that blunders
may be more probable and possibly severe the more heavily U.S. foreign policy
is influenced by the OPM. The OPM may be present in interventions that end
successfully, and if this were shown, it would not necessarily disprove the model.
The primary method of inquiry will be the examination of secondary sources. The
case studies are expansive and their sources of reference ample. Given that
there are many years of research having already been conducted for each of the
case studies, there is an enormous amount of data available for each of them.
This dissertation's purpose is therefore not to produce new data, but to detect,
compile, organize, triangulate, and interpret extant data in a new way to answer
new questions. Secondary sources will be comprised primarily of scholarly
origination but will also include some works by journalists and other nonscholarly
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researchers with intimate knowledge of and/or extensive data collection on a
particular subject.
While innumerable works have been published that relate to the subject
matter, there is sometimes no substitute for the original words of the FPDM
source. Documents related to the exact words of internal discussions among
high-level foreign policymakers can fall into two categories: transcripts or audio
files of informal conversations between foreign policymakers, which offer a
glimpse into the development of how a particular policy problem is detected,
interpreted, and understood, and formal memos and meetings drafted and
conducted in a formal setting in which foreign policymakers are being briefed,
informed, or advised on a particular topic. This raw record of FPDM thought
processes, unfiltered by speechwriters, journalists, or scholars, provides an
unadulterated account of a policy problem before it ever reaches the public
arena. Declassified documents number in the thousands for the Vietnam War
and are too many to examine individually. In the case of the Iraq War, there are
fewer documents of this kind available, but still many of essential value. This data
will therefore be utilized on an individual basis in order to substantiate the data
from secondary sources. It is also particularly useful for testing Indicator IV,
which charts the course of a conflict's justification and how information from the
target environment is processed up the chain of command.
Despite the fact that these original sources of FPDM can shed substantial
light on how a policy problem is detected, processed, an responded to, the
argument will be made throughout the two case studies that the true motivations
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for foreign policy are not hidden away in some secret government closet, but are
very much available to the average citizen, whether that citizen be policyattentive or policy-oscitant, through the proliferation of public statements with
regard to a particular issue. In other words, preponderance is an open secret, it is
fundamentally national in nature, and there is no need to conceal its tenets from
the public because the public generally accepts them. What is expected to be
uncovered in the case studies is the intricacy with which subterfuge is employed
against the public because FPDM leaders are aware of the fallacy of a given
foreign policy but neither wish to be blamed for its failure nor possess more
favorable alternatives and thus harbor the facts with which the public might more
quickly come to the realization that a blunder is in fact occurring (which it
inevitably will, if indeed a blunder is occurring—but for the foreign policymaker,
they would ideally come to this conclusion upon termination of their time in
office).
An array of declassified data centers provide the researcher with
countless media for understanding how foreign policymakers operate and how
decisions are made. Among the largest collections of declassified documents on
U.S. foreign policy are the following: The Foreign Relations of the United States
(FRUS) series, publishing an assortment of documents from 1861 to the late
1970's relating to multiple agencies overseen by the Office of the Historian of the
U.S. State Department; the Digital National Security Archives maintained by
George Washington University, which secures and stores declassified materials
in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act; the National Archives, much
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of which is now digitized; the Declassified Documents Reference System,
providing declassified documents from 1941 onward; the Center for the Study of
Intelligence releases, published by the Central Intelligence Agency; and the Cold
War International History Project digital archive, which houses declassified
documents from the former Soviet Union. 142 These data reserves are in addition
to publicly available Congressional hearing transcripts, leaked documents such
as the Pentagon Papers, leaking websites such as Wikileaks, the Public Papers
of the Presidents series, which contains many speeches, press conferences, and
other official statements of U.S. policy, and memoirs of presidents and other
high-ranking officials. The CIA also fully released its official history in digital
format in January 2016. In short, given that each of the three case studies began
many years ago, a plethora of sources are available documenting primary
sources of foreign policymaking. Nevertheless, secondary sources will constitute
the primary medium of investigation.
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CHAPTER 5
The Strategic-Tactical Blunder of the Vietnam War
It became necessary to destroy the town in order to save it. 143
U.S. Army Major to reporter Peter Arnett regarding the town of Ben
Tre, February 7, 1968

Criteria by which to measure the war have been hard to come
by. 144
Henry Kissinger

Part I. FPE
The Vietnam War is the classic example of the foreign-policy blunder in
U.S. history. Its development therefore offers a unique set of FPDM tensions,
events, and circumstances with which to evaluate the policy in relation to U.S.
grand strategy more broadly, in addition to offering a large data set from which to
examine the errors that led to problematic FPDM and an unfavorable foreignpolicy outcome. As we are four decades removed from the unsuccessful
termination of the conflict, we can draw upon a number of elongated studies,
historical accounts, military transcripts, and declassified documents to gain a full
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A U.S. Army Major made this comment to reporter Peter Arnett as they surveyed the
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picture of the process of the blunder's proceedings. How and why did U.S.
foreign policymakers initiate, escalate, and perpetuate the war in Vietnam? Why
did the status quo policy continue even after policymakers became aware of a
steady flow of disconfirming information rendering the policy fruitless, and how
did they rationalize this failed policy unto themselves and to the general public
over such a long period of time? What did U.S. policymakers estimate the
capacity of American power to transform Vietnamese political and security
conditions to be, and how did this play out over the course of the war? How did
the American presence in the country affect the ability of local partners (the
governmental leadership of South Vietnam) and adversaries (North Vietnam and
the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong)? This chapter addresses these and
other questions in the first of three case studies. It first evaluates the blunder
through the five criteria of the FPE metrics presented in Chapter 2. It then
analyzes it through the four Indicators of the OPM presented in Chapter 3.
The Vietnam War exemplifies the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. grand
strategy in the most lucid terms: in a country with little strategic value, great
human, financial, political, and military resources were expended in a failed
campaign to prevent the country from "falling," or being "lost," in official U.S.
foreign-policy terminology, to Communism. U.S. foreign policymakers never fully
recognized the cultural conditions in the country that united to complicate the war
effort, relying instead on superior technical capability and firepower to eliminate
the individuals involved in the South's insurgency rather than adequately
addressing or relinquishing to the political conditions that problematized
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intervention at every stage. As more U.S. troops poured into the country, more
North Vietnam Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) cadres mobilized; as the war
enlarged in scope, the galvanization against it strengthened. The wider the
military campaign became, the less effective it was. The longer it continued, the
less support it could rely on in the United States. Except for a token contingent of
"Free World" (this term was actually used on occasion in internal U.S. foreignpolicy discourse) allies, it was never anywhere near a multilateral effort.
As the war dragged on, more and more Americans could draw no
connection between the Vietnamese insurgents and civilians their army
destroyed by the thousands and the ideals for which the war was supposedly
being fought. The war over that justification thus assumed monumental
proportions, as everyday Americans for the first time witnessed the horrors of war
from the comfort of their living rooms over the airwaves of their set-top box. While
the strategy of Containment ultimately succeeded, in much the same fashion as
U.S. dominance of the international system, it did so in spite of total failure in
Containment's piece de résistance. In the words of George Herring,
"Containment was misapplied in Vietnam."
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Why did the policy fail so

miserably, what led to the strategic-tactical gap in this case, and why did the
United States continue to pursue a failed policy so long?
The overarching strategic objective of the American effort in Vietnam was
to stem the flow of Communism and prevent the feared "domino effect" from
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taking hold in Southeast Asia. This required the subsequent tactical objectives of
supporting the fledgling, repressive state of South Vietnam, combatting NVA and
VC forces wherever they materialized in South Vietnam, and breaking the will of
hostile North and South Vietnamese to continue to fight. 146 In addition to denying
the Communist enemy an expansion of territory, the effort concomitantly sought
to expand the sphere of influence of liberal democratic capitalism that
policymakers envisioned would protect the United States and the American way
of life the larger it became (this piece of U.S. grand strategy was abandoned ad
hoc in Latin America, Africa, and Asia wherever it conflicted with antiCommunism; anti-Communist sentiment therefore transcended pro-democratic
sentiment under the imperatives of the Cold War, including in South Vietnam).
This zero-sum game in the larger picture found its way all the way down the
chain of command to the tactical picture. Every VC cadre killed was one fewer
individual that could threaten the United States and the American way of life.
Thus, in this quintessential proxy war, the country was to be used as an
example that the United States would defend its allies and man the perimeters of
the "Free World" wherever Communism sought to expand. Therefore, in
simplified form, the objectives were (a) to prop up and support the state of South
Vietnam; (b) to prevent North Vietnamese incursions into the South and suppress
the VC; (c) to thereby stunt the material spread of Communism; and (d) to
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display to adversaries and allies alike that adversaries would be confronted and
allies would be supported, and, in so doing, restrain the ideational appeal of
Communism. Despite the tradition of mission in U.S. history, never before or
since has a U.S. military conflict been so united with an ideational struggle.
Americans could not see Vietnam for what it was because their lens of analysis
was blinded by anti-Communist fervor; by the time this lens became partially
removed as hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops confronted a skilled,
resourceful, and determined enemy, the conflict had been lost.
None of these objectives were met. The only silver lining of the failed
American effort in Vietnam, if one in fact exists, would be the fact that the
invasion and occupation of South Vietnam by NVA forces in 1975 preceded the
fall of the Berlin Wall by a mere fourteen years. One of the enduring tragic ironies
of this classic strategic blunder is that the whole raison d'etre for fighting the war
in the first place—that Communism had to be stopped everywhere to be stopped
anywhere—never materialized. The logical fallacy that each individual country
was somehow inexorably linked to an international Communism that found its
strength in global unification fell flat on November 9, 1989. This inaccurate
assumption on the part of U.S. foreign policymakers imagined a link between
international Communism and individual countries that never existed to the
extent imagined. That there was some level of cooperation between Moscow,
Beijing, and their supposed satellite states did little to defy the basic tenets of
realism; states look inward before looking outward. The American intervention in
Vietnam bore this out to a fastidious degree: the fall of Saigon did not usher in a
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new era of international Communism. The domino theory and two millennia of
realist doctrine quickly proved incompatible. Though Vietnam, as Beijing, remains
technically Communist, Communism as an idea has been all but purged from the
Earth in any practical sense of the word. The ideational link between Vietnam
and the American imperative to purge the world of Communism was largely a
figment of the American imagination.
In The Limits of Intervention, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Affairs Townsend Hoopes describes the strategic-tactical gap in
U.S. foreign policy:

I felt the absence of an explicit framework of policy for both global
and inter-regional issues. With respect to particular regions and
countries, small interdepartmental groups of flexible membership
conducted day-to-day operations with ability and zeal. But the
bridging mechanisms needed to relate policy in one region to policy
in another, and to link them to general problems of global
implication—like the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or the
progressive withdrawal of British military forces from East of
Suez—seemed weak. Moreover, there appeared to be a serious
lack of the kind of comprehensive assessment and long-range
planning that was a remembered feature of those days during the
Truman years when George Kennan and later Paul Nitze headed
an elite Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. Closer
examination confirmed the impression of no central guiding
philosophy in foreign policy, as well as of slackness in coordinating
the disparate elements. An important cause lay in the fact that
President Johnson, a man of little background and much
uncertainty in foreign affairs, had inherited an organization for their
conduct that had been made deliberately loose and flexible by
President Kennedy, a man of broad knowledge, intuitive grasp, and
determined initiative in that field. This inheritance, which adversely
affected both the scope of deliberations on Vietnam policy and the
quality of President Johnson's decisions from the fall of 1964
onwards, showed itself in the structural weakness of the National
Security Council and in inadequate attention to longer-range policy
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planning. The principal results were fragmented debate, loose
coordination, and an excessive concentration on the problems of
the moment. 147

Hoopes' nostalgia for the immediate postwar days of the 'Wise Men' may indeed
be warranted, but it is also revelatory of another development in U.S foreign
policy over the subsequent decades. During the early postwar years, the United
States was still forging and asserting its new identity as the singular arbiter of
international affairs. This burgeoning quest to remain the 'indispensable nation'
even after the cessation of the hostilities of the Second World War necessitated
conceiving of the nation in ideational terms. This new purpose first had to be
envisioned in order to then be articulated in artfully ambitious terms, in addition to
specifying what that purpose intended to achieve in the international system. It
would then be necessary to construct some kind of theoretical policy for how best
to attach means to end in grand strategy; that theoretical policy emerged in the
form of Containment, the temporary standard-bearer of the grand strategy of
preponderance. The grand-strategic objective to become the world's singular
international arbiter of international affairs thus employed the mid-level strategy
of Containment. That mid-level strategy subsequently needed application at the
tactical level. The most significant tactical application of it became Vietnam, and
the Vietnam War failed.
This process illustrates the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. foreign policy in
the clearest possible terms, and Hoopes' characterization of it illustrated his keen
147 Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention: How Vietnam Policy Was Made—and
Reversed—During the Johnson Administration (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 1.
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perception of its shortcomings in the pivotal year of 1965, when escalation was
taking flight. As a WWII Marine Lieutenant who had risen to become Chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee and served under three secretaries of
defense before holding a number of high-level foreign-policy positions at the
interchange between policymakers and defense officials, he was in a unique
position to give his assessment of conceptual and logistical shortcomings in the
FPDM chain of command. These shortcomings would become the applicative
basis for the Vietnam imbroglio, a blunder spurred on by the persistent impetus
of preponderance. The institutional and geographic hypertrophia of the global
military presence of the United States engendered by the Second World War
remains in place to this day; since 1945 it has never achieved its former success,
and Vietnam was its crowning failure.

Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives
Between 1964, when General William Westmoreland was appointed
Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and 1968, when
he was promoted to Army Chief of Staff, the number of troops in Vietnam grew
from 16,000 to over 500,000. The United States either had to pour millions of
troops into the country and invade North Vietnam proper or accept that it would
never control the countryside, control the night, or stem the influx of fighters,
support systems and weapons from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Instead, they kicked the can down the road until there was nothing left of it. From
1960-1963, the United States and South Vietnam targeted guerilla activity but

148

neither fully understood nor actively targeted with sufficient scope the political
and intelligence infrastructure of the Viet Cong (VCI). This allowed it to establish
the underlying political and intelligence network that would sustain the guerilla
arm of the insurgency in the years to come.
The VCI, made up of somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 cadres by
1967, was a "simple organization: Virtually every village had a cell made up of a
Communist Party secretary; a finance and supply unit; and information and
culture, social welfare, and proselytizing sections to gain recruits from among the
civilian population. They answered up a chain of command, with village cadres
answering to the district, then to the province, and finally to a series of regional
commands which, in turn, took orders from Hanoi." 148 Although operations were
ultimately controlled by Hanoi, VC cadres and People's Revolutionary Party
(PRP) officials also wielded their own amount of autonomy, being closer to the
frontlines as they were. Although it was called such by some high-level U.S.
foreign policymakers, this was no "ragtag" organization, as U.S. advisors and
intelligence operatives learned during the advisory years (1954-1963). The VCI
has been characterized as the largest and most sophisticated system of
intelligence gathering and political organization in the modern (post-WWII) history
of asymmetrical warfare. 149
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It was also highly adaptable. For example, after the Tet Offensive, which
left the VC decimated but was nevertheless a political victory for the North in that
public opinion in America began to turn away from the war, the Communist
Politburo in Hanoi enacted COSVN Resolution 9, which hailed Tet as a success
in that it broke U.S. resolve and forced the Americans to "sink deeper into a
defensive and deadlocked position," but also shifted its strategy to focus on
fighting against pacification efforts rather than taking on the U.S. army in fixed
battles. 150 In other words, it instructed guerillas to go back to what they did best,
now that the message that they could face the American army in sustained,
pitched battles, including in urban areas, had been sent. With the loss of nearly
all VC operational forces expended during Tet, VCI reorganization and
replenishment would ensure long-term combat viability.
COSVN was an acronym for Central Office for South Vietnam, the center
of the insurgency's political leadership, whose decision-making apparatus was
described by the CIA thusly: "Leadership at all levels within the VC Infrastructure
is provided through the PRP, through Party Committees set up at each echelon.
According to the statutes of the PRP, the Central Committee—or, more formally,
the Central Executive Committee—is the highest decisionmaking body of the
PRP between Party Congresses." 151 The American effort never succeeded in
dismantling the VCI, which proved far more effective operationally than the
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government of South Vietnam (GVN), the American Army, or its U.S. civilian
agency counterparts in terms of controlling the populace with a steady
combination of ruthless intimidation, coercion, and ideational appeal. The U.S.
effort suffered from discombobulation from the beginning of the buildup. General
Westmoreland, for example, characterized this problem on January 7, 1966, the
second year of the buildup: "It is abundantly clear that all political, military,
economic, and security (police) programs must be completely integrated in order
to attain any kind of success in a country which has been greatly weakened by
prolonged conflict...The Viet Cong, themselves, have learned this lesson well.
Their integration of efforts surpasses ours by a large order of magnitude." 152
From the North Vietnamese perspective, the assessment of the war was
not much different than Westmoreland's early lamentations of stunted progress.
The authors of Hanoi's official military history of the "American War"
acknowledges that over certain periods of the war, notably 1961-1963, 1966, and
1969, North Vietnam faced intermittent setbacks in the overall war effort.
Nevertheless, the admittedly biased account does highlight the one persistent
truth of the war: the more forces the American army employed, the more the
North resisted. It omits the substantial level of support it received from the Soviet
Union and China, and downplays the level of support and direction it gave to
prop up the insurgency in the South from 1959 onward. But it describes the
"maturation" of the insurgency from a disparate band of disorganized peasantwarriors to a fully capable insurgent army capable of challenging the American
152
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military from the battle of Ap Bac in 1963 onward through ingenuity, resolve, and
a whole host of prototypical guerilla warfare tactics. 153
One of the ironies of the tactical dynamics of the Vietnam War was that
the guerilla tactics used by the VC made it impossible to apply conventional
military doctrine to their pursuit, but when they did decide to meet the American
army in pitched battle, they won even when they lost by inflicting American
casualties. Even at a 5:1 or 10:1 ratio, Ho Chi Minh and his military strategists
knew that the Americans would eventually capitulate, given that for them this was
a war of choice. Just as George Washington's Continental Army made great
strides against the British Army with guerilla warfare tactics but gained coherence
and strength by eventually confronting their imperial overseers in conventional
battalion-strength battles, so too did the NVA and VC utilize both to their
advantage. This never changed during the course of the conflict. When it suited
them, such as in 1969 after the Tet Offensive, the enemy retreated into the
hinterlands to reorganize and replenish. When in strength, NVA and VC
battalions would materialize in order to inflict what were, by American standards,
heavy American casualties.
The evolution from guerilla warfare to pitched battled took form as U.S.
forces evolved from an advisory role to full-scale regimented search-and-destroy
missions, which increased after escalation was settled upon in 1964. One of the
first such confrontations was the January 2, 1963 Battle of AP Bac. In many
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ways, the story of the Vietnam War is the story of John Paul Vann. The
corollaries between his individual contribution to the war and the overall war
effort are unmistakable, as Neil Sheehan's Pulitzer Prize-winning biographical
account details. His role in the conflict is relevant to FPE Criterion I because it
illustrates how a failed military strategy was upscaled rather than reformulated;
this in essence ensured failure in the military component of the war, if not the
political component (which ultimately failed as well). This took place not in 1967
or 1968, when the war was in full-tilt, but more than a year before escalation was
eventually chosen as the course of action in the Johnson Administration, and
long before the size of the U.S. commitment rendered withdrawal politically
implausible. This attribute is nontrivial because of the fact that it affects how we
understand and analyze the FPDM that led to the persistent policy of
commitment.
Vann recognized that the VC held "the strategic and tactical initiative"
(Westmoreland would later use this lack of initiative as a justification for
increasing troop levels by an order of magnitude). 154 He observed that the VC
had access to all two million people in the division zone, and while the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) could move freely within it with American
firepower, advisors, and the backing of fighter bombers, in no way did they
control the countryside, nor was their presence welcome in many of the
surrounding provinces. The average soldier of the shoddy ARVN showed up for
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the paycheck, held few loyalties to the state, could barely adjust the sight of his
rifle, and wanted nothing to do with fighting the VC. This attitude was not in spite
of the loyalty of commanders; indeed, ARVN colonels tended to elbow each other
for resources, regime favoritism, and stature, with little regard for nationalist
sentiment and little more for the trade of combat. Colonel Cao, to whom Vann
was assigned, stated simply, "It is not safe to go out at night." Vann cited in one
of his reports "a deplorable condition" in which "commanders at all levels who do
nothing can still retain their command, and even advance, while those who are
aggressive may be relieved if they suffer a setback or sustain heavy losses.”
Colonels were not incentivized to fight: “Petty jealousies among battalion and
regimental commanders take precedence over, and detract from, the primary
mission of closing with and destroying the enemy." 155
The further ARVN companies ventured into VC territory, the more
weapons would eventually fall into enemy hands, the lower morale would sink in
their ranks, and the more tactical experience would be garnered and weaponry
captured by the VC, thereby evening out what would have otherwise been
guerilla disadvantages in technical capabilities and firepower. What the guerilla
could draw on that the ARVN regular could not was faith in his or her cause and
the backing of a state in Hanoi perceived to be legitimate in the minds of its
citizenry, unlike the oligarchy headquartered in Saigon. For harassment,
psychological warfare, and weapon-procurement purposes, the VC would attack
Regional Force/Popular Force (RFPF) rural militia outposts at night, which would
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in turn lead to indiscriminate artillery bombing, allowing the enemy to gather more
support from among the smoke of burning villages. When ARVN troops did
venture out on patrol, ambush was a constant concern. VC cadres became so
adept at policing battlefields abandoned by the ARVN and Americans that the
trash heap left behind after even an unsuccessful battle would supply a treasure
trove of materiel: "expended smoke grenades, safety levers and pins, LAW
tubes, Claymore mine components, ammunition boxes and containers, grenade
and projectile packaging tubes, propellant containers, packing material, pallets,
sandbags, bandoleers, loading clips, machine-gun links, empty C-ration cans,
mortar increments (propellant bags), artillery projectile booster charges (removed
from fuse wells), expended 'pop-up' flare tubes, expended time fuse igniters, field
telephone wire, expended batteries, used field dressings, IV (intravenous)
bottles, and other soiled medical items." 156 For a battle in which the ARVN was
overrun, there was no limit to what could be uncovered.
Vann's cohort, Colonel Daniel Boone Porter, observed, "Everything he had
seen had convinced him that if the Vietnamese on the Saigon side were going to
prevail, they needed Americans who would show them how to fight their war and
also find a way to goad them into fighting it.” 157 The war the United States would
eventually fight did not exist in Vietnam until Americans invented it. A climate of
civil conflict, an official army of the state, mobilized guerillas, and sociopolitical
strife were all present in 1962; the war as it came to be was not. Though Vann
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was particularly sensitive, in fact favorably inclined to, Vietnamese cultural
standards and practices, the soldier in him recognized the primal imperative of
security: “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety
percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first ninety percent,”
and thus “without security, nothing else we do will last.” 158 His plan was to coerce
Colonel Cao into major policing actions that would smash the cornerstone
guerilla forces that made up the hierarchy in Cao's area of operation; he thought
he could accomplish this task within six months.
In some ways, the battle of Ap Bac was the prototypical Cold War
battlefield. Vietnam itself as an international conflict zone was somewhat
accidental, but also the product of certain geographical conditions. President
Kennedy had become enamored with the intrigue of the Special Forces, in large
part simply because he found them personally compelling, but also for practical
reasons: Nikita Kruschev had announced on January 6, 1961, two weeks to the
day before Kennedy assumed the presidency, his intention to support "liberation
wars and popular uprisings," and the United States did not intend to sit on the
sidelines while peasants the world over were given a copy of the Communist
Manifesto and a Kalashnikov, preferring instead for them to be trained via a Bible
and an M-14. 159 The Special Forces would facilitate that exchange. Kennedy's
military mentor, Maxwell Taylor, published a book enshrining the doctrine of
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"limited war" that precipitated JFK's military predilection for "flexible response."
These terms implied the ability to project power anywhere on Earth via a rapidly
deployable force capable of working hand-in-hand with local allies and utilizing
superior firepower and tactical prowess rather than relying almost exclusively on
nuclear deterrence. 160
This transformation in military doctrine responded to the innumerable lowintensity "Third World" battlefields in which the United States and its allies was
engaged, Vietnam chief among them. Although Kruschev had taken criticism
from China for not doing enough to fight the hot battles of the Cold War, the
Americans had plenty of reason to be wary of Soviet influence in Cuba, Vietnam,
Algeria, the Congo, and elsewhere. Thus, what Vann concluded from the battle
of Ap Bac, conclusions that would symbolize his and others' views toward the
war in the coming years, carried with it global implications far beyond what the
local population of 600 miserly inhabitants could begin to fathom. The terms of
the battle, as described by Sheehan:

The 350 guerrillas had stood their ground and humbled a modern
army four times their number equipped with armor and artillery and
supported by helicopters and fighter-bombers. Their heaviest
weapon was the little 60mm mortar that had proved useless to
them. They suffered eighteen killed and thirty-nine wounded, light
casualties considering that the Americans and their Vietnamese
protégés subjected them to thousands of rifle and machine-gun
bullets, the blast and shrapnel of 600 artillery shells, and the
napalm, bombs, and assorted other ordnance of thirteen warplanes
and five Huey gunships. The Hueys alone expended 8,400 rounds
of machine-gun fire and 100 rockets on the tree lines at Bac. With
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the weapons they held in their hands the guerrillas killed or
wounded roughly four of their enemies for every man they lost.
They inflicted about 80 killed and well over 100 wounded on the
Saigon forces and also killed three Americans, wounded another
eight, and accounted for five helicopters. (The Saigon side later
officially admitted to 63 killed and 109 wounded, holding down their
losses by misstating the number of casualties suffered by the
reserve company in front of Bac.) The guerrillas managed to cause
all of this damage while still conserving their own bullets. From the
first shots at the Civil Guards through the last fight with the
paratroops they fired about 5,000 rounds of rifle and machine-gun
ammunition. 161

The tactical result of the battle was a stalemate. Cao's forces took no ground,
retreating the following day, as was characteristic of this asymmetric war. Neither
side had inflicted a mortal wound on the other. However, stalemate in this case
meant victory for the guerillas. They could wait out. All they needed to do was
survive as a fighting force capable of gathering popular support and intimidating
or assassinating opponents. A tie or even a marginal loss in battle was a victory
for the VC. The United States could continue fighting this type of battle even with
disproportionate expenditure of resources ad infinitum, and indeed did so for the
next decade. However, the four fundamental problems that would become more
evident to more people later in the war were the four problems that would
ultimately bring about defeat. First, to withstand the American army in pitched
battle, even when taking substantially more losses, meant that the VC got
stronger with each engagement. It gained tactical expertise; it established itself
as a viable fighting force; it confiscated American weapons which were far in
advance of their own; it signified to the populace that it meant to stay and meant
161
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to fight; it produced martyrs to inspire young men and women to fill their ranks; it
facilitated South Vietnamese and American casualties; it sapped ARVN morale; it
sapped the resolve of the American public. Second, while the guerillas stayed in
the communities in which they fought, strengthening the bond between them, or
retreated into the nearby hinterlands, the ARVN and Americans withdrew with
nothing having been gained from the battle.
Third, the meta-battle perspective of the ordinary civilian caught in the
conflict was to blame the foreigner (both the Saigon foreigner and the literal
foreigner) for civilian casualties; this perception was greatly exacerbated by the
indiscriminate artillery shelling and aerial bombing that often accompanied
military action. Fourth, because the ARVN and Americans did not want to declare
defeat, they changed the metrics for success: the 'body count' would define
victory, which in turn implanted the incentive to produce corpses, whether
combatants or civilians, that could verify this measure of 'success.' Furthermore,
colonels like Cao knew that cornering the guerillas would force them into more
aggressive action against his forces, which in turn would mean higher casualties.
Since the regime in Saigon needed the army to uphold its own legitimacy and
provide for internal security, it did not want to risk it against an army of peasants
far detached from the confines of the capitol. These were the battlefield
conditions that would eventually lead to the "Americanization" of the war effort,
which in turn would eventually lead back to "Vietnamization" as the American
public tired of the seemingly futile campaign. Vann understood these issues
immediately; he spent the rest of the war making his case in vain. The further
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significance of the story of John Paul Vann is his effort to inform high-level
military and political leaders of the need to reformulate the war strategy, both
strategically and tactically, which is discussed in Indicator IV of the OPM.
All this is not to suggest that with a better military strategy the war could
have been won, nor that a military success would have led to political success.
Both were always unlikely outcomes, and, as we shall see, U.S. foreign
policymakers knew this to a reasonable degree of certainty from an early stage.
1968 became the pivotal year of the war because of the confluence of the two
main consequences of the Tet Offensive. The immediate battlefield effect was
the near complete annihilation of the VC. The long-term effect was the loss of the
most essential weapon in the 'arsenal of democracy:' public opinion. After being
told for years that victory was just around the corner, the American public
realized they were being told lies by their leaders, thus making the average
American turn against the war. Once support was gone, it was never again
recovered; anti-war momentum permanently assumed a critical mass, and
Richard Nixon was elected partially based on the premise that he had a '"secret
plan to end the war." That plan would be "Vietnamization," or the shifting of
responsibility for the war's prosecution to the GVN. The war had come full circle,
and would end with the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the withdrawal of U.S.
forces altogether in 1975 as North Vietnam assumed control of the entire
country, fulfilling Hanoi's promise to someday reunite the quintessentially
nationalistic nation.
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Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences
In terms of the national interest, the most disruptive effect of the war was
an ideational effect. The American military had lost its first major war; its
impenetrable invincibility had been punctured; to many Americans it had lost the
moral high ground. This loss came at the height of the Cold War, deflating the
sense of inevitable victory Americans had come to enjoy as members of the most
successful nation-state since the Peace of Westphalia. And while one of the
ironies of the Vietnam War was that it appeared to come at great loss and yet
hardly appeared to affect the national interest, it had a devastating effect on the
morale of the nation. This strategic irony mirrored the tactical irony of the war:
there was little national interest in Vietnam until a commitment was made to
invent one. Therefore, the effect on the national interest existed once a
commitment was made to the country in the form of unprecedented aerial
bombing, hundreds of thousands of troops, and hundreds of billions of dollars.
These two ironies represent the divergence of the Cold War and its "hot" proxies
and illustrate the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. foreign policy. The ultimate result
was the loss of confidence for a nation that would not fight another major war
until its next foreign-policy blunder, which is the subject of the next chapter (if we
are to term the 1991 Gulf War a policing action).
In the February 1941 issue of Life Magazine, public intellectual and
founder of Life, Time, and Fortune magazines Henry Luce coined the term
"American Century," advocating a global role for U.S. leadership in the world and
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a sharp turn away from the isolationism of the interwar period. 162 His words were
prescient, and the nation listened, promulgating what would later be referred to
as the "Greatest Generation." To many, the national nightmare of Vietnam had
washed away that optimistic internationalist vision. Sociologist, Daniel Bell, wrote
that "the American Century foundered on the shoals of Vietnam." 163 This loss of
national morale was termed "Vietnam Syndrome" in popular and scholarly
discourse over the next two decades, and was to some degree exorcised during
the 1991 Gulf War, which many viewed as successful, before returning with the
"Iraq Syndrome," a term not yet born given that the conflict is still ongoing after
fourteen years of violent conflict. 164 While the exact impact of Vietnam Syndrome
is impossible to quantify, and the U.S. by no means avoided conflict during the
time in which it most affected the national psyche, its presence was
unmistakable. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, policymakers were careful not to
repeat the mistakes of Vietnam. The so-called "Powell Doctrine" that emphasized
'overwhelming force,' multilateralism, and public support was heavily influenced
by the Vietnam War, all three of which were to some degree absent from the war
planning of the 1960's (Powell was himself an infantryman in Vietnam and had
witnessed its failures first-hand).

162

"Henry Luce and 20th Century U.S. Internationalism," Office of the Historian, U.S. Department
of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/internationalism

163

Anthony Burke, Beyond Security, Ethics, and Violence: War Against the Other (New York:
Routledge, 2007), 169.

164 "Vietnam Syndrome" is also used as a catchall term for medical issues sustained by military
personnel deployed to Vietnam.

162

Geoff Simons describes the dialect associated with "Vietnam" as a term
with specified conceptual implications, rather than as a literal country or event:

For many, Vietnam is less a territorial expanse or a political entity,
more a warning, a rebuke, a shibboleth or a metaphor. Thus
Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, the Argentinian revolutionary, wanted to
create 'two, three or more Vietnams'; Afghanistan became 'Russia's
Vietnam,' the Lebanon became 'Israel's Vietnam'; and on 10 August
1996 the influential Moslem cleric Sheikh Mohammed Hussein
Fadlallah warned the United States of a 'new Vietnam' if it attacked
Iran... there was no 'Germany Syndrome', no 'Japan Syndrome', no
'Italy Syndrome', no 'Korea Syndrome' and no 'China Syndrome'
(except in a very different context)—though, as we shall see, there
was a 'Somalia Effect.'165

This led to the effect of "an enervating reluctance to use the American armed
forces to protect U.S. interests around the world." 166 The 'Somalia Effect' to
which the author refers was an echo of Vietnam Syndrome: many accredited the
failure to intervene in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 to the loss of eighteen U.S.
soldiers in Mogadishu less than a year earlier. Indeed, the 'syndrome' was often
compared to the 'effect' in the Clinton Administration's dithering over what to do
with Rwanda; the international community did nothing, and nearly one million
people were slaughtered in one hundred days. Though the author's conclusion—
that "Vietnam forced the United States to refine its pursuit of global hegemony,
with ethical factors continuing to weigh nothing in the scale of realpolitik
calculation"—is a rather cynical one, it does highlight the impact of the event on
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the pursuit of hegemony, whether morally induced or brought about by practical
considerations. The backlash against the Vietnam War would have international
repercussions as well: it would eventually become "the rallying cry of the radical
left throughout Western Europe and North America." 167
Just as much of the justification for intervention in Vietnam was due to the
perception of weakness that another country falling to Communism would create,
perhaps the primary loss in terms of the U.S. national interest was one of
perception. An army of peasants with limited technology and military
sophistication had defeated the full force of the American military and
demonstrated to the rest of the world that a determined Communist-nationalist
army could defeat foreign aggression if it only stood its ground and refused to
capitulate. Thus, in Kissinger's words, "Vietnam is still with us. It has created
doubts about American judgment, about American credibility, about American
power, not only at home but also throughout the world. It has poisoned our
domestic debate. So we paid an exorbitant price for the decisions that were
made in good faith and for good purpose." 168
The "good faith" Kissinger and many other U.S. foreign policymakers at
the heart of the Vietnam War clung to in the years of its aftermath is questionable
on multiple grounds, not the least of which is what the campaign meant to the
U.S. national interest, if anything. In human terms, the harm done in any largescale war in which hundreds of thousands or even millions of people are killed is
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immeasurable, and understandable only to those who are directly affected by it.
The FPE process utilized here means to evaluate the foreign policy in question
as it relates to the national interest. An accounting of casualties may therefore
seem irrelevant to the social-science observer. However, in the context of the
Vietnam War, this is not the case. The anti-war movement across the college
campuses and streets of America indeed gained steam because of the harm
being done to the Vietnamese people, and this movement precipitated the end of
the conflict, at least as far as America was concerned. It was not an uncommon
occurrence for U.S. soldiers to be spat at upon returning from the dangers of
Vietnam; this was unheard of in American history and this sentiment has never
returned to the treatment of U.S. soldiers who once again enjoy the reverence of
a nation, if only in symbolism.
The Vietnam War is therefore singular in American history in terms of the
direct effect between the loss of the war and the sentiment among everyday
Americans that there was an inherently moral problem with perpetuating a
conflict that was killing so many ostensibly innocent people in addition to its
active combatants. The nature of guerilla warfare meant that Vietnamese
civilians were caught in the midst of many of the war's battles, and the extreme
difficulty in identifying and targeting combatants made it impossible for the U.S.
military to avoid civilian casualties, whether by direct targeting out of ignorance of
who the enemy was or by indirect collateral damage from indiscriminate artillery
and aerial bombing. And while intentional massacres by ground forces like that of
My Lai were far from regular occurrences, their presence on American television
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screens made Americans question whether they could claim the moral high
ground for perhaps the first time in their history. It is therefore relevant here to
take a brief accounting of the casualties caused by this war that nobody seemed
to be winning prior to the end of the 'decent interval' and the North's full-scale
invasion of the South in 1975.
Who exactly these people were that the American army was killing is
therefore relevant as well. The VC were highly adept at violence and terrorism,
and to target such actors was perhaps an acceptable 'casualty of war' to the
average American. After all, in the context of Containment, 'spillover' was an
inevitability. The world was in the midst of a Cold War and Vietnam was its hot
landing zone. In the historical development of the remnants of French Indochina,
that spillover was regional. It came in the form of the bombing of Laos and
Cambodia. From the North Vietnamese and PRP side, the war was far more
nationalistic than the United States ever let on. For the fiercely nationalistic
Vietnamese people, the long-term goal was a unified, independent Vietnam, for
which Vietnamese north and south of the 17th parallel had been struggling, often
successfully, for hundreds of years.
For its part, the self-serving GVN viewed virtually all policy matters
through the lens of maintaining governance and the system of bribery,
clientelism, and opposition suppression that allowed it to keep its hold on power,
at least in Saigon and its immediate environs. But for the Americans, Vietnam
was part of "Indochina," which included the French colonies of Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia. "The American commitment to anti-colonialism, seen in some of
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt's pronouncements during World War II,
diminished because Washington deemed it more important to stop Communism
than to champion the cause of independence. Although there was an awareness
that Ho was a popular figure, the United States almost inevitably opposed his
movement because of its Communist leadership and ultimately gave its political,
moral, financial, and material support to the French," as described by historian
Kenton Clymer. 169 This pragmatic attachment to colonialism, fundamentally at
the heart of the American tug-of-war for international identity described in
Chapter 3, made it inevitable that the conflict the United States was to assume in
Vietnam would spill over into Laos and Cambodia. This effect was compounded
by the insecurity in those countries, the international nature of the Communist
materiel supply network from China and the Soviet Union, and the difficult terrain
in the virtually borderless areas on the Vietnam-Laos and Vietnam-Cambodia
borders that posed significant complications in targeting the mountainous and
canopy-laden supply lines of the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Laos and Cambodia had their own independence struggles to deal with.
Cambodia's took form in earnest after the 1942 arrest of two Buddhist monks by
the French, while in Laos nationalists seized the opportunity to begin their
movement when the Japanese displaced the Vichy French government in 1945.
President Eisenhower declared in an NSC meeting on December 31st, 1960,
"We cannot let Laos fall to the Communists even if we have to fight... with our
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allies or without them," given that Laos was "the key to the whole area" and "it
would just be a matter of time until South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Burma would
collapse" and fall into Communist hands. 170 On January 19, 1961, Eisenhower
discussed Laos at length with Kennedy; Vietnam was not even on the agenda.
Relative foreign-policy novice Kennedy viewed the situation through political
expedience, remarking on the whole matter: "Whatever's going to happen in
Laos, an American invasion, a Communist victory or whatever," to get it over with
"before we take over and get blamed for it." While Kennedy "understood that
Laos by itself was of little political or economic interest to the United States, he
considered it symbolically important to the Cold War. An American failure in Laos
would have important negative ramifications elsewhere in the world, he feared,
including elsewhere in Indochina." 171
The years of the Vietnam War bore witness to confusion, tension, and
negotiation between the United States, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as
extensive aerial bombing. In 1963, Norodom Sihanouk, King and later head of
state of Cambodia from 1955-1970, ended American aid in 1963 after the
assassination of GVN President Ngo Dinh Diem. But with or without consent,
bombing of the border regions was an inherent potentiality, given the supply lines
the NVA used to furnish their armies as well as the VC. Historian Alfred McCoy
estimates the amount of bombing in Laos' Plain of Jars: "By war's end, this Plain
of Jars, a small region with poor highland farms and no infrastructure, received
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over three times the total dropped on industrial Japan [during WWII], becoming
the most intensely bombarded place on the face of the planet." 172
If the political necessities of the Cold War were making and unmaking
strange bedfellows in the remnants of French Indochina, so too were
geographical hinterlands become epicenters of the hot wars fought under its
guise: the Plain of Jars became "a strategic prize for both the communist forces
in the caves of Sam Neua Province just to the northeast and the CIA secret army
based at Long Tieng Valley just to the southwest." 173 The amorphous battlefields
of the Vietnam War not only posed complications for military tacticians, but also
for U.S. foreign policymakers for whom moral questions of who to target and how
to target them were reduced to quantifiable units like "structures," "enemy sites,"
"supply vehicles," and the ever-generic "Viet Cong Infrastructure," especially
under the quantification-obsessed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
There was no code under McNamara's obstinately statistical battlefield metrics
for civilian casualties. 174 B-52 bombers are simply not built to target small groups
of individuals, even when assuming the opaque layers of canopy jungle do not
prevent ground forces from identifying those individuals, itself a virtually
impossible endeavor in the netherworld of borderlands comprising the supply-line
warscape. While the American public did eventually find out about the bombing in
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Laos and Cambodia, the secrecy surrounding it delayed the ferocity and scope of
the anti-war movement:

Among the few things that the American public did not know was
that thousands of innocent Laotians died in the bombing and the
terrifying gunship attacks. The gunships, which operated during the
night, unleashed 6,000 rounds per minute and were guided by
sensors that detected the urine of mammals. Thus monkeys, water
buffalo, cattle, guerillas, wandering refugees, and villagers—all
suffered. Under international law, the American action in Laos may
have constituted a war crime. Nor did most Americans know that
the CIA tolerated Vang Pao's control of the heroin trade or that the
intended market for the deadly drug was increasingly American
soldiers in South Vietnam. Under Vang Pao's direction, Air
America, the CIA airline, flew the raw opium to market. Vang Pao's
control over the opium harvest and of food aid supplied through
USAID also gave him enormous power over the Hmong
villagers. 175

The "power over the Hmong villagers" is especially relevant because the Hmong
were fearless warriors that were utilized by "Free World" forces in the struggle
against Communism throughout their native territory, from which there was no
escape. In 1973, ten years after Cambodia had ended its partnership with the
United States, the United States ended its partnership with Laos. It is difficult to
quantify the destruction the Vietnam War had on Laos and Cambodia, but simple
enough to estimate that the use of each as pawns in the battle against
Communism exacerbated the sense of tribalism and cyclical violence that these
countries were already prone to. To be sure, neither was a united Jeffersonian
democracy before the Americans came to town. But the stunted sociopolitical
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development of these countries was relieved in no part by the American
presence. The emergence of the Khmer Rouge during the Vietnam War and
consolidation of power after the Cambodian Civil War were not a direct
consequence of American actions, and in fact the movement was allied with
North Vietnam. But it is not inconceivable that a different American approach in
the rubble of French Indochina would have led to an outcome other than the
most terrible reign of terror since the Holocaust, in which some two million
Cambodians perished in mass executions, starvation and disease.
Although this dissertation focuses on these foreign-policy blunders as they
affect the U.S. national interest, the perspective of the enemy, including their
collective tolerance to withstand intimidation, displacement, imprisonment,
torture, death, and other forms of misery cannot be omitted from this evaluation.
The determination of the NVA and VC to resist the theretofore omnipotent U.S.
military indeed played a major role in limiting the ability of U.S. foreign
policymakers to make progress on their overall strategy. A survey of Vietnamese
casualties as a result of the conflict paints a picture of a people ravaged by war
yet unrelenting in their resolve, consistent with what might be expected from a
nation that had been successfully fighting against foreign aggressors from the
Chinese to the French for centuries. Vietnamese Casualties of the war are
therefore rather crudely classified under this Indicator, because the Indicator is
designed to assess undesired consequences and collateral side effects of the
foreign-policy action, which those killed in the Vietnam War inevitably became on
government charts.
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Although there was a careful accounting of the casualties sustained by
foreign armies, there are no confident estimates of Vietnamese casualties during
the "American War." Numbers from one to three million are frequently
reported. 176 One million Communist combatants are commonly thought to have
lost their lives, along with 250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers. 177 However, there
are no reliable figures to this effect. 178 The North Vietnamese government had no
more motivation to admit to the staggering cost of war dead than did the U.S.
government. One study utilized a demographically controlled model to estimate
total Vietnamese war deaths between 1965-1975 at 655,000 adult males,
143,000 adult females, and 84,000 children, totaling 882,000. 179 The staggering
numbers of war dead indicate perhaps as much as any other figure the extent to
which military force failed to break the will of the enemy. In terms of long-term
effects on the population, a 2002 study found that U.S. bombing did not have
negative impacts on local poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure,
literacy, or population density; however, a 2010 study found the opposite,

176

Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 1978), 450.

177

Charles Hirschman, Samuel Preston, and Vu Manh Loi, "Vietnamese Casualties During the
American War: A New Estimate," Population and Development Review Vol. 21, No. 4 (December
1995), 783-812.

178

Since there were no reliable figures during the war, confident assessments have been difficult
to quantify to an exact degree since the war. For some estimates, see Thomas Thayer, War
Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Wiliam
Turley, The Second Indochina War (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008); "Vietnam Declares
War Dead," Associated Press, April 3, 1995; and "Power Kills" website maintained by the Political
Science Department at the University of Hawaii:
http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB6.1B.GIF
179

Hirschman, Preston, and Loi 1995, 806.

172

discovering a correlation between the number of "war invalids" and economic
stagnation. 180
The potential for civilian targeting facilitated by the incentive to tally enemy
dead is described by Philip Caputo in A Rumor of War:

General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition also had an important
effect on our behavior. Our mission was not to win terrain or seize
positions, but simply to kill: to kill Communists and to kill as many of
them as possible. Stack 'em like cordwood. Victory was a high
body-count, defeat a low kill-ratio, war a matter of arithmetic. The
pressure on unit commanders to produce enemy corpses was
intense, and they in turn communicated it to their troops. This led to
such practices as counting civilians as Viet Cong. "If it's dead and
it's Vietnamese, it's VC," was a rule of thumb in the bush. It is not
surprising, therefore, that some men acquired a contempt for
human life and a predilection for taking it. 181

At the height of the war in late 1967, General Westmoreland continued to insist
that the "cross-over point" at which "North Vietnamese casualties exceeded their
ability to replace them" was on the horizon, in fact claiming publicly multiple times
that it may have already been reached. 182 It would never be reached, and
Westmoreland in his memoirs would later blame hamstringing politicians in
Washington, D.C. for failing to achieve the objectives he felt his futile war of
attrition could have.
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Criterion III. Cost
Given that none of the primary objectives of the war were met, the extent
to which it can be classified as a blunder is inexorably compounded by its
enormous cost in political, financial, and military terms. Between 1964 and
August 15, 1973, the U.S. Air Force expended 6,162,000 tons of ordnance over
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, primarily in Vietnam, with the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps expending an additional 1,500,000 tons, compared to a total of
2,150,000 tons of aerially originated explosives in all of the Second World War in
both the European and Pacific theaters. 183 In Laos alone, a periphery of the war,
$1.5 million a day was spent on a bombing load in eight-minute frequencies over
a ten-year average, totaling two million tons, which in itself surpasses WWII
ordnance in the European theater. 184 (Laos still has 80 million unexploded bombs
dropped by the U.S. Air Force that continue to maim farm animal and civilian
alike). 185 The Vietnam War was therefore by far the most intense aerial bombing
campaign in the history of warfare. Ultimately, this unprecedented military might
affected neither the morale nor the proliferation and mobility of the enemy in any
decisive way, as the supply chains of the Ho Chi Minh Trail needed only to be
shifted a few kilometers here and there to adjust to the predictable paths of
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regular bombing campaigns. The war cost American taxpayers $686 billion in
FY2008 dollars, peaking at 2.3% of GDP in 1968, an enormous cost in absolute
terms but one the prolific U.S. economy could withstand without significant
structural adjustments. 186
2,594,000 U.S. military personnel served within the borders of South
Vietnam in one capacity or another. 187 58,220 U.S. military personnel perished in
the war, 61% of whom were aged 21 or younger. 38,224 of these deaths were
attributed to the Army, 14,884 to the Marine Corps, 2,559 to the Navy, 2,586 to
the Air Force, and 7 to the Coast Guard. 188 Roughly one-third of those killed were
drafted. Table 2 gives an overview of American casualties: 189
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Table 2: U.S. Casualties of the Vietnam War

Americans were far more concerned with the lives of other Americans
than with the financial burden of the war, which was harmful to the U.S. economy
but not substantial enough to be debilitating. While the "Vietnam Syndrome"
discussed in Criterion II lasted for a great many years, it was more likely due to
the fact that America failed than the fact that it expended great financial
resources in the battle to defeat Vietnamese Communists. In other words,
despite an alternative undercurrent of isolationism, Americans have always
shown a willingness to go to war and pay a great cost for a cause believed to be
worth fighting for. What Americans were neither prepared for nor accustomed to
was to lose such a monumental military campaign, especially against a perceived
Lilliputian such as North Vietnam, and to lose so many soldiers in the process.
A number of factors all but guaranteed that the cost of the war would grow
as the years of escalation advanced. There was, of course, the obvious cost of
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maintaining and supplying more troops all the way around the world; hundreds of
thousands were more costly than tens of thousands. But certain aspects of the
military strategy in Vietnam built upscaling costs in them. In 1965, when the
buildup was taking form, General Westmoreland shifted away from the extant
strategy of protecting the population to seeking out the enemy wherever he lay,
in order to seize the battle initiative and ferret out VC and NVA wherever they
materialized en masse. He did not abandon pacification (pacification is discussed
in OPM Indicator III), but he did reformulate the war effort from defensive
protection to offensive maneuvers, shifting the aim from strategic defense against
NVA and VCI incursions to aggression to seek out and eliminate their forces, or
"search and destroy," as it came to be known. He instituted a three-phase plan
that would utilize the increasing number of troops in an increasingly offensive
capacity. First, he would stunt the NVA offensive in the central highlands in order
to stop their momentum. He would then use the twenty-four battalions that would
be at his disposal in 1966 to secure the capitol region, the delta provinces, and
other key areas of the conflict. He envisioned victory in 1968, when "the
incremental attrition of enemy strength would make the war too costly and force
the enemy to seek a negotiated settlement," thus fixing the number of forces to
the expectation of success as the buildup became fully implemented:

The arrival of North Vietnamese and American combat forces in the
summer of 1965 transformed the nature of the war in South
Vietnam. By the end of the summer, the enemy's combat strength,
which had steadily increased in 1964 and early 1965, reached an
estimated 221,000, including 55 NVA battalions and 105 VC
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battalions. At the end of July, President Johnson announced plans
to deploy forty-four more army and marine battalions, increasing
American military strength in South Vietnam to 175,000 by the end
of the year. The president had decided to send regular U.S. Army
units and not to mobilize any reserve units. It was no longer just a
struggle to defeat Viet Cong insurgents. A war between
conventional North Vietnamese forces that had entered South
Vietnam and American ground forces, the so-called main force war,
was superimposed on the continuing political struggle for the
countryside. MACV changed from a staff originally concerned with
advisory duties to a headquarters, dubbed "Pentagon East," that
increasingly concentrated on operations. As U.S. Army and Marine
Crops units arrived in 1965, pacification became known as the
"other war," a patronizing usage that stigmatized the program's
status as a noble but failing endeavor that was no longer the main
event. 190

The "other war" was actually a commonly used official term in military and CIA
documents, signifying the program to "win the hearts and minds" of the
population by protecting it from the influence and intimidation of the VCI. The
"main event" indeed changed dramatically in 1965, due to the intensification of
combat, as described by Colonel Hal Moore recounting the Battle of the Ia Drang
Valley:

Now came the body count. From the beginning of the fight I had
known that higher headquarters would eventually want to know
what damage we had done to the enemy. So after each major
action in this battle, hating it, I asked my company commanders for
their best estimates of enemy killed. With the battle raging back and
forth over three days and two nights, it was anything but orderly.
There was no referee to call time out for a body count. We did the
best we could to keep a realistic count of enemy dead. In the end it
added up to 834 dead by body count, with an additional 1,215
estimated killed and wounded by artillery, air attacks, and aerial
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rocket attacks. On my own I cut the figure back to 634, a personal
allowance for the confusion and fog of war, and let the 1,215
estimated stand. We captured and evacuated six enemy prisoners.
On our side, we had lost 79 Americans killed in action, 121
wounded, and none missing. But the body count on both sides,
tragic as it was, did not go to the heart of the matter. What had
happened here in these three days was a sea change in the
Vietnam War. For the first time since Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the
North Vietnamese Army had taken the field in division strength.
People's Army soldiers were pouring down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in
unprecedented numbers, and now they had intervened directly and
powerfully on the battlefield in South Vietnam. Seventy-nine
Americans had been killed in just three days in X-Ray. The cost of
America's involvement in this obscure police action had just risen
dramatically. Vietnam was now a whole new ball game militarily,
politically, and diplomatically. Decisions would have to be made in
Washington and Hanoi, and they would have to be made soon. 191

Colonel Moore understood exactly how the war was evolving to the NVA division
level even in real-time, just as John Paul Vann had understood the significance
of the VC fighting a pitched battle and holding its own at Ap Bac. Moore
understood the misperception involved in measuring success by enemy dead, as
well as the connection between that strategy of attrition and the implication that
American war dead would inevitably come to assume the other side of that
metric. A war of attrition was a two-sided coin, even with a 10:1 kill ratio and
superior firepower. When Ho Chi Minh estimated "You will kill ten of our men,
and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who tire of it," the
calculation was perhaps more scientific than even Ho realized.
The first chapter of Colonel Harry Summers' book American Strategy in
Vietnam: A Critical Analysis, "Tactical Victory, Strategic Defeat," opens with a
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quote that Colonel Summers received as Chief, Negotiations Division, U.S.
Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team, from Colonel Tu, Chief, North
Vietnamese (DRV) Delegation, on April 25, 1975, after the North had taken over
Saigon:

"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the
American Colonel.
The North Vietnamese Colonel pondered this remark a moment.
"That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant." 192

Colonel Summers then briefly alludes to Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts' politicalbureaucratic study (discussed in the Part II), which asserts that the system
worked, but nonetheless failed to achieve its objectives. Some military leaders
lauded the contribution of the military effort as an "unqualified success" if its job
were to "organize, train and equip active duty and reserve forces," given that "the
Army doesn't make strategy," leaving grand strategy to the statesmen and
figuring out tactics on its own. Repeatedly invoking the military philosophy of
Clausewitz in his 1832 publication On War, such as the need to "develop a
theory that maintains a balance among what he calls the trinity of war—the
people, the government, and the army," Summers describes the 1832 work as
"the most modern source available" (emphasis in the original) and "untainted by
today’s bias."
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Summers blames both military tacticians for failing to develop a viable
strategy and failing to communicate strategic imperatives to the FPDM officials in
Washington, D.C., as well as the negligence of those officials. Specifically, he
blames the war strategy for failing to attack the real enemy, the NVA, rather than
the "near" enemy of the VC, who were directed and supplied by North Vietnam.
His obsession with Clausewitz obscures the modern complexities of this war for
preponderance with an unlikely Lilliputian. Yet, quite astutely, he recognizes that
the Vietnam War was fundamentally a problem of American society: even in the
time of Clausewitz it was necessary to maintain support for the war at home. The
memoirs of the military men so involved in the Vietnam War illustrate how the
correlation between its human cost and the confusion over how to evaluate it
combined to lead the strategy into blunder.

Criterion IV. Availability and consideration of alternatives
It is a common misperception that leaders are dragged into a 'quagmire'
by circumstances, political demands, security concerns, or other inevitable
imperatives, and that therefore we should not retroactively assess the very
difficult decisions forced upon them by the constraints and demands of an
anarchical, dangerous international system. Indeed, this is one of the perceptions
scholars cite in dissuading against FPE in the first place. This perception is not
only false, but it also carries with it the effect of providing excuses to future
leaders that their actions will be accepted to the point of exculpation. This
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chapter gives examples of this misperception in the scholarly literature, while
also referencing the counter-literature that takes the opposite approach. This
section addresses how the alternatives of advisory and escalation were settled
upon as the advisory period shifted in 1964 to a full-scale military buildup. The
experience of the Vietnam War shatters the illusion that FPDM officials rationally
pursue the national interest. At the same time, it shows how a nation can be
united in blunder, in that the policy that shows clearly harmful trends from an
early stage is settled upon in spite of those trends because the national
consensus precludes a more prudent course of action.
Two factors thus become clear in any study of the Vietnam War which are
essential to the overall research objective of this dissertation. First, U.S. foreign
policymakers did understand the very difficult circumstances in which the U.S.
military would find itself if a full-scale war were to be the alternative settled upon.
They knew that success was going to be hard to come by, and settled on
escalation anyway because the "loss" of Vietnam was never accepted as a viable
alternative. The grand strategy of preponderance fueled the refusal to accept that
'Indochina' would fall into Communist hands. One of the many ironies of the war
was the contradiction between the understanding that victory would be very hard
to come by, especially when there were no metrics with which to evaluate it, and
the overwhelming confidence that the invincible American military was incapable
of losing in battle. In fact, it did not lose a single battle, but still lost the war.
Second, this alternative was settled upon as a national consensus,
including incorporating the preferences of Congressional leaders and the
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American populace, rather than being a hijacking of foreign policy by a faction of
foreign-policy hawks that somehow clawed their talons into the Oval Office or a
terrible FPDM fallacy by a few 'wise men.' This was a national blunder involving
every aspect of American society and it cannot be attributed to a small group of
misguided leaders. That said, the FPDM officials that made the mistakes that led
to blunder must be held accountable for their actions, even if they were in fact
pursuing the national consensus (if not the national interest—a distinction
discussed throughout this dissertation).
A state's foreign-policy agenda is determined and operationalized based
on what alternatives are available to the policymaker. The grand strategy of the
United States necessitated action in any part of the world in which Communism
could gain a foothold, even in the periphery. Because neither U.S. foreign
policymakers nor the American people were content to sit back and allow further
countries to 'fall' into Communist hands, U.S. leaders determined that the
alternative of doing nothing and allowing a potential Communist takeover of
Vietnam was neither politically nor morally viable. Thus the alternative that would
have precluded this tragedy from ever occurring—that of staying out of the
country militarily altogether, or at least limiting intervention to an advisory role—
never received the attention it needed in order to be considered a viable option.
There are those who point to the military strategy as being the culprit, and not
without reason. But any strategy short of attacking North Vietnam and perhaps
even China with nuclear weapons would have proven insufficient in the face of
the determined enemy.
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While there is now general consensus in both the scholarly and popular
literature that the Vietnam War was a blunder from which there was little to gain
even in victory, there is considerable debate over the extent to which nonintervention in Vietnam was considered by foreign policymakers and the extent to
which the Kennedy Administration differed from the Johnson Administration in its
calculations. In The Bitter Heritage, historian and Kennedy advisor Arthur
Schlesinger argued that the Vietnam debacle was "a tragedy without villains," as
the United States slowly began to be embroiled in "a land war in Asia—a war
which no president, including President Johnson, desired or intended." 193 This is
a shortsighted view of the circumstances. It may be true that no president desired
it, but it is not true that no president intended it. Who, if not a presidential
administration, can set and shape policy alternatives? If no president intended a
war, how did the war come about? At the center of this debate over to what
extent the various presidents involved held sway over the availability of
alternatives is whether Eisenhower and Kennedy had so marooned Vietnam
policy as to place it beyond the scale of de-escalation.
As Gary Hess describes, "this interpretation, which is reflected in much of
scholarly literature, substantially exonerates America's leaders as reasonable
men acting prudently on the basis of existing assumptions and projections, but
with tragic consequences" (emphasis mine). Hess presents a distinction between
what he terms the "turning point argument" and the "Cold War imperative
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interpretation," with the former contending that Kennedy's exceptional "prudence"
would have prevented a large-scale military intervention in Vietnam and the latter
contending that Kennedy was a Cold War warrior like any other that held no
special trait that would have prevented it. (This debate mirrors the changecontinuity debate discussed in Chapter 3). Unsurprisingly, those close to
Kennedy, such as Schlesinger and Robert Dallek, Kennedy's preeminent
biographer, argue that he was determined not to commit troops en masse to
Vietnam, due to the tenuous circumstances in which the country and the GVN
were attempting to survive. David Kaiser asserts that Kennedy had determined
that if Diem's regime became untenable, the United States "would not regard
South Vietnam as a vital American interest" and would therefore allow it to fall. 194
But as Hess notes, "although Kennedy talked of the need for the Vietnamese to
fight their own wars, he actually took steps that pulled the United States much
more deeply militarily and politically into the survival of South Vietnam." 195 The
same is true of Johnson, who proclaimed on multiple occasions that he wanted
Vietnam to fend for itself, and yet he chose to escalate troop levels into the
hundreds of thousands.
Just as the continuity in U.S. foreign policy argument discussed in Chapter
3 is more compelling than the change argument, the "Cold War imperative"
approach is more compelling as well. If the historiography of the Vietnam War
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has proved anything, it is that many of the pitfalls of a potential full-scale war in a
former French colony were all too clear even to the Eisenhower Administration,
which oversaw the unsuccessful French defense falter at Dien Bien Phu in 1954
and thus inherited the "problem" of Vietnam for itself. Eisenhower, having written
in his diary, "I am convinced that no type of military victory is possible in this type
of theater," pledged only financial and air-power support to the French, adding
$385 million in aid in addition to the $2 billion from the Truman Administration,
which was willing to commit troops to Indochina but unable to do so with so many
troops garrisoned in Korea. 196
Despite the refrain of those who would absolve U.S. foreign policymakers
of the colossal blunder that Vietnam ultimately became, as a state, across
leaders, very few prominent figures involved in U.S. foreign policy at the highest
levels were prepared to allow Saigon to fall into Communist hands, even if the
threat of such an inevitability necessitated a military intervention, precisely the
course these leaders charted from the very beginning. Perhaps none of them
desired it, but by dismissing the possibility of 'Indochina' falling into Communist
hands, they forced their own hands toward that intention. The leaders ignored the
local realities of Vietnam because they chose instead to focus on the bigger
picture, which is to say Containment policy and the total demonization of
Communism

everywhere.

Although

this
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assassination of Kennedy, it was also true to a certain extent in his
administration.

Whether Kennedy would have withdrawn U.S. forces from Vietnam,
as some have speculated, cannot be known. He probably would not
have. He was as determined as Eisenhower had been to support or
to build a viable state in South Vietnam opposed to Communist
North Vietnam. But just as Kennedy should not be commended for
planning to end the U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam,
Eisenhower should not be congratulated for avoiding one. Both
warrant plaudits putting the braces on more zealous, reckless
advisers. Yet neither demonstrated the foresight or political courage
to make a decision based on the realistic assessment that there
never would be a viable state of South Vietnam and that a unified
Vietnam under Communist leadership would not threaten the
United States or its allies. For different reasons, Eisenhower and
Kennedy would likely have responded to the challenges in Vietnam
that confronted Lyndon Johnson differently and more effectively
than he did. Yet neither can escape responsibility for their role in
forcing those challenges on their successor. 197

Even this passage from the well-researched Richard Immerman, from the
Columbia History of the Vietnam War, attempts to make a decisive projection of
what Kennedy would have done without actually providing convincing evidence
that he would have done anything differently than anyone else, because there is
no convincing evidence—in fact, there is evidence to support either claim.
Kennedy's statements on Vietnam and Laos were just as contradictory as every
other leader's.
On November 22, 1963, when Kennedy's assassination made Johnson
president, there were 16,000 troops stationed in Vietnam, not a meager number
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by any stretch, but one that would soon be dwarfed over the course of the next
two years. Once it became clear in 1964 that the government of South Vietnam
could not stand on its own, there were essentially two options in Vietnam: commit
troops en masse or permit the loss of South Vietnam, and potentially other
neighboring countries comprising the former territory of French Indochina, to
Communist expansion. McNamara summarized three alternatives in 1964 as
"leave the country with as little loss as possible, maintain present force and lose
slowly, or add 100,000 men—recognizing that number may not be enough—and
adding more next year." 198

Over the course of 1964, Johnson steadily

began to Americanize the war effort on a scale that would eventually become
monumental. What turned into a gradual buildup of forces was the result of the
foreign policymaking establishment deciding that neither pulling out nor assuming
responsibility for the war was a viable option. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
griped "that the consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad that
we simply must find a away of making our present policy work." 199 The "present
policy" that ensued consisted of slowly ramping up offensive combative
operations against the VC and initiating an aerial bombing campaign against
North Vietnam to punish aggression against South Vietnam. This pseudostrategy, while destined to fail strategically in the long term, achieved two short-
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term tactical aims: it placated the Cold War hawks at home, and sent a message
to the VC that attacks would be met in kind.
Unfortunately, what this alternative did was to institutionalize a war of
attrition in which the NVA and VC became more motivated each time one of its
own was killed, while the United States became less so and at the same time
less willing to pull out. Roger Hilsman describes this stay-the-course philosophy
with regard to the Kennedy Administration: "In an interesting example of one
type of gambit in the politics of Washington policy-making, the President avoided
a direct 'no' to the proposal for introducing troops to Vietnam. He merely let the
decision slide, at the same time ordering the government to set in motion all the
preparatory steps for introducing troops."

200

Meanwhile, President Diem's

promise to enact democratic reforms in exchange for American advisors,
technicians, mechanics, B-26 and T-28 helicopters and their pilots turned up
empty as he continued on with business as usual, maintaining the status quo on
the GVN end. There seemed to be no way out, but only because nobody would
devise an alternative that would incorporate the possibility of 'losing' Vietnam.
Ultimately, the story of Vietnam was not so much about what alternatives
were available, but how foreign policymakers justified the need to adhere to the
status quo of neither winning nor losing amongst themselves and to the
American voting public. U.S. war planners and statesmen had every opportunity
to rethink the strategy in Vietnam due to the low intensity of American
involvement during the advisory years of the conflict. In sum, U.S. foreign
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policymakers set their own alternatives at only two: advise, assist, and hope for
the best, which prevailed during the Kennedy Administration until his
assassination, and assume and protect, which prevailed in the Johnson
Administration once the GVN appeared unable to stand on its own. Because of
his assassination, exactly what Kennedy may have done will forever remain a
counterfactual. What did happen was that Johnson chose to "Americanize" the
war effort in Vietnam rather than allow it to fall into Communist hands.
There is a tendency in the literature to place undue emphasis on the
personal stubbornness of Johnson's and Nixon's myopia in dealing with the
Vietnam War, and indeed both were myopically stubborn in conceptualizing and
implementing their hopes and fears as far as the conflict was concerned. Many
accounts of the Vietnam War focusing on presidential decision-making point to
the character deficiencies of the two principle presidential protagonists, and not
without substantial evidence. For example, David Halberstam's The Best and the
Brightest quotes Johnson as saying, "I don't want loyalty. I want loyalty. I want
him to kiss my ass in Macy's window at high noon and tell me it smells like roses.
I want his pecker in my pocket." 201 Donald Schmidt assesses that "a 'Caligula
Syndrome' haunted the Executive Mansion as Lyndon Johnson overwhelmed all
advisors," leading to an environment in which "advisors denigrated into
sycophants as the Johnson ego swept all before it." 202 In fact, entire volumes
have been dedicated simply to illustrate the FPDM folly of the Johnson
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Administration (Because President Nixon took power after escalation had come
to fruition, the line of inquiry is slightly less intriguing with regard to that
administration). In Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, H.R. McMaster declares, "The War in
Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of The New
York Times or on the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C." 203
While the low-hanging fruit of the arrogance, obstinacy, and cognitive
biases of the faulty FPDM of the Johnson Administration no doubt contributed to
the strategic folly in Vietnam, it does not account for the whole picture. Although
it is true to a certain degree that 'yes-men' were valued in the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations as they are to a certain degree in any leadership group, the
extent to which this philosophy informed war planning has been exaggerated.
The central problem of the strategy was that the nation, not just the president and
his cabinet, had an appetite to fight Communism militarily, at least until 1968.
Larry Berman demonstrates the case in Planning a Tragedy that the failure of
policy in Vietnam was not an isolated symptom of a particular, ephemeral FPDM
ill but rather was seen as a weapon in the arsenal of preponderance that could
hit Communism with force rather than words alone. At some point Americans
needed to weaponize the lofty rhetoric of the Cold War or risk the self-emplaced
label of cowardice; Vietnam was as good a place as any. President Johnson
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explained as much when he addressed the nation in April 1965 at Johns Hopkins
University:

The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is
never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to
prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia—as we did in
Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no
further..." Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam, and
its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves—only that
the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country
in their own way. 204

Privately and among aides and small groups of journalists, he would characterize
the Cold War and its hot proxies in cruder terms. "If you let a bully come into your
front yard one day, the next day he will be on your porch and the day after that
he'll rape your wife in your own bed." 205 After bombing North Vietnam in 1964, he
declared, "I didn't just screw Ho Chi Minh, I cut his pecker off." 206 When asked
about why he would be successful in Vietnam, Johnson "unzipped his fly, drew
out his substantial organ, and declared, 'This is why.'" 207
In this way, National Security Advisor to both President Kennedy and
President Johnson McGeorge Bundy, whom the term "the best and the brightest"
was named for, estimated that "Kennedy didn't want to be dumb," but "Johnson
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didn't want to be a coward." 208 Bundy therefore concludes that Kennedy would
never have allowed escalation to happen had he survived long enough to make
that decision. While he is far from the only FPDM official to make that case, any
account that focuses exclusively on the personality or foreign-policy preferences
of the president omits the majority of the motivations and justifications for a war
in Vietnam. The sociopolitical causes of this national blunder cannot be
constrained to a small group of people. It was in large part the result of the
pursuit of preponderance and its theoretical employment of Containment,
especially in a region in which the United States was already invested.

Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes
The Vietnam War was being fought in the minds of U.S. policymakers long
before American soldiers were ever deployed to the deltas, jungles, and
highlands of Vietnam. Of the three case studies examined in this dissertation, the
case of Vietnam is most heavily influenced by the international context. The Cold
War affected every aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, it defined the
image America had of itself as the hegemonic defender of freedom in every
corner of the globe, the world's only indispensible nation, without which the 'Free
World' would inevitably succumb to the barbarities of heathenism and
Communism. The question, in terms of policy, was never whether Communism
or Soviet expansionism were evil or needed to be expelled from the earth. This
was taken as a given. Instead, policymakers needed to find a way to satisfy the
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American impulse to purge the world of this scourge most effectively using finite
resources as resourcefully as possible. They ended up doing the exact opposite
of this. The answer to the question of why and how the United States instead
ended up squandering 58,220 U.S. troops and $686 billion in the process of
losing its first major war is therefore found in the American self-image as the
global defender of the 'Free World.'
The rationalization for Vietnam policy—that Vietnam was at that time the
frontier of the sacred battle against Communism and to abandon the freedomloving people of South Vietnam was in effect to abandon the perimeter of the
'Free World'—was repeatedly invoked by virtually every major political and
military leader of the era involved in the campaign. Ironically, the massive
commitment that accompanied knotting the global lens of the Cold War so tightly
with the effort in Vietnam may have been what doomed the war from the outset.
Not only was Vietnam the wrong place to pick a fight with Communism given the
ineptitude of the effete GVN and the strength and following of Hanoi, but it used
resources in a way that meant the ends of anti-Communism and the means of
military expenditure became inversely related in this anti-nationalist campaign.
To be sure, the military strategy in Vietnam failed. But to view the Vietnam
War as a failure of military strategy obscures the historical context and the
division within the American self-conception. To view this tragic event in
American history, as many analyses do, dismissing the historical context
obfuscates the larger picture with which policymakers made their calculations,
practical or not. Just as the battlefields of the Cold War found seedlings in the
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ashes of World War II, so too did the Vietnamese people transform their struggle
to expel French colonialism into a struggle to expel American invasion. One of
the most glaring oversights of war planning was the portrayal of the Vietnamese
peasant as weak and incapable of mounting any meaningful resistance against a
modern American army, even when acknowledging the French collapse at Dien
Bien Phu in 1954. As far back as Yalta, President Roosevelt did not understand
the devout history of Vietnamese nationalism, saying that "the Indochinese were
people of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese, and were not warlike,"
adding that "France had done nothing to improve the natives since she had the
colony." 209 While Roosevelt, still in the midst of the fervor over the wartime
campaign of freeing the peoples of the Earth, retained more sympathy for those
living under the yoke of colonialism than would his Cold Warrior successors, his
was but part of a long series of underestimations of the historical sense of
nationalism that would become among the U.S. military's fiercest obstacles
during the Vietnam War. This nationalism transcended the 17th parallel.
After 1954, U.S. foreign policymakers thus "inherited" the problem of
Vietnam, realizing that financial assistance alone would not prevent Communist
victory. Meanwhile, to the Vietnamese people, North and South alike, the polar
opposite view was taken: the average Vietnamese cared little about the
international context, and much more about their ability to pursue their daily lives
without interference from meddlers, whether the meddlers hailed from the other
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side of Vietnam, a distant state in Saigon indifferent to their daily struggles, or an
outside power intent on stemming the flow of Communism from Moscow or
Beijing.
That the country divided into two, and subsequently fought what was in
effect a civil war with a superpower taking one side, says much more about
Vietnam than it does about the Cold War, as was true in every Cold War
battlefield from Cuba to Uganda. This discrepancy between the views of the
outside power and those of the local people, even in the virtually stateless areas
of rural South Vietnam, precluded a workable partnership between the United
States and the GVN, just as it has in various countries in which an outside power
interferes in the internal affairs of another to advance its own objectives. Even
where a 'puppet' state is emplaced, the outside power often finds it difficult to
advance its own agenda, since locals have an agenda of their own. This is
especially true when the local opposition can count on outside support, as the
Soviets would later learn in Afghanistan.
U.S. foreign policymakers were correct about one thing: North Vietnam
never would have accepted even a neutral South Vietnam, although if it had
remained neutral war may have been delayed and less costly. What we now
know about the domino theory, and what U.S. foreign policymakers failed to
understand at the time, was the extent to which every state in the international
system sought to advance its own interests above all else. Thousands of years of
realist international-relations evidence, hundreds of years of state-centered
international-relations evidence, and decades of modern realist IR scholarship
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should have informed both American and Soviet understanding of the desired
autonomy of even Lilliputians, but neither fully grasped this interminable social
phenomenon. Although the concepts of state sovereignty and the national
interest are well known fundamentals of realist theory, they seem to have been
overlooked by strategy planners in Washington whose tunnel vision lumped all
Communism into one category of evil. Communist countries around the world not
only competed with each other along traditional balance-of-power lines, but also
for influence in foreign insurgencies and access to markets and political systems
throughout the developing world. Still, in the Cold War between the West and
Communism, every country lost into enemy hands indeed fed the myth that the
enemy had to be confronted or it would continue to expand.
One of the great ironies of the war was that the war itself became the
stakes: there were very little stakes until the decision to commit was made, at
which time victory became paramount because of the refusal to accept defeat.
The 'investment trap' had the effect of increasing the cost of the war while
increasing the scope of it on that cost alone. The strategic effect of the South
being overrun by the North was nonzero, but it was neither significant in the
larger picture of the international system. State Department Official Chester
Cooper commented in the spring of 1965, just as the buildup was taking shape,
"The 75,000 American troops in Vietnam were now a hostage. They represented
too large a force to pull out without a tremendous loss of prestige, yet they were
too small a combat force to take over the burden of the fighting from the clearly
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ineffectual South Vietnamese forces." 210 Cooper, who also served on the NSC,
adeptly illustrates the groupthink aspect of Vietnam thinking:

During the process I would frequently fall into a Walter Mitty-like
fantasy. When my turn came, I would rise to my feet slowly, look
around the room and then directly look at the President, and say
very quietly and emphatically, 'Mr. President, gentlemen, I most
definitely do not agree.' But I was removed from my trance when I
heard the President's voice saying, 'Mr. Cooper, do you agree?'
And out would come a 'Yes, Mr. President, I agree.' 211

Yet it was not groupthink that led to the tragedy of Vietnam. There simply was no
way to reconcile the refusal to 'lose' Vietnam and the acceptance that it was not
worth mass American casualties.
A passage from President Nixon's memoir displays the higher level of
abstraction that the war permanently fell victim to:

While the path to the Chinese Summit had unfolded relatively
smoothly, the way to the Soviet Summit was strewn with pitfalls.
During the first few months of 1972, our intelligence indicated that
vast quantities of Soviet arms were pouring into North Vietnam. "I
think that what offends me most about the Soviets is their utter lack
of subtlety," Kissinger said when we learned this. "They're just
trying to blacken China's eyes because of your trip. They want to
increase their influence in Hanoi, but they don't see the danger of
giving new toys to the North Vietnamese fanatics." On January 25, I
wrote a letter to Brezhnev informing him of my speech that night
and stating, "The Soviet Union should understand that the United
States would have no choice but to react strongly to actions by the
North Vietnamese which are designed to humiliate us. Such
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developments would be to no one's benefit and would serve to
complicate the international situation." 212

Lost in this international-system level of analysis is the situation in Vietnam itself,
which had of course been quite tenuous for some nine years. Nixon then
comments on his personal FPDM process with regard to the U.S. national
interest in Vietnam:

I pointed out that I had withdrawn over 500,000 troops from
Vietnam. I had shown the greatest restraint when the North
Vietnamese began their massive buildup in March, because I did
not want anything to affect the summit. But when the North
Vietnamese actually invaded South Vietnam, I had no choice but to
react strongly. "The General Secretary remarked earlier that some
people may have wondered whether the action I took last month
was because of irritation," I said. "If that were the case, I would be a
very dangerous man in the position I am in. But that is not the case.
On the contrary, my decision was taken in cold objectivity. That is
the way I always act, having in mind the consequences and the
risks." 213

This "cold objectivity" with which he described his FPDM was quite a departure
for the man who had confided in his Chief of Staff, H.R. Hadelman, "I call it the
Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the
point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them
that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't
restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button' and
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Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace." 214 Perhaps
following Machiavelli's advice that it can sometimes be "a very wise thing to
simulate madness," this was one of his confounding responses to the maddening
stalemate of the war and the feeling of helplessness brought about by a strategic
inability to achieve victory and a political-expedient inability to withdraw. 215
In the minds of U.S. foreign policymakers there clearly was some kind of
connection between Vietnam and the broader Cold War, but what exactly was it?
Kissinger coined a concept to describe the connection between the Soviet Union
as the epicenter of the global Cold War and Vietnam, which he termed "linkage."
Nixon had argued publicly in his 1968 campaign that that the Soviet Union was
"the key" to getting some kind of settlement achieved in Vietnam. Kissinger, for
his part, believed that the "proper incentives" were "not yet in place" for the
Soviets to have enough of a stake in desiring an American withdrawal. As the
war had drawn on, Hanoi had gained technical expertise, weaponry, resolve, and
confidence, and therefore had become less reliant on its overseers in Beijing and
Moscow; this all while continuing to receive arms and support from both, given
that neither wanted to relinquish a foothold in the country to the other or allow
Hanoi to slip completely from their grasp. Kissinger's biographer, Walter
Isaacson, describes Kissinger's concept of "linkage" as a "variegation" of Nixon's
focus on Moscow:
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American policies toward the Soviet Union on various issues—
trade, arms control, Vietnam, etc.—should be linked. In the crudest
sense, this meant using trade on arms agreements as bargaining
levers to extract Soviet help on Vietnam. But in a subtler sense,
linkage was a way to assure that policy reflected reality. For
example, it would be unrealistic to expect great progress in arms
control at the same time as there was increased Soviet-American
tension over regional wars, such as Vietnam. By acknowledging
these linkages, Washington could create a framework of incentives
and penalties that would, in theory, make it in Moscow's interest to
be helpful on Vietnam. Linkage was a policy that played to
Kissinger's intellectual strengths: it appealed to a person who could
conjure up the connections and motivations that linked far-flung
events. That type of thinking came naturally to someone who was
both a brilliant conceptualizer and slightly conspiratorial in outlook,
who could feel the connections the way a spider senses twitches in
its web. Nixon was receptive to the idea of linkage, which Kissinger
spelled out to a meeting of the National Security Council on the day
of the inauguration. 216

FPE Conclusion
The Vietnam War is commonly conceived of as the classic U.S. foreignpolicy blunder. The engagement failed to meet its objectives, fell victim to events
and circumstances that could have been and were foreseen long before their
unfortunate occurrence, cost an exorbitant sum in blood and treasure, and
caused great harm to the national interest. This harm was most present in the
prestige and morale of the nation, since one of the ironic elements of the blunder
was the virtual irrelevance of the peripheral Southeast Asian nation of Vietnam to
the national security of the United States, an irrelevance rendering the huge cost
of the failed campaign grossly disproportionate to the importance of the policy's
objectives. It is difficult to imagine U.S. foreign policymakers in 1964 being willing
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to expend even for victory the cost that was ultimately expended in defeat. In the
end, the national refusal to allow Communism to spread, under the guise of
preponderance, amounted to a FPDM process at the highest levels akin to
placing a blindfold over the conductor of a train. Though this blunder-inducing
FPDM is certainly not unique to the "American War" in Vietnam, the event serves
as a historical admonition against hubris, dismissal of state differentiation, and
the cognitive and institutional biases promulgated my ideological myopia.
In his later writings, McNamara attempted to mitigate some of his
miscalculations by engaging in a series of intellectual discussions and
publications with various scholars and policymakers, including a book partially
based on conversations with North Vietnamese politicians and war planners and
a documentary. Among his conclusions in Argument Without End: In Search of
Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy are that the war could not have been won along
strictly military lines (hardly a controversial conclusion), but also that the war
could have been much more limited in scope, perhaps even avoided altogether, if
leaders in both Hanoi and Washington had taken a less aggressive stance. 217
This seems a superficial conclusion, given that simple conversations rarely
resolve deep-seated international conflict. McNamara and his fellows delineate
six principal lessons from the mistakes made in the Vietnam War on both sides:
(1) understand the mind-set of your adversary; (2) communicate with your
adversary at a high level; (3) in foreign policy, practice the democratic principles
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you preach (by bringing the public and Congress into the decision-making
process); (4) apply power only in a context of multilateral decision-making (aside
from territorial self-defense of the United States); (5) acknowledge that some
problems in international affairs have no solution, particularly no military solution
(emphasis mine); and (6) organize to apply and administer military power with
intensity and thoroughness. 218
While the Vietnam War certainly was a national tragedy, and even a
tragedy for the casualty-stricken yet victorious North Vietnamese and VC, the
constant use of the war as tragedy by its policymaking overseers and their
scholarly

apologists

obfuscates

it

understanding,

characterization,

and

classification. While it can certainly be conceived as a national tragedy in that the
American people were complicit and negligent in failing to scrutinize both the
grand strategy of preponderance and the specific FPDM of their leaders, these
leaders were not ordinary citizens. They held privileged information and
intelligence and consistently lied amongst themselves and to the country about
the motivations for the war, the methods used in the war, the state of the war,
and the outlook for it to be brought to a successful conclusion. It is therefore
imprudent of the scholar both on moral and academic grounds to examine it as "a
tragedy without villains." Part II instead examines the war along the lines of the
OPM model, the conceptual foundation of foreign-policy blunder in U.S. grand
strategy expounded in Chapter 3.
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Stanley Karnow writes in his epic history of the war, "History is an organic
process, a continuity of related events, inexorable yet not inevitable. Leaders and
the people who follow them make and support choices, but within the context of
their experience and aspirations. The roots of the American intervention were
planted and nurtured in what Professor Daniel Bell has called America's concept
of its own 'exceptionalism.'" 219 This exceptionalism is a two-sided coin. William
Fulbright describes this Manichean Americanism thusly: "The inconstancy of
American foreign policy is not an accident but an expression of two distinct sides
of the American character. Both are characterized by a kind of moralism, but one
is the morality of decent instincts tempered by the knowledge of human
imperfection and the other is the morality of absolute self-assurance fired by the
crusading spirit."
While these two sides of the American character are fundamentally
ideational in origin, the true understanding of their value, good, bad, and neutral,
can only be assessed through their material manifestation in the physical world.
An idea must find application to justify its relevance. At the center of that
interchange is the foreign policymaker, whose trade defines the purpose and
direction of the state in the process of colliding with other states. Distinctions
between the words, desires, imperatives, alternatives, and actions of FPDM
officials are sometimes in line and sometimes incredibly murky. So far, we have
seen that they tend to get murkier the more they are attached to ideological
pretense. While Part I has attempted to evaluate the what and how of the foreign
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policy of the Vietnam War, Part II attempts to address in further detail the how
and why of the war in order to contextualize it within the broader umbrella of U.S.
grand strategy. Where FPE meets OPM is in the bounded rationality of mission.

Part II. OPM
Indicator I. U.S. estimation of capability to transform the politics of Vietnam
Every aspect of the Vietnam War can be analyzed along some kind of
paradoxical lines, and Indicator I is no exception. For while the long line of
evidence of U.S. foreign policymakers' private statements demonstrates that they
almost invariably held great reservations about committing to 'Indochina,' they
willingly did so. This was due in part to the contradiction that it was inconceivable
that the U.S. military could be defeated (the potential war being instead a
concern of what victory would cost in blood and treasure), and yet it was also
unclear what could be gained politically in a peripheral country with only a
shadow of a state in Saigon. This reluctance to commit to Vietnam is evident in
hundreds of communication transcripts between presidential advisors. For
example, as early as February 1965, before escalation took hold as policy,
McGeorge Bundy wrote that "at its very best, the struggle in Vietnam will be
long," and McNamara agreed that "this war is one of attrition and will be a long
one." Dean Rusk had warned of "a long and tortuous prospect." War planners
estimated victory would require 200,000 men and two to three years to resolve.
Kennedy's advisors had told him in 1961 that he would need 250,000 men and to
be prepared to use nuclear weapons to secure Laos. And yet, despite all of this
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ominous forecasting, in the words of Richard Neustadt, "Johnson's advisors just
could not conceive that the North Vietnamese would not come to terms once they
saw the opposition they were likely to face and the punishment they might
suffer." Indeed, Johnson Administration officials told Neustadt "their great
mistake was to underestimate the North Vietnamese." 220
Thus while the United States never lost a battle in Vietnam, U.S. foreign
policymakers still managed to greatly underestimate the will and capability of the
VC, but particularly the NVA. David Halberstam's conclusion should therefore not
come as a surprise:

Our total military superiority was checked by their total political
superiority. In effect this meant we could win any set-piece battle
we wanted but the other side could easily replenish their battlefield
losses whenever they wanted (emphasis in the original). What was
even more depressing was the optimism I found among the top
Americans in Saigon, which struck me as essentially self-deception.
There was much heady talk implying that we were on the very edge
of a final victory and that the other side was ready to crack.
Invitations were even sent out that December by some high-ranking
diplomats asking friends to come to the light-at-the-end-of-thetunnel Christmas party. 221

In comparing results to expectations, then, what transpired was the realization of
foreign policymakers' fears without the realization of their hopes. They had
accurately identified some of the potential problems in Vietnam, while greatly
underestimating the cost required to achieve victory and the resolve and
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capabilities of the enemy. Whether the American people would have been willing
to pay the costs estimated by war planners is difficult to ascertain, but it became
a moot point because the costs for both the American public and foreign
policymakers became too great to sustain, and "Americanization" became
"Vietnamization," which became the "decent interval" that ultimately led to total
defeat with the capture of Saigon by North Vietnam and the forced evacuation of
all Americans and a handful of fortunate Vietnamese from the capitol.
From a grand-strategic perspective, the context of the Cold War dictated
the attitudes, preferences, and assumptions of the U.S. foreign policymakers
involved in the decision-making, planning, execution, and evolution of the
Vietnam War. To understand the foreign policy of the Cold War, we must first
understand the attitude with which American leaders envisioned the place of their
nation within it. The history of Vietnam is far from insignificant to the Vietnam
War, but, as it unfortunately was for those leaders, it is beyond the scope of
current expedience. Briefly, the French colonization of Vietnam began in 1664,
when a group of French religious officials and a group of French businessmen
united under the guises of the Society of French Missionaries and the East India
Company, respectively. A history of violence between France and Vietnam
ensued. After the arrest of a French priest in 1845, for example, the French Navy
shelled Da Nang, killing hundreds of people, to which the Vietnamese
reciprocated by confiscating French Catholic property and killing a number of
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Jesuits and Vietnamese priests, some of whom they cut in half lengthwise. 222
Chinese mercenaries and French Legionnaires provided security to French
authority and property, and insurgent resistance against them found safe haven
in the area around Hanoi, the all-but-impenetrable highlands, and the malariainfested swamps and marshlands of the South. In time, the Emperor's Council of
Mandarin was supplanted with a system of oligarchic clientelism in which select
Vietnamese, termed suplétifs, would acquiesce to French authority in exchange
for a favorable position within the polity. Insurrection against French authority
was suppressed with wanton incarceration, murder, and terrorism.
At the Potsdam conference, the United States, the Soviet Union, and
China agreed to carve the country in half along the seventeenth parallel, with
Chiang Kai-Shek and his nationalist Chinese Kuomintang army taking control of
the North. By 1941, Ho Chi Minh began to formalize disparate bands of
insurgents into an organized revolution under the banner of the Viet Minh (long
form Vietnam Doc Lap Don Minh Hoi, or League for the Independence of
Vietnam), an organization that held six of Vietnam's provinces around Hanoi by
1945. While Ho was an admirer of the United States and its founding documents,
and had helped the Office of Strategic Services (the precursor to the CIA) search
for downed American planes, there could be no cooperation between the United
States and Communists once the Cold War began to materialize.
There were some American soldiers alongside the French in the 1950's,
but assistance mostly took the form of nearly three billion dollars in financial aid
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to suppress the insurrection, along with four million dollars a year "as a retainer
for Emperor Bao Dai, who squirreled away the lion's share in Swiss bank
accounts and foreign real estate." 223 By 1954, after the French defeat at Dien
Bien Phu, the United States had shouldered most of the cost of the French
military struggle, even while denying the French a full military partner, in concert
with its own struggle between pragmatism and idealism described in Chapter 3.
In essence, the United States funded the status quo until the Viet Minh rendered
it the status quo ante. Thus, just as the U.S. pursuit of preponderance began in
full swing, the Vietnamese people were achieving their independence for the first
time in three centuries (although not for the first time—imperial Chinese
campaigns had been expelled many centuries earlier). The hands of time
conspired to connect the United States with Vietnam on unfavorable terms.
From the outset, U.S. leaders assumed responsibility for Vietnam, and
'French Indochina' more broadly, without assuming full ownership of it. This
tenuous tightrope held until 1964, when the war in Vietnam was "Americanized"
and Vietnam policy fell off the advise-and-assist wagon. In terms of the nation of
Vietnam and its purpose within the Cold War, policymakers recognized from an
early stage that it was not a vital interest in and of itself, significant instead for the
perception of who held momentum between the West and Communism. This
affected U.S. policy in Vietnam in two ways. First, in considering it a peripheral
power, it dealt little attention to the problem of what would happen if the U.S.
military were not able to establish dominance there and bring hostilities to a
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decisive conclusion in quick fashion. Second, it largely ignored the particularities
of the Vietnamese people, transposing instead American values on what their
motivations for support of or resistance to American involvement might be.
Compounding these two inherent shortcomings was the issue that once it
committed to defeating Communism in Vietnam, defeat there would be a defeat
for the American way of life against the expansion of Communism, in accordance
with broader Cold War objectives.
The general consensus is that President Johnson, the "man of little
background and much uncertainty in foreign affairs" in the words of Hoopes, had
very little interest in Vietnam and only acquiesced to foreign-policy hawks in
order to develop his Great Society programs at home. His own public statements
on Vietnam often followed the same language as those he used in his Great
Society deliberations, promoting equality, freedom, and social justice. Vietnam
was therefore not only in the periphery in terms of the national interest, but also
in the periphery of the most important decision-making mind of the war.
Escalation took hold under Johnson, even as his overwhelming political calling
was the development of social justice at home. As described by Walter
McDougall:

Vietnam was the first war in which the United States dispatched its
military forces overseas not for the purpose of winning but just to
buy time for the war to be won by civilian social programs. Had the
U.S. military been assigned the job of winning, Kennedy would
never have consented to the 1962 Laos accord, which left that
"neutral" country open to North Vietnamese infiltration, and
Johnson would not have restricted U.S. ground and air action
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against the real enemy, which was North Vietnam. Instead, General
William Westmoreland was obliged to dispense his forces and to
waste his firepower in search-and-destroy operations against the
National Liberation Front, which was in fact Hanoi's cat's-paw and
rival for control of the South. As Colonel Harry Summers has
shown, this approach ensured tactical victories but strategic defeat,
since it failed to isolate the battlefield, neglected to attack the
enemy's center of gravity in North Vietnam, and indeed assigned
the offensive role not to the army and air force but to the CIA,
USAID, and MACV pacification agencies "tasked" with building
South Vietnam's economy and winning over its people. Vietnam
was thus "the international equivalent of our domestic Great Society
programs where we presumed that we knew what was best for the
world in terms of social, political, and economic development and
saw it as our duty to force the world into the American mold—to act
not so much as the World's Policeman as the World's Nanny." 224

While he overstates the apathetic attitude toward "winning" (nobody wants to
lose, especially the most powerful state in the international system, and
especially when that state has never lost a major war), McDougall's point that
U.S. foreign policymakers never viewed Vietnam as central to U.S. grand
strategy and never desired to fight a protracted war there is quite accurate.
However, they did so; desire is all but irrelevant in the 'satisficing' world of
statecraft. In President Johnson's typically rudimentary idiom, he cautioned
himself against becoming embroiled in the world of foreign affairs when his true
political raison d'etre rested at home: "If I left the woman I really loved, the Great
Society, in order to get involved with that bitch of a war on the other side of the
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world, then I would lose everything at home. All my programs. All my hopes and
dreams." 225
The 'imperatives' of the Cold War did indeed force themselves on U.S.
foreign policymakers to a certain degree, and it is not entirely coincidental that
Vietnam became their interlocutor. From 1954 onward, the United States
assumed it could surmount the problems faced by the French, focusing instead
on what the cost of keeping South Vietnam within the purview of the "Free World"
would be. The American calculation was likely that Americans would succeed
because they were American in the same way that the French thought they
would succeed because they were French. Fredrik Lovegall examines this
historical analogy in his exhaustive 2012 Embers of War, winner of the Pulitzer
Prize in History, writing of American "self delusion," "Somehow, American
leaders for a long time convinced themselves that the remarkable similarities
between the French experience and their own were not really there." There was,
of course, a fundamental difference in the ideology of French colonialism and the
ideology of American preponderance and anti-Communist sentiment. While
Charles de Gaulle "spoke of the cohesion, the unbreakable bond, between
metropolitan France and her overseas territories," President Roosevelt before his
death planned for the postwar years "to promote Indochina's development toward
independence under a degree of international supervision." 226
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The "Free French" movement was therefore a misnomer outside of
France, just as American liberalism found itself undermined by the threat from
Communism in the proxy battlefields of the Cold War. Lovegall identifies what he
terms "The Long 1964" as the critical decision-making phase of mid-1963 to early
1965 that led to the "Americanization" of the war in Vietnam. He contends that as
the paternal financial overseer of the French defeat in Vietnam, U.S. foreign
policymakers believed their superior financial and military power would succeed
where the French failed. The author also details the overreliance on conventional
military power to resolve the conflict, even with full knowledge of the prior military
prowess of the Viet Minh.
The question of how U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the capacity of
the United States to transform the politics of Vietnam is a difficult one, because of
the contradiction between their genuine concern a land war in the country would
pose and their absolute conviction not to let Vietnam 'fall' into Communist hands.
This Indicator has therefore focused on the international lens through which U.S.
foreign policymakers viewed the 'problem' of Vietnam, absent which the nation
would never have landed on U.S. radar. Every president from Roosevelt to Nixon
and virtually every high-level FPDM official expressed both deep-seated
reluctance to become heavily involved in an expansive ground-troop campaign
and a relentless determination to prevent it from being overrun by Communist
forces.
At the same time, there seemed both an undying faith in the invincibility of
American military might even amid persistent concerns over the viability of
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fighting a war against a determined enemy that could count on a substantial
amount of support from the public and material and ideational support from
multiple external sources. On the one hand, it was inconceivable that an army of
peasants could defeat the U.S. military in open battle (and in fact they never
really did). On the other hand, if the war were to be one of attrition, how many
American lives would it be worth? U.S. foreign policymakers ultimately paid more
in blood and treasure to lose than they ever would have to win. Based on that
factor alone, the conclusion would follow that they clearly underestimated the
cost that would be required to achieve victory, and, conversely, overestimated
the return the investment of American intervention would produce.

Indicator II. The U.S. ability to control, bolster, and refine the host state of South
Vietnam
James Carter argues that the failure of Vietnam was primarily a failure in
statebuilding, a proposition finding ample evidence in its support. The GVN never
lived up to its promises to its people; in fact, in made scarce attempt to promise
anything to its people with any regularity, and provided even less. Carter
describes the telescopic view of Vietnam from the American perspective: "Just as
in Europe, any potential for postwar recovery depended on the restoration of
substantial regional trade and commercial intercourse. Policy toward East Asia,
then, had less to do with Vietnam and much more to do with larger, regional and
global interests and concerns." 227 Despite the fact that some scholars have
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engaged in revisionist history in an attempt to portray the GVN in a more
benevolent light, there never existed a viable state or an effective military in
South Vietnam, except in Saigon and its immediate environs. 228 Although it was
by historical default anti-Communist, it certainly could hardly have claimed to
have been democratic.
Carter contends that the failure of the Vietnam War largely resulted from
the failure of "the state-building experiment and the related refusal to recognize
that failure." 229 The decision to commit troops en masse to Vietnam came long
after the United States had (somewhat reluctantly) supported French colonialism
and subsequently installed a friendly leader to head the new government in
South Vietnam. The "invented" (in the words of Carter) state U.S. foreign
policymakers purported to send troops to defend would not have passed
common standards for a viable state. Corruption reigned supreme; the
inheritance of French Catholic colonialism by default rendered its leaders
nondemocratic in a nation of mostly Buddhists; it had virtually no presence
outside of Saigon; outside of Saigon it relied primarily on the occasional ARVN
incursions and mercenary peasant militias to maintain its authority. The ARVN
itself was as corrupt as every other institution of the state and incapable of
national coordination or operation.
An intervention to support any given regime is only as strong as the
regime itself. This was nowhere more true than in Vietnam, where a handful of
228
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generals, coup plotters, self-ascribed members of the fading French aristocracy,
opportunists, and other forms of ineffectual officials occupied the highest
echelons of Saigon, typically surrounded by sycophants and immediate family
and employing a regime based on entrenched parochial interests. Leaders in
Washington were somewhat aware of this unfortunate state of affairs, but had
readily become accustomed to dealing with similar figureheads as the Cold War
battlefields of the developing world turned hot and the need for establishing ties
with nefarious characters became ensconced in this theretofore unchartered form
of global confrontation. When Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai chose to appoint
Ngo Dinh Diem as the leader of the newly formed Republic of Vietnam, the
reaction in Washington was one of both cautious optimism and concern.
Although Diem's idealism made him more reliable than other candidates that
might have been more easily corrupted, his egomania, penchant for obstinacy,
and distrust of anyone with whom he was not intimately familiar made him
incapable of effectively heading a legitimate state. 230
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, his absence from Vietnam in the four
years prior to his appointment, which no doubt clouded the legitimacy a more
locally oriented leader would have enjoyed, also endeared him to a certain
segment of American politicians, since he spent a significant amount of that time
in the United States. (Although Ho Chi Minh had also spent many years outside
the country, he enjoyed much wider support among Vietnamese people North
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and South). His Catholic faith combined with his steadfast hatred of Communism
to appeal to the increasing coalition of American leadership that valued antiCommunist credentials over leadership efficacy or democratic ambitions. As U.S.
Ambassador to France Douglas Dillon assessed of Diem, "We are prepared to
accept the seemingly ridiculous prospect that this Yogi-like mystic could assume
the charge he is apparently about to undertake only because the standard set by
his predecessors is so low." 231
That Washington eventually sent signals to Saigon power circles that it
would tolerate the removal of Diem and his replacement with General Duong Van
Minh, who himself lasted only three months in power, did little to offset the
problem of leadership in South Vietnam. Never during the war was a leader in
power who commanded the loyalty of a majority or even a plurality of the South
Vietnamese population. This was one of a number of fatal flaws in the overall
U.S. strategy. A dictator who can control the entirety of his territory and
population can survive without its support, but a leader that can claim neither
leaves himself open to insurgence from within and invasion from without. This
was the first letter in the alphabet of obstacles in Vietnam. At this stage in the
trajectory of the amateur state of South Vietnam, the next step was to marry the
state with a field-worthy army. Once the French had acquiesced to its autonomy,
"Lightning Joe" Collins of the U.S. Army had been dispatched to ensure its
funding, maintenance, and functionality, but the ARVN never achieved its
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potential because it was always hamstrung by the weakness of the state it
worked for.
Diem countermanded, circumvented, or otherwise undermined whatever
limited, procedural democratic institutions existed in the country, wielding the
fledgling ARVN into "what could only be termed a police state." 232 With the
United States funding two-thirds of the administrative costs of the GVN and the
establishment of MACV under Lieutenant General Samuel Williams, the task of
state-building lay firmly in the hands of U.S. military leaders, charged as they
were to construct a new state by Washington's anti-Communist political
establishment. As U.S. leaders began a program of land reform and social
development in concert with America's liberal values, they meanwhile facilitated
Diem's consolidation of power, which included the displacement (due to become
an enormous issue in the war because of the reverence the Vietnamese people
held for ancestral territory) of neutral Vietnamese into the controversial Strategic
Hamlet Program and the incarceration of tens of thousands of suspected
opposition citizens and execution of countless more.
Although the fishing-net strategy of rounding up suspected infiltrators
caught more ordinary civilians than actual VC cadres or North Vietnamese
sympathizers, the campaign was enough to attract the attention of leaders in
Hanoi. In 1959, the Central Committee enacted Resolution 15, codifying the need
to launch a military campaign against the South. Clandestine Group 559 began
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to construct what would become the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In September of 1960,
The Communist Party's Third National Congress formally approved a plan of
insurrection against the South, and the subsequently formed National Liberation
Front convened near the Cambodian border to organize the foundations of an
insurgent army. Thus the seeds of the Vietnam War were planted. Upon leaving
office, Eisenhower, who had neglected to directly intervene in support of the
French in 1954, had nevertheless advised Kennedy that the need to preserve
both Laos and Vietnam was absolute, up to and including armed intervention,
which was to some degree already underway. 233 Thus the two countries headed
straight for each other on the same track.
While the United States viewed the South Vietnamese government as an
indigenous regime it could wield as a medium for prosecuting the war against
Communism, the government in Saigon viewed its security and police forces as a
way of maintaining its disproportional share of the country's political power and
material resources. The extent to which the Cold War was essentially a societal
(ideational) struggle from the U.S. perspective, rather than being a standard
matter of direct national-security concerns, is evident in the inherently civilian
aspect of the "other war" to support and improve civil institutions. However, in
both the pacification programs and other similar initiatives, the efforts sometimes
did more harm than good. For example, in 1954, Michigan State University
began a program to cooperate with the Süreté, the police force of the GVN, to
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more effectively assert its authority. Although "this early attempt at bureaucratic
streamlining was undermined by Diem, who kept the various police and security
agencies spying on one another," it nonetheless had a substantial effect:

In 1954, in the professed belief that it ought to extend the
"American Way" abroad, Michigan State University (MSU) offered
to provide the government of Vietnam with a huge technical
assistance program in four areas: public information, public
administration, finance and economics, and police and security
services. The contract was approved in early 1955, shortly after the
National Security Council (NSC) had endorsed Diem, and over the
next seven years MSU's Police Administration Division spent fifteen
million dollars of U.S. taxpayer's money building up the GVN's
internal security programs. In exchange for the lucrative contract,
the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) became the vehicle
through which the CIA secretly managed the South Vietnamese
"special police." 234

The MSUG arrived under the guise of the International Cooperation
Administration, the precursor to the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), which would later head many of the civilian programs of
the war including pacification. The Süreté had been taught by the French how to
form counterinsurgency programs that routinely employed mass incarceration,
torture, and wholesale executions, but they were to be informed by the MSUG
how to better identify and expose enemy sympathizers. Subsequently, in the late
1950's the campaign to quash anyone suspected of Communist sympathies
officially incarcerated at least 50,000 people who were sent to concentration
(branded "reeducation") camps, but the actual, unofficial number may have been
234
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twice that. 235 Diem's miscalculation was that in persecuting nationalists he would
be persecuting many people who were indifferent toward Communism. Anyone
who had fought with the Viet Minh against the French was considered a potential
Communist sympathizer, leading to a growing correlation between nationalism
and anti-Saigon sentiment. Partly because of its brutality and indiscrimination
and partly because of its scope, many people feared the GVN's crackdowns
more than the Viet Cong, which at least pretended to be a voice of the people,
even while waging its own terror campaigns. Typical of the GVN, internal security
was headed by a family member, Diem's younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, who
would later institute the highly controversial Strategic Hamlet Program.
The unfortunate state of affairs between Saigon, its internal security, and
the ARVN created an environment of fear and suspicion in South Vietnam that
left it ripe for insurrection:

Diem and his family believed that casualties suffered on offensive
operations against the Viet Cong had been a major cause of the
abortive coup d’état in November 1960. The Ngo Dinhs were
convinced that the ARVN paratroop officers who had led the
attempt had plotted with oppositionist politicians because they had
been disgruntled over these losses. The Americans saw the ARVN
as an army with which to defend South Vietnam. The Ngo Dinhs,
on the other hand, saw the ARVN primarily as a force-in-being to
safeguard their regime. The first priority of the Ngo Dinhs was the
survival of their rule. To hazard the ARVN in a war was to hazard
their regime, and that was unthinkable. Control of the army had
enabled them to crush their non-Communist opponents in the
young years of the regime in the mid-1950s. They thought that
even if most of the South were ultimately lost to the Communists,
an intact ARVN would enable them to hold on to Saigon and the
235
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other major population centers long enough for Washington to send
the U.S. Army and the Marines to rescue them. They assumed that
the United States, as the preeminent power in the world, could not
afford to let their anti-Communist government fall to Hanoi’s
guerrillas. That their attitude could prove expensive in the blood of
Vietnamese was another of those thoughts that did not occur to the
Ngo Dinhs. They were willing to accept casualties in defensive
actions because they saw these as unavoidable to maintain the
outpost system that was the substance of their rule in the
countryside. Most casualties in defensive actions were also inflicted
on the SDC militiamen who manned the posts. The Ngo Dinhs were
not troubled by the deaths of these peasants. The stability of the
regime was not affected, and the lives of the militiamen were
cheap. They could be replaced by other peasant hirelings at the
equivalent of $10 a month in Saigon piasters. 236

What the United States never understood was the pervasive sense of
nationalism that transcended the artificially transposed division between North
and South. The fact that many South Vietnamese neither sympathized with the
Communist cause nor desired to be ruled by Hanoi could never completely
negate the nationalist sentiment that ultimately propelled many Vietnamese
toward confrontation with the foreign occupiers. The war to expel the French
guaranteed Ho Chi Minh's place as a revered hero in modern Vietnamese
history, and rendered Diem, who sat on the sidelines, an irrelevant figure to
whom loyalty would have to be purchased or otherwise incentivized. Absent that
political purchasing power, his regime, like other regimes in Saigon during the
American involvement there, could never rely on any meaningful level popular
support. This already weak support was further undermined by the kleptocratic,
clientelistic governance characteristic of Saigon in general, as well as its
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wholesale repression against a large percentage of its population. The
fundamental problem of statebuilding in Vietnam is summed up by William
Hammond:

U.S. policy sought to strengthen South Vietnam by fostering the
confidence and self-reliance of the country's leaders, an end easily
frustrated if Americans began assuming functions proper to South
Vietnamese officialdom. The president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh
Diem, was also sensitive to any infringement on his nation's
prerogatives. American policy makers believed that he would resent
any attempt by American diplomats to become the source of news
for South Vietnam and that he might even retaliate by curtailing the
flow of information between his government and the U.S. embassy,
a development almost certain to hamper the effort against the
Communist insurgency in the countryside. 237

In other words, the needs of the United States and those of the GVN were not
aligned, and therefore even the perfect implementation of every initiative would
never have engendered any lasting success for the United States, because even
when means were aligned they were in advance of different ends. Richard
Immerman describes the precarious situation under Diem during the advisory
period, as well as the opportunity sensed by Hanoi to foment civil disobedience:

Beginning in 1959, however, Vietnam began its reascent to the top
of the national security agenda. On the one hand, with land reform
stalled and Diem's "rule by terror" producing the incarceration of
tens of thousands of villagers in "reeducation centers" (an
unspecified number were guillotined), unrest throughout rural South
Vietnam intensified, as did sympathy for the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam in the North. On the other hand, Diem's internal security
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machine, although not particular about whom it caught its dragnet,
took a toll on the Vietminh (referred to in Washington after 1959 as
the "Vietcong"). Le Duan, who headed the Vietminh's Central Office
for South Vietnam beseeched Hanoi for help. At the same time, in
light of obvious signs that the unification of Vietnam would not
come about through elections, momentum grew within North
Vietnam's Communist Politburo to resume armed conflict. Le
Duan's election as party secretary tipped the balance in this
direction. At its meeting in Hanoi in January 1959, the Central
Committee adopted Resolution No. 15. Although Resolution No. 15
emphasized the continued importance of political action, it
stipulated that final victory would be achieved only through
protracted and heroic struggle. It also proclaimed the need to
create and coordinate insurgent forces in the South. Within months,
southern commanders began to build a revolutionary base in
Vietnam's central highlands; the clandestine Group 559 began to
construct what would become the Ho Chi Minh Trail through the
Laotian mountains adjacent to Vietnam; and the Vietminh initiated
"spontaneous uprisings" from central Vietnam
extending
238
southward to the Mekong Delta.

Thus the strategic conditions for war, and therefore the possibility of U.S.
escalation, were made riper by the tactical success of Diem rounding up
opponents, because the sweeps made more enemies than they captured at
home and stiffened the resolve of Hanoi to support insurrection from the North.
The effort to confront that enemy is discussed in the next section.

Indicator III. The U.S. ability to limit the power and influence of North Vietnam
and the VC
Dale Andrade and James Willbanks describe the numbers of the
fundamental strategic problem the enemy presented American forces along with
their South Vietnamese counterparts:
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In Vietnam, the U.S. military faced arguably the most complex,
effective, lethal insurgency in history. The enemy was no rag-tag
band lurking in the jungle, but rather a combination of guerrillas,
political cadre, and modern main-force units capable of standing
toe to toe with the U.S. military. Any one of these would have been
significant, but in combination they presented a formidable threat.
When U.S. ground forces intervened in South Vietnam in 1965,
estimates of enemy guerrilla and Communist Party front strength
stood at more than 300,000. In addition, Viet Cong (VC) and North
Vietnamese main forces numbered almost 230,000—and that
number grew to 685,000 by the time of the Communist victory in
1975. These main forces were organized into regiments and
divisions, and between 1965 and 1968 the enemy emphasized
main-force war rather than insurgency. During the war the
Communists launched three conventional offensives: the 1968 Tet
Offensive, the 1972 Easter Offensive, and the final offensive in
1975. All were major campaigns by any standard. Clearly, the
insurgency and the enemy main forces had to be dealt with
simultaneously... Westmoreland's strategy of chasing the enemy
and forcing him to fight or run (also known as search and destroy)
worked in the sense that it saved South Vietnam from immediate
defeat, pushed the enemy main forces from the populated areas,
and temporarily took the initiative away from the Communists.
South Vietnam was safe in the short term, and Communist histories
make clear that the intervention by U.S. troops was a severe blow
to their plans. In the end, however, there were not enough U.S.
troops to do much more than produce a stalemate. The
Communists continued to infiltrate main-force units from
neighboring Laos and Cambodia, and they split their forces into
smaller bands that could avoid combat if the battlefield situation
was not in their favor. 239

The war was essentially broken in half between these search-and-destroy
missions that pursued and engaged the enemy and what was known as
pacification, or the effort to protect the population in order to prevent them from
siding with the enemy, defined by Kissinger as "the extension of the control of

239

Dale Andrade and James Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from
Vietnam for the Future," Military Review Vol. 86 No. 2 (March/April 2006), 9.

225

Saigon into the countryside." 240 Part I gave an overview of the former; this
section discusses the latter. The term "pacification" was somewhat of a catchall
phrase that basically signified support to the people of South Vietnam who were
not involved in VC activity. The CIA, USAID, the U.S. Information Service, and
the U.S. Department of State were the most relevant bureaucratic arms of the
U.S. government to implement pacification, in addition to the military. The
strategy to find and kill the enemy, the traditional and more comfortable role of
the military, took precedent in the escalation years between 1964-1967. The
"other war" of pacification to "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese
people had been existent for many years prior to 1967, but had never received
full institutional attention until that year.
From 1964-1967, pacification intelligence suffered from a lack of
command. This changed in 1967 with the creation of the Intelligence
Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX), which was renamed Phoenix in
December of the same year. On May 9, 1967, National Security Action
Memorandum 362, "Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification," established the
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) command
structure within the military. Prior to 1967, "stability operations were entirely
uncoordinated with different civilian agencies all running separate operations.
While they were theoretically coordinating with the military through the U.S.
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Embassy, this was not the reality." 241 McNamara had initially attempted to form
an office within MACV, but the military never granted the Office of Civil
Operations access and assistance, which eventually led to its disbanding and the
establishment of CORDS. Vietnam was perhaps the first war in history that
combined military, civilian, and intelligence agencies into a concerted effort to
control, subdue, and appeal to a foreign population to such an extent.
As Ambassador and head of CORDS, Robert Komer was one of the
central figures of the pacification program for much of the war. His
comprehensive, thorough, and veritable reports throughout the war reveal as
much about the strategic-tactical gap of the Vietnam War as virtually any other
series of reports. On May 7, 1970, he and his team published (in classified
format) the 259-page "first comprehensive systematic treatment of the
pacification program:"

Consideration of all U.S. support for pacification under CORDS
single management in May 1967 (to be followed by the parallel
GVN consolidation over the next few years) inaugurated the first
really comprehensive countrywide pacification effort on a scale
commensurate with the needs of the highly atypical Vietnam War.
This is not to denigrate prior efforts, especially the Strategic Hamlet
Program or the RD Program which got going really in 1966. But
none of them were on a large enough scale to have the necessary
impact, and many promising small-scale programs were diffuse
among competing agencies. Most of all, neither the U.S. nor GVN
military were really backing pacification. It was regarded by them as
essentially a civilian problem, to be handled by the remnant GVN
civil ministries backed by the U.S. Embassy, AID, and CIA—
whereas the military were chiefly focused on the "main force war."
241
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Yet most of the resources in country were controlled by the military
(money, manpower, supplies, transport, the works). Without the
military, territorial security in the countryside could not be expanded
rapidly enough to exploit the anti-main force successes. Our
solution to this problem was to saddle the military with pacification
responsibility, and to create a unified civil-military management on
the U.S. side under MACV. Reorganizing the Vietnamese was
harder, but a major step toward it at end-1967 was the RVNAF
reorganization, which helped put the RF/PF on the map as the
essential territorial security component. Such a major restructuring
and buildup took time, however; results down at the critical hamlet
level were unimpressive in 1967. 242

This excerpt illustrates the organizational deficiencies inherent in the
pacification program, in addition to the overall results being "unimpressive."
Komer's push to integrate civilian (pacification) and military organizational
structure, given that nothing done outside of the military received the support,
resources, or command that it needed, made logical sense. However,
implementation came too late: by the time the unity of command in pacification
programs were fully implemented, it was 1968, the year that Tet turned the tide of
public opinion against the war. Furthermore, this unification met the inevitable
institutional resistance such bureaucratic mergers always do. Major General
Joseph McChristian, the MACV J2 commander from 1965-1967, predictably
voiced concerns over the creation of ICEX:

On my last day in Vietnam, I became aware that a new plan for
attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure was to be implemented. It
was to be called the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation for
Attack Against the Infrastructure (ICEX) Program. Ambassador
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Robert W. Komer was to head the program as a deputy to the
MACV commander. To put it mildly, I was amazed and dismayed. I
called on Mr. Komer and General Westmoreland that last day and
pointed out that I had not known about the program but that I was
confident that the combined military intelligence system was out
front leading the way against the infrastructure. I suggested that coordination was in order. 243

McChristian was expressing the same dismay at the tactical level that
Hoopes was at the strategic level of the infighting over turf that the bureaucratic
discombobulation of the U.S. national-security infrastructure innately contained.
On his last day in Vietnam, McChristian not only laments the integration of the
pacification institutions, but also suggests that a new form of coordination is in
order. In that statement lay the circular impasse of implementation that was
charged with winning an already impossible war. It is not uncommon for an
outgoing military commander to suggest significant reforms; this suggestion
comes too late, and the new face that replaces the old commander comes in with
his own agenda. When Hoopes says "our intervention in 1965 was misconceived,
that viewed through cold, clear eyes it could not be justified on the grounds that a
vital national interest was at stake," he does so in part because of the convolution
of the U.S. foreign-policy 'apparatus,' as it is sometimes referred to in the
literature, or institutional infrastructure. At every level, like a three-dimensional
game

of

telephone,

turf

wars

and

regulatory

complications

muddle

communication, policy creation and facilitation, and operationalization vertically in
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terms of the chain of command and horizontally in terms of rank-wide
implementation. 244
Furthermore, every one of the hundreds of documents reviewed for this
chapter produced by the United States, even those that specifically target the
inefficiencies in the U.S. foreign-policy system, invariably characterize the same
problem on the host government side as being far worse. Not a single instance
was found in which the South Vietnamese government, bureaucracy, army, or
leadership structure was estimated to be even marginally more effective or
efficient than the American institutions partnering with them. Even accounting for
national bias, these assessments appear to be genuine. This means that a
highly-complex Vietnam War was being waged by the American military and its
fellow U.S. institutions in an ineffective, inefficient manner to prop up a South
Vietnamese government that was morally and institutionally bankrupt. Which in
turn begs the question, who was the protagonist in the conflict? Who was fighting
for what?
In South Vietnam the confusion over who was targeting whom for what
reason knew no bounds and extended to every facet of the war. This confusion
was perhaps no more evident in any program than that of Phoenix. Pacification
had a darker side as well, which the name "Phoenix" would gain infamy for. The
few dozen counterterror teams at the disposal of the CIA from 1964-1967
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morphed into a command that had a Phoenix advisor in all 44 provinces by the
middle of 1968, with over 700 advisors in all. 245 The Phoenix program was one of
the key operational fulcra of the battle between South Vietnam and the VCI.
Because there are too many battles of the war to document here, and because
they rarely amounted to any lasting shift in the dynamics of the conflict, the
Phoenix Program is examined because of the many metaphors between itself
and the conflict overall. Douglas Valentine summarizes its organizational
objectives:

Developed in 1967 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Phoenix combined existing counterinsurgency programs in a
concerted effort to "neutralize" the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI).
The euphemism "neutralize" means to kill, capture, or make to
defect. The word "infrastructure" refers to those civilians suspected
of supporting North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldiers... Under
Phoenix, or Phun Hoang, as it was called by the Vietnamese, due
process was totally nonexistent. South Vietnamese civilians whose
names appeared on blacklists could be kidnapped, tortured,
detained for two years without trial, or even murdered, simply on
the word of an anonymous informer. At its height Phoenix
managers imposed a quota of eighteen hundred neutralizations per
month on the people running the program in the field, opening up
the program to abuses by corrupt security officers, policemen,
politicians, and racketeers, all of whom extorted innocent civilians
as well as VCI. Legendary CIA officer Lucien Conein described
Phoenix as "A very good blackmail scheme for the central
government. 'If you don’t want what I want, you're VC.'" 246

Elton Manzione describes a mission he went on as a twenty-year-old SEAL in
Vietnam in 1964 that illustrates the difficulty in targeting the right people. Ground
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forces, of course, and especially Special Forces, were supposedly the 'surgical'
instrument with which to target VCI in lieu of the more clumsy missions utilizing
conventional battalions backed by artillery and aerial bombing, but even when
these most-surgical missions were executed with great care and skill it was still a
highly complex process to kill the right people:

I go into the hooch, and I spot my person. Well, somebody stirs in
the next bed. I'm carrying my commando knife, and one of the
things we learned is how to kill somebody instantly with it. So I put
my hand over her mouth and come up under the second rib, go
through her heart, give it a flick; it snaps the spinal cord. Not
thinking! Because I think 'Hey!' Then I hear the explosion go off and
I know the gun is out. Somebody else in the corner starts to stir, so
I pull out the sidearm and put it against her head and shoot her.
She's dead. Of course, by this time the whole village is awake. I go
out, waiting for Swetz to come, because the gun's been blown.
People are kind of wandering around the hooch, and there were
two young girls. I'd killed the wrong people. 247

This account demonstrates the difficulties in fighting a guerilla war. This
failed mission was after days of planning and employed the most highly trained
soldiers in the U.S. arsenal. To avoid the use of guerilla tactics would concede
the night, the countryside, and the initiative to the enemy who is willing to use
those tactics, and yet to utilize them is to straddle the line between a timehonored military code and terrorism. In that sense, counterterrorism is in itself a
form of terrorism, and these counterterror missions were seen as necessary to
take the fight to the enemy and deny it political control of the villages. While
Special Forces teams would take great care in intelligence gathering, mission
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planning, and coordination with the South Vietnamese counterparts who usually
accompanied these patrols, it was not possible to guarantee an attack on the
right people because it was rarely clear who the right people were, and even
when it was, it was still possible to target the wrong people. This was of course a
different situation when the enemy chose to fight pitched battles, but when it did,
its purpose was to inflict casualties on the American army rather than 'win' in
traditional military terms.
In this way, the North would bleed the Americans out of their resolve to
keep fighting a war that for them the outcome was in some ways irrelevant; it
certainly was not a war of survival, and, ironically, the main motivation became
the determination not to lose resolve for an otherwise irrelevant war. To add yet
another layer to the irony from the Vietnamese perspective, Phoenix "was not a
mechanism to end the war quickly, but a means to extend it indefinitely, with a
minimum of American casualties" in order to "show success," according to one
NVA commander. 248 While the United States refused to consider "losing"
Vietnam a possibility until it became clear that tens or even hundreds of
thousands of American soldiers would have to perish, the enemy would not
consider losing its own country for any price—this was the miscalculation to
which Johnson's advisors referred in their interviews with Richard Neustadt.
While the NVA and VC had only victory or death as possible outcomes, the
Americans could leave whenever they wanted with only the shame of losing
soldiers for nothing and the wounded pride of being defeated by supposedly
248
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inferior forces. Therefore, to "show success" became paramount, which led to the
'body count' metric, which in turn fueled failure for the reasons discussed in Part
I. And at the same time, the United States never stopped trying to "win the the
hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people, even while reigning destruction
upon them. This tactical paradox reflected the grand-strategic paradox of the
'liberal leviathan' pursuing preponderance.
Like virtually all programs in the Vietnam War, Phoenix was indeed
successful at its tactical prowess; like virtually all other programs it failed
strategically. The word "Phoenix" eventually became the most notorious word
associated with the Vietnam War. Not My Lai, nor Rolling Thunder, nor Khe
Sanh, nor Tet nor Hue conjure up the same emotions in the popular literature,
even if those names were far more significant to the soldiers who fought there. A
fair assessment would be to say that "Phoenix was neither the devastatingly
effective program its supporters have sometimes claimed nor the merciless
assassination campaign that its detractors have alleged," in the words of a RAND
study to evaluate its purpose and effectiveness. 249 The study was commissioned
in 2009 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to learn
counterinsurgency

lessons

that

could

be

applied

to

contemporary

counterinsurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, although the authors
assert:
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Some analysts conclude that the lack of an insurgent shadow
government in Iraq and Afghanistan makes a Phoenix-style antiinfrastructure program in those countries both unnecessary and
unworkable. But insurgent documents captured in Al-Anbar—at one
point, Iraq's most violent region—describe elaborate underground
bureaucratic structures with functional elements devoted to
intelligence and counterintelligence, media and propaganda,
finances, recruitment, and religious affairs. The insurgencies in
Afghanistan may not be as well organized or as highly
bureaucratized, but they certainly have an apparatus for financing,
intelligence, and recruitment that could be targeted in a selective
fashion... Effective counterinsurgency today, as in Vietnam, calls for
much more than defeating guerillas on the battlefield: It requires the
ability to understand, map, and disrupt the insurgent
infrastructure. 250

The study aptly summarizes of the Phoenix program and Vietnam, "The
Vietnam War must be considered an American failure," but "The pacification
program in general, and the Phoenix Program in particular, met with success."
In "Countering Global Insurgency," one of the most oft-cited counterinsurgency
papers, one-time advisor to General David Petraeus David Kilcullen in fact called
for a "global Phoenix program" to head the tip of the spear of the militaryintelligence war against what Kilcullen labels the "global Islamist insurgency,"
citing Phoenix as "unfairly maligned (but highly effective)." 251 Although this
dissertation does not compare the events of the three case studies per se, it
does intend to compare the motivations for and understanding of their metaevent significance, and therefore these types of reports offer relevant evidence of
how policymakers, military leaders, and scholars define and address national-
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security problems, which is a central inquiry of this research. This topic is
therefore reviewed in further detail in Chapter 6, the case study on the Iraq War.
In terms of the wider pacification program, Komer later found it to be
insufficient in the face of a determined enemy and a populace at best suspicious
of the Saigon government and the foreigners supporting it:

Why has a cumulatively enormous U.S. contribution—on top of
South Vietnam's own great effort—had such limited impact for so
long? Why, almost regardless of the ultimate outcome, has U.S.
intervention entailed such disproportional costs and tragic side
effects? The reasons are many, complex, and interrelated. They
include the unique and unfamiliar—at least in U.S. experience—
conflict environment in which we became enmeshed. Particularly
contrasting was the sharp contrast between the adversary we faced
and the ally we were supporting—a highly motivated and
ideologically disciplined regime in Hanoi and revolutionary Viet
Cong apparatus versus a weak, half-formed, traditionalist regime in
Saigon. We repeatedly misjudged the enemy, especially in his
ability to frustrate our aims by his tactics and to counterescalate at
every stage—right up to 1972. Another constraint was implicit in the
incremental nature of our response, doing only what we believed
minimally necessary at each stage. 252

The "weak, half-formed, traditionalist regime in Saigon" could not contain the
"highly motivated and ideologically disciplined regime in Hanoi" when faced with
the incessant prospect of its ability to "counter-escalate." Komer tried his best,
but could not overcome the logical fallacy of the overall effort. In 1966, he had
authored a paper entitled "Giving a New Thrust to Pacification: Analysis,
Concept, and Management," in which he had specified three areas to focus on:

252 Robert Komer, "Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN
Performance in Vietnam," RAND, August 1972, v, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R967.html

236

security (protecting the populace), anti-VCI operations (targeting the enemy), and
enlarging and streamlining the larger pacification campaign. He succeeded
somewhat in the third effort; the effect, however, could never mitigate the
shortcomings of the first two, for the same reasons conventional military
operations failed. The population-protection programs that succeeded the
progenitor of the Strategic Hamlet Program did achieve some success in some
areas: A full 93 percent of South Vietnamese were judged to live in "relatively
secure" villages, an annual increase of almost 20 percent from the middle of
1968, the year marred by the Tet Offensive (President Johnson had trumpeted
the percentages of "secure villages" in his January 17, 1968 State of the Union
Address). However, these were often artificially constructed villages that had
removed the steadfastly ancestral-oriented Vietnamese from their homelands,
widening the chasm between the war effort and the population and doing little to
overcome the parochialism innate in Vietnamese culture.
In November of 1967, Westmoreland gave a series of talks in Washington
in which he specified "indicators" of military success, predicting that a drawdown
of the successful campaign could be initiated in earnest in late 1968. But in the
January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kissinger wrote that the Tet Offensive
"overthrew the assumptions of the American strategy." 253 By then, U.S. foreign
policymakers knew that the fears they had held all along about a land war of
attrition with a guerilla enemy in Asia had materialized. President Johnson chose
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not seek reelection, and Richard Nixon was elected president, ushering in the era
of "Vietnamization."
Confederate General George Pickett, who etched his name into history
books by way of his infamous failed 'Pickett's Charge' through heavy Union fire at
the battle of Gettysburg, was once asked how the Confederacy had failed to
achieve victory. His reply, "I kinda think the Yankees had a little something to do
with it," serves as a reminder that 'the enemy has a vote' in every battle of every
war. 254 Although American historians tend to see the history of the Vietnam War
through the lens of the U.S. military and U.S. policymakers, the tenacity and
fervent nationalism of the Vietnamese played a decisive role in the conflict, and
tilted the balance in favor of NVA and VC forces. The war strategy in Vietnam
has received more attention than it deserves, simply because U.S. objectives
could not have been met by military metrics alone. The obsession over the "body
count," or the drive to kill as many of the enemy as possible, may have created
more of the enemy that it was able to kill. Figures 3 and 4 show U.S. troop
strength in Vietnam and PAVN (NVA) infiltration of the South on an annual basis.
They illustrate that the presence of the U.S. military had virtually no effect on
Hanoi's ability to foment insurgency with their own forces (U.S. forces were more
successful, at particular periods in the war, at targeting VC): 255
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Figure 3: U.S. troops in Vietnam

Figure 4: PAVN infiltration of the South: 1965 - 1975

Indicator IV. Rationalization and operational learning
The Vietnam War is in many ways a conundrum for the IR scholar
because the obstacles were so clear and inherent in the strategy that statesman
and citizen alike almost had to construct an alternative reality to maintain faith in
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it. (But while the statesman, or his predecessors, must deal with the policy even
after failure, the citizen can turn away and simply vote differently). This
alternative reality was heavily influenced by the ideology-driven grand strategy of
preponderance and its Cold War progeny, Containment. On one hand, military
and political leaders lied to themselves, each other, and the country at every
juncture about the prospects for success and the state of the war to date. On the
other hand, the public was not prepared to accept the reality that in spite of its
substantial power endowment, the United States could not be omnipotent.
Statesman and citizen alike began to abandon the war in theory after 1968; the
statesman was still faced with picking up the foreign-policy pieces until a 'decent
interval' had come and gone and the war was lost completely.
In some ways, there in fact was a new reality that even "the best and the
brightest" failed to develop a viable prescription for. Only once before in history,
in Korea, had a state engaged in such a bloody war while storing its most
powerful weapons on the sideline—in this case, nuclear weapons. While the
contemplation of releasing the thermonuclear genie from the bottle was a
potentiality that terrified every sane individual, especially with the advent of MAD
(mutually assured destruction), it simultaneously seemed unthinkable to send
young men into battle hamstrung. But the use of nuclear weapons would have
made little difference against a guerilla enemy. The United States could have
eliminated North Vietnam from the map as it could have North Korea, but would
have risked Soviet or Chinese nuclear retaliation. Furthermore, the total bombing
over North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which still constitutes
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the most extensive aerial bombing campaign in history, far exceeded the
destruction a few nuclear weapons would have created.
The real hamstringing, many in the military felt, was the delicate balancing
act of trying to avoid confrontation with the Soviets, engender support of the
South Vietnamese populace, and maintain support for the war at home while at
the same time trying to fight and win a brutal guerilla war, in difficult terrain, in
which identifying the enemy was a virtually insurmountable quandary. This is the
'holy trinity' that Summers discusses in his invocation of Clausewitz, with the
compounding distinction that instead of only having to juggle the people, the
government, and the military of the home state, U.S. foreign policymakers also
had to deal with the people, government, and military of the state in which the
United States intervened. This is the basic logical fallacy of regime-toppling and
nation-building: if the state requires intervention, in what way is it worth
supporting?
Among the untold ironies of this befuddling reality therefore emerged an
environment in which the duplicity circulated by policymakers often transcended
even their own knowledge of the 'situation' in Vietnam. They knew they were
lying, but they did not always know the full truth, in part because, on multiple
levels, the reality of it did not fit the reality of the American self-image—
specifically, in strategic terms, the possibility of failure and the concession to
Communist expansion. On a tactical level, policymakers could never reconcile
the fact that the guerillas and NVA regulars could not defeat the Americans in
battle with the fact that the Americans seemed to be losing the war, nor that this
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intrinsically nationalist struggle they were facing transcended the immediate
medium of Communism and therefore ensured that the American values the
United States was supposedly upholding were in fact some of the same values
the enemy fought for. That the VC sometimes employed terrorist tactics mattered
little in this equation, given the totalitarian destruction U.S. fighter bombers
reigned down from the air, the hundreds of thousands of civilians caught in the
crossfire between the two opposing armies, and the self-serving impotence of
Saigon. And while the detestable blight of Communism was easy enough to
imagine a foe, this was less than half of the Communist-nationalist struggle in
Vietnamese eyes North and South.
For the United States there were many firsts in this most perplexing of
conflicts: the first loss of a major war; the first time American citizens could watch
the war from their living rooms; the first time Americans were fundamentally
divided about the moral implications of the war to such an extent; the first time
the 'body count' became the almost singular metric by which to judge success.
These newfound puzzles were reflected in public opinion polls. In November
1965, 29% of Americans thought the war would end in victory, 30% thought it
would end in stalemate or compromise, and 10% expected a prolonged conflict.
By May 1966, 54% expected a stalemate or compromise, and by February 1968,
that figure grew to 61%. In May of 1967, the public was exactly divided about
whether they knew what the United States was fighting for in Vietnam, at 48%
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each. 256 Unsurprisingly, as shown in Figure 5 from Gallup, the percentage of
those believing it was a "mistake" to escalate in Vietnam grew as casualties
mounted (why this figure dropped 5% between 1990 and 2000 would be a
subject for another dissertation): 257

Figure 5: Gallup poll, “Was it a mistake sending troops to Vietnam?”
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Figure 6 shows the annual U.S. casualties of the war: 258

Figure 6: U.S. Fatalities in Vietnam

In evaluating the foreign policy of the Vietnam War and processing it
through the OPM, A distinction must be made between the confusion of reality
and the confusion caused by duplicity. Perhaps ironically, the misinformation the
American people heard about the war was sometimes just as disingenuous
within certain circles of the military and other areas of government even before
being marketed to the public. This Indicator assesses feedback integrity and
justification integrity. The deceit disseminated by U.S. foreign policymakers to the
American people was but one link in a chain of delusion, mischaracterization,
and outright lies. However, it is also the most important link. Foreign
policymakers are the media through which a policy is settled upon, altered, and
marketed to the public, and their words and deeds are more important than those
258
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of the average citizen or soldier. Therefore, to categorize the Vietnam War only
as a national "tragedy without villains" based on a particular set of terrible
circumstances misses an opportunity to understand exactly how this FPDM
failure came about.
Even a cursory review of declassified documents related to the Vietnam
War reveals a systematic avoidance, rejection, and manipulation of the truth
about the war. The review for this chapter has been more than cursory, and
nothing reviewed for it has changed that characterization. What has been
somewhat surprising is the extent to which this was a national crisis, just as the
experience of the war for the average Vietnamese was a national crisis.
Nevertheless, foreign policymakers are charged with successfully defining,
clarifying, and pursuing the national interest, and they failed miserably at this task
in the case of Vietnam. In part, this can be blamed on a nation wishing to
conceive of itself as the preponderant power in the international system and
unwilling to face its own contradictory demons. But it is the task for the statesman
to lead the country in a prudent direction, employ its finite resources efficiently,
and avoid unnecessary conflicts that will bring harm to the national interest. With
respect to Vietnam, the statesmen in question did none of these things; in fact,
they shunned their sacred duty intentionally because they refused to accept the
reality of the situation presented to them. They could have attempted to fully
grasp the indigenous complications in Vietnam and incorporated that into their
calculations among themselves and in their conversations with the American
public. They chose not too.
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As mentioned in FPE Criterion I, the significance of John Paul Vann and
his role in the Vietnam War for this chapter is twofold: first, as an advisor, he
understood the tactical complications of the war that would lead to strategic
defeat if they were not rectified. Second, as both a soldier and later as a civilian
working for CORDS, he spent the remainder of his life until his death on June 9,
1972 attempting to proliferate understanding of the conflict to those who held the
power to change it. As a soldier, Vann recognized the problems inherent in the
ability of the United States to affect the local political and military conditions of
South Vietnam, many of which have been highlighted throughout this chapter.
Sheehan presents too many to summarize, but the paramount obstacles to
success in the advisory stages of the war in Vann's view were: (a) the
overrunning of the outposts, which were staffed by the peasant militia, (b)
indiscriminate artillery shelling and aerial bombing, (c) maltreatment of the
populace by the ARVN, (d) defining, identifying, and targeting the enemy, and (e)
the disregard in the ARVN and GVN for professional and moral standards of
state and security.
The (a) outposts were significant for two reasons. First, the fact that they
were manned by peasants that stood guard like sitting ducks only for the pittance
they were paid to staff the rural ramparts signified that the only loyalty the GVN
could count on in much of the countryside was not loyalty at all, and certainly not
Johnsons' 'Macy window ass-kissing' kind, but what amounted to indentured
servitude. To much of the rural population of South Vietnam, there was no GVN
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in functional terms, and what there was of it was less than appealing because of
(b) and (c), indiscriminate bombing and maltreatment of villagers. From ABSL:

If nothing was done to stop this drain of American arms through the
outposts—and Harkins and his representatives were always
prodding the training advisors to hand out weapons faster despite
the warnings from Vann and other division senior advisors—then
Vann would encounter increasingly better-armed Viet Cong in his
shakily led campaign to destroy the Main Force and provincial
guerrilla units. If his campaign was ever interrupted or lost
momentum for some reason and the Communists were able to fully
reconstitute their striking force and go on the offensive with
impunity, the guerrillas would capture many more American
weapons, build their strength far beyond current numbers, and
become a foe more formidable than Vann cared to imagine.
There was an ugly side to this war and to his Vietnamese allies that
went far beyond the everlasting problem of the Saigon troops
treating their peasantry like an occupied population, stealing the
chickens and ducks and rice and molesting the women... Nothing
he had seen or heard of in Korea would have prepared him for the
cultivated sadism with which the Saigon troops treated captives.
“Ziegler made a partial list in his diary of the techniques used by
Thuong and his Rangers, cataloguing a dozen. Ziegler printed the
title “Strong Methods” above the list in a translation of a French
euphemism for methods of torture:
Wrap in barbed wire.
Strip skin off back.
Rack by use of vehicle or water buffalo.
Head in mud—1½ minute.
Shoot thru ear.
Hook up to EE8. [EE8 was the designation of the Americansupplied battery-powered field telephone. The common method
was to tape the ends of two wires from the phone to the genitals of
a man or to a woman’s vagina and a breast. Shock was then
administered as desired by turning the crank handle on the phone.]
Sit on entrenching tool. [The entrenching tool was the folding pack
shovel the U.S. Army supplied the ARVN for use in digging
foxholes. The shovel blade was thrust firmly into the ground. The
prisoner was stripped of his pants and made to sit on top of the end
of the shovel handle. He was then forced down on the handle.]
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Knife strapped to back. [Thuong would tie the prisoner’s hands
behind his back and lash the Bowie knife to the wrists with the
blade pointing inward toward the back. He would have the prisoner
hauled up against a tree, place his hand on the victim’s chest, and
start pressing as he asked questions.]
Water treatment. [Water was forced into the mouth until the
stomach swelled painfully, when it was beaten to induce more pain,
or a wet rag was held over the nostrils while water was poured
down the throat to create the sensation of suffocating.]
Calves beaten.
Knee in back, face down, dislocate shoulders.
Beat stomach until it collapses and indiv. vomits it out.
The willy-nilly killing and maiming enraged Vann, not only because
it contradicted his ideal of his profession, but also because it struck
him as the worst conceivable way to fight this war. A
counterguerrilla war surely required the strictest possible controls
on air and artillery.”
A single shot from a sniper was enough to stop a battalion while the
captain in charge called for an air strike or an artillery barrage on
the hamlet from which the sniper had fired. Vann would argue with
the captain and later with Cao that it was ridiculous to let one sniper
halt a whole battalion and criminal to let the sniper provoke them
into smashing a hamlet. Why didn’t they send a squad to maneuver
around the sniper and scare him off or kill him while the battalion
continued its advance?
The province and district chiefs kept their 105mm artillery pieces
and large 4.2-inch mortars, the equivalent of artillery, positioned
freely so that they could rotate them 360 degrees and shoot in any
direction. During one of his first operations in another division area,
Vann had stayed late in the command-post tent to work on some
notes of the day’s events and had been alone with the Vietnamese
duty officer and a few enlisted men. A voice came up on the radio.
The duty officer picked up the microphone and, after a brief
exchange with whoever was calling, walked over to the map,
checked something on it, and then returned to the radio to give a
quick reply.
“What’s going on?” Vann asked.
“That was the district chief. He wanted to know if we have any
troops in this hamlet over here,” the duty officer said, pointing at the
place on the map. “He says he’s got a report from an agent that VC
are in the hamlet and he wants to shoot at them.”
“What did you tell him?” Vann asked.
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“I told him we don’t have anybody out there,” the duty officer
replied.
“But what about the people who live in that hamlet?” Vann asked.
The duty officer shrugged. Several miles away a howitzer began to
sound in the night.”
As the spirit moved them day or night, the province and district
chiefs and the major ARVN unit commanders would pick out places
on the map—the ford of a canal or stream, a crossing of trails, a
clump of water palm jungle, any place they guessed some Viet
Cong might conceivably be at that particular moment—and would
shoot at these spots. No air or ground observer zeroed the guns
beforehand or adjusted the shelling after it started. The gunners
calculated the direction and range from the grid coordinates on the
map. The fact that the firing was done by the map, without being
observed and adjusted, was a small gain for the peasantry. It is
difficult to shell effectively from map coordinates alone, and the
copies of French Army maps that the ARVN used were so outdated
that the hamlet or other target might no longer be located where the
map showed it. The irrationality of shooting artillery this way also
did not seem to bother the Saigon officers, because nothing was
done after a puzzled Vann pointed out this failing too.
Cao and the other Saigon officers, Vann concluded, wanted to kill
these people and destroy their homes and slaughter their livestock,
not on a systematic basis, but often enough to intimidate them.
Their theory of pacification apparently was to terrorize the peasants
out of supporting the Viet Cong. For this reason Cao and the
province and district chiefs also did nothing to stop the torture and
murder. They thought it useful. Their attitude was: “We’ll teach
these people a lesson. We’ll show them how strong and tough we
are.” The only coherent reply he could ever get out of Cao when
they argued about the air strikes and shellings was that the planes
and the artillery flaunted the power of the government and made
the population respect it. Vann had also been puzzled at first as to
why Cao and most of his fellow Saigon officers did not feel any guilt
over this butchery and sadism. He had come to see that they
regarded the peasantry as some sort of subspecies. They were not
taking human life and destroying human homes. They were
exterminating treacherous animals and stamping out their dens.
When Porter and Vann appealed to Harkins to stop this selfdefeating slaughter, he turned out to be as dense in his own way as
the Saigon commanders. Instead of using his influence to put a halt
to the bombardments, he was furthering them. It had been
dismaying for Vann to watch himself and Porter lose the argument.
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As they flew across the countryside and passed over a Viet Congcontrolled area, Vann and Porter would call Harkins’s attention to
the marks of recognition—the ditched roads, the dirt barriers
blocking the canals, the ruins of an outpost. When they stretched
out the map between the seats on the plane or during the briefing
at the stop ahead, Cao and the Vietnamese officer from Saigon
would point to a “Viet Cong hamlet” here and a “VC arms factory”
there. “We must bomb it,” Cao would say.
Having heard so many complaints from Vann and Porter, Harkins
would ask if the place was not filled with ordinary people.
“No, no, they are all Viet Cong,” Cao would answer.
“Absolutely, all of them have been corrupted by the Communists,”
the officer from Saigon would add.
The moment they were alone afterward, Porter and Vann would
explain to Harkins that the “Viet Cong hamlet” was just like many
other peasant hamlets in the Delta. The Viet Cong occasionally
used it to stay in overnight, and it had a pesky squad of local
guerrillas who gave the district chief trouble. The squad would
probably escape unscathed if the place was bombed. They had
hideaways into which they would jump as soon as the planes
appeared. The several hundred other inhabitants would not be so
well prepared, and some of them might also panic and get killed out
in the open. The Viet Cong taught the peasants to dig cave shelters
under the sleeping platforms rural Vietnamese cover with mats of
woven straw and use as beds. This expedient gave the peasants a
handy shelter right inside the house, unless that house happened
to be one of those set afire by the napalm or the white phosphorus,
called Willy Peter in U.S. military idiom. The family inside the little
cave would not have the time or the battle training to evacuate the
shelter. They would be asphyxiated. As for the “VC arms factory”
Cao had also put his finger on, Vann and Porter would explain that
they had intelligence reports that the Viet Cong were fabricating
shotguns out of galvanized pipe in that particular hamlet.
Harkins would resist accepting what they had to say. He would look
at them with disbelief when they said that Cao and the senior
Saigon officer were not telling him the truth. They got the
impression that the words “Viet Cong hamlet” and “VC arms
factory” conjured up in his mind World War II images of a German
barracks and a munitions plant. Harkins’s trips out of Saigon did not
extend to marching with the infantry. He therefore never saw
anything to contradict these preconceived images. Nor could Vann
and Porter get Harkins to agree that, as Vann summed up for
Ziegler, the bombing and shelling “kills many, many more civilians
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than it ever does VC and as a result makes new VC.” Vann and
Porter would usually be overruled and the hamlets would be
bombed. Harkins also did not stop the abuse of artillery. He could
have forced restrictions on the Saigon officers by rationing shells.
It was not a question of some noncombatants, it was a question of
mostly noncombatants, and this was not an ordinary war, Porter
would counter. Porter had to be exaggerating, Anthis would say;
the commander of the VNAF and the ARVN officers he met told him
that most of the casualties were guerrillas and that the bombing
was hurting the Communists a great deal. He was being deceived,
Porter would tell Anthis, and try to set him straight with the latest
report from Vann on how the bombing was driving “these people
right into the arms of the Viet Cong.” Anthis would refuse to accept
the possibility that his bombs could be a boon to the Communists.
Porter would challenge again, if Anthis wasn’t afraid of the truth,
why didn’t he come down and see for himself who his planes were
hitting? Anthis would fall back on a legal argument. He and his
people didn’t initiate any of the bombings. The air strikes were all
conducted at the request of the country’s legal authorities—the
responsible ARVN officers and the province and district chiefs.
“But you wouldn’t honor the request for the strike if you thought you
would kill “women and kids and old folks, would you?” Porter would
ask.
Porter had enough seniority as a full colonel and a corps advisor to
take on an Air Force general and get away with it. Vann did not. He
was fortunate never to have had an opportunity to confront Anthis
or he might not have remained at 7th Division long enough to
become Harkins’ star advisor. He understood what Porter was up
against with Anthis. Every service wanted as big a role as possible
in Vietnam as soon as Kennedy committed the United States to the
war. The more the Air Force bombed, the bigger its role. If air
power was restricted the way it ought to be, the Air Force would not
have much to do in Vietnam. It was in Anthis’s personal interest
and the interest of his institution to believe that the bombing
furthered the war effort, and so he believed it. Letting himself be
confronted with the corpses of women and children would inhibit his
ability to bomb with enthusiasm. Vann did not blame the Air Force
for being the institutional creature it was. The fault lay with Harkins
for not grasping the nature of the war and curbing institutional
proclivities. The bombing was worsening with each month as Anthis
and his staff steadily built the power of their hybrid VietnameseAmerican air force.
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All buildings were called “structures” in the reports of the raids. This
term removed the distinction between a hut that had been erected
by the guerrillas and the home of a peasant family or, for that
matter, a pigsty. At the same time the term fulfilled the bureaucratic
need to demonstrate that the air strikes were achieving tangible
results, i.e., “structures” blown up or burned down. The official
reports naturally presented all “structures” as guerrilla “structures.”
By September the fighter-bombers were blasting away an average
of more than a hundred “structures” a week, and as far as Vann
could determine from the evidence in his area the majority of them
were peasant homes.
The Rules of Engagement, the regulations governing what, where,
and when the aircraft could attack, permitted the Vietnamese
forward air controllers in the L-19S to decide that anyone on the
ground who ran was a Viet Cong.
After the strafing runs the FAC and the fighter-bomber pilots would
tally a score sheet of how many “KBAs” the planes had dispatched.
The initials stood for “killed by air.” Once dispatched, or reported as
having been dispatched, a KBA was ipso facto a dead guerrilla for
Harkins’ headquarters to add to the body count that was the
fundamental measure of progress in the war. Vann coined a term of
contempt for the forward air controllers. He called them “Killer
Kings." 259

These passages illustrate these problems with an unparalleled level of
detail, due to Vann's military genius and moral fortitude and Sheehan's keen
intellect and research moxie. In terms of the general (d) disregard in the ARVN
and GVN for the sacred duties of statehood and security, the government and its
military that Chester Cooper characterized as "ineffectual" were never designed
to perform the functions of statehood nor to protect the citizens living within the
territory of the state. By multiple definitions of statehood, there was in fact no
state in South Vietnam save for in Saigon and its immediate environs; South
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Vietnam was not even a state in technical terms except that it had been carved
up like a country ham at Potsdam the way so many countries in the 'Third World'
had been since the 'age of exploration' that gave way to colonialism.
The strategic crown of failure holding these tactical jewels together was
Vann's valiant yet unsuccessful campaign to convince General Harkins, General
Anthis, and others that the war would be lost if it were not fought in a different
way. This campaign is displayed in unambiguous detail in ABSL, but there is not
room here to include it. John Paul Vann's personal life was a disaster from his
birth until his death, and yet he became one of the most respected officers in the
Army and deputies of CORDS, even while challenging authority at every step of
the way. He never lost faith in the military, the nation, or even the war, and yet in
many ways he was its most vocal critic, at least in terms of the way in which it
was being fought. Perhaps he was destined to symbolize everything Americans
loved about themselves in the conflict that made them question what it means to
be American.
He was not the only one with doubts. By the time public opinion shifted to
the point of affecting the calculations of U.S. foreign policymakers in 1968, it was
too late. Pacification intensification and "Vietnamization" efforts could never take
shape because they were constructed on the debris of smoldering hamlets. The
one element the United States needed in its favor— the Vietnamese populace—
was alienated by indiscriminate incarceration and killings and the frivolity of the
state in Saigon. Compounding this problem was the ruthless efficiency of the
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enemy and the U.S. underestimation of its motivation and capabilities. 260 Just as
U.S. foreign policymakers would stumble on their words attempting to justify
Vietnam policy to the American public, they could never justify it to themselves.
As described in FPE Criterion IV, every president involved in the Vietnam
War in some fashion from Truman to Nixon advised against large-scale
intervention in one form or another. Lovegall argues that Kennedy "privately
doubted the validity of a crude domino theory" and "perceived from early on that
there were limits to what the United States could achieve in that part of the
world." 261 Kaiser further demonstrates that Kennedy's actions in Laos make plain
that he “never regarded Southeast Asia as a propitious place to deploy American
power.” 262 At the same time, Kennedy himself stated that "Withdrawal would be a
grave mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of
an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but
this is a very important struggle even though it is far away." 263 Johnson, a
domestic-oriented president who likely never gave a damn about Vietnam and
wanted instead to invested valuable political capital on his Great Society
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programs, repeatedly insisted that to Americanize the war would be a mistake. In
September 1964 he explained to a crowd in New Hampshire, "What I have been
trying to do with the situation I found was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their
own fighting, with our advice and our equipment." A month later in Ohio he
infamously proclaimed, "We are not about to send American boys nine or ten
thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for
themselves." 264 A hermeneutics expert need not be employed to comprehend the
disingenuous nature of that statement.
Johnson's downplayed announcement to the American people that his
administration had decided on a policy of escalation on July 28, 1965, mirrored
the process of decision-making in his inner advisory circles in that it was never
described in grandiose war terms but simply as granting a request to give the
generals what they needed to be more decisive in the field of battle. Instead of
addressing Congress with the fanfare of a televised address, which would have
befitted a decision of such a magnitude, he instead arranged for a midday press
conference to announce that a request for an increase in troops had been met.
What was grandiose, however, was the idealism in the language he used for
justifying this ostensibly (to the American public) minute resolution. He spoke of
"dominoes," "commitment," and "credibility," arguing that allowing South Vietnam
to fall would "guarantee" that "the battle would be renewed in one country and
then another, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we
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have learned from the lessons of history." America would stand by "this small
and valiant nation." 265 Johnson's carefully chosen choreography allowed him to
maintain both the image of restraint and the language of defender, as opposed to
aggressor, even while committing several hundred thousand troops to a
peripheral nation with an impotent, repressive government.
From the feigned Gulf of Tonkin incident to the fall of Saigon, there was
very little to learn operationally because the dim prospects for success were
known from the outset of escalation. In a conversation in 1965 about how many
battalions to send to Vietnam, McGeorge Bundy wrote to McNamara that two of
his primary concerns about a continued buildup were "What are the chances of
our getting into a white man's war with all the brown men against us or
apathetic?" and "Can we frame this program in such a way as to keep very clear
our own determination to keep the war limited?" 266 Based on an analysis of every
recorded conversation and memo between the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Vietnam,
H.R. McMaster demonstrates that inter-agency parochialism, a preoccupation
with advancement, and an institutional failure to produce accurate and coherent
advice to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations left the words of military
leaders unreliable at best. They were complicit in consciously adhering to
decisions they knew to be detrimental to the national interest in order to placate
President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and other foreign
policymakers, brushing aside concerns about Vietnam policy among lower-
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ranking military officers. 267 At the same time, they knew that if they did not tell
policymakers what they wanted to hear, their careers could be at stake. This
contrasts sharply with the common view that the military could have won the war
had it not been hamstrung by foreign policymakers in Washington.
A seismic chasm thus existed between commanders on the ground at the
platoon level and the generals that reported to Washington, as evidenced by the
saga of John Paul Vann. Information from the battlefield was so heavily filtered
that by the time it reached the highest levels of government in Washington,
reports often resembled their original wording about as much as the last in a
sequence in the game of telephone. Recently declassified documents show that
Nixon did not even read the President's Daily Briefs, the official intelligence
briefing prepared for the president on a daily basis. These and other essential
intelligence briefings from the CIA usually did not reach the president's eyes, and
only did so once they had been filtered through Kissinger's typewriter, who would
prepare memos of no more than four pages based on what he thought the
President wanted to know. 268 For a president that was inherently suspicious of
dissent, as well as the CIA, this filtration ensured the president's ignorance of the
information emanating from the theater that intelligence officials deemed most
germane to the proceedings of the war. Philip Caputo's remark, "If that general's
going to look at those bodies, we'd better hose the trailer down" epitomizes how
267

H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1997).

268

John Helgerson, Getting to Know the President: Intelligence Briefings of Presidential
Candidates, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.:
2012).

257

the reality of the war was rinsed clean like so many fragments of bone and
flesh. 269
Between President Johnson deciding not to run for reelection on March
31, 1968 and President Nixon deciding to invade Cambodia on April 30, 1970,
"the Vietnam War more or less disappeared from the mainstream of American
political debate as a major issue," reflecting the collective understanding that the
war in Vietnam had fundamentally shifted toward disengagement. 270 Yet during
that time support for the war continued to deteriorate. In President Nixon's
memoir, he stated, "Over the past thirty months, Kissinger, Rogers, and I had
carefully tailored our public statements to protect the secrecy of the meetings
because we were determined to do nothing to jeopardize any chance they had
for success," even while downplaying "any belief that we would succeed in
obtaining" an agreement. 271
30 months was quite some time to be concealing the true facts of the war
simply to avoid hampering negotiations, especially when confidence in the
negotiations was low and monthly casualties were hovering around 100 KIA. On
January 5, 1972, Nixon revealed to the American public that Kissinger had been
maintaining secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese since August of 1969.
While Americans welcomed the possibility of ending the war, it was still unclear
what had been gained up to that point, and no peace agreement would come for
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another year. Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding the negotiations galvanized
the sentiment that Nixon and other political leaders were not to be trusted.
Indeed, their collective justifications for the war seemed to many like one giant
grain of salt.

OPM Summary
How much did the grand strategy of preponderance fuel the impetus to act in
Vietnam and the refusal to accept the great cost involved in defending the shell
of a state in South Vietnam? Where was the intersection between that refusal
and the estimation of U.S. capacity to control the situation within Vietnam? Why
did FPDM officials adhere so vehemently to the status quo when it was so clearly
failing to achieve its objectives? How did Vietnam differ from other interventions
and why does it stand out as the most abysmal failure in U.S. foreign-policy
history? The war has been approached from hundreds of different angles by
highly capable scholars and students of the era. While this chapter has
discussed many contending viewpoints as to how and why the event unfolded so
unfavorably for the United States, there does exist a certain general consensus
that transcends both realist and liberal critiques, as explain by David Anderson:

The realist analysis emphasizes that Moscow's Red Army was not
in Southeast Asia, that the strategic value of the region to the
United States was low compared with the importance of other
areas, and that costs of protecting limited American interests there
were very high. The liberal critique adds that although it is true that
the leaders of North Vietnam derived their intellectual and
revolutionary dogma from Marx and Lenin, they were striving for
self-determination and social justice, goals that were not unlike
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America's own core values. The liberal-realist scholars find from
their examination of the origins of and rationale for the U.S. war in
Vietnam that American military intervention in Vietnam was a
flawed application of containment and based on a misinterpretation
of the realities of Vietnamese history and identity. Although this
thesis is widely accepted, there is considerable debate among
scholars over why the containment strategy came to be
misdirected. 272

In real-time as well as in retrospect, the quagmire of Vietnam was both
actual and theoretical. Even as early as 1966, before the effects of escalation
had materialized, realists like George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau were
arguing against over-committing in Vietnam because it was on the periphery and
therefore peripheral to the national interest. Even the father of Containment
policy recognized that U.S. resources were finite, that the Chinese were already
preoccupied domestically with their own 'Cultural Revolution,' and that the
Soviets were not indifferent about Indochina but were certainly more focused on
Europe. 273 Thus, to some degree, commitment to Vietnam was both espoused
and denounced by both realists and liberals, for differing reasons, just as
policymakers denounced intervention and then intervened. The main axis of
confusion often came down to where exactly the interchange between material
and ideational imperatives fell in FPDM calculations.
As in the theoretical sphere, the institutional arena faltered at every
dimension of instituting policy and operationalizing the war-fighting and nationbuilding efforts. And the disjointed dysfunction in the institutional arena inevitably
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led to problematic tactical issues, as described by James Wirtz in The Tet
Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War:

This interservice rivalry often affected the war effort, especially the
air war over South Vietnam. In 1962, for example, the air force
gained operational control of the light transport aircraft flown by the
army. In early 1965, the air force prevented the army from
operating Mohawk (light transport) aircraft in a ground attack role
but failed in its effort to prevent the army from using helicopter
gunships. On the eve of the Tet Offensive, the most divisive debate
over command of the air war erupted when Westmoreland
attempted to place marine air units under the operational control of
air force tactical air control centers to increase the air support
available to army units transferred to I CTZ and to facilitate air
operations supporting Khe Sanh. In addition to interservice rivalry,
U.S. officers were often preoccupied with controversies sparked by
efforts to place South Vietnamese and Korean forces under
Westmoreland's command. 274

It is simply not possible for hundreds of thousands of people involved in an
intervention and millions of people voting at the ballot box to have total
informational and institutional purity. To illustrate the point, let us take a piece of
information and counterfactually process it through the chain of command. Let us
say a sergeant hunting down VC and attempting to 'pacify' South Vietnam by
killing the enemy and protecting the villages, hamlets and population centers
takes part in a battle in which he recognizes that several of his comrades were
killed because the South Vietnamese RFPFs he is paired with provided
intelligence to the VC with which they managed to lay a successful ambush
against his platoon. The sergeant knows this for a fact; there is no doubt in his
274 James Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Cornell University Press, 1994),
100.
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mind. He takes this information to his commanding officer, a lieutenant, who
provides a willing ear, having experienced the same thing and understanding the
predicament. The lieutenant in turn explains this problem to the colonel of his
battalion, as well as to his South Vietnamese counterpart.
The South Vietnamese colonel is already hamstrung by two constraints:
the first cognitive; he cannot leave his own country, his knowledge of this
prevents him from thinking of the conflict in terminable terms; the second
bureaucratic, his commanding overseers are part of a military in which each
colonel perpetuates a rival against another, a parochial system in which
resources are granted to those who incur the fewest casualties and bribery
above all grants promotion. On the GVN side, this piece of battlefield intelligence
dies at this level: everyone knows the extent of VC infiltration whether it is
publicly stated or not, and nothing can be done about it. On the U.S. side, the
colonel forwards the information to intelligence officials and to the commanding
generals over the course of the next few weeks at the few audiences they grant
him.
The intelligence officials are already working overtime to neutralize VCI,
but will act on the intelligence if they are given specific names and locations of
suspects. The generals hear his plight; they do not deny that the VC make up
perhaps 50% of the RFPFs in that area of operation, but there is little they can
do, other than raise the issue to the deaf ears of the Saigon regime, which has a
set of priorities incongruent with their own. They are not pulling out of that area; it
is in a strategic location that the enemy cannot be allowed to operate freely in.
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One of the generals mentions the problem at a luncheon a month later in
Washington, D.C. to someone at the grand-strategic level. There are hundreds of
people at this level, but this particular official has the ear of someone in the NSC,
to whom he passes on the information. That official does not want to share any
information with his counterpart, due to a longstanding feud over turf within the
Council, but will see what he can do.
Another month later one of the president's advisors mentions to the
president over a glass of scotch, "I heard some of the units fighting alongside our
boys are 50% VC in X area of operation." How is the president, beholden to
every form of bureaucratic, interest-group, ideological, and political-expedience
constraint imaginable, to respond? In the time it takes him to decide to do
nothing, hundreds of people have died, and the conditions perpetuating failure
have become more ingrained than they were when the intelligence manifested.
The president cannot pull out, his foot is already too far in; he will not expand the
war, the stakes would then be raised too high with the Soviets and Chinese.
Perhaps he can put the screws to Saigon to put more effort into the fight. But
Diem has already declared, "The principle export of this country is antiCommunism." 275 Where is the incentive for Saigon to end what is by far the
largest influx of financial and military resources in the country's history?
This is, of course, a farcical caricature of bureaucratic information
processing. It is not, however, far-fetched. This is the ideational battle that John
Paul Vann fought until his helicopter crashed into a cemetery in Vietnam in 1972,
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a tragic yet fitting end for a man that gave his life for the ancestor-worshipping
Vietnamese people and his view of the American way of life and warfighting.
What those who were neck-deep involved in the bureaucratic jungle could not
grasp was that the military and civilian institutions charged with implementing the
Vietnam War performed exactly as they were designed to. In The Irony of
Vietnam: The System Worked, Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts contend:

America's war in Vietnam was obviously a failure. Whether the
failure was strategic, tactical, conceptual, operational, military,
political, diplomatic, moral, or all of these, will remain in dispute. But
after decades of commitment to prevent Communist domination of
the country, at the cost of many billions of dollars and many
thousands of American and Vietnamese lives, virtually no one can
credibly maintain that the effort was successful. By what seemingly
perverse logic, then, can we argue that the system worked? The
ironic logic is the central reason for this book, for now that the dust
has settled, the conventional wisdom of most post-mortems still
holds that America's failure in Vietnam was the failure of America's
foreign policy decisionmaking system. Somehow the process of
assessment, consultation, and decision must have gone awry.
Given the results of the war, common sense suggests that U.S.
leaders could not have realized what they were doing when they
decided to do it. But this commonsense interpretation is simpler,
and in a way more dangerously comforting in its implications, than
the reality that those making decisions to increase U.S. involvement
were aware that victory would probably not be the result. Of all the
lessons of the war for Americans—and many of these lessons will
prove to be as simplistic, confining, and misleading as the earlier
ones of World War II and the cold war that prompted commitment in
Vietnam—this paradox is the most fundamental. Without
recognizing this point, it will be impossible to perceive accurately or
to appreciate the other lessons of the war. Our argument is not a
perfect one—the evidence indicates exceptions, particular ways in
which the system did not work—but in general, and at the most
crucial junctures, the argument is depressingly valid. The paradox
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is that the foreign policy failed, but the domestic decisionmaking
system worked (emphasis in the original). 276

By arguing that the system worked but the foreign policy failed, the authors make
two points critical to the OPM. First, they illustrate that the system is not designed
simply to achieve foreign-policy success. This may explain why it never has.
When Kissinger says of foreign-policy objectives, "Whether these goals are
desirable is relatively less crucial" than the process of settling on and
implementing the policy, rather than the most prudent policy, he defines this
FPDM fallacy in no uncertain terms. When David Baldwin invokes the sarcastic
Pyrrhic victory, "The surgery was a success, but the patient died," he illustrates
the same point. U.S. foreign policy is fundamentally designed as an output of
bureaucratic and ideological "superabundant energy," as Tocqueville described
it, not as a means to achieve particular foreign-policy ends. Therefore, by any
common definition of grand strategy, the United States is not pursuing the
national interest. It certainly did not in Vietnam, and yet the "system worked." If
the most successful state in the international system is employing a highly
functional system and still succeeding in the larger picture, then there are more
questions than answers for IR scholars with regard to the definition of, production
of, and pursuit of the national interest. This is not to say that leaders want to fail,
but rather that success is not always the central directive. The fact that the war
was lost with no in-policy loss to the national interest (that loss more a function of
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losses in human lives, financial expenditures, prestige, and pride) demonstrates
this tragic paradox. Gelb and Betts argue further:

Vietnam was not an aberration of the decisionmaking system but a
logical culmination of the principles that leaders that leaders
brought with them into it. Radicals believe that the system produced
bad policy because capitalism requires imperialism and
counterrevolution. Reactionaries believe that the system produced
bad policy because democracy requires compromise, and that
overly accountable leaders lacked the autonomy and security to go
to the unpopular extremes of either withdrawal or unlimited war.
Both agree, in short, that the system worked yet produced bad
policy because it was a bad system. For liberals, conservatives,
and most Americans, the argument that a good system produced
disastrous policy is understandably galling. But the painful reality is
that if the system failed, it did so in ways almost unfavorable in a
democratic regime and representative institutional pattern of
policymaking, or because no system can compensate for errors of
judgment (or felt needs to gamble on unlikely possibilities) if those
errors are pervasive among authorities (emphasis mine). Failure of
policy cannot automatically be the same as failure of the system;
otherwise substance and process are indistinguishable (emphasis
mine). 277

Here, the authors recognize what many FPDM accounts do not: the FPDM
process and the outcome of a policy must first be studied separately and then
integrated analytically, in order to assess each on its own and then evaluate in
what ways the former did and did not lead to the latter. This is the fundamental
premise of this dissertation. To learn only about the outcome is to learn nothing
about the FPDM process; to learn only about the process is to limit analysis
exclusively to a study of organizational behavior; to understand process,
outcome, and the interaction between the two, all three must be studied as the
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unified science of FPE. The Vietnam debacle exemplifies the need for this
science in uniquely typical fashion. The system worked because "(1) the core
consensual goal of postwar foreign policy (containment of communism) was
pursued consistently; (2) differences of both elite and mass opinion were
accommodated by compromise, and policy never strayed very far from the center
of opinion both within and outside the government; and (3) virtually all views and
recommendations were considered and virtually all important decisions were
made without illusions about the odds of success." The authors pack a lot into
their contentions, but the two most significant takeaways from their three criteria
of the 'successful' system are that it did in fact pursue a popular policy (an antiwar majority among the American populace was not achieved until after the Tet
Offensive in late 1968) and that it was an understanding that success was
unlikely and foreign policymakers stayed the course in spite of that
understanding.
This leads the researcher to the conclusion that the maintenance of the
system itself is prioritized in ideology, policy, and operation over the media of
objectives the system purports to perform as a means to form any given policy.
Domestic politics constrained alternatives to the status quo because of the dual
imperatives of "Do not lose the rest of Vietnam to communist control before the
next election" and "Do not commit U.S. ground troops to a land war in Asia,
either," as described by Daniel Ellsberg. 278 Ellsberg's "Pentagon Papers," or
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the
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Department of Defense, as was its official title, revealed to the public in June of
1971 that the tactical lies U.S. foreign policymaking officials told them about the
war itself were an inherent part of the faulty strategic thinking with regard to the
foreign-policy means-end chain. There simply was no way to connect the searchand-destroy missions in Vietnam either to success in that war or to the overall
national interest. His counterpart in the leak at The New York Times, Neil
Sheehan, would come to understand and document the depths of the strategictactical gap all too well during the course of his encyclopedic research of John
Paul Vann. It is perhaps fitting that Ellsberg's 1962 dissertation in the field of
economics is a challenge to the rational decision-making model, arguing for
distinguishing between risk and ambiguity as decision-making input factors. 279
Robert Komer, involved in the military and civilian side of the war at every
level as head of CORDS, Ambassador, and other positions, came to the same
conclusion in 1972 that Gelb and Betts detailed in their exhaustive account:

Essentially both governments attempted to handle an atypical
conflict situation by means of institutions designed for other
purposes. Such constraints as institutional inertia—the inherent
reluctance of organizations to change operational methods except
slowly and incrementally—influenced not only the decisions made
but what was actually done in the field. These constraints led to (1)
an overly militarized response; (2) diffusion of authority and
fragmentation of command; (3) hesitation to change the traditional
relationship of civilian to military leadership; and (4) agency
reluctance to violate the conventional lines dividing responsibilities.
The conclusion is that atypical problems demand special solutions.
Policymakers must be sure the institutions carrying out the policy
can execute it as intended. Adequate follow-through machinery
must exist at all levels, to force adaptation if necessary. Where the
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United States is supporting an enfeebled ally, effective means of
stimulating optimum indigenous performance are essential. 280

The argument that "rational bureaucracy does not necessarily have to serve
rational purposes" therefore mirrors the idea that a foreign-policy outcome does
not necessarily have to be rationally correlated with the FPDM process. 281 These
are unintelligible perspectives to promulgate. The genius of Komer, Gelb and
Betts is their ability to recognize the process, the outcome, and their
intersubjectivity. Kissinger was fond of such platitudes, and in fact often spoke in
conceptually circular terms in spite of his admittedly acute mental acumen.
Making the point that political expedience, bureaucratic restrictions, and
institutional inertia are factors in FPDM is redundant; everyone knows that this is
the case. Promoting the idea that these are more important than the production
of the agreed-upon foreign policy is irresponsible; promoting the idea that they
are more important than the production of the prudent foreign policy is criminal.
To be sure, the U.S. foreign policy system achieved remarkable things in
Vietnam, but none of them did the effort any good. The skill and bravery of U.S.
soldiers and the incredible destructive power of U.S. aerial bombardment were
indeed the instruments of a veritable superpower high on its might. This
superpower was fighting against itself in Vietnam. The United States foreignpolicy system had been preparing for something monumental since it was
attacked at Pearl Harbor, but it was not Vietnam that it was preparing for. The
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'arsenal of democracy' was therefore misapplied in Vietnam via what Kaiser
brands "The greatest policy miscalculation in the history of American foreign
relations."
A major part of that miscalculation was a mischaracterization of the
psyche of the average Vietnamese and, in particular, the psyche of the enemy.
Gelb and Betts mention "ethnocentricity and misperception" as a common
criticism of the FPDM analysis that fueled the obstacles to success in Vietnam.
From the perspective of the sociopolitics of intervention, the ignorance of the
local political, cultural, and social conditions of Vietnam highlights the focus on
great-power conflict more broadly. Militarily, the focus on using traditional military
tactics to fight a guerilla war, certain exceptions like Phoenix notwithstanding,
represents the tactical component of the strategic-tactical gap in U.S. grand
strategy. The tragic irony of the Vietnam War was that the U.S. became willing to
expend great-power-conflict resources against an enemy that lacked them in a
country where the national interest was in fact never at stake.
In fairness to certain elements within military and foreign policymaking
circles, the idea behind efforts like Phoenix was to get closer to the source of the
insurgency and improve battlefield intelligence. Had this been the main
provenance of counterinsurgency, as was the initial purpose when Kennedy
initially sent advisors to the country, the effort may or may not have been
successful, but it certainly would have left a smaller footprint, saving resources
and humiliation in the face of defeat. This is where the metric of efficiency comes
into play. The willingness to 'pay any cost' to 'protect freedom,' simplistic slogans
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too often reverberating in the discourse of official U.S. foreign policy and certainly
present during the Vietnam era, leaves policymakers hamstrung in terms of both
limiting and maximizing the amount of resources expended. Contrary to the
assumptions of many foreign policymakers involved in this catastrophic blunder,
the employment of fewer resources may in fact have led to a more favorable
outcome, given that the aggressively violent nature of the American intervention
fed weaponry to the Viet Cong and motivated many Vietnamese countrymen to
take up arms. This is not to say that the United States would have succeeded in
preventing the North from taking over the South, which is likely to have happened
anyway at some indefinite point. But it may have been more effective, and would
have saved a fair amount of resources, American and Vietnamese lives, and
humiliation.
British military officers described the American militiamen they confronted
during the American Revolution as "a very effeminate thing, very unfit for and
very impatient of war," and American civilians as "a worthless lot, a rabble,
without discipline and without courage, running away from battle, deserting to the
British ranks, leaving Mr. Washington with no army at all." 282 What a difference a
century makes: as the sun began to set on the British Empire, it would be this
"worthless lot" of American power that would transpose the Pax Britannica with
the Pax Americana. Roosevelt's "people of small stature" that were "not warlike"
would in turn come to undermine that power by the way of the same
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transformation from guerilla warfare to pitched regimented battle, combined with
an absolute determination to expel foreigners from their native land. While it is
now perceptible what effect the loss of the American Colonies signified for the
British Empire, it is not yet clear what the loss in, not of Vietnam means to the
United States. How Americans interpret the conflict conceptually still affects the
U.S. encounter with the world in real terms.
Perhaps the two most distinguishable inferences garnered from this
chapter are the trance-like myopia with which U.S. foreign policymakers viewed
the situation in Vietnam and the complete inability of the state in Saigon to stand
on its own. What caused this myopia is open to interpretation; this dissertation
contends that it was informed by the pursuit of preponderance at every level due
to the inability to think outside of that box and accept that Vietnam would be 'lost.'
The problem of adherence to the status quo and the problem of the institutionally
and morally barren GVN came together when U.S. war planners realized that the
ARVN could not even make an attempt to fight the war effectively, let alone win
it. They therefore took over the fight from 1965 onward, eventually relinquishing it
back to the GVN through "Vietnamization" as the war came full circle,
acknowledging that the price was greater than they wished to pay. There was no
way to unify the two armies because the standards were so distinct:

Westmoreland and the South Vietnamese command believed the
ARVN was better suited to work among and protect the indigenous
population than were foreign-born troops. Yet since they perceived
ARVN as demoralized, they had little choice but to have fresh, wellarmed American troops engage the enemy's regular forces...

272

Command-and-control arrangements between U.S. and South
Vietnamese forces reinforced the concept that the forces of each
nation remained separate entities with distinct missions. In April,
Westmoreland turned down the notion of encadrement, of placing
American officers and cadres in charge of South Vietnamese units,
because of the language barrier and the requirement of additional
logistical support. 283

In reviewing reports from the Vietnam War, one of the starkest realizations
becomes just how predictable all of the problems of implementation were. And
yet, even decades later, there is still much argument about why the war failed. In
the same way that FPDM is often clouded by political expedience, bureaucratic
necessities, ideology, the heat of the moment, groupthink, or just the endless
confusion of statecraft, so too can the memory of that FPDM be confused even
many years afterward. Just as cognitive biases and preference restrictions
constrain and codify FPDM maxims, so too do accounts of that FPDM frame its
understanding in both popular and scholarly analysis. This is in large part
because whatever ideology, IR paradigm, political predilection, or general
perspective you adhere to will inevitably determine to a large degree what
happened, why it happened, how it happened, and what conclusions to draw
from it. James William Gibson describes this confusion:
During the 1970s various liberal interpretations of what happened in
Vietnam were considered definitive. Some claimed the great lesson
to be learned concerned "the limits of power." The United States
had expended too many men and too much money fighting in a
country that wasn't so important after all. Other liberals viewed the
war as a tragic drama fueled by hubris. Our political leadership, the
best and the brightest of the land, made a series of "small
decisions," each decision being "reasonably regarded at the time
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as the least that would be necessary." But Fate intervened and lo
and behold we found ourselves "entrapped in that nightmare of
American strategists, a land war in Asia." It was a sad, sad story,
says Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "a tragedy without villains." Curiously
enough, the views of the Conservatives were not so different. They
offered another way of "getting over Vietnam" without ever
searching for the war. In November 1980, President-elect Ronald
Reagan declared that Vietnam had been a "noble cause." The war
had been lost only because of American "self-imposed restraints."
We had not been sufficiently "tough," but no longer would be weak
or timid. Reagan promised to "rebuild" our "defense" capabilities.
He announced a new plan for spending $750 billion for the military.
A new Rapid Deployment Force was created for quick transport to
the Third World. We were ready to go to war again. For months the
news media talked and wrote about how the United States had
finally gotten over the "Vietnam Syndrome." Never was the
question raised about just what it was we were over. The Vietnam
part of the "Vietnam Syndrome" was left blank. Perhaps the war
was just a normal part of growing up for a young nation, a
childhood disease like chicken pox, which leaves behind some
small scars but builds character. In this way a strange consensus
developed: it was okay to use the war as a point of departure for
almost any discussion—whether on literature or Greek tragedy or
foreign policy—but only as long as you didn't talk about the war
itself. In this way the war became progressively displaced and
repressed at the same time it was written about. 284

To talk about it without talking about it is what Geoff Simons meant when
he examined the war as an idea, and not an event, in his discussion of Vietnam
Syndrome. At this point it is necessary to reiterate that the purpose of this
dissertation is not to regurgitate old information in order to produce some
cathartic exorcism in the reaction of the reader, nor to hoodwink the reader into
normatively deploring any particular leader, but rather to make the case that the
archetype of the stoic statesman rationally maximizing the utility-function in the
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pursuit of a static, materially determined national interest is an inaccurate
description of a much more human, much more complicated process. These
foreign-policy blunders were chosen for case studies in part to illustrate that
process.
If Vietnam Syndrome died with the perceived success of the 1991 Gulf
War to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, the Iraq War resurrected the ghosts
of Vietnam, as George H.W. Bush's multilateral effort to establish his "new world
order," which accomplished its admittedly limited objectives, descended into
George W. Bush's seemingly interminable tempest in the form of the Iraq War,
perhaps the most egregious foreign-policy blunder in the history of the United
States in terms of the national interest—only time will tell. While there is very little
in common between the international conditions, motivations for choosing the
particular country of conflict, or political climate of these two blunders, they
nevertheless demonstrate in conjunction that two features remain immutable in
U.S. foreign policy: the pursuit of the grand strategy of preponderance and the
assumption that with great power comes the capacity to dictate the sociopolitical
terms of other states. Gibson writes of the explosion of literature on the Vietnam
War from 1983 onward (after eight years of mourning, presumably), "It was as if
a legendary monster or unholy beast had finally been captured and was now on
a nationwide tour." 285 Along would come another monster exactly two decades
later, and it now appears to be spawning new monsters of ever-increasing
ferocity...
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CHAPTER 6
The Iraq War: FPDM Prisms and the Man Behind the Curtain

The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered
dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction. We acted because we saw existing evidence in a new
light through the prism of our experience on 9/11. 286
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 2003
I'm here for a reason, and this is how we're going to be judged. 287
President George W. Bush prior to the Iraq War

Part I. FPE
Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives
On March 21, 2003, the day after the invasion of Iraq, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld set forth the preliminary goals of the invasion, or what
he termed "aims and objectives we have for the days ahead:"

Our goal is to defend the American people, and to eliminate Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction, and to liberate the Iraqi people.
Coalition military operations are focused on achieving several
specific objectives: to end the regime of Saddam Hussein by
striking with force on a scope and scale that makes clear to Iraqis
that he and his regime are finished. Next, to identify, isolate and
eventually eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, their
delivery systems, production capabilities, and distribution networks.
Third, to search for, capture, and drive out terrorists who have
found safe harbor in Iraq. Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we
can find related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond. Fifth, to
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collect such intelligence as we can find related to the global
network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity. Sixth, to end
sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian relief, food and
medicine to the displaced and to the many needy Iraqi citizens.
Seventh, to secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, which belong to
the Iraqi people, and which they will need to develop their country
after decades of neglect by the Iraqi regime. And last, to help the
Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a
representative self-government that is not a threat to its neighbors
and is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that
country. 288

The following day, General Tommy Franks, commanding general of the
invasion force, reiterated these objectives, promising, “This will be a campaign
unlike any other in history, a campaign characterized by shock, by surprise, by
flexibility, by the employment of precise munitions on a scale never before seen,
and by the application of overwhelming force."
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Use of the phrase

"overwhelming force" was clearly intentional, given that Colin Powell and other
military leaders had demanded just that as one of the lessons of the Vietnam
War and a cornerstone of modern American war doctrine. Of course, these were
all tactical objectives, as the Defense Department is charged with carrying out
military policy, not creating it. As Harry Summers summarized of a particular
attitude prevalent in the military, "The army doesn't make strategy." While this is
technically true, the words and preferences of defense officials inevitably do
affect policy to a certain degree. Both the military and the intelligence community
288

Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General
Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 21, 2003,
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/03/20030322094327relhcie0.3604242.ht
ml#axzz4Mhdb564t

289

"Franks Holds Press Briefing," CNN Transcripts, March 22, 2003,
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0303/22/se.22.html

277

would become politically enmeshed in the Iraq War to a further extent than
defined in their charters with respect to WMD, troop levels, and other matters.
But in terms of establishing the war narrative, the Bush Administration set the
tone. Its lofty rhetoric emphasized a more holistic approach to the Middle East
more broadly, with establishing a "liberated," pro-Western Iraq as its primary
policy piece within the regional grand-strategic puzzle.
Even though this war narrative was highly idealized in its choice of
concepts and words, policy with regard to Iraq did establish particular objectives,
including those specified by Rumsfeld and Franks. Chief among them, at least in
terms of priority, was of course removing Saddam Hussein from power. This
turned out to be the only aspect of the Iraq War that met or exceeded
expectations. Coalition forces reached and secured Baghdad in one of the most
rapid advances of modern warfare, and did so with remarkably few casualties. It
would be difficult to classify this phase of the war as anything other than a
resounding success. It took only days to reach Baghdad, and less than three
weeks to sweep the country. This comprehensive battlefield accomplishment was
due to myriad factors: weak morale in the Iraqi military and the decrepit state of
its infrastructure; Saddam Hussein's strategic miscalculations and obsessive
focus on internal rather than external threats; the rapid advance on Baghdad,
leaving few opportunities for coordination of a counterattack; the skill and
firepower of American ground forces; and the strength of aerial bombing. All of
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these factors were compounded by the relative simplicity of fighting a war in the
desert for the side with superior firepower. 290
Given the open terrain and the shortcomings in Iraqi military capabilities,
declarations by military officials that characterize the campaign as one of the
most daring and impressive in history seem somewhat overstated. Nevertheless,
this objective was in practical terms a clear success, even though Saddam
Hussein and many other high-level targets were not captured until months into
the conflict. The "shock and awe" aspect of the campaign may or may not have
had an impact on Iraqi defections; it seems likely that defections would have
been high regardless. What the blitzkrieg ground assault and leadership-andchain-of-command

aerial

targeting

did

accomplish

was

the

immediate

decapitation of the Hussein regime, even if some of its leaders managed to flee
for the time being. Many of the faces on the deck of cards representing wanted
regime members American soldiers were dealt would evade capture for some
time, but within days few were able to affect the country's situation in any
meaningful way. What the otherwise successful blitzkrieg did not address was
the total accounting of all Iraqi military forces, many of which were bypassed, a
maneuver which itself bypassed standard military procedure—never allow the
enemy to roam free and occupy your flank, even in a full frontal assault that
quickly captures the flag. Many of these chickens would come home to roost,
especially after the dismissal of the Iraq Army.
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The most important medium-term goal, and the fundamental muse for the
war, was the location, capture, and disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). But the saga of Iraq's nonexistent WMD quickly became a
game with a cat a no mouse as the aloof statements of Bush Administration
officials promised WMD but delivered none. The narrative justifying the war
therefore became 'the man behind the curtain' as the Bush Administration moved
to justify the war on other grounds. This enormous balloon deflated a little bit
each week as the American public and the world waited for a train to arrive that
had never left the station.
This anticlimactic end was the result of a long chain of means whose
mass-public forum began on February 5th, 2003, when Secretary of State Colin
Powell, perhaps the most admired Bush Administration official and the one
whose word carried the most legitimacy, made the official case for Iraq's pursuit
of WMD in an impassioned speech at the United Nations. Powell claimed
unequivocally that "the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and
his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass
destruction." 291 This assessment of the situation on the ground failed to convince
many heads of state, including many allies in Western Europe, who found the
assertions exaggerated and unworthy of a major military confrontation. Concerns
among allies were compounded by Hans Blix's testimony at the same body nine
days later, which was largely contradictory. Blix testified, "More than 200
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chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different
sites," which produced no prohibited samples. 292
The multilateralist element of the Bush Administration led by Colin Powell
did manage to get Resolution 1441 passed, "Recognizing the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security." 293
The resolution was left intentionally vague so as to receive a larger coalition of
support and to deny anti-war leaders in the United Nations and the United States
language with which to claim that Iraq was in fact complying with that and prior
resolutions. In fact, the first declaration within the resolution was to recognize
prior resolutions Iraq had been in violation of. Although roundly questioned the
world over, Powell's assertions were consistent with virtually every public
statement made theretofore by the Bush Administration.
President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address, in which he famously
singled out Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil," also contained a false
report of the soon-to-be infamous 'sixteen words:' "The British government has
learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa." 294 Later, the Bush Administration recognized that the report was
inaccurate, and dropped it from the rhetorical casus belli. Generally speaking,
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however, the Administration avoided specifics, proliferating in general terms the
charge that Iraq was aggressively pursuing WMD and partnering with terrorists.
These claims were based in large part on the now-declassified October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for
Weapons of Mass Destruction, which stated categorically: "Since inspections
ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its
missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of
most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program." 295 The
British government's public claims were almost identical to U.S claims, as well as
being equally vague. Tony Blair wrote in the Foreword to his government's
version of the U.S. NIE, the 2002 Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The
Assessment of the British Government: "What I believe the assessed intelligence
has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical
and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear
weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile
programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do
his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors." 296
However, declassified documents reveal that the certainty with which
Saddam Hussein was assumed to be in possession of WMD was greatly inflated
by both intelligence officials and Bush Administration officials. In fact, Defense
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Secretary Donald Rumsfeld estimated the low end of that certainty to be 0%,
writing in a memo to Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Meyers: "Please take a look
at this material as to what we don't know about WMD. It is big. Our assessments
rely heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than on hard evidence.
Our knowledge of the Iraq nuclear weapons program is based largely—perhaps
90%—on analysis of imprecise intelligence." 297
The job of the intelligence community is to use hard evidence to make an
assessment with a specified level of confidence, not to make assumptions based
on a lack of hard evidence and peddle them as certainty. In 2004, weapons
inspector Charles Duelfer simply stated, "Saddam Hussein ended the nuclear
program in 1991 following the Gulf War," and "There were no credible indicators
that Baghdad resumed production." 298 But as with the adage that statistics can
be inferred to produce any conclusion, so too can 'credible indicators' be
produced in intelligence where there exists a viewpoint unwilling to accept their
nonexistence. Confirmation bias plagued WMD intelligence gathering and
analysis at every step of the way because Bush Administration officials pressed
the CIA for confirming evidence and systematically dismissed and discredited
disconfirming evidence.
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"Conclusion 1" of the March 2013 "Final Report from the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction" states: "Most of the major key judgments in the
Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated,
or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of
failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the
intelligence." 299 This metric for evaluation therefore can only be considered a
monumental failure, since the most significant justification for war was null and
void before the war ever began. To make matters worse, the intelligence
community failed miserably at its two most important tasks, remaining apolitical
and producing solid intelligence. The Bush Administration had inflated the threat
to such an extent that the lines between the actual intelligence and the claims
made about Iraq's WMD became so blurred as to be immeasurable. The
Administration thus shifted its rhetoric to other justifications for war in Iraq, but by
that time, there was a new problem in Iraq and public attention shifted to it:
rampant insecurity.
The final goal enunciated by Secretary Rumsfeld was "to help the Iraqi
people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative selfgovernment that is not a threat to its neighbors and is committed to ensuring the
territorial integrity of that country." This is an extremely vague reference to the
absolute imperative of security and stability operations. Curiously, and highly
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problematically, nowhere under the veneer of his eight objectives is a concern
over security even mentioned in any substantive terms. But insecurity in fact
became the significant harm to the national interest that a simple toppling of the
regime and exfiltration from a safe, secure country left behind would never had
entailed had it been quickly and effectively achieved. As many people had
predicted before the invasion, the drive to the capitol proved to be a fairly easy
task short-term against the dilapidated Iraqi military, while the secure occupation
of the country would become a virtually insurmountable challenge long-term.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) did
manage to establish some basic services, but never retained enough resources
to completely fulfill this task. 300 The mixed success with which retired General
Jay Garner oversaw Iraq in March and April of 2003 soon gave way to the
leadership of Ambassador Paul Bremer III on May 1, when he was charged with
developing

a

Coalition

Provisional

Authority

(CPA).

He

subsequently

incorporated Iraqi leaders into the Authority to cooperate in formation of the Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC), which took the baton from the CPA in July, just as the
insurgency was picking up steam. The prevailing environment rapidly turned into
"a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by
fanatical foreign jihadists and persistent criminal opportunists." 301 This power
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struggle and the American-Iraqi campaign to establish security is detailed in
OPM Indicators II and III.
While the idea behind foreign policy evaluation is to assess any given
foreign policy as it relates to the national interest, there is no way of avoiding the
intersection between the foreign policy in objective terms and the foreign policy
as perceived by the group of people promulgating it. In the case of the Iraq War,
that group was primarily made up of the Bush Administration, and the perception
of the foreign policy from the view of its core group of individuals was highly
idealized and in fact almost cavalier toward how it related to the national interest.
This is simply because it did not relate to the national interest in real terms. The
United States stood little to gain in Iraq, and in fact the country is now much more
tied to the national interest (in a highly problematic fashion) than at any time in
history, including the 1991 Gulf War. It was therefore marketed in ideational
terms to the American public and Congress, who accepted the connection
between Iraq and the national interest on those grounds. However, this was not
an act of simple deception, but of self-deception. While the progenitors of the Iraq
War did in fact manipulate the truth and lie about the threat posed by Iraq, its
supposed WMD, and its ties to groups that meant to threaten the United States,
they believed that they could successfully remake the Middle East in a more
modern, Western-friendly image, and that this would benefit the national interest.
The Iraq War was intended by its neoconservative protagonists to
symbolize the zenith of the American social-engineering project in the Middle
East. Instead, it now represents a nadir above which it would never reach.
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Assessing this metric provides both opportunities and challenges. On the one
hand, there can be little doubt that toppling the brutal dictatorship of Saddam
Hussein did indeed motivate revolutionary and progressive people in other
countries in the region, as the Arab Spring has demonstrated. On the other hand,
the current conditions within Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and
elsewhere in the region signify that in no way has the Middle East in fact been
democratized. Instead, extant U.S. allies have largely maintained their
sociopolitical status quo ante, while sectarian strife has transformed from a
dormant problem into a malignant regional firestorm.
As the architect of the Iraq War, the United States now finds its national
interest transposed over a region in a manner much more acute than prior to
2003. Because of its position as the originator of this social-engineering project,
the United States has now been forced to engage even further with the region
just as the motivation to do so among the American citizenry is fading and just as
the "Asia pivot" is meant to be hitting full stride. There is still not a single
democracy in the Middle East. 302 Dictatorships and kingdoms that were U.S.
allies prior to 2003 remain just as dictatorial, and U.S. enemies (chiefly Iran) have
become emboldened by their influence in Iraq and Syria and the response
against the Iraq War.
The ideational component of the Iraq War, which was its primary
component, can therefore only be assessed as an utter failure. The message
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sent by removing Saddam Hussein from power by military force, especially via
the lightning-quick "shock and awe" military campaign that so swiftly removed his
authority, may indeed have been received by other potential adversaries,
including Iran and North Korea, that had been singled out by President Bush in
his 2002 State of the Union Address. However, Iraq's descent into chaos and
insurgency have all but eroded any victory in perception that lighting advance
may have created. Furthermore, North Korea continues to flaunt its nuclear
weapons program in the face of impotent U.S. threats against it, and Iran has
taken control of the helm of the securitization effort in Iraq. In virtually every
conceivable way, the Iraq War produced exactly the outcomes it meant to
preclude in Iraq, in the region, and throughout the world.
In time, as WMD were not found and the justification for the war shifted,
one alternative narrative became the need to "fight them over there so that we
don't have to fight them here." This justification was one of a plethora of
alternative justifications from mid-2003 onward, which included everything from
humanitarian imperatives to hedging against Iran. Even if we set aside for a
moment who "they" are supposed to imply, this is a highly problematic way of
thinking, and yet the few policy and pundit stragglers that still cling to the Iraq
War as a "success" consistently invoke this philosophy as evidence for why the
United States has not been attacked again in any significant way since 9/11. But
first, it is impossible to prove a counterfactual, so there is no way of establishing
this as fact. Second, this assertion does not follow sound logic. The U.S.
presence in Iraq was opposed by the Muslim community, and therefore
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exacerbated the U.S. image problem in it rather than helping it. It is true that
jihadists were attracted to Iraq because of the American presence, but since
there were more of them available do to its presence, there is no way to link that
presence with a lack of presence of the home front. 303 Third, the price paid to
dislodge Saddam Hussein in blood, treasure, and prestige, detailed in FPE
Criterion III, was so enormous so as to render the argument moot. Indeed, more
American soldiers perished in Iraq than civilians in the 9/11 attacks, and now
continue to perish in the war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences
On June 10, 2014, the gigantic expenditure of time, money, soldiers, and
political capital invested by the United States in Iraq largely dissipated in days
when a wayward band of Sunni jihadists that came to be known as the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) captured Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, after
only four days of fighting. 304 In the hundred days between that date and
September 23, when the United States began airstrikes on ISIS in Syria, the
group established a self-described caliphate that covered hundreds of square
miles between northwestern Iraq and eastern Syria, defeating the Iraqi army, the
Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Syrian army on multiple fronts with adept military
303 The term 'jihadist' is used here as an admittedly generic term for a militant motivated by
Islamist fundamentalism. It does not represent any singular individual or group. In the case of
Iraq, it generally signifies a Salafi jihadist, whether Iraqi or foreign national.
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tactics, ferocious battlefield tenacity, and a systematic campaign of execution,
extortion, and terrorism that enveloped everything and everyone within its path. It
instilled fear into anyone who opposed it via summary executions, public
beheadings, crucifixions, torture, and a highly public media campaign to
proliferate its name, purpose, efficacy, and ruthlessness. For one analyst, the
word that best described the group that seemed to so revel in violence for the
sake of violence was "bloodlust." 305
ISIS successfully assumed the mantle of the only Sunni force capable of
defending the faith against the Shia oppression of the Iraqi government,
solidifying the sectarian rift unleashed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq a decade
earlier. In desperate times, people back a winner, and ISIS, in spite of its
austerity and brutality, seemed the only force capable of advancing Sunni
interests in the face of the Baghdad government's Shia domination. While the
group is certainly not universally praised among Sunnis, in large part due to the
ruthless nature of its 'governance,' a nontrivial portion of the Sunni community
within Iraq either openly supported it or tacitly approved of it as a wedge against
the perceived inside-out power grab that replaced Sunni Saddam Hussein with a
host of Shia partisans in Baghdad. The same is often true in Syria, where "ISIS is
more popular in the Sunni towns and villages they have captured around Aleppo
than many other rebel groups that are halfway to being bandits." 306 In the
wasteland of anarchy, fear alone is enough to stimulate inhabitants to back the
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group that appears to be winning, even in the case that it is frowned upon
ideologically—to resist can often mean mass slaughter, and ISIS has shown little
restraint in that regard.
One of the most dire admonitions against a military intervention to topple
Saddam Hussein was the concern that removing the regime, which had
successfully (if brutally) asserted authority in the country, would expose a
centuries-old sectarian rift within Iraq between Sunni, Shia, and Kurd; the SunniShia divide dates all the way back to the death of Muhammad in year 632 of the
Common Era. Even before the rise of ISIS, this fear had been realized in the
form of Shia death squads operating with either the implicit approval of or direct
support from the Iraqi government battling it out with disparate Sunni Arab
tribesmen. In the early years of the insurgency, loose bands of militias targeted
Sunni leaders, with Sunni groups forming in defense to retaliate.
By 2006, even Sunni groups that were "heavily armed and lightly
supervised" were collaborating with the Shia-dominated government to facilitate
extrajudicial killings in Sunni-dominated areas, while Shia death squads operated
freely in Shia-dominated areas, in both rural and urban areas alike. 307 The
insecurity that took hold after the 2003 invasion led directly to the alienation of
Sunnis, the bitterness of ex-army soldiers that had been disbanded by Paul
Bremer's wholesale anti-Baathist purges, and the humiliating treatment of
detainees in the invasion's aftermath. These nationalists and former Ba'athists
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either partnered with foreign jihadists or fought them for the authority to fight the
American-Iraqi government alliance. Many of the core fighters that would
eventually form ISIS had been detained together at the U.S. prison at Camp
Bucca, including Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, who came to be known by his
nom de guerre Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the organization's 'caliph.'308
By the time ISIS had conquered vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, leading to a
consolidation of territory covering 80,000 square kilometers by the end of 2014,
sectarian tensions had become so entrenched that going by Weber's definition of
a state as having achieved the monopolization of violence left Iraq without a state
at all. 309 The current security situation in Iraq is dire, and the long-term outlook
may be even more precarious (while government forces have made slow
advances on Mosul and other ISIS strongholds, long-term sectarian strife is far
from solved). The nonstate armed groups on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide
that emerged following the 2003 invasion and subsequent insurgency continue to
operate at will. The force charged with liberating northwestern Iraq from ISIS—
the same force that melted in the face of its advance—the Iraqi army, is
incapable of retaking Mosul without significant help, and often even direction,
from Shia militias backed by Iran and their leader on the ground, Qasem
Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Quds force.
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While a delicate balance currently exists between the Iraqi government, its
Shia militias, Iranian commanders and fighters, the small contingent of U.S.
Special Operations troops, and the Kurds, this balance will likely evaporate as
ISIS is destroyed and Iraq returns to its previous state of virtual anarchy between
its rival factions. That these groups are currently allied to fight a common enemy
is not to suggest that the alliance is stable even in the short term: the Asaib Ahl
al-Haq militia, known as the League of the Righteous, recently warned on its
television channel, "If the U.S. doesn't withdraw its forces immediately, we will
deal with them as forces of occupation." 310 When territory has been successfully
taken back from ISIS, extrajudicial reprisal killings, torture, unlawful arrests, and
wanton destruction of property have followed in its wake, blurring the moral war
between ISIS and its multifarious adversaries. 311 While the heinous nature of
ISIS terrorism and its sleek usage of media make it profoundly clear how barbaric
the group is, there is still no obvious moral high ground anywhere to be found.
The Iraqi state and its proxies seem at best the lesser of two evils.
While ISIS is under siege in Iraq, it still operates relatively freely in Syria,
where a half-million people lost their lives between 2011 and 2015, 11.5% of

310

Raf Sanchez, "Iran-Backed Shia Militia Says it will Fight U.S. Marines Deployed to Iraq," The
Telegraph, March 21, 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/12200172/Iran-backed-Shia-militiasays-it-will-fight-US-Marines-deployed-to-Iraq.html

311

"Ruinous Aftermath: Militia Abuses Following Iraq's Recapture of Tikrit," Human Rights Watch,
September 20, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/20/ruinous-aftermath/militias-abusesfollowing-iraqs-recapture-tikrit

293

Syria's population. 312 Whereas the rebellion against dictator Bashar al-Assad
may have otherwise been comprised of ordinary, relatively secular (or at least
non-jihadist) groups, ISIS has largely intimidated all others to become the
primary opposition force. The fact that Russia has largely avoided targeting ISIS
in Syria, as Assad views the other groups as more threatening to his regime
given that the United States and others oppose both he and ISIS, has only
allowed them to further consolidate their rule there. While U.S. airpower has
proven sufficient to prevent the group from traveling freely in armored columns
(often made up of U.S.-supplied Humvees and tanks abandoned by or lost from
the Iraqi army), it has proven equally insufficient to prevent it from maintaining its
authority and buttressing its newly conquered territories.
Another significant problem with challenging Assad in Syria was recently
described by Vice President Joe Biden in typically blunt Biden-esque terms: "Our
allies poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of
weapons into anyone who would fight against al-Assad," leading directly to the
proliferation of groups each of these allies (specifically Turkey, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, or each of the Sunni Gulf states) is now in
direct confrontation with, such as al-Nusra and ISIS. 313 To summarize, the
security vacuum left by the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein, whose regime had
successfully established order in Iraq and who posed no threat to the United
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States or any direct threat to its allies, has been filled in both Iraq and Syria by
forces defiantly opposed to the United States and its interests, most notably
international Sunni jihadists, Iranian-backed militias, and the Russo-Syrian
alliance. This outcome was far from unpredictable and far short of surprising, as
the FPE Criterion IV section discusses further. 314

Criterion III. Cost
Through FY2009, the war cost U.S. taxpayers $683 billion according to
the Congressional Research Service (CRS). 315 By FY2011, this figure had
reached $784 billion in constant $FY2011. 316 However, this figure includes only
direct combat costs and excludes the substantial costs of reconstruction
assistance, diplomatic security, and all other costs by all agencies apart from the
Department of Defense (DoD). Other estimates put the cost much higher, even
when only considering direct military costs. Economist Joseph Stiglitz' exhaustive
attempt to quantify the direct and corollary costs of the war estimated the cost of
the campaign as The Three Trillion Dollar War, producing a book in 2008 of the
same name. This estimate included indirect expenses such as caring for disabled
veterans, replenishing military hardware, the price of oil, and macroeconomic
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impact on the American economy. 317 In 2015, Stiglitz revised that estimate,
raising it to an astounding $5-7 trillion. 318
In December 2011, the last U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq, belatedly
fulfilling a campaign promise by President Obama, and leaving the fledgling Iraqi
army to fend for itself. According to the final report of the Special Investigator
General for Iraq Reconstruction, the United States spent $26 billion training,
equipping, and staffing the Iraqi military and Iraqi police between 2003 and 2013,
in addition to $34 billion in nonmilitary reconstruction projects. 319 Iraq itself spent
$41.6 billion between 2011-2014 on its army, which by then totaled 350,000
soldiers. 320 When considering that President Bush's economic advisor projected
that the war would cost $200 billion, and his political advisor Paul Wolfowitz
argued that the war would "pay for itself," even the more conservative of these
estimates are quite staggering. The Center for Economic and Policy Research
has shown that the long-term effect of the post-9/11 military spending increase
has damaged the economy by decreasing payroll employment, housing
construction, and car sales, raising inflation and interest rates, and diverting
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precious resources away from sectors of the economy that tend to multiply GDP
and standard of living indicators. 321 The Costs of War Project at Brown University
assembles data on U.S. defense expenditures from 9/11 onward and maintains
the following figures as shown in Table 7, with total defense spending totaling
$4.79 trillion, not including interest on previous expenditures and debt: 322
Table 7: Summary of costs of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Homeland Security
FY2001-FY2017

These figures include areas of operation other than Iraq, but Iraq is
overwhelmingly the largest expense within them. Brown's Costs of War Project
also keeps an estimate of war casualties. 4,489 members of the U.S. military
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died in Iraq between March 2003 and April 2015, along with 12,000 Iraqi miiltary
and police, 3,481 U.S. contractors, and 319 allied troops from other countries. It
estimates 370,000 "direct war" casualties as a result of the wars in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
It is impossible to quantify the damage done to the image of the United
States in the world as a result of the functionally unilateral (though technically
multilateral) Iraq War, the lack of WMD found, the insecurity the power vacuum
caused, and the hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. While President
Bush often trumpeted the "Coalition of the Willing," in reality this consisted of the
United Kingdom and a token set of marginal U.S. allies. In the early years of the
war, images of prisoners improperly treated and sometimes tortured made
headlines around the world. General David Petraeus estimated the total number
of detainees to be a whopping 27,000 at the height of detentions, quite a sum
considering the lack of proper prison infrastructure and military police trained to
control and care for so many prisoners. The photos that emerged from Abu
Ghraib, the ongoing detentions at Guantanamo, and reports of CIA "extraordinary
renditions" and "enhanced interrogation techniques," limited though the programs
may have been, produced the perception that torture and excessive and/or illegal
detentions were an inherent piece of the global war on terror (GWOT) strategy.
As ISIS began filming the public execution of prisoners, they did so with
the prisoners dressed in orange jumpsuits, as Guantanamo Bay prisoners and
some Abu Ghraib prisoners had been. The perception within the United States
that abuses of prisoners were widespread in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at overseas
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interrogation and rendition sites became cemented in 2012 with the release of
the Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and
Interrogation Program published by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Based on the review of six million documents reviewed between 2009-2012, its
primary finding was that "The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques
was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from
detainees." 323
Robert Kagan, one of the founding fathers of neoconservatism, lamented
only one year removed from that ideological movement's centerpiece that "For
the first time since World War II, a majority of Europeans has come to doubt the
legitimacy of U.S. power and of U.S. global leadership." He described the shell of
multilateralism that made consensus on Iraq-related issues difficult, as opposed
to the 1991 Gulf War when multilateralism was pursued in earnest:
The situation was quite different in Iraq: although President George
W. Bush bragged that his coalition was ultimately larger than the
one his father created in 1991, it was of much lower quality. No
Arab countries were willing to associate themselves with the
occupation; many big NATO allies, such as France and Germany,
similarly refused to join, and some that did, such as Spain,
withdrew under pressure from domestic opinion or terrorist acts.
The United States was wary of the United Nations in the weeks and
months following the invasion and was not eager to seek a broader
role for the organization until its plans started unraveling in late
2003. 324
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The backlash against both the decision to go to war in Iraq and the
feigned justification for doing so was fierce among both allies and adversaries.
Indeed, the unification of these allied and adversarial actors would turn out to be
one of the most incisive shortcomings of the war effort as well as its aftermath.
Germany, France, China, Russia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Mexico all
aligned against the war, with only a token level of support from countries
eventually comprising the "Coalition of the Willing." Prime Minister Tony Blair, as
the only prominent ally with a substantial enough military to substantively support
the war, was to suffer mightily in political terms for years afterward.
Blair, who was vilified within Great Britain as a pawn of President Bush,
successfully managed to convince the president with the support of Colin Powell
that the United States could not afford to go it alone, and that he needed to go to
the United Nations in order to win the backing of his British constituents. He was
surprised to find Vice President Cheney alongside the president when he arrived
at Camp David to discuss his multilateralist agenda, but the conclusion to at least
attempt a U.N. resolution was eventually settled upon. 325 The alienation felt by
nations disregarded in the decision-making process produced an environment in
which "the impression of a belligerent United States was reinforced by
Washington's half-hearted approach to the U.N., the timetable of which was
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driven by military imperatives rather than diplomatic necessities." 326 Having had
the world behind it after the devastating attacks of 9/11, by 2003 virtually all of
that goodwill toward the United States had been squandered.

Criterion IV. Availability and consideration of alternatives
There was enough to dislike about the policy of containing Saddam
Hussein and his reign of terror over the Iraq people. When George W. Bush
assumed office, lamentations over allowing Hussein to retain his position as
dictator of Iraq after the Gulf War continued to reverberate in certain circles
around Washington. Although far from an ideal outcome, President George H. W.
Bush, along with his military and political advisors and the consultation of allies in
the Middle East, had considered it more practical than assuming ownership of
the entire country. Although sanctions have been show to have little effect on the
target state except under specific unique conditions, Iraq was particularly
susceptible to sanctions given its overreliance on a single export product, oil, and
international alienation. Sanctions are most effective where a country is highly
dependent on international trade, has limited options in terms of substitutes for
export products, and cannot rely on allies to circumvent the sanctions. 327 All of
these factors were present in Iraq, leading to an environment in which "the
sanctions regime imposed on Iraq was unprecedented in its comprehensiveness,
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severity, and length, and in the enormous human and economic cost which it
inflicted." 328
A World Health Organization report assessed that "the quality of health
care in Iraq, due to the six-week 1991 war and the subsequent sanctions
imposed on the country, has been literally put back by at least 50 years." 329
Every social indicator, from infant mortality and childhood education to life
expectancy and rate of infectious disease, had risen dramatically. The war with
Iran, the Gulf War, and the subsequent sanctions on the Iraqi economy had
devastated the country's oil productivity output, infrastructure, health, and social
well-being. Hussein, meanwhile, remained in power with as much of a
stranglehold on the country as ever before. While his presence was a thorn in the
side of U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf, he was contained, his military lacked
the strength to invade any other state again, and his WMD program had been
shut down after the Gulf War.
These obstacles to Hussein posing a serious threat to anyone other than
his own people notwithstanding, the Bush Administration would argue
convincingly enough to persuade a majority of the American people and
members of Congress, with the rubble of the Twin Towers in the rearview mirror,
that sanctions had not achieved their objective and should be abandoned in favor
of military intervention. After 9/11, and in many ways even before 9/11, the story
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of the decision to initiate the Iraq War was never about the delineation and
discussion of alternatives, but rather how to sell the war to Congress and the
American public and how to win it in the most efficient manner possible. As
described by Paul O'Neill, Treasury Secretary under President Bush, the
Administration was already on a war footing long before 9/11: "It was all about
finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The president saying, 'go find me a
way to do this.'" 330
In April 1999, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted
war games on the "worst case" and "most likely" outcomes of an invasion of Iraq
to depose Saddam Hussein. Among its findings were that any invasion force
would encounter "rival forces bidding for power," "fragmentation along religious
and/or ethnic lines," the antagonization of "aggressive neighbors" (principally
Iran), and a "period of widespread bloodshed in which various factions seek to
eliminate their enemies." 331 It further warned that any tenderfoot state would
meet stiff resistance in its attempts to coalesce around a single government and
that a swift exit strategy would be complicated by insecurity and sectarian
divisions. These games were not conducted with the small, nimble force that
Secretary Rumsfeld eventually employed, but with a full 400,000-strong invasion
force, the figure that many military leaders later called for in the months prior to
the invasion.
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The other alternative in addition to invasion, of course, was maintenance
of the status quo, which meant isolation of Hussein, sanctions, isolated bombing,
a no-fly zone, and diplomatic pressure on the regime, which had collectively
succeeded in both limiting Hussein to the confines of Iraqi national territory and
preventing him from even attempting to initiate a WMD program, from fear that
rigorous inspections would reveal just such an activity. As such, the most
vociferous voice against maintaining that relatively pacific status quo, Vice
President Dick Cheney, made it his mission to undermine just that approach. In
speeches to troops, conversations with talk show hosts and pundits, privately to
Bush Administration advisors, and in conversations with intelligence officials, he
excoriated what he termed "appeasers" and stated repeatedly both that the
threat from Hussein and his WMD had to be confronted militarily and that this
mission would arrive quickly at a resounding success.
In August of 2002, for example, he told a Veterans of Foreign Wars
congregation: "A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of
his compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger
that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow 'back in the
box.'" 332 He paired this menacing opinion with the false claim that "there is no
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no
doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies and
against us." This claim went beyond any intelligence report, even reports that
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assessed that it was likely that the regime had not entirely shut down its WMD
programs. The approach to securitizing the Middle East was not invented on the
fly by Vice President Cheney or any other Administration official, but rather a
direct result of the grand strategy of preponderance expounded by the Bush
Administration from its earliest stages, stated in no uncertain terms in the 2002
National Security Statement (NSS) and other official documents and policy
statements.
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia found himself dumfounded at the
Senatorial podium on February 12, 2003, when his call to at least discuss the
merits of invasion fell on deaf ears: "Listen. You can hear a pin drop. There is no
debate. There is no discussion. There is no attempt to lay out for the nation the
pros and cons of this particular war. There is nothing." 333 With no attempt to
delineate for the American people why the United States was going to war in
Iraq, Byrd summarized in a few simple words the gigantic disconnect between
what would become the most costly war since 1945, the most bloody since 1975,
and the new breeding ground for Islamist terrorism and the debate about the
foreign policy's value. Not only was it not clear how a war in Iraq would affect the
national interest—good, bad, or neutral—but Congress barely discussed the
matter at all, leaving anyone to guess as to what ought to be gained on such a
monumental foreign-policy campaign. In comparison to the lack of intellectual
interest in Congress as to what to do with the 'Iraq problem,' it seems somewhat
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unremarkable that the Bush Administration sought to go to war in Iraq. Many a
presidential administration has sought to assert itself in times of crisis by
launching a military campaign of some sort against a foreign adversary. What is
more remarkable, however, is the aloof capitulation of Congress to invade a
sovereign nation with whom the United States had already maintained a
persistent, comprehensive, successful campaign of political isolation and
deterioration of military capabilities.
The determination that the war was inevitable under the leadership at the
time does not entirely discount the fact that there were in fact prominent voices
warning against the dangers of invading and occupying Iraq. Barack Obama
eventually ascended to the presidency based in part on his opposition to the war.
In August 2002, Brent Scowcroft, who had been George H. W. Bush's National
Security Advisor and maintained close ties to the George W. Bush
Administration, argued in a Wall Street Journal op-ed: "There is scant evidence
to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the September 11
attacks. Indeed, Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who
threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with
them." 334 Scowcroft maintained the same reservations that he had when the
George H. W. Bush Administration, after much debate, decided to leave Hussein
in power rather than take responsibility of the whole of Iraq. After all, who would
want such a possession?
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As the war began to become a reality, a group of IR scholars initiated an
unprecedented campaign to engage in political activism galvanizing around
realist principles that, if adhered to, would reveal the impending conflict as an
imprudent misadventure away from thousands of years of empirical evidence in
international relations. This movement is particularly noteworthy given the
disconnect between theory and praxis in international politics, a disconnect which
itself has been the subject of scholarly inquiry and indeed informs this
dissertation to a certain degree. 335 In one of the few instances in which the
academic community found itself ahead of political events, rather than
responding to and debating over their aftermath, dozens of prominent IR
academics came out against the war by forming the Coalition for a Realistic
Foreign Policy.
No lesser names than Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Richard Betts,
Jack Snyder, Barry Posen, Stephen Walt, Robert Jervis, Charles Kupchan and
many others united to form a platform of dissent against "worrisome imperial
trends" that encouraged "other nations to form countervailing coalitions and
alliances." The self-described “diverse group of scholars and analysts from
across the political spectrum” argued for urgency in resisting the “imperial
impulse,” given that “imperial policies can quickly gain momentum, with new
interventions begetting new dangers and, thus, the demand for further actions.”
Based on the Founding Fathers’ notion that “republic and empire are
335
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incompatible,” the flagship statement of the Coalition assailed elements of the
'Bush Doctrine' and the 2002 NSS, particularly its reliance on preemptive strike,
for its pursuit of a foreign policy “inconsistent with our traditions and values and
contrary to our true interests.” 336 While realists formed the basis of this assembly,
liberal scholars also filled out its ranks, representing an unprecedented
partnership of inter-paradigm perspectives that sought to transcend the theorypolicy gap for a particular moral purpose.
Nevertheless, the voices of dissent were drowned out within the Bush
Administration, in Congress, and in the public. Richard Haas, then director of
policy planning at the State Department and aide to Colin Powell, recalled of a
July 2002 conversation with Condoleezza Rice in her office in the West Wing, "I
raised this issue about were we really sure that we wanted to put Iraq front and
center at this point, given the war on terrorism and other issues. And she said,
essentially, that the decision's been made, don't hold your breath." 337 Before the
NIE that Congress subsequently requested in September 2002, and without
consultation with the Secretary of State, a select few Bush Administration officials
had decided on going to war in Iraq. But when this was taking place, "no one had
yet presented the president with a full range of options," and a Bush aide simply
described the FPDM process with regard to Iraq as, "Sometimes, decisions
happen as much as they're made." 338 This way of thinking is eerily reminiscent of
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the faulty FPDM that led to the Vietnam War. A decision is not a sentient entity
and does not propagate itself; an individual or group of individuals must create it,
even if those individuals are informed by certain conditional constraints. Saddam
Hussein had been a dormant threat for more than a decade, and to characterize
him as such a grave threat to national security that the decision to invade Iraq
made itself is to make a needle out of a haystack.
The encyclopedic British 2016 Chilcot Report, also known as the Iraq
Inquiry, found that a thorough examination of alternatives to war was purposively
avoided by the Bush Administration. 339 On February 5, the day of Colin Powell's
U.N. speech, 20 members of Congress assembled at the Cabinet Room of the
White House to hear the case for war against Iraq straight from the camels'
mouths of President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The
conversation was short on substance and long on blanket concerns about, as
well as blanket prescriptions for, potential problems if (progressively when) war
came about. Rice was the typically succinct, vague Bush Administration official: "I
don't know what we will find exactly, and what period of time. Blix says he can't
tell you they don't have them [WMD]... He's hiding a lot. I'm quite certain he's
hiding a lot of it." 340 Senator Carl Levin, the ranking Democrat on the Senate
Armed Services Committee, was perceptive enough to retort, "Blix also says he
can't tell you they have them. You're inconsistent." Nancy Pelosi simply asked,
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"Is war the best way?" Like many other Congressional leaders, she asked the
right questions, but provided no answers of her own, ceding to the
Administration. Senator John Warner told National Security Advisor Stephen
Hadley, "You got to do this and I'll support you, make no mistake. But I sure hope
you find weapons of mass destruction because if you don't you may have a big
problem." Then-Senator Joe Biden further added, "If we go in and don't find
caches, we'll have a serious perception problem." The Senators were thus quite
literally "hoping" that there were WMD in Iraq, even while cognizant of the threat
that could pose to the invasion force.
The wish to maintain the perception of the moral high ground was obvious,
but the "hope" for WMD also exposed an underlying flaw in the FPDM with
regard to Iraq. The justification for invading and occupying a Muslim country in
the heart of the Middle East was now contingent upon hoping for the existence of
weapons so terrible that their use would almost certainly cause mass casualties
for American troops. The flawed logic went that the perception that the
justification for invasion was valid became more important than the actual
existence of WMD. But if WMD were not as important as the perception of them,
the whole justification would therefore by null and void. Wouldn't Senator Warner
and Senator Biden be grateful to find no WMD in Iraq? Their nonexistence would
certainly be a relief for the international community. In that fallible logic lay the
exposure of a Constructivist threat-perception FPDM marketed as a liberal-realist
threat. Iraq did not pose a threat to the United States. Even if it had been in
possession of WMD, it is highly likely that Saddam Hussein would have found a
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way to make a deal with the Americans to relinquish them, as Iran, Libya, South
Africa, Argentina, and other nations have done. 341 And in fact, he did not possess
them, precisely because he knew that their possession would justify an invasion.
Indeed, we now know that Hussein was so concerned with the American
threat to his regime from the 1991 Gulf War onward that he believed that the CIA
would know for certain that his WMD program had been dormant, and that his
flaunting of sanctions, threats, and inspections would be accurately interpreted
by the CIA as nothing more than hollow saber-rattling. 342 And this was in fact the
consensus within most of the intelligence community, until an environment was
created within it that incentivized WMD evidence from 2001-2003. And yet the
consideration to stay the course with sanctions was never really considered by
the Bush Administration, and neither Congress nor the American people
questioned it. The war path settled on from within, the Bush Administration would
then turn outward to contextualize its scope and stakes to the public and
Congress via magnifying, distorting, and inventing Iraq's purpose within the U.S.
national interest.
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Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes
It is conceivable that the Bush Administration would have pushed for a
military intervention in Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein had the 9/11
attacks never taken place, given the significant influence of neoconservative
ideology on the Administration and President George H.W. Bush's history of
conflict with Saddam Hussein, including the 1991 Gulf War and an assassination
attempt on his life. 343 However, if such a push had ever commenced, it would
have met with much stiffer opposition from the general public and from Congress,
particularly Democrats. In his 9/11 address, even without having a full picture of
what had transpired, President Bush was already preparing for a military
response, warning adversaries that "Our military is strong, and it's prepared," and
setting forth a striking policy making no demarcation between hostile states or
nonstate regimes and terrorism: "We will make no distinction between the
terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them," the president
warned. 344
The rhetoric produced by the Bush Administration and its counterparts in
Congress made the case that nothing short of the existential physical safety of
the American people, and the future of the free world more broadly, were at stake
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in Iraq. It successfully convinced a majority of the American public, and a majority
of U.S. lawmakers, that Saddam Hussein was harboring terrorists and seeking to
produce and proliferate WMD, including nuclear, chemical, and biological agents.
But the rhetoric did not match the reality, and as with the Vietnam War, but for a
different reason, the stakes therefore increased from virtually zero to quite
significant once the decision to militarize the policy took shape. Robert Brigham
explains how Bush Administration officials were able to "speak to ideals and not
to interests" as they made their case to the American people:

The main problem in Iraq, as in Vietnam, was that it was relatively
easy for the president to speak to ideals and not interests when
laying out his war plan before Congress and the American people.
Heightened threat perceptions and the uniquely American impulse
to strike out against potential adversaries led the United States to
war in Iraq and Vietnam. In both wars, fear and the appeal to ideals
all but completely quashed debate. It is remarkable that most
members of Congress waited until the 2006 midterm elections to
voice any serious opposition to the president’s policies in Iraq.
Congress finally held hearings in January 2007 to consider the Iraq
Study Group Report, but even these deliberations were more
publicity events than serious inquiry. Not one major policy revision
came out of these investigations. 345

The Bush Administration thus made scarce attempt to link Iraq to the national
interest in any strategic terms as far as a direct line from Saddam Hussein to
9/11, because it knew there was none. What it did attempt to do was to
characterize him as a threat in general terms and link that generalized threat to
the security of the United States via the interlocutors of WMD and 9/11. WMD
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thus became the basis for the war, and the pressure on intelligence agencies to
produce the "smoking gun" combined with the Bush Administration's eagerness
to receive it to foster an atmosphere unresponsive to anti-war evidence. That
eagerness was married with the rage of the American people to justify invading
Iraq. There was thus ample 'context' with regard to Iraq and the war against
terrorism, but that context was invented in extremely ideational terms and made
operational by the ignition of the spark of WMD.
Sometime between 1973 and 2003, the United States unlearned many of
the primary lessons of the Vietnam War, chief among them how to perceive,
conceptualize, and contextualize threats in the FPDM input process, as well as
how to apply power in the FPDM output process. W. Edwards Dunning warned,
"If you can't describe what you are doing as a process, then you don't know what
you're doing." The Bush Administration never described the process of getting
from 9/11 to WMD to Baghdad. They described their disparate parts and hoped
Americans would bite and, in their rage, they sunk their rabid teeth into the
bounded rationality of mission—where they were going and why they did not
know, but only a hand basket would do in those uncertain, vengeful times.
The U.S. government is highly adept at producing exhaustive research
reviews that are intended to put a particular policy issue, problem, or threat into
the proper context so that FPDM can utilize the most accurate, timely information
available. Indeed, that is one of its primary functions. The State Department, the
CIA, and other bureaucratic arms can direct great resources to understanding a
problem if they are instructed to do so. In both Vietnam and Iraq, perhaps
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contrary to the intuition of those who watched each policy fail, this in fact took
place. It was less pronounced in Iraq, in part because the shift to focus attention
there was so sudden. But there were significant volumes to draw on nonetheless,
especially given the history of antagonism between the United States and Iraq as
a result of the 1991 Gulf War, sanctions, and aerial bombing. Renewed vigor had
been instilled into the teams at foreign policymakers' disposal in 2001, with the
aim of being prepared in the event of war, an event which the Bush
Administration desired. But with regard to Iraq, as with regard to Vietnam, the
enormous studies highlighting the complications in the country were dismissed in
favor of highly idealized interpretations of each country's purported purpose
within the national-security portion of the national interest of the United States.
Dave Halberstam describes an in-depth review of the efficacy of the bombing of
North Vietnam in 1964:

It was, in a classic sense, a pure study. It reflected the genuine
expertise of the government from deep within its bowels, not its
operational functions, not its ambitions, not its success drives.
None of the staffers represented vested interests, and none really
saw his future being affected by either a positive or negative study.
They considered all kinds of bombing, quick tit-for-tat retaliations
and massive, prolonged saturation bombing. They worked under
intense pressure for about two weeks, eight hours a day, six days a
week. When they finished they had a stack of papers about a foot
high and the essential answer, which was no, bombing the North
would not work. Basically, the study showed that the bombing
would fail because the North was motivated by factors which were
not affected by physical change and physical damage. The North
Vietnamese were not hooked on the idea of economic growth
determination (which was one of the great hang-ups of Rostow),
but were determined to extend their regime's control to the entire
country rather than maintain their industrialization. That was what
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motivated them, and that was what they considered their unfinished
business. They had invested a great deal in it and they would
continue to invest in it; no North Vietnamese government could
afford to do less. Hanoi, the study said, enjoyed the nationalist
component of unity and the Communist component of control,
which made for an organized, unified state. 346

Iraq, of course, enjoyed neither unity nor control but for the ruthlessness of
Saddam Hussein, thus compounding the obstacles of its occupation. The result
of the bombing campaigns in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia have been detailed in the previous chapter. The next two sections
discuss this phenomenon with regard to Iraq. Bush Administration officials
intentionally deceived themselves into believing that Iraq would be a walk in the
park, even though none of the empirical evidence suggested that. The more
doubt circulated amongst themselves and was subsequently transmitted to the
American people, the less faith there would be that the war would be worth it.
Both within the higher circles of leadership of the Bush Administration, the CIA,
and the DoD, an environment was therefore constructed that would shun
disconfirming intelligence and magnify evidence confirming Iraq's WMD program.
Any intelligence analyst can testify that where to direct the siphons of information
is just as important as deciphering whatever information is siphoned, especially
in the information age when there is such an order of magnitude of capturable
information.
The United States has the technological tools to learn virtually anything
that is learnable, and can sequester virtually any information from virtually any
346
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source if given enough time. 347 If the president orders to find a shred of evidence
that can be sold to proliferate the idea that some kind of WMD evidence exists, it
will be found. If he says to ignore evidence to the contrary, it will be ignored. The
seventeen intelligence agencies of the United States government are apolitical in
theory; they can be partisan when the wind blows in partisan directions (the
president, after all, appoints intelligence officials). The paltry evidence presented
by Colin Powell failed to convince American allies of the need to confront
Saddam Hussein militarily. The rest of the story is history. That history is further
recounted in Part II.
The incentive to believe what was not otherwise believable was eventually
processed through the American people and Congressional leaders like sausage
through a grinder. By the time the American people realized the truth, Iraq policy
had come full circle, and there actually was now a national-security threat coming
from within its borders, a threat created by the 2003 invasion. That the Bush
Administration turned its back on Afghanistan, where the veritable masterminds
of the 9/11 attacks still wandered freely, in order to commit all its resources to a
dormant benchwarmer was highly problematic. But that it left Iraq in such a state
of sectarian strife and social disrepair that from it would spawn the fiercest
terrorist threat in the history of the world is catastrophic. This foreign-policy
outcome was a direct result of the strategic ineptitude of the Bush Administration,
347

Recent developments have made this phenomenon abundantly clear. Wiretapping, spying on
foreign allies, the NSA programs exposed by Edward Snowden, the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet virus,
and many other tools and electronic surveillance and warfare initiatives are by now well known in
the field of cybersecurity. See documentary Zero Days, dir. Alex Gibney (2016), for a description
of the story of the Stuxnet virus, including a recounting by an intelligence analyst detailing the
total sequester of Iran's electronic and nuclear systems by U.S. cyberwarfare technicians.

317

the tactical dismissal (as opposed to ignorance) of the social conditions within
Iraq, the further dismissal of evidence against the case for Iraq possessing WMD,
and the acquiescence of a berserk American public and its Congressional
leaders seeking revenge in the wrong place. Ignorance must be distinguished
from dismissal because of the exhaustive research planning at its disposal
(discussed in OPM Indicators I and II). The leaders involved in the FPDM that led
to the blunder in Iraq knew they were lying about the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein, even if they thought they were lying to justify the right choice.

FPE Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates that the Iraq War resulted from gross errors in
strategic judgment. These errors convinced Congress and the American public
that Iraq represented a grave threat to the United States and the free world and
had to be "disarmed." The tactical errors made in the invasion's aftermath, such
as disbanding the Iraqi army, not furnishing enough troops to secure the country,
and assuming that Iraqis would fall in line with the new state exacerbated the
strategic error of invading the country in the first place. The war clearly caused
significant harm to the national interest in prestige, cost, and direct security
concerns in a country that did not present them previously, most notably in the
rise of ISIS, which would render the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq a measure lasting
only a few short years. The United States is still enmeshed in that conflict in both
Iraq and Syria, which itself has metastasized into a stalemate with Russia, Iran
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and Syria on the government side and the United States and rebels backed by its
Sunni Arab allies on the other.
Despite some startling admonitions based on research and planning within
the State Department and other agencies, including the DoD, planning at the
highest levels accepted the incorrect declaration by Dick Cheney that U.S. forces
would "be greeted as liberators." The corresponding assumption that initial
military victory, which was indeed simple enough to achieve, would translate into
political stability and the embrace of peaceful democracy fell flat. Once the
insurgency took hold, the development of civil society and state-building took a
backseat to immediate security concerns, and that culture of fear and suspicion
based on sectarian loyalties continues to this day.
From a broad point of view, the challenges posed by global terrorism
make traditional threat perception and military power calculations in many ways
more difficult than in centuries past. There is little doubt that the Iraq War failed to
address 9/11 and exacerbated Islamist fundamentalism by providing a breeding
ground for Sunni extremism and feeding the narrative of the American antiMuslim crusader, but this is an ongoing problem for the United States, and it
must learn from the lessons of Iraq if it intends to address this threat effectively in
the coming decades. Robert Jervis highlights an important factor in the largely
irrational thinking that eventually coalesced around the necessity of immediate
invasion:
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The difficulties in coping with this fear [of terrorism] may be one
reason why the American debate over whether to go to war in Iraq
was so feeble. Also important were the president's political skill, the
Democrats' desire not to look weak, and—a factor often
overlooked—the fact that the draft has been abolished. The
immediate danger in the war was to other people and to other
people's children. But in another way the debate was typical, in that
both proponents and opponents of invading Iraq displayed irrational
cognitive consistency, motivated bias, and the refusal to face value
trade-offs. Those who favored invasion rated the long term
prospects of deterring Saddam as low, the likelihood of a fairly easy
military victory as high, the regional effects of overthrowing Saddam
as favorable, and the prospects for constructing a stable and even
democratic Iraq as bright. Opponents disagreed on all four points.
Only a psychological explanation will account for this pattern,
because the four factors being judged are logically independent
from each other (emphasis added). A world in which allowing
Saddam to build his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be
very dangerous is not necessarily one in which overthrowing him
would be relatively cheap. But people want to minimize the costs
they perceive in their favored policy. In fact, many of the reasons
they gave are rationalizations, not rationales, and come to their
minds only after they have reached their decisions (emphasis
added). 348

Just as President Johnson's advisors could not contemplate the
potentiality that North Vietnam would not capitulate in the face of overwhelming
American military might, the United States did not believe its overwhelming
military might could not secure Iraq. Sherman Kent described the (short-term)
intelligence failure of the Cuban Missile Crisis by simply remembering, "We
missed the Soviet decision to put missiles into Cuba because we could not
believe that Kruschev could make such a mistake." 349 The 1962 National
Intelligence Estimate concluded that Kruschev was too rational an actor to make
348
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a decision so rash so as to place nuclear weapons 90 miles from Miami at the
height of the Cold War. To what extent the word "rational" can be considered
scientific depends on the mind of the observer, although some decisions clearly
display a certain comfort with risk that others do not (assuming the decisionmaker has accurate information and has accurately calculated that risk, which is
in itself somewhat of an irrational assumption to make). Nevertheless, what is
clear with reference to Iraq, as with Vietnam, is that the pursuit of preponderance
fueled the motivation to liberalize the Middle East, and the dismissal of the
strength and complexity of the indigenous response was once again greatly
underestimated, as Part II brings into fuller light.

Part II. OPM
Indicator I. How U.S. foreign policymakers estimated the capacity of U.S. power
to transform the politics of Iraq
President Bush predicted on October 7, 2002, "The lives of Iraqi citizens
would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein were no longer in power, just as
the lives of Afghanistan's citizens improved after the Taliban," a view Dick
Cheney had echoed two months earlier on August 26:

Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to
the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the
freedom-loving people of the region will have a chance to promote
the values that can bring lasting peace. As for the reaction of the
Arab 'street,' the Middle East expert Professor Fouad Ajami
predicts that after liberation, the streets in Basra and Baghdad are
'sure to erupt in joy the same way the throngs in Kabul greeted the
Americans.' Iraq is rich in natural resources and human talent, and
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has unlimited potential for a peaceful, prosperous future. Our goal
would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is
democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every
ethnic and religious group are recognized and protected. In that
troubled land, all who seek justice, and dignity, and the chance to
live their own lives, can know they have a friend and ally in the
United States of America. 350

What exactly "justice and "dignity" signify is of course different for an Iraqi
than for an American. While it is a fair assessment that most Iraqis would have
preferred a different leader, many Sunnis did not, and any regime can only be
compared to another. What replaced Saddam Hussein was worse by virtually
any measurable, but most importantly that of safety and security. As John Paul
Vann had said of South Vietnam, “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or
it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first
ninety percent." The sweeping platitudes of "freedom-loving" people and "values
that can bring lasting peace" said little about the actual social conditions within
the state of Iraq. Indeed, that was the whole idea—social engineering from
without that could only take place after military dislodgement of the regime.
Although elections, a democratic political foundation, and sovereignty were all
tremendous achievements in theory, the insecurity and sectarian violence that
have characterized Iraq's internal environment since 2003 largely rendered these
procedural accomplishments hollow. The enormous cost in blood and treasure
also calls into question whether the modest progress in these areas was worth
the cost.
350
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Although President Bush built his campaign on ushering in his domesticfocused 'compassionate conservatism,' the 9/11 attacks allowed the foreignpolicy hawks he brought with him into office to espouse a theretofore relatively
unknown ideological bent now infamously known as neoconservatism, a set of
core ontological assumptions that generally advocate a Manichean view of the
world pitting good against evil, a penchant for unilateralism, reliance on military
power as the arbiter of international conflict as well as the willingness to use it,
disdain for excessive diplomacy, and positioning the United States as the
singular preponderant power in the international system with the unique ability
and duty to right the wrongs within it. 351 Many Bush Administration advisors
entered his cabinet bitter about the way in which the 1991 Gulf War ended, with
Saddam Hussein still in power, and viewed the 9/11 attacks as an invitation to
correct that error. 352 A primer on the historical development and policy nuances
of neoconservatism is beyond the scope of this research, but the impact of its
tenets on this Indicator cannot be entirely omitted. 353 The stark language of its
propounders is unmistakable in documents such as the Bush Administration's
2002 NSS.
The 2002 NSS is one of the most idealistic statements of public policy in
the history of official U.S. discourse. It is unequivocal in its declaration of the
351 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global
Order (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11.
352

James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Penguin
Books, 2004).

353

For an introduction to the history of the movement, see Irving Kristol, The Autobiography of an
Idea: Neoconservatism (New York: Free Press), 1995.

323

ideational triumph of Western liberal democratic capitalism and straightforward in
its definition of the American purpose in the world. Beyond advocating the
doctrine of preemptive strike, itself a violation of some of the basic tenets of
realism, it also grossly oversimplified international threats and the strength of
state and nonstate challengers, ironically even while propagating a policy of
interventionism abroad. As if building on the premise of Francis Fukuyama’s “end
of history,” the NSS declared that the “great struggle of ideas” that pitted
“destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality” simply no longer
existed and “is over.” 354 U.S. national-security policy would henceforth “be based
on a distinctly American internationalism” with an expanded mandate to utilize
“unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world” in order to
“to help make the world not just safe but better.”
Thus, even while dismissing threats to global order as peripheral and
incapable of organized challenges, official United States doctrine was enshrined
as the singular driver of international affairs and the party responsible for
modernizing the world in its own image. Inherently contradictory in this
philosophy of international relations is that if the defined threats are so severe,
how can it be so that they are easy to confront? Conversely, if the war between
good and evil has been won, why is there such a need to reignite it? This logical
fallacy has been at the heart of the American grand-strategic pendulum for two
centuries. There is perhaps no document in this dissertation that so unites the
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pursuit of the grand strategy of preponderance and the overestimation of U.S.
power to transform the politics of other states as the 2002 NSS.
The document was neither an anomaly nor a policy statement pulled from
a vacuum, but rather a continuation of the modern (postwar) American tradition
of assuming (a) that the world tends to divide between good and evil and (b) that
only the United States can lead the charge to purge evil from the world. While
there is ample precedent for the grand strategy of preponderance since 1945, as
well as precedent for the occasional preemptive strike dating back even further,
the 2002 NSS perhaps stated these tenets in more unequivocal terms than ever
before, especially given the 'unipolar moment' that supposedly existed after 1989
and the enormous wound-up energy of 9/11. Stephen Westphal has found that
preemptive attack had been used by Woodrow Wilson in Haiti in 1915, President
Lyndon Johnson in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Ronald Reagan in
Granada in 1983. However, Westphal also concludes that "[n]o president has
explicitly raised, emphasized, and moved the practice into a stated and used
government policy." 355
The strike-first mentality, buoyed by the attacks of 9/11, eventually
became codified in what came to be considered the 'Bush doctrine,' or the
doctrine of preemptive strike, based on the perceived threat from Islamist
terrorists, their state or nonstate guardians, and the WMD they could get their
hands on. Arthur Schlesinger described the Bush Doctrine as "striking a potential
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enemy unilaterally if necessary; before he has a chance to strike us. War,
traditionally as a matter of last resort, becomes a matter of presidential choice.
This is a revolutionary change. Mr. Bush replaced a policy aimed at peace
through prevention of war by a policy aimed at peace through preventive war." 356
But rather than a "revolutionary change," this was more a minor adjustment to
longstanding policy. It was Schlesinger himself, remember, who said that "there
is no older American tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs than unilateralism."
The United States had always at least reserved the right to attack another state
preemptively even if it only employed that right scarcely and selectively, in
addition to utilizing force to expand the territory of the nation in the 18th century,
protect overseas markets in the 19th century, and stem the flow of Communism
in the 20th century. Even with regard to the Second World War, that most
transformative of events for the United States, President Roosevelt prepared his
nation for war long before December 7, 1941, even if he waited for the Japanese
to fire the first shot.
On February 26, 2003, a month before the "shock and awe" aerial
bombing portion of the invasion began, President Bush echoed the socialengineering language of the 2002 NSS by proclaiming: "We meet here during a
crucial period in the history of our nation, and of the civilized world. Part of that
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history was written by others; the rest will be written by us." 357 Quotes by
President Bush linking the role the United States in the world to the fate of all
people everywhere were not the exception, but rather the norm. In discussing
why he included the "axis of evil" phrase in his 2002 State of The Union speech,
for example, he told Bob Woodward: "I believe the United States is the beacon of
freedom in the world. And I believe we have a responsibility to promote freedom
that is as solemn as the responsibility is to protecting [sic] the American people,
because the two go hand-in-hand." 358 This statement in particular revealed two
enormous claims with regard to U.S. foreign policy. First, it declared that the
objective of transforming the nondemocratic states of the world was as important
as national security, which in effect denied the absolute existential nature of the
duty of a leader to protect its constituent citizens. This muddles the meaning and
purpose of the national interest to an unrecognizable extent. Second, it linked
that protection to the effort to transform nondemocratic states, in effect
proclaiming that there is no difference between the two.
The U.S. national interest, he exalted, was now to reinvent the trouble
spots of the world. Those who propound the lens of examination that Bush
radically manipulated U.S. foreign policy point to this type of rhetoric, as well as
its operationalization in the Iraq War, as evidence. Although this claim is
exaggerated, as evidenced by the quotes and actions attributed to the leaders
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who came before him, it is not difficult to understand why many scholars adhere
to it, because the idealized nature of Bush Administration foreign-policy
discourse was so profoundly pronounced. In his June 1, 2002 speech at West
Point, which is often cited as one of the most unequivocal and public declarations
of the 'Bush doctrine,' he again declared, "Our nation's cause has always been
larger than our nation's defense." 359 In that speech, he told cadets that he would
implement his brand of foreign policy according to that axiom, given that the
"Cold War doctrines of deterrence and Containment" no longer applied to this
new war against terrorism, which could only be won by employing a strategy to
"confront the worst threats before they emerge."
President Bush was right that the nature of 21st-century threats had
transformed security dynamics; he was wrong to apply the old tools of
overwhelming force and interstate conflict to these changing dynamics. He was
hardly singular in promoting a nebulous conception of the U.S. national interest,
but he carried the normative idealization of the national interest to new heights. It
was as far from the realist definition of a fixed set of zero-sum, relatively
intractable, given material indicators as a president could travel. Had the Iraq
War been a success, it is quite plausible that other regimes, possibly not North
Korea but likely Iran, would have been the next targets.
In conjunction with this contention, Robert Jervis has attempted to
contextualize the Iraq War as a product of a policy rather than a policy in and of
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itself, calling it "even more noteworthy as a manifestation of the Bush Doctrine"
and summarizing that "the doctrine has four elements: a strong belief in the
importance of a state's domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the
related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics;
the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous
policies, most notably preventive war; a willingness to act unilaterally when
necessary; and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding
sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy on
world politics." 360
There is significant overlap between what Jervis refers to as "primacy" and
preponderance, as Chapter 4 teased out. While these four pillars are consistent
with the postwar history of the OPM, and therefore far from a post-9/11
metamorphosis of U.S. foreign policy in general, they certainly represented an
invigoration of the more hawkish, as well as idealistic, tendencies in U.S. foreign
policy that the national humiliation of the Vietnam War had largely precluded until
that time. In that sense, the Iraq opportunity, if it could be carried out
successfully, presented a chance to exorcise the demons of Vietnam, along with
planting a seed of democracy in the Middle East as a beacon of hope to the
region and a wedge against the Islamist terrorism narrative. That Iraq did not
expel 'Vietnam Syndrome,' from the American psyche, but rather further
ingrained it, and that it perpetuated the Islamist terrorism narrative, now presents
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en enormous challenge to U.S. policymakers: the need to reconcile a transition
back to isolationist sentiment among the American public along with the need to
prosecute the war against Islamist terrorism, perhaps the first war since the
Second World War that is not a war of choice.
Consistent with the lofty grand-strategic ambitions of the 2002 NSS was
the military-strategic post-9/11 defense strategy "designed to eliminate the
conditions that spawn asymmetric threats." 361 In terms of global military posture,
this means preparing to intervene anywhere in the world where potentially hostile
actors enjoy a safe haven. The problem with this perspective is that much of the
world is dangerous, chaotic, and 'alternatively governed,' meaning that "the
conditions that spawn asymmetric threats" are found in so many places that to
plan for eliminating them all is all but unfathomable. As the poster child of this
policy, the Iraq War did not hold up to its protagonists' hopes, and the Obama
Administration has since shifted away from large-scale military intervention and
counterinsurgency in favor of the 'targeted strike' of (suspected) Islamist
militants. Thus an era that began with international social-engineering ended on
the polar end of the spectrum, with the favored policy of the Obama
Administration to kill from the air even before capturing, let alone invading and
occupying. Indeed, the prevailing sentiment in prosecuting the war against
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Islamist terrorism now is that to capture is to carry a vexatious burden. 362 This is
not to say that Obama's approach to the war against terrorism has been pacific:
his unprecedented drone campaign is discussed in Chapter 8, the concluding
chapter.
In any case, U.S. policymakers at the highest levels of the Bush
Administration were overwhelmingly confident that the Iraq War would swiftly be
brought to a successful conclusion. The provenance of this confidence was not
duplicated at the Pentagon or the State Department, which were much more
wary of what might happen in the aftermath of the war, as well as the host of
dilemmas that might erupt during the combat phase, including the potential for
the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, as well as the possibility of
oil wells being set ablaze, as they were in the previous confrontation between the
United States and Iraq two administrations prior. In concert with the perennial
concern war-planners always have for the potential for loss of military life and the
unexpected potentialities of open conflict, and in concert with the cultural
complications inherent in Iraq, the Department of Defense and State Department
conducted research to define and describe what might happen if the Executive
Branch decided that war was the only way. It did eventually decide this, as
detailed in FPE Criterion IV, but it did not give these comprehensive reviews
adequate consideration.
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The DoD, to which President Bush eventually granted almost exclusive
authority to plan for postwar Iraq, thus carried out significant preparation for the
conflict as it would with any other in order to confront many of those potentialities.
The exhaustive reviews performed at the lower levels of government, what
Halberstam refers to as its "bowels," never received the full attention they
deserved because the higher levels of government were focused on the sale of a
war they had already set course on rather than how to successfully manage Iraq
in the war's aftermath. Furthermore, the extremely detailed planning that was
carried out was disregarded in order to facilitate a smoother chain of command of
the country when Baghdad fell. The Bush Administration did not want to get
mired down with bureaucratic entanglement, and thus left experts, particularly at
the State Department, out of the planning for and early administration of postconflict Iraq.
As James Fallows describes it: "The Administration will be admired in
retrospect for how much knowledge it created about the challenge it was taking
on. U.S. government predictions about postwar Iraq's problems have proved as
accurate as the assessments of pre-war Iraq's strategic threat have proved
flawed. But the Administration will be condemned for what it did with what was
known. The problems the United States has encountered are precisely the ones
its own expert agencies warned against." 363 In practice, therefore, planning was
neglected and thus operationally indecisive. Anthony Cordesman states simply,
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"The U.S. government failed to draft a serious or effective plan for a 'Phase 4' of
the war: the period of conflict termination and the creation of an effective national
building office." 364 The fact that the final war plan presented to President Bush by
General Tommy Franks included no plan for the postwar phase deposited much
of the hope for a smooth transition to Iraqi democracy securely in the
bureaucratic wastebasket. Some of it would eventually be recycled once the
insurgency began in earnest; most of it would not. The dismissal of rich, countryspecific cultural research Halberstam chides U.S. foreign-policymakers for during
Kaiser's "The Long 1964" was precisely the type recurring in 2003, and led
directly to the overestimation of U.S. power to transform the politics of Iraq.
Ironically, one of the few voices warning against invasion at a high level
was the man who was eventually charged with selling the case for war at the
United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell, who stated simply: "Once you
break it, you are going to own it, and we're going to be responsible for 26 million
people standing there looking at us. And it's going to suck up a good 40 to 50
percent of the army for years. And it's going to take all of the oxygen out of the
political environment." 365 In that conversation, Powell was urging President Bush
to get the United Nations on board with any invasion that might take place. The
president's response was to send Powell to do just that. If he desired it, so went
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the logic, go achieve it, especially since he was one of the most respected
members of the Bush Administration.
He would expend virtually all of that reverential capital in selling a war to
the United Nations that nearly every leader whom he addressed would come to
condemn. In the end, Vice President Dick Cheney's pre-invasion claim that "we
will in fact be greeted as liberators" won out over the voice of those advocating a
more guarded approach to "disarming" Saddam Hussein. 366 Failure to adhere to
prewar admonitions on the postwar environment inevitably led to myriad
complications in the invasion's aftermath. Francis Fukuyama, one of the chief
architects of neoconservative doctrine, later lamented in his requiem on the
nation-building effort in Iraq:

The administration did plan for a number of contingencies that did
not occur, such as a humanitarian/refugee crisis and oil well fires;
however, it was completely blindsided by the collapse of state
authority in Iraq and the chaos that followed. This omission is a
perfect example of institutional memory failure. Almost every
postconflict reconstruction during the previous decade and a half,
from Panama to East Timor, had been characterized by the
collapse of local police authority and the ensuing disorder.
Consequently, a great deal of thought and effort had been given to
improving the so-called “civ-pol” function through the early
deployment of constabulary forces. Unfortunately, few of the
officials responsible for the Iraq reconstruction had personal
experience with these earlier efforts, and they evidently expected
that the post-Saddam transition would look like those in Eastern
Europe in 1989. That misjudgment would prove extremely costly,
as looters stripped government ministries bare and Iraq’s
infrastructure crumbled. Throughout its entire existence, the CPA
was understaffed and had to spend considerable energy building
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up its own organization rather than providing governmental services
to Iraqis. 367

This elegy, particularly ironic given the source, was as predictable (and in fact
was predicted) as it was tragic. The idealized response to the existential threat of
Islamist fundamentalism all but guaranteed the U.S. would experience a
quagmire in Mesopotamia. CIA Director George Tenet's "slam dunk" assessment
of Iraq's presence of WMD and Dick Cheney's giddy predictions on Iraq's
reception of American troops illustrated a reality whose ultramodern futurism met
no ally in the reality of postwar Iraq.
U.S. foreign policymakers not only overemphasized the assumption of
rational-choice modeling in presupposing that Iraqis would not exercise the will to
fight against superior firepower and technical military expertise, but also
underestimated the ideological motivation for why many Iraqis did take up arms
against them. Many Iraqi insurgents were motivated by a general sense of
nationalism, rather than the fanatical religiosity that foreign jihadists brought with
them. Insurgents in Iraq were often fighting for far more than a living wage or
because no other economic opportunity existed, including those members of the
Iraqi army that had been disbanded by Paul Bremer's executive decree. In a
study on insurgents in Iraq, a team of economists examined 3,799 payments to
insurgents by al-Qaeda and found that fighters were paid less than the
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opportunity cost of their time, or less than an unskilled job in Iraq would pay. 368
While al-Qaeda's interest in Iraq was of course transnational, this contradicts the
image of the insurgent as an economic unit.
The

rational-choice

models

that

U.S.

policymakers

surmised

in

preparation for invasion therefore failed to hold up against a people—albeit a
disparate, balkanized people with intense sectarian tensions—unwilling to accept
the presence of foreign, Christian troops on Muslim, Iraqi soil. The fact that most
Iraqis did not want Saddam Hussein in power did not mean that they wanted an
American-installed regime in power. The calculation among U.S. foreign
policymakers that Iraqis would buy the official narrative in the U.S. that it was
Saddam or freedom—publicly stated by various U.S. leaders—failed to gain any
understanding of the true animosity an invasion force would be met with. The fact
that such ingrained sectarian fault lines did in fact exist only exacerbated the
problem, rather than serving to unite the nation against the outgoing common
enemy of Saddam Hussein. Thus the overestimation hubris of Vietnam was not
exorcised but exercised in Iraq.

Indicator II. The U.S. ability to control, bolster, and refine the host state
The United States went to war in Iraq to enact "regime change" that would
remove Saddam Hussein from power, eliminate his Ba'ath party from the
government, and build a new government that would serve as a democratic
example to other nations in the region. In that sense, the extent to which a new,
368
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secure state that went beyond procedural democracy to functional democracy
could be established would be one of the most fundamental benchmarks for
success or failure in Iraq. U.S. policy was therefore tied inextricably to the idea
and practice of nation-building, a concept that President Bush campaigned
steadfastly against as a presidential candidate, telling voters in a 2000
presidential debate, "If we don't stop extending our troops all around the world in
nation-building missions, then we're going to have a serious problem coming
down the road, and I'm going to prevent that." 369
As with other U.S. interventions in areas of (actual or perceived) strategic
significance, state-building was a key component of the overall objectives. One of
the tragic ironies of the Iraq case was that a (relatively) stable, orderly state was
already in place under Saddam Hussein, with some social indicators such as
education level higher than regional averages, as Dick Cheney alluded to in his
speech on August 26, 2002. While the increase in nation-building campaigns
after the end of the Cold War were largely directed at failed states, which were
judged to be breeding grounds for terrorism and other nefarious activity, Iraq
deviated from that pattern in that it was a robust, wealthy state, rendered less so
because of Hussein's kleptocracy and wars and because of the sanctions those
actions drew in response. And while the official justification for the war was
cloaked in practical national-security considerations of disarming Iraq from WMD
and preventing it from proliferating Islamist terrorism, the true motivations for the
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war were more ideological, as the official discourse in 2002/2003 made plain. As
such, the nexus between that neoconservative ideology and the actual
prosecution of the state-building aspect of the campaign prevented effective
execution in both the planning and operational stages.
As mentioned in the previous section, the tragic paradox of prewar
planning for the postwar effort was that enormous resources were poured into
planning for the postwar environment, but the most important concerns going into
the conflict were brushed aside because the emphasis at the highest levels of the
Bush Administration and the Pentagon was always on how to successfully
convince Congress and the American people to go along with the war effort as
well as guarantee military victory in the first few weeks of conflict, rather than
addressing the glaring problems that the coalition was sure to experience once
the early phases of conflict concluded. Further compounding the planning effort
was President Bush's acceptance upon Secretary Rumsfeld's recommendation
to bestow authority for planning to the Pentagon rather than the State
Department and its diplomatic tentacles.
This was the first time since the Second World War that there were not
two equally authoritative concomitant lines of direction between Defense and
State. Unity of command was valued at the expense of delegating civil postwar
efforts to the arm of government most experienced in doing so, the State
Department. Thus, while State, USAID, Justice, and other agencies had all been
planning for the postwar effort since President Bush's August 2002 Presidential
Directive to begin doing so, none had the authority necessary to execute its plans
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with the exception of DoD, and there was no coordinating central command on
the diplomatic side to partner with that of the office of General Tommy Franks.
Postwar planning ultimately fell to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense,
which "had no prior experience with this kind of operation and had limited
institutional capacity for setting up the kind of organization needed." 370 Larry
Diamond's characterization of this problem in Iraq is almost identical to
Halberstam's characterization of the same problem in Vietnam:

Indeed, the administration of the occupation was highly centralized
under Bremer personally, in a manner that impeded the flow of
analysis and knowledge from the field, elevated a small circle of
political appointees, and marginalized those with vast stores of
knowledge and understanding about Iraq—not just the career U.S.
diplomats, but also well-informed British experts, as well as Iraqis
and Iraqi-Americans not tied to any specific political interest. This
same centralization plagued the challenge of postwar
reconstruction. The obsession with control was an overarching flaw
in the U.S. occupation, from start to finish. 371

Johanna Mendelson Forman has identified four strategic imperatives in
the reconstruction effort of any postconflict area with the objective of creating "a
minimally capable state:" (a) security; (b) governance and participation; (c) social
and economic well being; and (d) justice and reconciliation, analyzing postinvasion Iraq along those four areas of assessment. On security, as with other
analysts, Forman cites the dismissal of the Iraqi army as "the single most costly
error committed by the American-led coalition, with the second most costly being
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the concomitant de-Ba'athification order in which "by the stroke of a pen, the
CPA forbade thousands of mid-level party civil servants, including doctors and
teachers, from participating in public life." 372 These decisions, made in small
circles under the tutelage of high-ranking Bush Administration officials such as
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith and his cohort of inner-echelon
confidants, were concocted and processed in such an encapsulated fashion that
actors and events on the ground played at best a secondary role, if any at all, in
planning and executing the post-invasion environment.
Presidential Directive 56, placing the DoD in charge of all Iraqi activities,
while ensuring presidential chain of command leadership, all but guaranteed an
ineffective governing processes by dismissing and alienating Iraqi counterparts in
Baghdad and other administrative provinces. Throughout the CPA's reign from
May 2003 until the handover on June 28, 2004, the disconnect between Iraq's
administrators and Iraq's indigenous leaders grew so great that in effect there
was no authority in Iraq that could represent any semblance of legitimacy. Out of
the vacuum left by the lack of social and military authority in Iraq would breed an
insurgency whose ferocity would forestall the installation of a consensus
government. In turn, the institutions of civil society that were needed to buttress
any security operations would be bypassed, because the U.S. State Department
and the Iraqi "mid-level civil servants" most able to administer the basic civil
functions of society were placed on the sidelines. These two decisions by the
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Bush Administration, combined with the dismissal of the Iraq army, all but
guaranteed a conflict-ridden transition and the continuation of decrepit Iraqi civil
functions and infrastructure. It was far from unforeseeable that these actions
would revert Iraq to a state of anarchy in which tribalism would dominate the
sociopolitical environment.
The Future of Iraq Project (FOIP), the exhaustive organization that banded
together disparate parts of the State Department, intelligence agencies, national
security professionals, and Bush Administration officials, stated simply: "The
people of Iraq are being promised a new future and they will expect immediate
results. The credibility of the new regime and the United States will depend on
how quickly these promises are translated to reality."

373

While the FOIP

contained an extensive amount of research and planning, it also suffered from
some inherent weaknesses. Its greatest obstacle in its creation was that it was
constantly being jumbled and hamstrung by inter-agency parochialism and
rivalries. Although it contained an immense amount of information, it never could
have succeeded in formulating a detailed plan at state-making or state-building
because of its lack of institutional coherence. It was intended as a collaborative
project with Iraqi exiles in order to plan for what complications might ensue
should the United States invade Iraq.
Its greatest obstacle in implementation, however, was that it was never
actually implemented. Paul Bremer had arrived in Baghdad to take full control of
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Iraq over the interim transition before he had even heard of the FOIP. 374 General
Sir Michael Jackson, commander of the British invasion force, lamented simply:
"All the planning carried out by the State Department went to waste." 375 Two
months before the invasion, President Bush authorized National Security
Presidential Directive 24, which granted the DoD authority to oversee all
reconstruction in Iraq. Whether to ensure that the chain of command remained
intact or to militarize the overall process, this Directive guaranteed that the State
Department, responsible for so much prewar planning, would be brushed aside
once the invasion began. 376 The Directive also placed ORHA under control of
DoD, further establishing DoD as the preeminent authority on immediate postwar
reconstruction. Ultimately, the FOIP lacked the specificity to be utilized as a
practical guide to reconstruction, and the Bush Administration and DoD officials
in charge of reconstruction discarded it anyway.
Thus, the ability of coalition authorities to control, bolster and refine the
fledgling Iraq state could never take form because the revert to tribal survival
orientations made state-building a secondary concern. Whoever owns Iraq must
patrol 438,317 square kilometers of ethnic tensions between Sunni, Shia, and
Kurd, each with loyalties to their own before that of the nation (with further intra-
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sect divisions), along with borders on either side that have been subject to
sustained warfare, most notably the 1991 Gulf War with Kuwait and the Iran-Iraq
war of the 1980's. 377 Few geographical barriers prevent foreign entry into Iraq's
territory, and tensions with neighbors make border patrol difficult. In short,
maintaining security in the country is no small feat. The strategy for removing
Saddam Hussein from power failed to give these difficulties sufficient
consideration.
Prewar planning underestimated the number of troops needed to secure
the country's cities and borders, the extent to which Iraq's dilapidated
infrastructure, which had been neglected by Saddam Hussein, needed
rebuilding, and, most importantly, how much chaos would ensue from the
removal of Iraq's dictator. It overestimated the extent to which Iraqi troops would
rejoin the state after a swift military defeat (few did), the ability of Iraqis to govern
their old country with a new state, and the expectation that ordinary Iraqis and
ex-soldiers would accept the authority of the new state simply because it was no
longer headed by a tyrant. In short, from the beginning of the U.S. occupation of
Iraq in March of 2003, the new U.S. and Iraqi authorities in the country fell victim
to "a serious underestimation of the work needed to secure, stabilize, and
reconstruct Iraq after Saddam Hussein's regime had been toppled." 378
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Indicator III. The U.S. ability to limit the power and influence of adversarial
leaders and insurgent groups
Military planners were keen to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam in their
calculations. For example, General Peter Pace, who would become Chairman of
the JCS in 2005, described his disgust of the 'body count' metric for assessing
success in war:

Not once in this building have we ever reported a number, probably
because guys like me from Vietnam know what happens when you
start counting. You completely skew the way people think, the way
folks on the ground operate. What we want the people on the
ground to understand is that we want to get the job done with the
least amount of killing, but with whatever is needed to be done to
protect our own guys. And asking for body counts…causes people
to focus on 3-to-1, 5-to-1, 7-to-1. The purpose was not to kill X
number of people, the purpose was to remove a regime. If you
could do that without killing anybody, you win. If you have 1,000
people killed and you haven't done anything to replace the regime,
you lose. So numbers don't count. 379

Indeed, this mistake was not repeated in Iraq, but that incident of prudence was
offset by other mistakes. By July 2003, only four months after the invasion,
General John Abizaid, commander of all forces in Iraq, characterized the
gathering insurgency as a "classical guerilla-type campaign." 380 The conditions
within Iraq by default pitted the disparate band of insurgents that united to fight
the common enemy of the United States and the nascent Iraqi state against one
another. To a certain extent, the various groups attacking American and Iraqi
379
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forces had to do so in order to be noticed or forfeit relevance to more aggressive
groups. Unfortunately for the coalition, this incentivized even groups that may
have been ambivalent toward the Americans to engage in open combat against
them. Secular Ba'athists, local nationalist leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr's
Mahdi Army, Iraqi soldiers now out of work, Iraqi nationalists, and foreign fighters
seeking martyrdom came together in a way that never would have been possible
without American troops on Muslim soil in the heart of the Middle East. Though
these groups were by no means all aligned or in full cooperation, the necessity to
seek relevance made the power struggle after March 2003 inherently a struggle
of violence.
Furthermore, the fact the foreign jihadists focused the lion's share of their
violence against the Americans cemented the ingrained perception that this was
a war between foreign aggressors and a nationalist war to expel them, even if led
by jihadists from abroad. What ensued in subsequent years was what John
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt describe as netwar: "In this loose, ambiguous, and
constantly shifting environment, constellations of shells or collections of
individuals gravitate toward one another to carry out armed attacks, exchange
intelligence, trade weapons, or engage in joint training and then disperse at times
never to operate together again." 381 Thus, regime change in Iraq removed a
national dictatorship and unwittingly replaced it with small-scale organizations
that together formed a network worthy of the label of wholesale insurgency.
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Those violent enough to exert their will—more often than not, foreign jihadists—
hijacked the lead role in the effort to advance their own brand of global jihad,
precisely the outcome U.S. policymakers went to war in Iraq to prevent.
The lack of prewar planning for the postwar environment and the series of
missteps in implementing Operation Iraqi Freedom have by now been well
documented. From March 2003 to December 2011 the United States fought,
sometimes successfully and sometimes less so, to keep Iraq secure from
domestic threats and safe from foreign jihadists. It left in its wake a fragile
government reliant on Iran, the sworn enemy of the United States, and an army
so innocuous it evaporated in the face of a small band of jihadists in the form of
ISIS. In sum, as it relates to the national interest, there was no enemy in Iraq until
the United States invaded it. Once that enemy materialized, it proved a most
difficult adversary, even though it was heavily balkanized, and the United States
was never able to vanquish it, as the rise of ISIS has illustrated. This Indicator
therefore must be assessed as a strategic failure, even while achieving many
tactical victories along the way.
As with the war against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army,
tactical military victories never produced the strategic political victories necessary
to fulfill the overall umbrella of strategic objectives. American forces and their
Iraqi counterparts were never able to secure the country, and it remains insecure
today as the state attempts to wrest Mosul and other areas back from ISIS. In
spite of its experiences in Vietnam and other Cold War battlefields, "the broader
U.S. national security system is not optimized for counterinsurgency support," but
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rather more aligned to achieving overwhelming force against a state enemy on a
conventional battlefield, as evidenced by the rapid advance on Baghdad and
subsequent struggles in dealing with the insurgency. 382
The transformations in war fighting sought by Donald Rumsfeld were not
entirely indifferent from the 'flexible response' promoted by President Kennedy.
But Rumsfeld's emphasis on a small, nimble force backed by overwhelming
military firepower was only relevant in the first three weeks of the campaign, after
which the nature of urban guerilla warfare complicated the security effort.
Kennedy died before deciding whether or not to shift to a full-scale conventional
military buildup, and Rumsfeld's push to modernize the American way of war
appears to have been embraced by the preference for the “targeted strike” of the
Obama Administration that emphasizes small groups of Special Forces, air
power, and drone attacks rather than large, clumsy, conventional military
operations.
In any case, with particular respect to Iraq, the history of the insurgency
reads like a state-building manual in reverse. The veneer of a functioning state
based on the monopolization of violence and a hierarchy of power in which those
deemed non-hostile by the regime could more or less go about their lives
imploded the day Baghdad was taken by coalition forces. The Sunni insurgency
began almost immediately. Although Sunni leaders naturally "saw themselves as
the target of the invasion," given that their interests were inextricably tied to
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Saddam Hussein's minority Sunni regime, many did not actually take up arms
until they witnessed Shia political domineering of the neophyte government begin
to take hold. 383 Others, however, fought the Americans from the first day of
conflict. While U.S. leaders were quick to declare success in the overtaking of the
country,

the

ensuing

insurgency

"forced

the

U.S.

military

to

relearn

counterinsurgency on the fly," in the words of counterinsurgency expert Steven
Metz, given that the end of the Cold War had ushered in a pivot away from
interest in and preparation for asymmetrical conflicts. 384
Throughout the course of the counterinsurgency effort, the U.S. military
did make some gains, but these were always offset by the sectarian nature of the
Iraqi conflict, the lack of civil society functions, and the Iraqi reliance on the U.S.
military to fight in its stead. In September 2005, General George Casey
estimated that of 115 Iraqi police and military battalions, one was prepared to
stand on its own without American oversight. 385 By 2008, security had been
improved somewhat, buoyed by the 2006 Sunni Awakening, in which Sunni tribal
leaders in the "Sunni Triangle" allied against al-Qaeda with U.S. support, and the
2007 troop surge, which flooded Iraq's more volatile areas, particularly in
Baghdad, with U.S. troops to quell the violence. But this only further stoked
sectarian tensions. The further the U.S. was perceived to be allied with Iraq, the
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more motivated the Sunni population was to take up arms. But the more the U.S.
distanced itself from the Iraq state, the less it could stand on its own. Thus the
direst prognostications of the postwar environment transformed from an
admonition into reality.
Sadiq al-Rikabi, a close advisor to prominent Shia politician Jawad alMaliki, told an American reporter in June 2007, "The government’s aim is to
disarm and demobilize in Iraq, and we have enough militias now in Iraq that it is
hard enough to solve the problem. Why are we creating new ones?" But the
American view was that the Sunni Awakening was a resounding success.
General Rick Lynch simply stated, "When you've got people who say, 'I want to
protect my neighbors,' we ought to jump like a duck on a june bug." Lynch cited
areas of the country such as Babil that were susceptible to al-Qaeda and other
international terrorist groups because the Iraqi state was not providing security
there. 386 What was tantamount to treason for the Shia-dominated Iraqi state was
thus a no-brainer for the United States. This is but one example in which U.S.
interests and the interests of the Iraqi state, and many of the various factions
within it, were not even remotely aligned—in fact, they were often diametrically
opposed.
Even if we were to exclude the reign of terror of ISIS from the equation,
the security situation in Iraq is now tenuous at best. A comprehensive report by
Amnesty International detailing arms trafficking in Iraq from 2014-2016 found that
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"militias allied to the Iraqi government have access to arms from at least 17
countries." Specifying the Munathamat Badr (Badr Brigades), Asa'ib al-Haq,
Kata'ib Hizbullah, and Saraya al-Salam militias as among the chief recipients of
arms among the government-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), the
report denounces the government's complacency in systematic atrocities: "The
Iraqi authorities have helped to arm and equip the PMU militias and pay their
salaries—they must stop turning a blind eye to this systematic pattern of serious
human rights violations and war crimes." 387 Aside from the moral question of
extrajudicial detainments and killings, the issue raises serious concerns over
whether the Iraqi state is simply operating as a governor of a disparate band of
sectarian Shia militant groups, which raises further questions about the long-term
stability of the country and region as well as the overall war against Islamic State.
The fact that Iranian-backed militias are now on the frontlines of the fight against
ISIS in Iraq presents concerns both for the U.S. national interest and for the
future of secular Iraq.

Indicator IV. Rationalization and operational learning
The historical narrative of the Iraq War and the official narrative by the
Bush Administration did not operate in the same galaxy. This is, of course, true to
some extent with regard to Congress as well as the American public, who
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hopped on the foreign-policy merry-go-round with little resistance. But the
American public requires leadership and does not wish that the government lies
to them, just as Congressional leaders want to believe that the CIA is correct
when it gives an assessment about WMD. In addition, the Executive Branch has
been setting foreign policy for many decades, as evidenced by the lack of a
declaration of war (required by Congress) since 1941. But in none of these three
arenas was there much common sense to be found. That begins and ends with
the Bush Administration, even if meanders through the Congress, the public and
the fourth estate on the way there.
21 Democrats and one Republican, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island (who
later switched to the Democratic Party) voted against the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF) in the Senate, with 29 and 48 Democratic and Republican
Senators, respectively, voting for the resolution; in the House of Representatives
the Republican vote was 215-6 in favor, while the Democratic vote was 126-82
against. 388 The tally recorded only two independent votes in total from both
chambers, both were from Vermont, and both voted against the measure,
Senator James Merrill Jeffords and then-Representative Senator Bernie
Sanders. As was the Vietnam War, this was destined to be another national
tragedy, with or without villains. No secret society hijacked U.S. foreign policy;
the pantheon of leaders leading the nation into Iraq represented a majority of
both Congress and public opinion.
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Whether it is therefore fitting or ironic that the nation went to war based on
faulty intelligence, misinformation, misperception, duplicity, and outright lies
depends on the eye of the observer. There can be little doubt that the intentional
distortion of the threat by U.S. leaders influenced public opinion in favor of war,
just as there can be little doubt that the American people were willing to go along
with that false narrative if only to exorcise the demons of 9/11. Had this been the
first time in history such an occurrence had been produced by the American
political system, it could be understood as a singular phenomenon based on a
sudden and overwhelming disorientation caused by a truly horrifying attack on
the nation's soil. But we have seen this movie before, and while these two
situations have very different circumstances, one development ties them
together: the incorporation of otherwise irrelevant foes into the national-security
threat-perception mechanisms of the state, a perception which is then distorted
beyond comprehension.
Seldom before in history has the official discourse about a policy been so
clearly opposed to its realty. Even with regard to the Vietnam War, U.S. foreign
policymakers made little attempt to characterize North Vietnam as an existential
threat, but rather an ideational threat. But with regard to the Iraq War, Bush
Administration officials married the two in an unprecedented public-relations
campaign: because Iraq's "evil" dictator possessed weapons of mass destruction,
he should therefore be confronted as a symbol of dangerous tyranny so that the
'Middle East' could be democratized and made safe and "rogue" states would
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understand that to stray from the international system, or U.S. authority, would be
to risk annihilation: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." 389
As the months following the invasion passed, no WMD were found, and
soldiers were being killed and wounded on a daily basis, causing the White
House to struggle to defend its prewar statements on WMD and to continue to
justify the invasion and subsequent occupation on other grounds, in addition to
scrambling to explain how it could have been so wrong about WMD in the first
place. An exchange between a reporter at the White House and Press Secretary
Ari Fleischer from July 7, 2003 is particularly symbolic of this effort, in reference
to the infamous "sixteen words:"

Q : I just want to take you back to your answer before, when you
said you have long acknowledged that the information on yellow
cake turned out to be incorrect. If I remember right, you only
acknowledged the Niger part of it as being incorrect—I think what
the—
Mr. Fleischer: That's correct.
Q : I think what the President said during his State of the Union was
he—
Mr. Fleischer: When I refer to yellow cake I refer to Niger. The
question was on the context of Ambassador Wilson's mission.
Q: So are you saying the President’s broader reference to Africa,
which included other countries that were named in the NIE, were
those also incorrect?
Mr. Fleischer: Well, I think the President's statement in the State of
The Union was much broader than the Niger question.
389

This phrase from President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address painted an international
picture in Manichean terms and incorporated those terms into the national-security policy of the
United States.
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Q: Is the President's statement correct?
Mr. Fleischer: I'm referring specifically to the Niger piece when I say
that.
Q: Do you hold that the President—when you look at the totality of
the sentence that the President uttered that day on the subject, are
you confident that he was correct?
Mr. Fleisher: Yes, I see nothing that goes broader that would
indicate that there was no basis to the President's broader
statement. But specifically on the yellow cake, the yellow cake for
Niger, we've acknowledged that the information did turn out to be a
forgery.
Q: The President's statement was accurate?
Mr. Fleischer: We see nothing that would dissuade us from the
President's broader statement.
Q: Ari, that means that, indeed, you all believe that Saddam
Hussein was trying to obtain uranium from an Africa nation; is that
correct?
Mr. Fleischer: What the President said in his statement was that
according to a British report they were trying to obtain uranium.
When I answered the question it was, again, specifically about the
Niger piece involving yellow cake.
Q: So you believe the British report that he was trying to obtain
uranium from an African nation is true?
Mr. Fleischer: I'm sorry?
Q: If you're hanging on the British report, you believe that that
British report was true, you have no reason to believe—
Mr. Fleischer: I'm sorry, I see what David is asking. Let me back up
on that and explain the President's statement again, or the answer
to it. The President's statement was based on the predicate of the
yellow cake from Niger. The President made a broad statement. So
given the fact that the report on the yellow cake did not turn out to
be accurate, that is reflective of the President's broader statement,
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David. So, yes, the President's broader statement was based and
predicated on the yellow cake from Niger.
Q: So it was wrong?
Mr. Fleischer: That's what we've acknowledged with the information
on—
Q: The President's statement at the State of the Union was
incorrect?
Mr. Fleischer: Because it was based on the yellow cake form Niger.
Q: Well, wait a minute, but the explanation we've gotten before was
it was based on Niger and the other African nations that have been
named in the national intelligence—
Mr. Fleischer: But again, the information on—the President did not
have that information prior to his giving the State of the Union.
Q: Which gets to the crux of what Ambassador Wilson is now
alleging—that he provided this information to the State Department
and the CIA 11 months before the State of the Union and he is
amazed that it, nonetheless, made it into the State of the Union
Address. He believes that that information was deliberately ignored
by the White House. Your response to that?
Mr. Fleischer: And that's way, again, he's making the statement
that—he is saying that surely the Vice President must have known,
or the White House must have known. And that's not the case, prior
to the State of the Union.
Q: He's saying that surely people at the decision-making level
within the NSC would have known the information which he passed
on to both the State Department and the CIA.
Mr. Fleischer: And the information about the yellow cake and Niger
was not specifically known prior to the State of the Union by the
White House.
Q: What does that say about communications?
Mr. Fleischer: We've acknowledged that the information turned out
to be bogus involving the report on the yellow cake. That is not
new. You can go back. You can look it up. Dr. Rice has said it

355

repeatedly. I've said it repeatedly. It's been said from this podium
on the record, in several instances. It's been said to many of you in
this room, specifically.
Q: But, Ari, even if you said that the Niger thing was wrong, the
next line has usually been that the President's statement was
deliberately broader than Niger, it referred to all of Africa. The
National Intelligence Estimate discussed other countries in Africa
that there were attempts to purchase yellow cake from, or other
sources of uranium—
Mr. Fleischer: Let me do this, David. On your specific question I'm
going to come back and post the specific answer on the broader
statement on the speech.
Q: Will you post something later?
Mr. Fleischer: I'll just get the word out. If you don't hear from me,
just assume that there is nothing new that moves the ball today. 390

Press briefings and conferences in which the speaker is available to
respond to questions are often the most revelatory of any public statements,
given that the speaker, in this case the Press Secretary, has little or no time to
invent an answer consistent with the official narrative. The speaker can simply
refuse to answer, but this simply adds to the interest surrounding any given
inquiry. In this case, Secretary Fleischer begins by acknowledging that the claim
that Saddam Hussein attempted to purchase yellow cake from Niger was
"bogus." He then defends the "broader" claim that Hussein may have been
pursuing material for weapons of mass destruction from somewhere in Africa, but
uses the debunked Niger claim as evidence to support that claim. This is
obviously a logical fallacy, an omission that the reporter quickly pounces on.
390
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Once the specious line of explanation is exposed, Fleischer abruptly ends the
press conference, promising to return with further information. A week later,
when questioned on the African uranium issue by another reporter in another
briefing, Fleischer succinctly responded by offering, "We don't know if it's true.
But nobody, nobody, can say it is wrong." 391 In other words, anything that cannot
be proven to be wrong may be correct. Using this substandard benchmark for
intelligence facilitates the justification of any policy a given policymaker wishes to
promote, and that is exactly what happened in the case of Iraq.
The mushroom cloud of "bogus" WMD claims died a slow, radioactive
death. Although there were certain acknowledgements about the faulty WMD
intelligence and the inflation of the Iraq threat, there was also a continuation of
claims of ties between Hussein, WMD, and terrorism for years afterward. After
stating on Meet The Press on March 16, 2003, four days before war began, in no
uncertain terms, "We believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons,"
Dick Cheney simply remembered, "Yeah, I did misspeak. We never had any
evidence that he acquired a nuclear weapon" on the same television program on
September 14, 2003. 392 But never was there a hint that this called into question
the justification for invasion.
President Bush cited the CIA's 2004 report that found that Saddam
Hussein had abandoned his WMD program in his book to repeat the false claim
that "Saddam wanted to re-create Iraq's WMD capability... after sanctions were
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removed and Iraq's economy stabilized," completely dismissing the fact that no
weapons were ever found. 393 The WMD fence-hopping understandably confused
Americans. The public relations campaign to terrorize the American public into
acquiescence was so successful that months after the invasion, one-quarter of
Americans still believed not only that Iraq possessed WMD, but that they had in
fact already been found, with a full half of Americans believing the falsehood that
"Saddam was personally involved in the 9/11 attacks."

394

While the

misinformation campaign is partially to blame, there is no other statistic that so
unambiguously illustrates the willful ignorance of the American public.
Some scholars blamed the media for the public's eagerness to embrace
false beliefs. For example, Mary Cardaras attributes the ignorance of the
American people to media "complacence:"

How could knowingly bad intelligence clear the way for war? In the
absence of answers to these questions, the people did not hold the
president to account because they could not hold the president to
account. This was because the news media was largely
complacent in their work. Information imparted to them by the Bush
administration was largely accepted as face value and reported as
such back to the public. 395

But the media is an easy punching bag. If people do not believe what they
see, they will turn the channel. It is not the media's job to assess CIA intelligence.
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That task is assigned to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government,
and neither performed its task properly. What the media does do is facilitate how
the issue is framed through what Robert Entman calls the two functions of
"problem definition, which often virtually predetermines the rest of the frame, and
remedy, because it directly promotes support (or opposition) to public policy." 396
In these two areas the media put up little resistance, but it was hardly the media's
role to reinvent the words of politicians.
Furthermore, the source of the misinformation and threat inflation was not
the media, but the Bush Administration. And nowhere within that body was there
ever any substantial remorse or responsibility to be found. Even the revered
Colin Powell, whose U.N. speech made the case for war in Iraq, in addition to
containing false information about Iraq's WMD, mentioned al-Qaeda operative
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would eventually lead al-Qaeda in Iraq, 27 times,
even though the intelligence community had not produced any credible evidence
that there had been any collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.
Despite this fact, Powell continued to blame the intelligence community for the
false information, characterizing his U.N. speech as "a great intelligence
failure." 397
Michael Morrell, who eventually served as CIA Deputy Director and acting
Director in 2011 and 2012, when asked whether "they [Bush Administration
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officials] gave a false presentation of what you said to them," responded: "On
some aspects... What they were saying about the link between Iraq and alQaeda publicly was not what the intelligence community" had concluded on its
own. 398 It does not take a non-proliferation or terrorism expert to recognize what
"aspects" they gave a false representation of. The intelligence community, for its
part, also failed miserably to remain apolitical, in accordance with its charter, and
to provide solid intelligence. As with the failure to detect and prevent the 9/11
attacks, there was plenty of blame to go around. But of the five people most
central to the Iraq War, George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin
Powell, and Condoleezza Rice, none ever offered a complete about-face of their
position in its creation. 399
This is also generally true of its lower-level protagonists, such as Paul
Wolfowitz, Karl Rove, Douglas Feith, Scooter Libby, George Tenet, and others.
Rather than issue a mea culpa, each was quick to blame the others. For
example, in his memoir, Donald Rumsfeld says of Paul Bremer, "His formal
direction from the President to report through me was being ignored." 400 Francis
Fukuyama, who coined the "end of history" phrase whose spirit is invoked in the
2002 NSS, is one of those who did begin to question his assertions, perhaps due
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to his academic nature, eventually regretting the lack of learning among his
colleagues:

What is remarkable about this entire experience is how little
institutional learning there has been over time; the same lessons
about the pitfalls and limitations of nation-building seemingly have
to be relearned with each new involvement. This became painfully
evident during the American occupation and reconstruction of Iraq
after April 2003. 401

Though he was not an official in the Bush Administration, he eventually
recognized the questionable logic inherent in neoconservative doctrine.
Perhaps those most central to the Bush Administration had trouble
regretting their position within the Iraq War because the mountain they made of a
molehill in Iraq's WMD evidence was so fragile that to question any of it would
bring down the whole house of cards. Much of the misinformation and confusion
about WMD emanated from the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). This
confusion and misinformation were present in its creation, alteration, and public
characterizations. A 2014 RAND study summarized that the NIE "contained
several qualifiers that were dropped... As the draft NIE went up the intelligence
chain of command, the conclusions were treated increasingly definitively." 402 This
politicization of intelligence information is precisely the opposite of how it is
supposed to be treated, and this does not even account for its public
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mischaracterization once the final report had reached the highest levels of
command. One of the most controversial aspects of the NIE was the discussion
of what Iraq’s pursuit of aluminum tubes signified. Condoleezza Rice flatly stated
on CNN that they "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs," which is
factually inaccurate. 403
On the evidence surrounding the connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda,
the declassified NIE cited "sources of varying reliability" and noted that "several
dozen additional direct or indirect meetings are attested to by less reliable
clandestine and press sources." 404 When contrasted with Donald Rumsfeld's
claim that the evidence linking Iraq with Al Qaeda was "bulletproof," or CIA
Director George Tenet's assertion that WMD existence was a "slam dunk," the
gap between the facts and the rhetoric becomes irreconcilable. David Kay, an
Iraq weapons inspector who headed the Iraq Survey Group, believed the
intelligence community did a "poor job" with the NIE, calling it "probably the worst
of the modern NIE's, partly explained by the pressure, but more importantly
explained by the lack of information they had. And it was trying to drive towards a
policy conclusion where the information just simply didn't support it." 405 In other
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words, the gap in information was filled by confirmation bias, breaking the first
rule of intelligence.
The tragic genius in the Bush Administration's marketing of the Iraq War to
the public was in being simultaneously vague and specific: vague in exactly what
charges were being leveled against Saddam Hussein and how they
corresponded to the 9/11 attacks, but specific about the overall threat posed by a
multitude of hostile states and their supposed connection to terrorism and WMD,
Hussein chief among them. The source of much of this vague specificity was
none other than Donald Rumsfeld, whose Mr. Rogers-like demeanor and manner
of speech caused the audience to respond at once understandingly and
suspiciously. Consider, for example, the following excerpt from his speech in
New York on February 14, 2003:

Now the connection between those kinds of weapons, terrorist
states that have those weapons—and let there be no doubt they
do—and terrorist organizations like the ones who attacked the
Towers here in this city and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., that
nexus has created something that's totally different. It must cause
us as individuals to think fresh about these things. That's not easy
to do. And to the extent people don't have the same sets of facts
that they're working off of, they're very likely to come to different
conclusions. It takes time for those facts and that information to
seep out. 406

What his speech did not mention was that he did not have those facts
because they did not exist. He had snippets and snapshots of highly
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questionable half-cooked projections that were twisted by confirmation bias at
every step up the chain of command. When Administration officials were not
suggesting that there was much that was unknown, and that what was unknown
was dangerous, they were stating outright false claims about Iraq's WMD. Thus,
in prepared remarks, they were specific about the threat Hussein posed without
being specific about the evidence supporting that claim, and in unprepared
remarks, they were intentionally opaque. At a press conference on February 12,
2002, Rumsfeld offered the following characterization of his approach the
subject:

As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we
know there are some things we do not know. But there are also
unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know. 407

This was not in response to an erudite question about the infinite nature of the
metaphysical universe. The question was (in statement form), "There is no
evidence of a direct link between Baghdad and some of these terrorist
organizations." When asked if that was an unknown unknown, he responded,
"I'm not gonna say which it is." The statement became so emblematic of the
turbid discourse of the Bush Administration that it became the subject of a
documentary film by Errol Morris, The Unknown Known, whose documentary The
Fog of War on Robert McNamara is referenced in the previous chapter.
Rumsfeld even named his memoir Known and Unknown. While Rumsfeld's
407
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epistemological rant is logically plausible, as anyone in the scientific community
can attest, it is hardly a viable explanation for one state invading another. A
Google search conducted to reference this quote produced only one result in the
top-ten attempting to utilize it for any rational purpose, and it came from a twopage 2009 entry of the Journal of Experimental Botany, perhaps where this type
of logic belongs. 408

OPM Summary
As summarized by Robert Brigham, "the main difference between the
Eisenhower years and 2003" was not the desire to impart American institutions
internationally but rather "the undying belief of Bush [Administration] officials in
the efficacy of conventional military power to achieve its objectives. Few
administrations have embraced the notion that the world could be remade by
American military power as securely as the Bush team." 409 The same could be
said of the Vietnam War, with the difference being that Iraq was an immediate
invasion and Vietnam was a slow build. What did not change between 1945 and
2003 was the assumption of the role of international arbiter and defender of the
"Free World" American leaders (as well as citizens) embraced. The Iraq War
certainly represented one end of the spectrum, but its opposite end is not so far
away as many would imagine. The more internationally ambitious end that
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produced the Iraq War gathered steam in the 1990's after the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
Robert Kagan and William Kristol argued in the Summer 1996 Foreign
Affairs issue that "American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a
breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American
foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as
possible." Their United States was one in which isolationists and declinists
"absentmindedly dismantle the material and spiritual foundations on which their
national well-being has been placed," instead of recognizing that "the main threat
the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness." 410 There can
be no more lucid statement on preponderance than the assumption that U.S.
power is truly unlimited, if only Americans would accept that fact of reality.
In 2000, Kagan and Kristol again railed against "flagging will and
confusion about our role in the world," calling for a "benevolent hegemony" that
wielded "the capacity to contain or destroy many of the world's monsters." 411
Their mission rested on the ideological point of departure that "the remoralization of America at home ultimately requires the re-moralization of
American foreign policy." This perspective not only mischaracterized the nature
of U.S. power and the transformative utility of power in general, but also built its
presumptions on the ontological fallacy that national identity is drawn from
410

William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs
(July/August 1996), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-07-01/toward-neo-reaganiteforeign-policy

411 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American
Foreign and Defense Policy (Washington, D.C.: Encounter, 2000), 4.

366

international mission, when the opposite is how a state is defined. A state cannot
know what it means to pursue and how it means to pursue it without first
understanding its own national identity. Conceptualizing national purpose and
national security in global terms makes a grandiose assumption: the world can
be engineered by the powerful. Both times the United States has employed the
full arsenal of its financial, military, and ideational tools to this end since 1945, it
has failed.
When Donald Rumsfeld claimed that "the coalition did not act in Iraq
because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq's pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction" but rather "because we saw existing evidence in a new light
through the prism of our experience on 9/11," he conceded the ultimate tragedy
of the conflict as a war of choice with no clear muse. This quintessentially
Constructivist statement revealed that the narrative of the evidence was more
important to Bush Administration officials than the evidence itself. This belief
subsequently necessitated duplicity in the sale of the Iraq War to Congress and
the American public. That the argument for war was based on ideology, some of
it taking its provenance from the neoconservative movement but much of it from
steadfast, enduring traditions in U.S. foreign policy since 1945, compounded the
problem of clarity of purpose and mission. As Constructivist scholar Karl
Schonberg has described it, "To understand the role of America in this period it is
necessary to consider not just the relative power relationships between the
United States and other actors in the international system, but also the ideational
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framework through which U.S policymakers have viewed and made sense of the
world around them." 412
In the eyes of many observers, Islamist terrorism, a term the Obama
Administration avoided either out of excessive political correctness or out of
concern that the proliferation of the term would alienate friendly Islamic allies
(likely both), presents the most glaring challenge to American national security. If
this

is

indeed

the

case,

the

Obama

Administration’s

shift

from

invasion/occupation doctrine to the doctrine of targeted killing seems the least
terrible in a cesspool of terrible alternatives. What we can learn based on the Iraq
experience is to focus like a laser on the perpetrators of any attack on the United
States or American allies rather than launching a social-engineering attempt to
completely reformulate problematic (whether threatening or not) states and even
entire regions.
Terrorism is far from a new problem. Terrorism against the Roman
occupation of Judea helped spread the liberation cause and convince the
Romans that they would pay an unspecified, unpredictable, but nonetheless
frightening and annoying cost for its attempt at subjugation in that particular area
two millennia ago. David Fromkin, writing in 1975 in response to what many
inaccurately viewed as the new phenomenon of terrorism, understood even then
the two fundamental necessities of fighting terrorism: (a) although it has to be
confronted, never assume that it can be eliminated, and (b) never play into the
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terrorists' hands by allowing them to dictate the terms of the battlefield and the
narrative of the ideational conflict. 413 Fromkin also correctly predicted that the
stakes involved in terrorism would rise exponentially, complicating the effort to
curtail terrorist financing, occupation of land, operational capabilities, and
ideational prowess. The Iraq War not only fueled the narrative of Islamist
terrorism, but also provided it safe haven within the country, precisely the
outcome it meant to prevent.
In the words of Barry Posen, "Officials in the Bush Administration
convinced themselves that a quick application of overwhelming military power
would bring democracy to Iraq, produce a subsequent wave of democratization
across the Arab world, marginalize al Qaeda, and secure U.S. influence in the
region." 414 But just as Bush Administration officials greatly exaggerated the threat
from Iraq as they sought to rouse the nation into a war-footing frenzy, so too did
they retroactively exaggerate prewar concerns about the ease with which
security would be established in Iraq. When asked if his prewar projections were
too optimistic, President Bush replied, "No. I think I was pretty well prepared for a
pretty long haul." 415 This revisionist history was paired with constructing an
alternative reality of facts on the ground in Iraq in the months after invasion. Even
after the country had begun to fall victim to insecurity, President Bush was still
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invoking the lofty rhetoric of militaristic liberalization. On May 1st, 2003, more
than one decade before the capture of Mosul by ISIS, Bush declared victory in
Iraq:

Our commitment to liberty is America's tradition—declared at our
founding, affirmed in Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, asserted
in the Truman Doctrine, and in Ronald Reagan's challenge to an
evil empire. We are committed to freedom in Afghanistan, in Iraq,
and in a peaceful Palestine. The advance of freedom is the surest
strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. Where
freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes
hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life.
American values, and American interests, lead in the same
direction: We stand for human liberty. The liberation of Iraq is a
crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We have removed
an ally of al-Qaida, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this
much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass
destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no
more. 416

It was later revealed that the White House had furnished the "Mission
Accomplished" banner for his declaration of victory aboard the U.S.S. Abraham
Lincoln, in contrast to statements by the Bush Administration that the Navy had
provided the banner. 417 While a shameful photo op is one thing, every politician
commits that type of transgression. The true crime of the distortion of reality
before, during, and after the invasion was the inability to predict, recognize, and
account for problems on the ground that would lead to insecurity in Iraq,
thousands of dead American soldiers, and the development of one of the most
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significant terrorist threats in the history of the world. No international terrorist
group has ever held so much land in addition to such a large audience.
If statements of the war's purpose, evidence to justify it, and rosy
predictions of its successes to come were completely distorted by Bush
Administration officials, which they surely were, why did Congressional leaders
and the American people not put up more of a fight? If nine days after Colin
Powell's speech Hans Blix had rendered Powell's contentions inaccurate, why
was there not more of a backlash in America, even if there was abroad? 72% of
the American people favored war in Iraq prior to the invasion. 418 That number did
not lose its plurality until two years later, as shown in Figure 8:

Figure 8: Pew Research Center, “Do you support the decision to use force in Iraq?”
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What accounts for this disconnect between reality and perception in the
case of Iraq? To attribute the Iraq War to the Bush Administration alone is to
mischaracterize the views of the American people. An administration wishing to
promote the demonization of a particular foe found ready ears among the public
so soon after the most catastrophic attack on American civilians in the nation's
history. Had the Bush Administration chosen Iran as the object of its rage
instead, it is likely that a plurality of support would still have been present.
Someone had blindsided the sleeping giant again six decades later, this time
against a civilian complex, and rattling the cage of a small band of
fundamentalists in a country less than 1% of Americans could locate on a map
hardly seemed just reprisal. Never mind that fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers were
from Saudi Arabia and that none of the four others were from Iraq, but from
Lebanon, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Every one of the perpetrators of
the attack was a citizen of a state with which the United States had benevolent
relations, and yet the U.S. military would turn its guns on a state that had no
involvement in it that did not possess a single weapon of mass destruction, nor
any connections with Islamist terrorist groups that could threaten America.
Recognized for the pragmatic dictator he was, Saddam Hussein was not even
considered a legitimate Muslim in the Muslim community.
As with the "tragedy without villains" that the Vietnam War became, Iraq
was chosen by U.S. leaders as the target for a new mission—against terrorism,
so was the refrain—and again the nation acquiesced. But while South Vietnam
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was under attack by Communist forces, Iraq neither possessed WMD nor
maintained ties with any organization threatening the United States. And while a
variety of factors limited U.S. casualties in Iraq to 4,424, the harm to the national
interest is likely to be far greater as a result of the Iraq War than with the Vietnam
War. 9/11 proved that Islamist fundamentalism is not just an ideational threat but
also existential—perhaps not in the literal interpretation of the word, since
jihadists will not be able to conquer the country, but in terms of the security of
American citizens, infrastructure, and leadership compounds, which can no
longer be taken for granted.
The two giants moats that protected the nation from attack before the
advent of international terrorism are no longer relevant in the globalized age. And
it is now beyond debate that the focal point of the American response to 9/11 has
created far more terrorism than it ever could have prevented. Islamist
fundamentalism is here to stay, and the United States will need to constantly
assess the response to it as it machetes its way through the increasingly
asymmetrical threats of the 21st century. One of the responses to another of
these threats, the war against drugs, largely defines itself according to the pursuit
and definition of that threat, rather than the elimination of the problem itself. Just
as terrorism is a tactic, drugs are a social phenomenon, if a social blight, and the
weaponization of the response to them carries the potential to further weaponize
the response to that response, just as bleeding weapons from the remnants of
French Colonial outposts under Diem and stirring the wrong hornet's nest in Iraq
have demonstrated.
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Donald Rumsfeld' FPDM "prisms" informed the conception of, planning
for, and justification for the motivations and characterizations of the purpose and
direction of the Iraq War. Prudent FPDM does not incorporate prisms. The further
a statesman travels away from a strict definition of the national interest and the
role of national security within it, the more he risks becoming mired in the smoke
and mirrors of those prisms. The American people and their Congressional
leaders did not pay sufficient attention to 'the man behind the curtain' because
they did not object to the preponderant nature of American grand strategy and
did not understand that power does not innately contain a capacity to transform
the politics of other states. While the blunder of the Iraq War indeed blemished
the neoconservative movement and the names attached to it, as evidenced by
the collapse of the think tank Project for a New American Century, Brian Schmidt
and Michael Williams explain why this should not be viewed as a "momentary
aberration:"

The difficult and deteriorating situation in Iraq has no doubt
damaged the neoconservative project, in some eyes fatally. Yet
even if neoconservatism is no longer the power it was, it is
important to be clear about its impact and its implications both for
realism and for future debates over foreign policy in the United
States and beyond. As we have shown, neoconservatism's impact
cannot be reduced to circumstances alone. However important 9/11
and the location of specific individuals in the Bush Administration
may have been, the ability of neoconservatives to influence the
debate over Iraq also reflected a coherent intellectual position
grounded in a specific philosophy of politics, a capacity to locate
these arguments within powerful currents in American political
culture, and an ability to use rhetorics and social networks
connected to both. Obviously, the particular circumstances
surrounding the invasion of Iraq will not be repeated, and the dire
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consequences of the decisions made may make it more difficult to
use these arguments, rhetorical moves, and political alliances in the
future. But appreciating the diverse resources that neoconservatism
was able to mobilize should make us cautious about seeing the
run-up to the Iraq War as nothing but a momentary aberration.
Neoconservatism as it has been expressed in foreign and domestic
politics over the past two or three decades may or may not pass
from the scene, but the political potential it reflects is rooted in
much deeper aspects of American politics and political culture, and
is unlikely to prove as ephemeral as many of the critics and
obituary writers of the neoconservative moment are wont to wish. 419

The Iraq War, despite the various threats that it created that we now must
confront, is not coming around again, as Schmidt and Williams point out. But at
the same time, it is an inaccurate portrayal of the American identity and political
system to suggest that the philosophies and assumptions guiding the failed
policy have come and gone.
From a theoretical perspective, the FPDM of the Iraq War seems to exhibit
all of the most imprudent elements of liberalism, realism, and Constructivism,
with few of their more prudent qualities. It combined the Manichean, unilateral
realpolitik of realism, the idealized messianism of liberalism, and the socialengineering of Constructivism into an unmitigated disaster not even the Vietnam
War rivals in terms of harm to the national interest. In terms of the international
perception of the United States, after 9/11, the United States enjoyed a level of
sympathy perhaps never before seen in its history. The goodwill showered upon
the United States, including by a majority of Muslims the world order, all but
evaporated in the months after March 2003. By contrast, the environment of the
419
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Cold War was so diametrically opposed and morally murky that the crimes
committed within it by both sides were more or less considered water under the
bridge from 1989 onward (except, of course, for those caught in its 'hot' war
zones). The fact that the United States came to be viewed by many as an
imprudent, self-serving, imperialist power after 2003 is not simply ideational. It
transforms into the existential via the narrative of Islamist terrorism, the most
acute national-security threat the United States now faces.
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CHAPTER 7
The Infinite Multidimensionality of Foreign Policy Analysis

I do the very best I know, the very best I can, and I mean to keep
doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said
against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out
wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference.
Abraham Lincoln

The Battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on
September the 11th, 2001, and still goes on.
President George W. Bush on May 1, 2003, aboard the U.S.S.
Abraham Lincoln

Square pegs, round holes, and FPDM
To evaluate a particular foreign policy, we must understand the FPDM
process, the outcome, and the relation between the two. One cannot be
determined by the other alone; they are fundamentally codetermined. If
international relations are conducted in a multidimensional sphere in which
unpredictable, dynamic, asymmetrical threats can come from any angle and any
provenance, in many ways the policies produced by FPDM constitute a onedimensional plane of constraints and restrictions on those charged with pursuing
the national interest abroad. At the same time, the multitude of FPDM inputs, be
they psychological, ideological, bureaucratic, interest-group, or otherwise, so
disambiguate the FPDM process that how to study that process in relation to the
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national interest leaves the researcher with too many tools in the toolbox, as
shown in Table 9: 420
Table 9: Major levels of analysis in FPA

Yet all of these tools are necessary for understanding that process. Thus, in a
sense, the FPDM conditions leaders operate in are multidimensional, the foreignpolicy issues they seek to address are multidimensional, but the foreign policies
produced by the multidimensional FPDM process end up being one-dimensional
outputs. The agreed upon foreign policy, or resultant, in Foreign Policy Analysis
terminology, represents "the lowest common denominator outcome: the outcome
upon which a majority of the participants in the process can agree," which
produces a policy that "would probably not coincide with the one chosen by any
420 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2014), 44.
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unitary rational actor." 421 (Outcome here is the FPDM output outcome, not the
result of the implementation of the policy, or foreign-policy outcome). As
mentioned in Chapter 2, Henry Kissinger described the process of establishing
and maintaining any given policy as a negotiated bargain: "Whether these goals
are desirable is relatively less crucial," and alterations to policies, once settled
upon, is highly problematic because "the alternative to the status quo is the
prospect of repeating the whole anguishing process of arriving at decisions." This
operation applies a set of tools that is often incapable of responding to and
dictating the terms of the system in which that toolset is applied. What follows as
an outcome is therefore akin to using the skills required for a game of tick-tacktoe to solve a Rubik's Cube.
Whatever policy settled upon still has to be operationalized through
whatever foreign-policy resources and institutions are available to the state. Even
with perfect information (intelligence) and perfect policy operationalization, which
is never the case, the resultant can never be created and employed with the
singular formation of addressing the policy problem, because of these
multidimensional FPDM input constraints and restrictions. This entire process is
before the policy ever reaches its target environment, in which it will find a new
host of obstacles that dwarf those encountered in the FPDM process. Once the
policy meets the target environment, the need for assessment and reassessment
is absolute, but the motivation to do so is minute due to the "anguishing process"
of having to repeat the procedure all over again—it is not only frowned upon, but
421
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impossible, because the various input-parties will never again assemble as they
did to construct the policy in the first place. Intelligence operatives have new
tasks; Congressional leaders have new constituencies and issues to face;
officials in the Executive Branch must respond to changing conditions, problems
in other areas of the world, and problems on a higher grand-strategic scale than
the one in question, which is itself often a peripheral policy-target environment
(for various reasons, interventions tend to be in areas of the periphery); citizens
have accepted the policy and moved on with their lives. The policy never again
receives the attention it requires after those essential decision points have come
and gone—"The Long 1964" with regard to Vietnam and 2002/2003 with regard
to Iraq.
No matter how many Senate Select Committee on Intelligence closeddoor meetings, House Armed Services Committee hearings, presidential cabinet
assemblies, public inquiries, or formal investigations take place, no entity exists
that can put the policy genie back in the box. The events of 1964 and 2003 make
that painfully clear. The complexity of creating and subsequently operationalizing
and implementing an intervention therefore inherently relies on a multitude of
fortuitous inter-subjective, codetermined conditions to achieve its objectives. No
matter how many factors contribute to the confluence of inputs that inform FPDM,
a policy that can be widely understood, institutionalized, and sustained
temporally must still be specified and reevaluated. It may take a 100,000-word
document to begin to understand the social conditions within Iraq or Vietnam, but
a presidential administration cannot concoct a 100,000-word policy that invents
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tools to address the multitude of issues an intervention will face. No institutions of
foreign policy are variegated enough to fulfill so many objectives within so many
parameters, and the average citizen possesses neither the time nor the
inclination to sift through miles of documents to understand any given foreign
policy; hence the need for platitudes, sound bites, and the manipulation of the
public perception (fortunately for the foreign-policy practitioner, these are skills
required of any policymaker).
It cannot be expected, for example, that commanding generals speak the
native language fluently, understand the local culture, recognize the strengths of
the adversary, and recognize the weaknesses of the partner state politically and
military, much less an ordinary private sent into a village. The target environment
is therefore by default far more complex than the intervening policy attempting to
control it, when the inverse would be much more likely to achieve success. A
bovine will always have difficulty outmaneuvering its human domesticator for this
exact reason. It is small wonder, then, that sweeping interventions are often
domesticated by the sociopolitical conditions in which they are targeted, rather
than the intervening authority domesticating local sociopolitical conditions. The
partner actors in the target area utilize the intervention to their own advantage
because their interests in many cases do not align with that of the intervening
state and because they know they can get away with it.
Even when they do align, the local actor can still use its leverage to extract
resources, vicarious authority, and vicarious legitimacy from the intervening
state, limiting its own incentives to provide civil institutions and services to the
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populace, thereby creating even more pressure on the intervening state to
provide those institutions and services. In Vietnam, for example, advisors were
assigned to ARVN units for one-year terms, which meant that "just as he was
getting to know the ARVN commander whom he was advising, the American
would have to leave and be replaced by a new one who probably knew nothing
of the language or what was really going on and who could thus be manipulated
or circumvented by the local ARVN leaders," leading to the common adage that
Americans did not fight one war in Vietnam, but ten one-year wars. 422
This problem is of course compounded by the potential of adversarial
actors to wreak havoc on the intervening state's plans. If the total military and
political strength of the intervening and partner state x is weaker than the military
and political strength of the collection of adversarial actors y within the target
area, t time will slowly bleed the motivation of the intervening state and force the
partner state, which had its own agenda to begin with, to rely less on the
intervening state and thus pursue its own agenda even further. This phenomenon
alone is enough to problematize intervention, and indeed has done exactly that
for many centuries. But it becomes further compounded by myriad other factors,
many of which have been documented in the case studies. It is therefore of
absolute importance that a state pondering intervention be fully aware of these
inextricable eventualities and construct remedies to address them prior to
intervening.

422

Anthony James Joes, The War for South Viet Nam, 1954-1975 (London: Praeger, 2001), 91.

382

The case studies have highlighted problems with the weakness of the
partner state, the strength and determination of local adversaries with support
from abroad, the phenomenon of the actions of the intervening state creating the
opposite of their objectives, and the inherent ineptitude involved in operational
learning and institutional policy adaptation. These are all problems in
implementation, irrespective of the problems a given foreign policy may have in
its construction, definition, and proliferation throughout the relevant foreign-policy
agencies and institutions. Many of these factors are more pronounced than they
were in 1945, when the United States decided to capitalize on the expansion of
the Second World War by maintaining fixed interests, political institutions, and
military installations abroad.
It is true that guerilla warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism
all existed prior to 1945, but the plethora of national-security threats have
undergone a sea change in how they materialize and pose challenges to the
material and ideational national-security objectives of the state. Combatting the
Viet Cong with B-52 bombers was as effective as combatting Islamist terrorism
by toppling a secular, non-religious dictator in a sovereign state, which is to say
not at all. New threats require new strategies, tactics, and ways of thinking. The
United States was late to shift to these new ways of operating because of the
enormous ideational and institutional inertia created by the overwhelming
victories of the Second World War. Not only are institutions of the state always
slow to adapt, but where is the motivation to adapt when everything in the
broader picture seems to be proceeding along swimmingly?
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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who made a concerted effort to
modernize the American military in spite of some of the problems this caused to
commanders (such as minimizing troop levels in Iraq), was widely panned for his
comment, "You go to war with the army you have—not the army you might want
or wish to have at a later time." 423 This was a farcical statement for two reasons.
First, Iraq was a war of choice, and could have been fought at a later time;
second, his insistence on minimizing troop levels had nothing to do with timing.
Nevertheless, it was half true. "What I saw from 9/11 forward was Don
Rumsfeld's shock and disillusion with intelligence," a covert operations specialist
who worked for Rumsfeld recalled after 9/11. "He had been working for decades
with an intelligence community that was focused on one question: the Soviet
order of battle. But when the intelligence community had to move down the scale
to low-intensity conflict, well..."

424

The United States never adequately

modernized the order of its military because it has largely maintained the same
grand-strategic perspective since 1945.
This ideational and institutional inertia that catapulted from the launchpad
of the Second World War facilitates the factors complicating intervention. The
pursuit of preponderance and the belief that sheer material power can transform
the politics of other states fuels a FPDM process that values output over
prudence. The U.S. foreign-policy system exists in many ways to perpetuate
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itself, rather than to respond to particular policy issues or national-security
threats. It is therefore unsurprising that it has not adapted well to new conditions.
The process of seeking out monsters to slay has been systematically prioritized
by U.S. foreign policymakers since 1945 over the need to deal with specific
threats because the American identity relies on that process to assert itself on
the international level. Voltaire mused in the 18th century, "If God did not exist, it
would be necessary to invent him." This is the philosophy behind the tradition of
mission in the history of U.S. foreign relations and the crusading spirit more
isolationist tendencies have never been able to completely subdue: if no threats
appear on the horizon, wade further into the depths of the sea; you are sure to
encounter some eventually.
John Quincy Adams feared the United States wandering about "abroad in
search of monsters to destroy." But the events of the Second World War
convinced Paul Nitze and other U.S. foreign policymakers that the only way to
achieve lasting security would be to achieve a "preponderance" of power. The
United States indeed achieved a preponderance of power in the subsequent
seven decades—but in spite of, rather than because of, its most ambitious
foreign-policy campaigns. And while the United States remains the preeminent
power in the international system, the overall balance of power is careening away
from U.S. preponderance, irrespective of U.S. desires, objectives, and actions. If
it wishes to remain the preeminent power, it would do well to recognize its
limitations and de-idealize its international ambitions. Perhaps most importantly,
U.S. leaders must recognize that the power of the United States is not defined by
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its displays of military power alone. The failure of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq
obviate this simple fact of power and prestige precisely because they did not
bring about any substantial shift in the overall balance of power.
Chapters 3 and 4 described grand strategy as a means-end chain. If the
stated objectives of grand strategy are limited and pragmatic, they can
sometimes be achieved, even in a difficult, dangerous, and unpredictable world.
When the objectives are sweeping, heavily idealized, Manichean, and
transformational, they become much more difficult to reach, regardless of power
endowment. One of the perceived constraints on the science of FPE is the
obstacles the researcher must overcome to identify and explain the veritable
motivations for and objectives of FPDM leaders. But these objectives are more
discernible than is commonly thought. When we go back and analyze the
Vietnam War and Iraq War, we do not find some hidden treasure trove of secrets
that flips the extant perception of the war on its head (even while we do
encounter misinterpretations and highly subjective historiography in the scholarly,
policy, and popular literature). The data point to very similar motivations and
objectives as were commonly held before the years have passed, the relevant
documents declassified, and the memoirs written. The grand strategy of
preponderance and the overestimation of sheer power to transform the politics of
other states are open secrets. They are not hidden away in some arcane lockbox
beneath a government building in Washington. Every major policy document of
the last seven decades contains at least traces of each of the two, if not a fullblown endorsement of each as with the 2002 NSS. Even if FPDM leaders had
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taken every effort to conceal their true motivations and calculations, they would
still have to answer for their actions, which inevitably render their words,
thoughts, espionage and statecraft secondary in the minds of the American
citizens empowered with the ability to vote them into oblivion. Foreign
policymakers are judged by their actions, not their thoughts, and should be
evaluated along those lines. While intention is not irrelevant, it hardly constitutes
the whole picture.
The reason many scholars have focused so diligently on the limits of U.S.
power is because U.S. foreign policymakers have so often characterized U.S.
power as omnipotent. But if there is one thing thousands of years of international
relations have demonstrated, it is that there is no such thing as omnipotent
power. Robert Gilpin notes that “no state has ever completely controlled an
international system; for that matter, no domestic government, not even the most
totalitarian, has completely controlled a domestic society." 425 Not the Romans in
the Mediterranean, nor Ghengis Kahn in Asia, nor the Third Reich in Europe, nor
the sunset-less British Empire, nor American preponderance have ever achieved
anything remotely characteristic of global omnipotence. If for no other reason,
this could be attributed to the simple idea that if x amount of individuals are
willing to die to expel foreign occupiers, and those individuals effect y deaths on
the soldiers of that occupying force, in t time the occupier will withdraw, realizing
that the costs outweigh the benefits, and having the privilege of ending a war of
choice in which the national interest is peripheral at best, and sometimes being
425
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negatively impacted by intervention. The key distinction between the American
crusading spirit and those of her preponderance-seeking forefathers is that she
often did so with a noble purpose in mind, which is to say securitizing and
liberalizing the international system. 426 But when you are on the receiving end of
the most powerful military in the history of the world, intention is hardly a relevant
factor.

U.S. grand strategy, IR theory, and change
At the center of the interchange between scholarship and praxis is the
intention-result spectrum, otherwise characterized (in reverse) as the descriptionprescription spectrum. Realism intends to describe the conditions from the
present backward, liberalism intends to normatively improve the world by
developing theories and tools to facilitate its betterment, and Constructivism
intends to shatter the fourth wall as would have a traveler on the Further bus with
Ken Kesey's Merry Pranksters in the watershed year of 1964. Classical and neorealism, with their emphasis on human nature and a relatively fixed, materially
and/or structurally determined national interest, assumes that a change in
leadership or a change in ideas seldom brings a substantial change in foreign
policy. Liberalism, for its part, is more of a paradox than commonly conceived in
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this regard. In theory, with its emphasis on the value of human liberty, its primary
focus is in fact the individual.
However, in practice, this is a bit of a conundrum. Because the paradigm
takes standard ideals as its defining characteristics, it is fundamentally transindividual by default. An idea in one person's mind is irrelevant until they share it
with another. Ralph Waldo Emerson observed, "Every revolution was once a
thought in one man's mind, and when the same thought occurs to another man, it
is the key to that era." 427 While in theory liberalism espouses the value of one life,
one body, and one idea-unit unto itself, in practice it specifies specific normative
ideas based on specific international objectives—democracy to achieve selfdetermination, interconnectivity to achieve peace, the free market to achieve a
medium through which individuals and groups of individuals can pursue
happiness and variegated standards of living based on the intersection of
personal ambition and societal efficiency. In practice, however, liberalism is
intolerant of ideas, polities, institutions, and international processes that do not
abide by those specific tenets.
It is therefore a fundamentally international paradigm at its core, which
leads to an international situation in which the tenets of Democratic Peace
Theory render relations between democracies and non-democracies virtually as
antagonistic as those between non-democracies. In the words of E.H. Carr, "The
doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device
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invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain
their dominant position." 428 Perhaps this has been one of the reasons why the
most powerful state in the history of the international system, which was also the
first liberal, pluralistic, secular state, has had such a chaotic interchange with the
rest of the world, especially nonliberal states. The United States, as the
(supposed) peerless exemplar of liberal power, has had an especially difficult
time relating to nonliberal powers, with certain notable exceptions during the Cold
War when anti-Communism temporarily eclipsed liberalism as its international
identity-creator. It may be the case that the only reason this 'liberal leviathan' has
had such antagonistic relations with nonliberal states is because its enormous
share of world power by diffusion creates more areas of overlap with nonliberal
states than other less powerful liberal states have, inevitably leading to more
conflict. Where the territory of the lion and the hyena intersect, the ground will be
bloodied sooner or later. And while the magisterial king of beasts is unchallenged
on an individual basis, he is often outnumbered by the tenacious hyena.
However, two things stand out about the United States irrespective of its
substantial power endowment. First, no other state has pursued preponderance
to the point of the United States even when accounting for its great power
differential since the material and ideational demise of colonialism. Either this
says something about the economy of scale inherently changing the behavior of
a state—which would not only be a surprising development, but one which would
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be impossible to test given the singularity of U.S. power since the Second World
War—or there is some other factor at play. Christopher Fettweis notes that "the
stronger a country gets, the more mistakes it seems to make." 429 But this is due
to the affordability of mistakes a large power endowment offers. This dissertation
has demonstrated that the other factor is the pursuit of preponderance. Second,
the United States seems to have chosen the blunders herein virtually arbitrarily—
that is to say, without proper consideration for the role of the country chosen as it
relates to the national interest—neither Vietnam nor Iraq had any in any
substantial sense. The two most notable of these wars of choice utterly failed to
achieve their objectives.
Therefore, either there is a terribly unscientific process for choosing these
conflicts, or there is another factor at play. This dissertation has demonstrated
that preponderance is the other factor at play and that there is a terribly
unscientific process for choosing these conflicts. This is without even considering
the extremely difficult obstacles that must be overcome if one state wishes to
transform the politics of another. In other words, at each one of the input, output,
operationalization, and implementation phases of foreign policy, the U.S. grandstrategic means-end chain contained neither theoretical nor applicable prudence
as it related to these blunders. The theory of preponderance that has been
guiding the nation for seven decades has not found effective application where it
is applied with the most vigor. In fact, in the two most notable of these cases, that
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vigor was actually a source of the overwhelming response against it by armed
indigenous and external actors. In Vietnam, investment of troops, bombs, and
dollars was inversely related to objectives there. In Iraq, this phenomenon was
even more pronounced. In Vietnam the enemy was singular—the North
Vietnamese/VC alliance, with modest external assistance. In Iraq, the enemy
was also singular in that it consisted of social conditions of fractionalization within
the state, as well a modest external disruption in the form of Salafist jihadism.
The problems producing this social condition were of course multifarious, but the
United States was essentially fighting a singular war against this malignant
condition.
In fact, the security vacuum left in the invasion's wake hardly signified antiAmericanism. Anti-Americanism was certainly a part of it, and anti-Americanism
certainly achieved a stature that it had not held prior to the invasion (recall that
the United States was drowning in international sympathy in the months after
9/11). But just as the 9/11 attacks had little (nothing) to do with Iraq, neither did
its internal social conditions. Instead, Iraq descended into a cauldron of
sectarianism, regionalism, and balkanization as one faction warred on another for
its share of domestic-national autonomy. Ironically, this was both nationalist and
anti-nationalist in nature. Groups were essentially fighting each other for a right to
fight against the foreign Christian occupier, and at the same time fighting both
with and against the fledgling Iraqi state. Shia fought Shia for control from within
the state, and Sunni fought the state's oppression. He who could take the banner
of the 'nationalist' movement in ideational and militaristic terms would be able to
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take a larger share of political power within it in material, political, and territorial
terms.
The international jihadism that overtook Iraq in the aftermath of March
2003 existed as but one of these rival factions, and could enjoy little local
authority and sparse support in its early days of 2003-2004, for two reasons.
First, in order to establish its name, it had to resort to brutal bombings and
executions in order to be noticed, especially as the extant violence became
further exacerbated. Second, as these groups were international in nature and
did not exist in Iraq prior to the invasion, they could not rely on the solidarity of
extant groups that did not resort to those barbaric tactics, in part because no
such nonsense was permitted under Saddam Hussein's monopolization of
violence (except of course by his own forces). As is always the fundamental
conundrum for any terrorist organization, the brutality of the tactics of terrorism
by default alienate a majority of the audience for which the attacks are
engineered.
If the story had ended there, Iraq would have been a simple one-off
foreign-policy disaster, the United States would have left it in disarray as it did
South Vietnam, and the Americans would have moved on and forgotten about
that sorry state of affairs as would have been its prerogative in a war of choice in
which the national interest was not at stake. However, because of the sectarian
rift exposed by the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the story did not end there, and
Iraq became relevant to the U.S. national interest because there now was
international jihadism there just as Vietnam became relevant to the national
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interest because each American soldier killed there served as a call to arms to
send more soldiers to die in Vietnam in his name. The United States created the
perfect Petri dish for ISIS to emerge from the rubble of shock and awe: a weak,
Shia-dominated state with an impotent military incapable of confronting the Sunni
militant movement that predictably assembled after being toppled over by a
nation still angry about attacks launched against it by barely more than a dozen
members of states allied with that nation orchestrated by a nonstate group based
in a country 1,800 miles away. This was not a crusade against Islam—as
Saddam Hussein was not even religiously inclined—but to many in the Muslim
community, and certainly to Salafi jihadists, it contained all the hallmarks
necessary to perpetuate their narrative.
Had the FPDM process been perfectly designed, processed and applied
with the express purpose of harming the national interest, it could scarcely have
achieved such success. Based on results alone, it seems as if the leaders
involved in both cases not only did not pursue the national interest, but did
everything within their power to harm the national interest. Of course, this is not
the case. It is the case, however, that the national interest was neither properly
defined nor prudently pursued with respect to Vietnam or Iraq. For all of their
frivolities, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and incompetence, these leaders did the best
they could to pursue the national interest within the bounded rationality of
mission. Whether the mission of pursuing preponderance at the international
level, or the mission of transforming the politics of the state in question, cognitive
biases and preference restrictions prevented these leaders from thinking
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rationally. At the grand-strategic level, it was not possible for them to conceive of
relinquishing South Vietnam or allowing Iraq to exist under Saddam Hussein. At
the individual policy-level, it was not possible for them to conceive that their
shortsighted plan was incapable of working.
At the grand-strategic level, this could be labeled a simple act of hubris; at
the individual-policy level, this is a basic ignorance of what can happen when
very different cultures collide. A paradigm that dismisses cultural factors is likely
to fail at intervention; indeed, one that recognizes them is unlikely to undertake
intervention. Somewhat paradoxically, American militant liberalism has taken a
realist approach to the lack of differentiation in states as archetypical boxes, even
while superimposing liberal projections of what foreign citizens desire; all this
while utilizing highly Constructivist interpretations of the national interest as it
relates to liberalizing the world through militancy (creating the material world
through ideational inventions). Out of the wreckage of this paradigmatic
salmagundi emerges a grand strategy confused about its own means-ends
chain.
One phenomenon none of the major paradigms adequately address is that
of change in the international system. Liberalism purports to; its emphasis on the
determinative nature of ideals understands only a system base on those ideals.
Constructivism, true to its form, embraces malleability to such an extent that so
much potential change changes the nature of change, and thus change cannot
be understood except in the absence of change. Marxism is so confident of its
prognostications of cyclical class warfare that its predictability renders it
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incapable of out-of-model change. Marxists have also yet to be tapped on the
shoulder and reminded that their predictions have never historically materialized.
Realism likewise only understands change within the confines of its highly
parsimonious conceptual prison:

The realist theory of international political change is based on what
can be called the law of uneven growth, in contrast to the Marxist
law of uneven development. According to realism, the fundamental
cause of wars among states and changes in international systems
is the uneven growth of power among states. Realist writers from
Thucydides and Mackinder to present-day scholars have attributed
the dynamics of international relations to the fact that the
distribution of power in an international system shifts over a period
of time; this shift results in profound changes in the relationships
among states and eventually changes in the nature of the
international system itself. Underlying the operation of this law and
its significance is the fact that power by its very nature is a relative
matter; one state's gain in power is by necessity another's loss. 430

This nonzero calculation of power feeds directly into the security dilemma,
in which every state seeks to increase its relative power in order to increase its
relative security. The rest is history. But change has been the only constant in the
international system since the domestication of agriculture some ten thousand
years ago in present-day Iraq. And change is occurring more rapidly now than at
any time in history. Each of the paradigms has lessons and shortcomings for the
change the international system is now experiencing. We have learned from
Democratic Peace Theory that liberal states tend not to fight one another;
however, they do fight other states at more or less the same rate, and
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modernization models have failed to bring about democracy in China and other
partially liberalized economies in authoritarian states (President Nixon 'opened'
China in 1972—45 years ago). We have learned from Constructivism that
attitudes and ideas can most definitely contribute to the definition of interests, if
not control them altogether, as evidenced by the European Union. We have
learned from Marxism that people are concerned with class, as evidenced by the
previous presidential election, even if Vietnam and China have moved to
modernize their economies, if not their governments. And the primary strength of
realism, understanding prudence in international affairs, has not quite been offset
by its primary weakness, the dismissal of culture and state differentiation,
throughout the course of this dissertation.

Conclusions drawn from the case studies
A summary of the FPE and OPM of each case study was contained
therein; as such, another here would be redundant. A summation of the lessons
provided by these case studies in correlation with their FPE and their relation to
the OPM in aggregate now follows. The case study chapters were elected to
illustrate the functionality of FPE, examine why and how blunders occur, and
explore the connections between the OPM and the blunders its assertions might
contribute to. The data suggest that the process of constructing alternatives and
deciding on an initial choice of invasion or escalation is the most important factor
in determining how the conflict will be viewed by policymakers in later years. In
other words, once a policy course is set toward a substantial investment of

397

foreign-policy resources, alterations and deviations become difficult. The
common illustration of the battleship being turned around as a metaphor for the
lack of adaptation of government and its policies comes to mind. If a particular
policy problem is framed as a must-win between good and evil, it will be difficult
for policymakers to walk back that framing, as they would have to not only
contradict themselves but also renegotiate through all of the different
bureaucratic machinations (Congress, military services, public opinion, advisors)
that had to be negotiated to initiate the policy in the first place.
Above all, these case studies illustrate a neurasthenia in the central
decision-making system at the highest levels of leadership, especially in three
determining decision axes: the interpretation of the problem, as it is detected in
the foreign policy system's tentacles; the digestion of the problem through
domestic governmental processes and the court of public opinion; and the
construction of the policy response by way of arriving at a consensus. Once
these three conditions have been met, they become so ingrained in the
production of foreign policy with regard to a particular state, region, or issue that
they achieve a critical mass whose momentum cannot easily be reversed.
Proclamations that the enemy is evil—along with the imperative that it must be
confronted—leave policymakers hamstrung in terms of more cautious options.
The overarching lesson from these blunders is to be more prudent when in
the decision-making phase, before the policy carries so much institutional and
ideational inertia that its course arrives at a point of no return. Policymakers must
keep close at hand the absolute necessity to demand precise exaction and
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unfiltered clarity in defining the three fundamental decision axes. It is perhaps for
this reason that scholars gravitate toward the question of whether President
Kennedy may have kept the United States out of a policy of escalation: such a
conclusion would signify that it was the critical decision-making phase that
faltered, rather than underlying conditions in the American foreign-policy system.
In fact, both feature prominently in each of these cases. While these conditions
are of utmost significance, in each of the examined cases, policymakers indeed
committed grave errors of strategic judgment at each decision axis. These
conditions, described in Chapter 3 and detailed throughout the case studies, are
directly related to the interpretation of the policy problem (the first decision axis)
and the imperative of response (as opposed to inaction).
The case studies elected are special cases—strategic blunders replete
with a multitude of tactical shortcomings that result in total failure and significant
harm to the national interest. They are by definition different from normal
interchanges between one state and another in which the outcome is 'mixedresult,' or each state loses some battles and wins others (whether political or
military). The purpose of utilizing these blunders as case studies is therefore to
produce inferences about how the process of imprudent FPDM can lead to
unfavorable outcomes via a host of FPDM fallacies. Nevertheless, while some
are specific to the United States, some of the lessons from this volume can
inform all interstate interactions, whether extreme or normal. Avoiding the same
FPDM errors made during the course of these events should in theory lead to the
betterment of any given policy, maximizing what the state is able to gain from the
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other, even under conditions of cooperation in which the rising tide raises all
boats. For even among partners the art of statecraft must still be adeptly
employed, just as the art of diplomacy is never completely absent among
adversaries.

Each Criterion and Indicator offers conclusions from the analysis of the case
studies:

FPE
Criterion I. Degree of fruition of primary and secondary objectives
Redefine the interaction between intervention and the national interest.

The perpetual pursuit of monsters prohibits the development of foreignpolicy tools, institutions, and processes capable of distinguishing unfortunate
circumstances and events from existential threats. Conceiving of national
security in global terms and threat hypersensitivity raise the costs of intervention
and lower its return on investment by setting virtually impossible objectives and
assuming that total victory is the only acceptable outcome. 431 Although he
characterizes war as "a dramatically nonzero-sum activity," Thomas Schelling
recognizes that "winning in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive
meaning; it is not winning relative to one's adversary. It means gaining relative to
one's own value system; and this may be done by bargaining, by mutual
431 Thomas C. Schelling, Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist
(Harvard University Press, 1984), 269.
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accommodation, and by the avoidance of mutually damaging behavior." 432
Chapter 5 noted that Robert McNamara attributed much of the damage of the
Vietnam War to a lack of cooperation and communication between warring
parties. Like many of the protagonists of the Vietnam War, as well as the Iraq
war, he wished to blame the events on inevitable conditions, uncontrollable
circumstances, and "what-ifs."
But this is not an accurate characterization of the conditions under which
the two adversaries interacted. Neither was interested in the other's perspective
because the perspectives were diametrically opposed, which is why secret
negotiations continued for years even with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger
expecting to gain little from them, and indeed gaining little from them and
eventually losing control of Saigon to the Communists. Even while maintaining
these modest expectations, the war was directed by its leaders in a fashion in
which total victory was the expectation. What the United States was willing to
settle for at the Paris Peace Accords was far short of what it had sought at the
outset of the conflict, after expending far more in defeat than it ever would have
even to achieve success—even after winning every battle of the war.
The same was true in Iraq. No militia or band of jihadists could challenge
the American military in any open battle. But as with the NVA and VC, they
managed to make the cost too great to be worth the effort. The words of Sun Tzu
remind us, "To win victory is easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult." Likewise,
Machiavelli's deliberations led him to the conclusion, "Everyone may begin a war
432
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at his pleasure, but cannot so finish it." 433 After the spurious Gulf of Tonkin
incident, and in the months after 9/11, the United States went to war at its
pleasure, but could not finish it in accordance with its objectives. The
fundamental lesson from Criterion I is twofold: do not characterize a particular
policy problem in terms of good and evil or total victory and total defeat, and do
not fight a war of choice as if it were a war of survival. Fit particular policy
objectives to the national interest, not the national interest to particular policy
objectives, which is exactly what the 2002 NSS did.

Criterion II. Corollary strategic consequences
All politics is local: do not conflate states in the aggregate or individually
and do not apply grand-strategic lenses to local problems.
No two foreign-policy assumptions can be equally applied to any two
different states. U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War exemplifies this grandstrategic shortcoming. Classical realism, with its emphasis on the generalities of
human nature and hard power, and neorealism, with its emphasis on structural
constraints, largely ignore the relevance of culture in international relations.
Critical scholars accurately contend that "pure or unadulterated (Western) IR
concepts do not correspond with many local realities.” 434 But in the case of
intervention, culture is an essential component of the efficacy of the policy. By
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imposing the concept of the 'ungoverned area' into security considerations, an
intervening power mischaracterizes the area in question. There is no such thing
as an 'ungoverned area:' "In reality, many so-called 'ungoverned spaces' are
simply differently governed." 435 In fact, in South Vietnam, as with many other
Cold War battlefields, the state being 'defended' in intervention had little
presence in the areas of the country where the enemy was active, which was
precisely the problem with that state. It only controlled a tiny fraction of the
country and ceded the rest as alternatively governed areas. William Odom wrote
in 1992, soon after the Cold War ended:

Two things seem to be missing from the various lines of study of
the problem that the Third World poses for U.S. security. First,
there is seldom an effort to stand back and view the U.S.—Soviet
competition in its broader context, to examine the assumptions and
political values on both sides, to reexamine the record on both
sides, and to relate the competition to the indigenous factors that
cause wars in the Third World. Second, there has been little
effective effort to integrate the military dimension of wars in the
Third World with two other dimensions—external influences and
indigenous politics. Mention of their importance and urgings that
they be seen as important are numerous, but how they interrelate
and how they affect U.S. strategy are integrating issues that are
largely neglected. 436

Odom recognized that to superimpose the perceptions and misperceptions of the
global Cold War over indigenous local politics meant the misapplication of power
in an intervention because such power would only be exploited by local
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adversaries as well as partners. Robert Komer, whose writings are detailed in
Chapter 5, argued that linking human rights with military aid in foreign policy was
akin to "fiddling while Rome burns," even while he administered pacification
programs in Vietnam. 437 But the self-defeating perspective "Blowtorch Bob"
Komer propounded was ineffective for exactly that reason: not understanding
local conditions led to unsuccessful interventions because the two were related,
but in precisely the opposite way. You could positively affect the overall balance
of power by adeptly partnering with local actors, but you could not turn local
actors into pure Cold War proxies because they already had their own set of local
objectives.
Henry Kissinger concluded after the failure in Vietnam, "We probably
made a mistake" by viewing Vietnam strictly through the FPDM prism of
international Communism, lamenting of this myopia, "We perhaps might have
perceived the war in more Vietnamese terms, rather than as the outward thrust of
a global conspiracy." 438 There is no other conflict in American history that has
been subject to such histrionics, as Chapter 5 details. Kissinger's comment about
the need to "perceive the conflict in more Vietnamese terms" is most welcome to
the social scientist, but unfortunately came after the war, when it was needed
before. This is the first lesson of the Vietnam War; the second being to
understand the limits of the utility of even virtually unlimited military power. The
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third lesson of the Vietnam War is that the United States never fully accepted the
first two, which were un-learned sometime between 1975 and 2003. The heavily
idealized foreign policy of the Bush Administration is documented in Chapter 6,
but the re-militarization of U.S. foreign policy began before that. On August 18,
1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan nostalgically addressed the
Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago, recounting, "For too long, we
have lived with the 'Vietnam Syndrome.'" His Vietnam War requiem was entirely
distinct from the depiction offered in Chapter 5:

Over and over again they told us for nearly 10 years that we were
the aggressors bent on imperialistic conquests. They had a plan. It
was to win in the field of propaganda here in America what they
could not win on the field of battle in Vietnam. As the years dragged
on, we were told that peace would come if we would simply stop
interfering and go home. It is time we recognize that ours was, in
truth, a noble cause. A small country newly free from colonial rule
sought our help in establishing self-rule and the means of selfdefense against a totalitarian neighbor bent on conquest. We
dishonor the memory of 50,000 young Americans who died in that
cause when we give way to feelings of guilt as if we were doing
something shameful... There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If
we are forced to fight, we must have the means and the
determination to prevail or we will not have what it takes to secure
the peace. And while we are at it, let us tell those who fought in that
war that we will never again ask young men to fight and possibly
die in a war our government is afraid to let them win. 439

This is not only a complete distortion of the events of the Vietnam War, but
it is a perspective that continues in both the popular imagination and in some
segments of the scholarly literature, some of which is discussed in Chapter 5.
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President Reagan, knowingly or unwittingly, completely ignores, and in fact
lambasts, the most important lessons of the war. When he says "they," he is
referring to the enemy. He does not name them by their actual political titles, as
in Viet Cong, or North Vietnamese Army. He is promoting precisely the
perspective that Kissinger realized was wrong by characterizing it as a "global
conspiracy," in Kissinger's words. Nowhere in his statement is there any
responsibility of any wrongdoing or even poor FPDM, except to say that political
hamstringing lost the war, which is factually inaccurate.
If far more bombs were dropped on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that all
ordnance expended over the Pacific and European theaters in all of the Second
World War, in what way was the military effort hamstrung? If this is to suggest
that the air war should have been expanded into China, or the ground war into
North Vietnam, which would have provoked the same Chinese response as did
crossing into North Korea, Reagan is virtually pining for World War Three. His
characterization of South Vietnam as a "small country, newly free" omits the role
the United States played defending French colonialism, as well as the repressive
tyranny of the government in Saigon. North Vietnam was not a "totalitarian
neighbor." In fact, it did not take orders from Beijing or Moscow, and the idea of
nationalist Vietnamese unification was popular in South Vietnam as well as
North.
This mendacious misrepresentation of the most tragic war in American
history not only dishonors the men who died there—which were nearly ten
thousand more than the figure he offers—it all but guarantees that similar
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tragedies will recur. What was "shameful" about Vietnam policy was not the
brave soldiers who fought there, but the imprudence of the men who sent them
there to fight a losing war. While the American public has been at least
complacent in if not supportive of preponderance, the imprudent FPDM involved
in the two foreign-policy blunders of the case studies require both self-deception,
in terms of how U.S. foreign policymakers estimate U.S. capabilities to transform
other states, and duplicity to the American people, in terms of how easy the
campaign will be. John Mearsheimer’s Why Leaders Lie explains that deceiving
the public is an inherently democratic activity, because of the fact that voters in a
democracy can boot leaders out of office if a policy is perceived to be contrary to
the national interest. 440 FPDM leaders therefore take great care to preserve their
narrative of events as it suits their particular brand of political expedience.

Criterion III. Cost
Do not equate military power with political power.
The possession of power is not universally fungible across different
applications of power. Military power cannot always buy political power, much
less become the other. One of the common themes throughout these case
studies in terms of the FPDM that led to blunder is the intentional magnification of
preferred conditions, traits, and ideas with respect to specific policy issues and its
concomitant depreciation of the threats obstacles to policy implementation
present. This is especially evident in terms of defining the struggle and what
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resources are necessary and feasible in order to win. These problems are
compounded by a conflation of global ideology and local realities. The cousin to
Criterion III is Criterion V, which addresses context, scope, and stakes. When
evaluating cost, it is necessary to evaluate the cost in relation to the value of
success. As mentioned in Chapter V, it is unlikely that the United States would
have paid the cost for success that it ultimately paid for failure in Vietnam. The
same could be said of Iraq. Therefore, when evaluating the FPDM of the relevant
leaders, it is necessary to evaluate what they estimated the cost of intervention to
be in relation to what it turned out to be. The wider the gap, the less accurate the
FPDM. While it is impossible to calculate with precision the cost an intervention
will have, this is part of the job of responsible leaders.
Assuming that with a great power endowment comes the ability to
transform the politics of other states is imprudent. The calculations of the Second
World War and the Cold War—the destruction a fielded military can wield on
another, for example, or the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons—are not
relevant to the majority of today's conflicts. The theories and tools of great power
politics cannot be applied to asymmetrical and/or nonstate threats. Even in
Vietnam, when Kennedy touted 'flexible response,' the war still became the
application of great-power military doctrine to such an extent that it became the
most destructive bombing campaign in history, but it mostly destroyed the
animals and trees of the jungle. In Iraq, with both the justification for invading the
country and the prosecution of the war itself, great power politics were employed
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again against a single individual and his tyrannical regime, with the same
unfavorable results.
The argument could be made that the United States was in fact going to
war against another state, but this was explicitly denied by President Bush in his
war-eve address. Having already made the case several times that the war was
not with the Iraqi people but with the head of state alone, President Bush was
quick to equate Saddam Hussein with terrorism in moral terms: "America faces
an enemy that has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality." He did
attempt to warn that war would be long: "A campaign on a harsh terrain in a
nation as large as California could be longer and more difficult than some
predict." But "some" could have referred to the majority of his cabinet, with the
exception of Colin Powell, the only member of it with combat experience. His
claim, "We have no ambition in Iraq except to remove a threat" would be
contradicted by events on the ground. His claim, "Our nation enters this conflict
reluctantly" was as far from the truth as Baghdad from Washington.
Having applied the Manichean morals of the crusade, he lastly offered,
"The only way to limit its duration is to apply decisive force, and I assure you, this
will not be a campaign of half-measures, and we will accept no outcome but
victory." 441 This comment was a direct acknowledgement to the perception that
political hamstringing prevented victory in Vietnam, which was not the case, and
to the criticism of allowing Hussein to retain power during the 1991 Gulf War.
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Throughout the heavily idealized rhetoric and the constant demonization of
Saddam Hussein by Bush Administration officials in the media, great care was
taken to frame the relevant "issues, story line, and slogans" in order to
manipulate public perception into a more warlike footing. 442 Entire volumes have
been published on this disinformation campaign. 443 Ultimately, when it came to
the conflict itself, Defining victory would become as mercurial a prospect in this
struggle as it was in Vietnam, and "decisive force" would again result in decisive
defeat.
Cost is perhaps the most difficult metric to project while being the easiest
to evaluate retroactively. When the deed is done, the financial cost can be
calculated to the dollar. But before intervention takes place, the cost is somewhat
a matter of conjecture. The estimation by Paul Wolfowitz that the Iraq War would
"pay for itself" demonstrates how oblivious FPDM leaders can be to the costs of
impending conflict. While they cannot be expected to predict cost to the dollar,
the incentive on those promoting war is to depreciate its expected costs, and
therefore other FPDM leaders and ordinary citizens must question these
somewhat arbitrary projections. Applying military power to political grandstrategic objectives will inevitably carry high financial costs, in addition to
provoking strong reactions from adversaries.
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Robert Brigham reminds us, "The progressive impulse in American foreign
policy has led to the realization in some circles that there generally is no political
corollary to American military strength when the United States engages in nation
building abroad." 444 When President Kennedy pronounced in his inaugural
address, "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support
any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty," it is
likely that he was both undecided about whether this was true with respect to
'Indochina' and somewhat ignorant about the costs ambitious foreign-policy
campaigns could sustain. 445 It is certain that he did not know that the full force of
the American military would be applied to the deltas and jungles of Vietnam and
falter:

The primary lesson of Vietnam, and one completely ignored by
President Bush and his advisers, is that there is often no political
corollary to America’s overwhelming military power. In Vietnam, the
armed forces of the United States fought with courage and valor.
They never lost a major military engagement and they inflicted
severe pain on their adversaries. Yet U.S. objectives in Vietnam
proved illusive. The United States was never able to translate that
massive military might into sustainable political results. Without a
successful political war, there was little that could be done militarily
in Vietnam to change the course of the war within acceptable risks
and costs. 446
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Kennedy was inaugurated during a time of unbridled American patriotism and
optimism. The Vietnam War would cause Americans to question everything they
thought they had come to take for granted about American power, American
morality, and the dynamic between them. If the 1991 Gulf War served as a
cathartic exorcism of those questions, the Iraq War would cause them to revisit
those doubts once again.

Criterion IV. Alternatives
No policy is inevitable.
This is the perhaps the most crucial of all the FPE Criteria, at least for a
state with a great power endowment that can bear a very high cost of conflict.
The manner in which the alternatives are created and processed through the
FPDM system are absolutely essential in how the conflict will proceed and its
prospects for success. By incorporating the respective policy issues into the
grand strategy of preponderance, both the Vietnam War and Iraq War distorted
the predictions, assessments, and costs calculated by the relevant leaders. They
began from a point of victory, rather than striving towards it. They began from the
assumption that 'Indochina' could not fall into enemy hands and that Saddam
Hussein could not remain in power, rather than accepting it as a possibility. They
began from the assertion that American military power could not be challenged.
They began by assuming the NVA and VC would rapidly capitulate when they
saw what they were up against and that American soldiers in Iraq would "be
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greeted as liberators." 447 Beginning from a presumption of success is an
imprudent way to achieve it. Worst of all, they linked the fate of South Vietnam to
the fate of the Cold War, perpetuating the perception that a loss there was the
loss of the Cold War. They did lose in Vietnam, they did not lose the Cold War,
and the Vietnam War was not worth 1% of the cost incurred in blood and
treasure in terms of the national interest. The same was true in 2003, when
President Bush rashly linked the fate of Iraq with that of the "free world."
Arthur Schlesinger's assertion that the Vietnam War was "a tragedy
without villains" represents a fatalist school of historiography that accepts
particular events in history as inevitable. It may be the paramount lesson of
history, as well as international relations, that every event everywhere in the
world somehow simultaneously affects every other in an unpredictable symphony
of surprises, especially in a world globalized by the astronomically expanding
technological advancements in the transportation of material and information. As
Captain Lawrence proclaimed in the film epic Lawrence of Arabia upon having
rescued an outcast boy on an ostensibly impossible mission back through the
Nefud Desert, "Nothing is written." Just as to deny the plausibility of constructing
comprehensive, consistent methods and metrics to evaluate foreign policy is to
ignore one of the basic necessities in international relations, so too is the
exoneration of leaders because of presumed inevitability, a logical fallacy that
reduces the value of scholarship and the general progress of humankind. If
history is inevitable, then we cannot learn from it, and if we cannot learn from
447
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history, then the future may as well be considered just as inevitable as history.
This line of thinking is decidedly irreconcilable with the entire premise of this
dissertation. FPE and FPA need more prominent roles in IR literature precisely
because of the fact that decision-makers are human and their policies, both
ideationally and practically, malleable.
It could hardly be said of the FPDM of the Iraq War that leaders
"agonized" over it. In fact, discussion was tragically truncated. Senator Robert
Byrd spoke to an empty audience during his lonesome rhetorical deliberations on
the war in the Senatorial chambers. In contrast, FPDM leaders did indeed
"agonize" over what to do with Vietnam. From March 10-24 of 1965, still part of
the decision-making phase of "The Long 1964," Assistant Secretary of Defense
John McNaughton reported to Robert McNamara proportioned U.S. objectives in
Vietnam as "70%—To avoid a humiliating defeat (to our reputation as a
guarantor); 20%—To keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands;
10%—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer, way of life." 448 At the
time, there were less than 30,000 U.S. troops in country, and less than 500
soldiers had lost their lives there. 449 And even with those modest (relative to what
would come) losses, prestige was still of utmost importance. The U.S. thus fell
victim to what Hilton Root termed the "commitment trap."
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The trap the United States faces in Iraq exemplifies a recurring
dilemma in U.S. foreign policy. Presidents have continuously
coddled client regimes that are unwilling to make the political tradeoffs necessary for national legitimacy. Despite American rhetoric
about overseas reform and ambivalence about backing dictators,
throughout the cold war many U.S. political leaders relied on one
authoritarian regime to help defeat another more odious
authoritarian regime. And there were the proxy wars, too, when the
United States armed Iraq against Iran and the mujahedin against
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Such myopic policies
consequently impaired America's ability to forcefully advocate
domestic reforms within those regimes. Once engaged, U.S.
support weakened American demands for pro-reform quid pro quo
terms. This is the U.S. commitment trap. Committed to the survival
of allies but lacking the leverage to discipline recalcitrant regime
leaders, America creates a strategic vulnerability that even weak
client states can exploit. The commitment trap reduces America's
credibility as a reform advocate. It binds the United States so that
America cannot walk away from allies without eroding its credibility.
Curiously, this trap isn't sealed abroad but at home—by the fears
that have driven the U.S. electorate since the cold war. 450

The United States has faced this problem everywhere it has intervened to prop
up a weak state, as OPM Indicator II illustrates. Another memo from the
Pentagon Papers discussing alternatives for Vietnam described a situation in
which "the bombing campaign is reaching the point where we will have struck all
worthwhile fixed targets except the ports," leaving Air Force commanders "no
major military targets [remaining] to be struck in the North." With nowhere left to
bomb in North Vietnam, the Air Force moved on to Laos and Cambodia and the
Army pondered invading North Vietnam proper: "These new military moves
against North Vietnam, together with land movements into Laos and Cambodia,
are now under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Even long before the
450 Hilton Root, Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World (Washington, D.C: Brookings
Institution Press, 2008), 174.
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Tet Offensive turned the tide of public opinion against the war, U.S. war planners
knew the effort was futile: "With respect to interdiction of men and materiel, it now
appears that no combination of actions against the North short of destruction of
the regime or occupation of North Vietnamese territory will physically reduce the
flow of men and materiel below the relatively small amount needed by enemy
forces to continue the war in the South." The memo concluded that "there
appears to be no attractive course of action." 451
In McNamara’s memoir, he similarly recalled the 1967 JASON study
mentioned in Chapter 6: "Since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder, air strikes
on NVN, the flow of men and materiel from NVN to SVN had greatly increased,
and present evidence provides no basis for concluding that the damage inflicted
on North Vietnam by the bombing program has had any significant effect on this
flow. In short, the flow of men and materiel from North Vietnam to the South
appears to reflect Hanoi's intentions rather than capabilities even in the face of
the bombing." 452 This was a profound statement about U.S. calculations. U.S.
foreign policymakers were unable to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable
developments that all the bombing in the world could not alter "Hanoi's
intentions." At this point, it should have been obvious that the calculations the
United States commenced the war with were no longer operable, but the war
continued full-tilt for several more years. U.S. foreign policymakers could not
451
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improve Vietnam policy because the reality of the situation did not fit the
preconceived notions with which they entered hostilities. Disconfirming
information was therefore useless because it was too late to change the course
of events.

Criterion V. Context, scope, and stakes
Redefine the scope of the American grand-strategic means-end chain by
avoiding characterizing the world in Manichean terms.
This need not, should not, and does not imply a renegotiation or
compromise of American values. In fact, this is an American value—the freedom
of every people to chart its own destiny through the course of its sociopolitical
trajectory. In neither Vietnam nor Iraq did America control the moral high ground.
The world is not flat, and its varying 195 nation-states contain differing levels of
economic and social development, cultural preferences, democratic values,
national identities, and foreign-policy customs. So many volumes have been
published on the irony of the "arsenal of democracy," "empire by invitation,"
"liberal leviathan," "benevolent hegemon," or whatever term we choose to
describe the engagement of the world by the United States that all sense of irony
has dissipated and it has simply become a fact of life. The hypertrophy in
American foreign relations has become problematic precisely because of the fact
that republicanism is incompatible with interventionism. The ideational and
material impulse to achieve total security by liberalizing the world produces an
ideational and material backlash where it is applied in militant fashion. In the
words of Colin Dueck, "The United States cannot be all things at once. It cannot
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be the epitome of mortal virtue on a state scale and the international arbiter of
world affairs; the consummate liberal utopia and the world's foremost warinitiator." 453 It is therefore essential to deeply examine the context and scope of
U.S. grand strategy in correlation with any particular foreign policy by explicitly
defining how its stakes relate to the national interest. President Bush declared
that it was "our responsibility in history" to "rid the world of evil." 454 This is far too
great a burden to place on any one nation.
Characterizing the enemy as an "Evil Empire or an "Axis of Evil" severely
constrains the availability of policy alternatives for foreign policymakers, because
of the perception that allowing evil to roam freely is not only weak but also a form
of morally bankrupt appeasement. It therefore links the strength of the state to
the ability to purge those evils from the world. In reality, there is no such thing as
'pure evil,' and conquering that evil may be much more difficult than policymakers
believe. This characterization was particularly acute during the Cold War, when
the bipolar world seemed divided, at least to the two protagonists, between
inextricably dyadic poles, split along pervasively ideological terms. Richard
Herrmann points out that this 'enemy image' subsided somewhat when this
conflict came to its termination. 455 But it experienced a revival with the 2002 NSS
and President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address. The 'enemy image'
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represents a "psychological construct as it signifies the actor's perception of the
enemy," facilitating a process of demonization through which is created a
"'bipolar' 'us' versus 'them' environment where 'good' is associated with 'us' and
'evil' with 'them.'" 456 The Constructivist Copenhagen School of IR describes this
type of discourse as a process of "securitization" whereby threats are interpreted,
codified, and made public: "In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that
refers to something more real, the utterance itself is the act." 457 Whether we
should accept the Constructivist premise that security exists primarily in the
ideational sphere is up to the observer to decide. What is certain is that U.S.
leaders would be wise to under-promise and over-perform rather than
overpromise and underperform in relation to the pursuit of prestige and moral
Puritanism in the international system.

OPM
Indicator I. The estimation of the capacity to transform other states
Recognize that even relatively unlimited power has limitations.

In War and Peace, Tolstoy ponders, "What is power?" to which he
responds rather rhetorically, "Power is power. That is, power is a word the
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meaning of which we do not understand." 458 In slightly less philosophical (more
scientific) terms, James March's 1966 classic paper "The Power of Power" poses
the question, "To what extent is one specific concept of power useful in the
empirical analysis of mechanisms for social choice?" to which he offers the halfresponse, "The answer to the original question is tentative and mixed... the
concept of power and a simple force model represent a reasonable approach to
the study of social choice... on the whole, however, power is a disappointing
concept. It gives us surprisingly little purchase in reasonable models of complex
systems of social choice." 459 Gilpin defines power in his discussion of prestige,
part of the FPE Cost Criterion: "Prestige is the reputation of power, and military
power in particular. Whereas power refers to the economic, military, and related
capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states
with respect to a state's capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise
power." Prestige can "deter or compel other states to achieve its objectives," but
at the same time, "the fact that the existing distribution of power and the
hierarchy of prestige can sometimes be in conflict with one another is an
important factor in international political change... prestige, rather than power, is
the everyday currency of international relations." 460
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With respect to Vietnam and Iraq, the United States possessed relatively
unlimited power (virtually unlimited material power vis-à-vis the target state). It
could have destroyed each country, and everyone in it, hundreds of times over.
But this would not have accomplished the objectives of inspiring antiCommunism or combatting terrorism, and would have provoked a response from
other states. Therefore, power itself is becoming an increasingly problematic
measure of means. The extent to which U.S. leaders have assumed that hard
power innately wields the capacity to control the political processes and
outcomes of other states cannot be overstated. Indeed, the literature cited in this
research is riddled with implicit and explicit declarations that where there is
military and financial power there must also be the ability to affect and control the
politics of other states. What prevails in reality is the ability to have a say in those
politics, just as the enemy has a say in any confrontation, as Confederate
General George Pickett adroitly proclaimed. State power is a factor in any
interstate interaction or confrontation, it is not necessarily the factor. For all the
tactical pitfalls in Iraq, "the deeper problem was that the fundamental premise of
the Bush revolution—that America's security rested on an America unbound—
was mistaken." 461
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Indicator II. The ability to support and bolster the host state
Do not intervene to shield an ineffectual government.

The paradox of intervention in support of a friendly government is that if it
is worth defending, it should be able to stand on its own, but if it cannot stand on
its own, it must be defended. Hilton Root addresses this exact problem when he
refers to the "commitment trap." It is therefore up to the intervening state to
calculate whether the state is worth defending, whether it can in fact be defended
via successful intervention, and whether the cost required to successfully defend
it is worth it. The calculations are the same whether the state is defending itself
against adversaries foreign or domestic (though it is often a combination of the
two). Just as an intervening state tends to believe that it can overcome the
strength of local adversaries, it also tends to believe that its interests are aligned
with local partners. The problematic manifestations of this paradox were highly
acute during the Cold War, as the United States partnered with states of varying
quality, often non-democratic, in order to fend off Communist expansion. In 1971,
Robert Keohane described the "cruel and unusual paradox" of the case of the
Lilliputian powers that are the "badgers, mice and pigeons—if not the doves—of
international politics, and in many cases they have been able to lead the
elephant."
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assistance saps the host nation’s motivation to defeat insurgents on their own or
undertake the measures necessary to enhance their counterinsurgency prowess,
while economic aid reduces an allied regime’s incentives for fiscal reforms which
would grow and strengthen their wartime economy." 463 While the 2014 version of
FM 3-24 recognizes that the intervening state and the partner state do not
necessarily share aligned interests, counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine itself
requires an intervention by an outside power. The 2014 version therefore simply
limits the scope of the U.S. intervention, which is prudent, but nevertheless relies
on U.S. COIN support to accomplish its objectives. But whenever military
intervention is undertaken, it will face these strategic issues no matter how
tactically adept its planners.

Indicator III. The ability to restrict the power of adversaries
Do not assume that more of the same means more success.

This is the all-too-common adage of the powerful state: more resources
within the same parameters will achieve superior results. In fact, the opposite
may hold true: it is entirely plausible, and, in the cases examined here, factual,
that the intervention itself perpetuates precisely the problems its undertaking
sought to prevent. Milton Friedman's quote, "If you put the federal government in
charge of the Sahara Desert, in five years there'd be a shortage of sand," is
somewhat more famous than his marginally more reasonable contention: "Almost
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all government programs are started with good intentions, but when you look at
what they actually achieve, there is a general rule. Almost every such program
has results that are the opposite of the intentions of the well-meaning people who
originally back it."
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This is, of course, an extreme characterization of

government waste. Many government programs are far more efficient, important,
and effective. But these are extreme cases of blunder, and these statements
apply. In both Iraq and Vietnam, the military effort was the source of the
gathering response against it.
Pickett's assertion supporting the idea that 'the enemy has a vote' in any
confrontation, "I kinda think the Yankees had a little something to do with it,"
illustrates this point. No matter how inferior the strength and firepower of the
enemy, his will alone is a metric that is not only difficult to judge, but impossible
to judge until the war is well underway. Not until the fight is on can the enemy's
will be known. Chapter 5 quoted Roosevelt as describing the people of
'Indochina' as "not warlike." Nothing could have been further from the truth. The
Vietnamese were in fact well versed in the art of war and had been repelling, or
at least attempting to repel, invaders from the Chinese to the French to the
Japanese for hundreds of years. The strategy and tactics used to inflict
casualties on the Americans and break the will of the American people to fight
were not plucked from thin air, but taken from the theoretical military doctrine of
insurgency and guerilla warfare and put in practice by the Viet Minh against the
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French. The lessons learned in Communist insurgency acquired during Mao TseTung's experience in the Chinese Civil War would inform NVA and VC military
doctrine later on. 'Chairman Mao' describes his evolution of guerilla warfare in
stages:

The first covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and
our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the
enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparations for the
counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic
counter-offensive and the enemy's retreat. It is impossible to predict
the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in
the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. The
objective course of events will be exceedingly rich and varied, with
many twists and turns. 465

The

Chinese

guerillas'

experience

honing

patience,

timing,

resourcefulness, and leverage of the populace against an otherwise superior
force paid dividends in Vietnam once the atmosphere of the Cold War brought
the interests of the two countries more in line than they had been for the
thousand years prior. Just as intervening states tend to assume that the interests
of local partners are aligned with their own, they also tend to assume that they
can overcome the strength of local adversaries. But the guerillas of South
Vietnam, backed by their North Vietnamese counterparts, relied on a way of war
that was more favorable to the conditions of the conflict than was the American
way of war. While the Viet Cong relied on maximizing available resources and
using time as a weapon, the U.S. military relied on superior firepower and short-
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term "decisive victory" as a crutch, and time was therefore against it over the
long-term.
In Iraq, the sense of brooding nationalism that had been lying dormant
under the authoritarian dictatorship of Saddam Hussein suddenly discovered
flight in the total power vacuum that prevailed after the disbanding of the Iraqi
army and the institutional purge of all Ba'ath Party civil servants. Those who had
been unable to express a sense of nationalism now found it a necessity in order
to preserve relevance in the fledgling Iraqi state. Political and religious sects and
factions thus organized on those militarized terms, paradoxically linking the
development of the state with its fractionalization. In both cases, the very
presence of the intervention galvanized the militarized response against it.
Furthermore, the simple condition of one state intervening in another creates
such a confusion so as to create an overabundance of interests, perspectives,
and overlapping alliances. Clausewitz describes the 'fog of war:' "If we remember
how many factors contribute to an equation of forces, we will understand how
difficult it is in some cases to determine which side has the upper hand. Often it
is entirely a matter of the imagination." 466 Mao's portrait of war as one in which it
is "impossible to predict the concrete situation" and to always be prepared for
"many twists and turns" fit perfectly with protracted guerilla warfare, and was the
ideal counterpunch to the reliance on the quick, decisive battles of superior
firepower employed by the American military.
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Indicator IV. Rationalization and operational learning
Place more care into defining the national interest in painfully transparent
terms with respect to a particular policy.
According to Arnold Wolfers, "It would be an exaggeration to claim that the
symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion,
though closer analysis will show that if used without specifications it leaves room
for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford." 467
As such, FPDM leaders would do well to exercise a higher level of caution in
assessing the value of a given country as it relates to the national interest.
Vietnam never held the significance to our national interest that we applied to it,
nor did Iraq. These were wars of choice, chosen not at random but certainly
arbitrarily, in which the national interest was superimposed over the respective
country via the medium of the ideology of preponderance.
In a dangerous world, statesman must be borderline obsessive over the
process of defining the national interest and seek to make that process as clear
and scientific as possible. It is not in the national interest to have an extremely
esoteric vision of grand strategy carried out by recondite leaders via clandestine
methods and practices. Indeed, this has not been the problem with the grand
strategy of preponderance, which has been openly and transparently pursued
with little effort made to conceal it. Any encounter with another state, even a
cooperative one, potentially carries with it disastrous consequences. It is
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therefore incumbent upon statesmen to engage in the world with extreme
discretion. Even in circumstances of extreme benevolence, it is difficult to affect
local conditions. Researchers at the London School of Economics, for example,
found that that "no relationship exists between the levels of aid and rates of
growth in recipient countries," resulting instead in "increasing the size of recipient
governments and lining the pockets of elites." 468
Rather than relying on a presumption of meliorism, U.S. grand strategy
should be more focused on specifying more precisely what goals the nation
seeks in its relations with others. George Kennan envisioned a stricter
interpretation of the national interest than his preponderance-promoting
colleagues. In simultaneously deploring "the histrionics of moralism" and
advocating the pragmatism of pursuing "real possibilities for acting upon the
international environment," his response to the "moral problem" of fending off the
"two unprecedented and supreme dangers" of environmental destruction and
catastrophic systemic wars was to strike a balance between morality, the national
interest, and foreign relations:

This would be a policy founded on recognition of the national
interest, reasonably conceived, as the legitimate motivation for a
large portion of the nation's behavior, and prepared to pursue that
interest without either moral pretension or apology. It would be a
policy that would seek the possibilities for service to morality
primarily in our own behavior, not in our judgment of others. It
would restrict our undertakings to the limits established by our own
traditions and resources. It would see virtue in our minding our own
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business wherever there is not some overwhelming reason for
minding the business of others. 469

The key passage in this excerpt is "primarily in our own behavior." The
United States is at its most powerful as an exemplar of liberty to other states,
rather than as the international dictator of liberty. In the modern world in which
pacific, liberal norms are paraded and militarism is frowned upon, power
becomes more powerful by creating an interdependence that relies on norms and
best practices of liberal interaction. The two most militarized U.S. foreign policies
in the last forty years, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, failed miserably. This
says as much about changing conditions in the international system in terms of
security, norms, and the value of hard power as it does about the United States
itself. There has not been a direct great-power conflict since 1945. That does not
mean it could not happen tomorrow, but it does mean it is unlikely to happen
soon. Under these conditions, the most powerful state in the international system
would benefit more from selective cooperative engagement than selective
militarist engagement. Military power, for the time being, has been eclipsed by
other forms of power as international currency.
At the height of the Cold War, in quintessentially Nixonian fashion,
President Nixon pronounced, "When the president does it, that means it's not
illegal." As the former President of the Duke University Bar Association, Nixon
would have known this to be legally incorrect. But this train of thought has
informed the inverse manner in which FPDM is conducted in the United States.
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The impulse to slay monsters abroad complicates FPDM because rather than
responding to a policy problem with a proportional understanding of its place in
the national interest and proportional tools with which to address it, it places the
cart before the horse. The innate spirit of mission described in Chapter 3 so
characteristic of the American collision with the world, especially since 1945,
places emphasis on pursuit over capture. The chase is the game. It is therefore
unsurprising that the bounded rationality of mission ensues within that
overarching perspective. The leaders involved in the FPDM of these foreignpolicy blunders willfully pursued a policy that was known to have a low likelihood
of success, even while paradoxically overestimating U.S. capacity to affect local
politics, because they molded reality into their preferred grand strategy of
preponderance rather than molding a grand strategy around reality.
This bounded rationality of mission on the grand-strategic level correlates
to the same problem on the tactical level. Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate this in detail.
To offer another example, eight years into the war in Afghanistan, General
Stanley McChrystal entered a situation in which "there was no single effective
campaign assessment" mechanism. 470 He would also lead an effort in which the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found that the availability of indigenous
translators "remains essentially nonexistent." 471 The availability of linguists in
Vietnam and Iraq was likewise a tiny fraction of the amount needed to interact
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with local communities and gather sufficient intelligence with which to protect
those communities and thus win the war. The assessment by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence of prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq concluded,
"Much of the information provided or cleared by the Central Intelligence Agency
for inclusion in Secretary Powell's speech was overstated, misleading, or
incorrect." 472 General Tommy Franks, who led the invasion force into Iraq, led a
style of command that "tended to distort the information that flowed upward to
him." One officer that worked under his command simply lamented, "I am
convinced that much of the information that came out of Central Command is
unreliable because he demands it instantly, so people pull it out of their hats. It's
all SWAGs [scientific wild-assed guesses]. Also, everything has to be good news
stuff.... You would find out you can't tell the truth." 473 This preference for
confirmation bias fit perfectly on the political side with the Bush Administration.

Where to in U.S. foreign policy?
The change/continuity in U.S. foreign policy debate continues, and many
of its contentions remain in progress. Did the United States build the postwar
international order based strictly on in its own interests, or did the 'benevolent
hegemon' actually build something normative that transcends interests? Can that
international order survive a world without a hegemon, or a world in which the
superpower does not wish to arbitrate international affairs? Richard Haas
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predicts that without forceful U.S. leadership, smaller countries will appease
rising powers like China, the international system will revert to self-help, nuclear
weapons will proliferate, and U.S. leaders defining the American national interest
in very narrow terms will force other countries to do the same. 474
John Mearsheimer contends that the United States is a regional hegemon,
hegemonic only in the Western Hemisphere, while in Europe and Asia the United
States is an offshore balancer. 475 But the expansion of NATO after the Cold War
(which Mearsheimer opposed on realist grounds), U.S. maneuvers in the South
China sea, and the rhetoric emanating from U.S. foreign policymakers call this
characterization into question. Charles Krauthammer, who heralded the 'unipolar
moment' when the Soviet Union collapsed, recently declared that the triumphant
era of liberal democracy "is over. The autocracies are back and rising;
democracy is on the defensive; the U.S. is in retreat. Look no further than
Aleppo." 476 But prognostications of American decline are as oversimplified as
were prognostications of the "end of history" and the triumph of post-Cold War
American hegemony. The phrase "is over" juxtaposes paradoxically with the
declaration in the 2002 NSS that the battle between tyranny and liberty "is over."
Paul Kennedy attributes the "fall" of great powers to imperial overstretch
and fiscal irresponsibility, in addition to natural cycles in the distribution of power:
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Ideally, of course, "profit" and "power" should go hand in hand. Far
too often, however, statesmen found themselves confronted with
the usual dilemma: between buying military security, at a time of
real or perceived danger, which then became a burden upon the
national economy, or keeping defense expenditures low, but finding
one's interests sometimes threatened by the actions of other states.
The present large Powers in the international system are thus
compelled to grapple with the twin challenges which have
confronted all their predecessors: first, with the uneven pattern of
economic growth, which causes some of them to become wealthier
(and, usually, stronger), relative to others; and second, with the
competitive and occasionally dangerous scene abroad, which
forces them to choose between a more immediate military security
and a longer-term economic security. No general rule will provide
the decision-makers of the time with a universally applicable course
of action. If they neglect to provide adequate military defenses, they
may be unable to respond if a rival Power takes advantage of them;
if they spend too much on armaments—or, more usually, upon
maintaining at growing cost the military obligations they had
assumed in a previous period—they are likely to overstrain
themselves, like an old man attempting to work beyond his natural
strength. 477

The key line in this passage is "No general rule will provide the decision-makers
of the time with a universally applicable course of action," which signifies that
there are no absolute truths in statecraft, and decision-makers can seek to
maximize their utility function but they can never guarantee wealth or security.
The cyclical economic vision of changes in the balance of power over time
implies a certain inevitability about the "rise and fall of the great powers," as
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Kennedy terms it. George Modelski envisions these cycles in specifically
predictable patterns, as shown in Table 10: 478
Table 10: Modelski’s Long Cycles (adapted from Modelski, 1981)

Kennedy's work was published in 1989, and Modelski's power cycle theory
in 1981, before the coming of the (perhaps short-lived) 'unipolar moment.' But the
studies were based on historical trends, and if those trends are to continue, the
United States will need to be wary of 'imperial overstretch' and fiscal imprudence
if it wishes to extend its current status as the world's preeminent power. At the
center of this crossroads is the 'military-industrial complex' that President
Eisenhower warned against in his presidential farewell address. At best, the
gargantuan American military-industrial complex functions as a necessary
system

of

military-hardware

production

processes

and

public-corporate

partnerships in order to protect the private sector while ensuring that the United
States government never gets militarily flanked by a rival power. At worst, it
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simply leads to a fiscal catch-22 in which “circulation of the ‘wheeling and
dealing’ elites between and within the Pentagon, its contractors, the military
brass, and government officials has become an ominously efficient vehicle for the
waste and plunder of the citizens’ tax dollars appropriated by the Pentagon.” 479
The truth is likely somewhere in between these two characterizations.
The absolute cost of maintaining preponderance, although perhaps made
temporarily manageable by the relative size of U.S. GDP during the second half
of the previous century, is made more costly in relative terms by its
ineffectiveness. The U.S. economy may be capable of maintaining the status quo
ad infinitum, or for at least a number of decades to come, based on current
projections. But whether this is money well spent, when many U.S. standard-ofliving indicators fall short of those in other industrialized nations, is one question
Americans need to answer. Another is whether the money spent on maintaining
the status quo is being used effectively. On December 5, 2016, the Washington
Post published a story on a January 2015 internal Pentagon audit that "revealed
for the first time that the Pentagon was spending almost a quarter of its $580
billion budget on overhead and core business operations such as accounting,
human resources, logistics and property management." 480
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The U.S. military is currently engaged in at least 190 military operations in
a majority of the world's countries. 481 U.S. Special Operations Forces deployed to
138 countries in 2016. 482 Whether the average citizen is openly supportive of,
barely cognizant of, or simply serving as a myrmidon to the prevailing status quo
of American preponderance remains somewhat of an open question, given that
public opinion vacillates depending on the perceived success of whatever
foreign-policy engagement features most prominently in the headlines at any
given moment. But seven decades of preponderance have ossified a credence in
the citizenry that the world cannot survive without American direction, the
viewpoint described by Richard Haas. Precisely to what extent this credence is
inherent in the American mind versus perpetuated by the American leader is
difficult to ascertain; the preceding chapters offer clear evidence that both
phenomena have been operative for a long time.
Central to the viewpoint that the world needs a liberal hegemon to function
properly is the concept of interdependence, a subject on which common ground
between realists and liberals has sometimes been hard to come by. Like many
inter-paradigmatic debates, it has at times suffered from overly simplistic
parochialism. It is rudimentary to argue that interdependence produces conflict,
just as it is rudimentary to argue the opposite. In the end, neither can be a law if
even a general rule, as the nature of that interdependence, and the prevailing
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conditional circumstances of the era, will define whether it produces war, peace,
or something in between. Engaging with a trouble world means more trouble
under certain circumstances, while isolationism from a troubled world means
more security under certain circumstances.
What the case studies illustrate is what happens when the conception of
the national interest with respect to a particular policy issue becomes distorted. If
the United States continues to perceive threats to the national interest where
none exist—and to respond to these benign dangers in militarized fashion—it
risks precisely the national quicksand described by Kennedy. Writing in 1976,
Robert Jervis examined the power of perception and misperception as related to
capabilities, threats, and intentions:

Differing perceptions of the other state's intentions often underlie
policy debates. In the frequent cases when the participants do not
realize that they differ on this crucial point, the dispute is apt to be
both vituperative and unproductive. This has been the case with
much of the debate in the United States over deterrence theories
and policies. Although the arguments have been couched in terms
of clashing general theories of international relations, most of the
dispute can be accounted for in terms of disagreements about
Soviet intentions. 483

The beauty of Jervis' argument is in its simplicity of purpose and clarity of
explanation. He is correct to assert that there is a limit to the utility of the "general
theories of international relations," just as Kennedy is correct to assert that "no
general rule will provide the decision-makers of the time with a universally
483 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University
Press, 1976), 59.
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applicable course of action." IR requires more depth as a field, more attention to
the particularities of circumstances and conditions, and a richer appreciation for
the exceptions to rules rather than to the rules themselves; one step in this
direction is to recognize the differentiation between states. What all states do
have in common, however, is the desire to avoid annihilation. The Cold War is
such an enticing case study because of the presence of MAD. If the American
leaders could simply have said to the Soviet leaders, "We will not attack you if
you do not attack us," there would have been no Cold War and thus no need to
produce more nuclear weapons than are required to vaporize the human planet.
But there is no such entity as total trust, and the gap between that lack of totality
and the totality that fear of annihilation produces in the human spirit created the
security dilemma that existed long before the advent of nuclear weaponry. The
stakes are simply higher now. How to escape this madness?

The ideal solution for a status quo power would be to escape from
the state of nature. But escape is impossible. The security dilemma
cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated. Bonds of shared
values and interests can be developed. If actors care about what
happens to others and believe that others care about them, they
will develop trust and can cooperate for mutual benefit. When two
countries are locked in a spiral of arms and hostility, such bonds
obviously are hard to establish. The first step must be the
realization, by at least one side but preferably by both, that they
are, or at least may be, caught in a dilemma that neither desires. 484

While the impending doom experienced during the height of the Cold War has
come and gone, nuclear weapons and the art of deterrence are now permanent
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fixtures of the international system. There is only one way for the human race to
survive, which is of course to learn to cooperate. Jervis references a 1947 article
by George Kennan in Foreign Affairs: "It is an undeniable privilege of every man
to prove himself in the right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he
reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct, he is
bound eventually to be right." If the United States looks abroad and sees threats
first, they will materialize in the flesh. There are two problems with this
perspective. First, it dilutes the real threats facing U.S. and global security—
namely, at the present time, nuclear proliferation in unpredictable states such as
North Korea and Iran, Islamist fundamentalism, and environmental destruction
(Kennan was decades ahead of his time on this third issue). Second, it reduces
the incentives for other states to engage in cooperation. These issues will be
resolved in one fashion or another if the great powers continue to avoid military
confrontation as they have since 1945.
The U.S. experience during the Second World War convinced U.S. foreign
policymakers that only a preponderance of power would suffice in the
interminable quest to achieve lasting security. This may or may not have been
true in the immediate postwar years. It is not true now. The only path to security
in a nuclear-armed, power-diffused world is to straddle the fence of
interdependence and promote the idea that it leads to pacific enterprises, rather
than accepting that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they
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must." 485 The world can no longer afford to escape normative interpretations of
international relations. Security in a world with these two conditions must be
codeterminally

created.

As

perhaps

the

preeminent

authority

on

interdependence, Robert Keohane understands that interdependence, like
anarchy, "is what states make of it." 486 As was the conclusion of Jervis, Keohane
simply states, "Cooperation is necessary," while recognizing, "It will be
cooperation without hegemony."

Interdependence in the world economy generates conflict. People
who are hurt by the unexpected changes emanating from abroad,
such as increases in the prices that producers charge for oil or that
banks charge for the use of money, turn to their governments for
aid... If discord is to be limited, and severe conflict avoided,
governments' policies must be adjusted to one another. That is,
cooperation is necessary. One way of achieving such mutual policy
adjustment is through the activities of a hegemonic power, either
through ad hoc measures or by establishing and maintaining
international regimes that serve its own interests while managing to
be sufficiently compatible with the interests of others to be widely
accepted... The United States played this role during the first fifteen
or twenty years after world War II; hegemonic cooperation was a
reality...The United States is still the most important country in the
world political economy [and] remains an essential participant in
international regimes. Indeed, U.S. involvement is usually
necessary if cooperation is to be fostered successfully...The ability
and willingness of the United States to devote substantial resources
to maintaining international economic regimes have both declined
since the mid-1960's... It seems unlikely that the United States will
reassume the dominant position that it had during the 1950's, or
that any country will come to occupy such a position, in the
absence of a wrenching upheaval such as occurred in the past as a
result of major wars. Since war in the nuclear age would have
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altogether different and more catastrophic effects than the world
wars of the past, it is probably safe to assume that hegemony will
not be restored during our lifetimes. If we are to have cooperation,
therefore, it will be cooperation without hegemony. Nonhegemonic
cooperation is difficult, since it must take place among independent
states that are motivated more by their own conceptions of selfinterest than by a devotion to the common good. 487

A symposium on Dale Copeland's book Economic Interdependence and
War at the 2016 International Studies Association Annual Conference produced
a fierce debate between John J. Mearsheimer and Copeland, in which the
disciple eclipsed the master simply by evolving theory beyond the dinosauric
age. 488 Mearsheimer hysterically repeated that the boundaries of realism cannot
be punctured by liberal advancements, to which Copeland responded by doing
exactly that. His book examines interdependence and war through historical
analysis, with the most relevant current debate of course being that of U.S.-China
relations. He argues that one of the underappreciated factors in determining how
states calculate the costs and benefits of war versus peace are the expectations
of benefit from future trade, a dynamic more important in today's globalized world
than at any time in all of history. The merits of his precise argument can be
debated by political economists, but its relevance here is in the adaptation of
realism by incorporating liberal tenets. Mearsheimer's died-in-the-wool realist
parsimony is adeptly propounded by his magnificent scholarship, but Copeland's
epistemological evolution surpasses the confines of that parsimonious ontology.
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IR as a field has been designed to resolve system-level questions. As
such, it tells us little about smaller questions. However, these are the questions
that define the larger questions. A state is made up of the smaller units of groups
and individuals, just as the structure of the international system is made up of
states. Grand strategy and the international balance of power are intricately
linked to events and processes of seemingly less significance. Since the Second
World War, the United States has controlled the 'world stage,' all the while
declining in relative power and losing many smaller battles (Vietnam, fiscal
discipline, efficient defense policy, Iraq, Afghanistan, the war against drugs)
along the way. 489
Alternatives to the Bretton Woods model pursued by actors such as
Russia, some East Asian countries, China, and others continue to threaten the
legitimacy of the Western world order. Chaos in the Middle East, the source of
much of the world’s energy, continually threatens to derail any semblance of
stability in international relations. In short, though the United States is by no
means responsible for the maelstrom of instability that characterizes the
unpredictable, dangerous nature of international relations, it has fallen short of
the mark in terms of producing, clarifying, pursuing, and achieving its grand
strategy because of inconsistencies and shortcomings between that grand
strategy and the application of particular foreign-policy objectives. The resulting
strategic-tactical gap fails to account for, for example, how local indigenous
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politics relate to great-power interventions. This dissertation has attempted to
take a step in the direction of filling that lacuna.
When dealing with the losing powers after the Second World War, in the
construction of the Bretton Woods system, a large-scale, hegemonic-like
ushering in of an international regime was possible because of glaring cultural
similarities between Europeans (despite the despotic regime of the Third Reich)
and Americans, and even Japan and its crumbling empire (despite its adherence
to Shinto-Buddhist militarism). However, the current foreign-policy climate pits
major powers against nonstate actors such as guerillas (hence the need to
establish COIN doctrine) and Islamist terrorist groups. While the security
demands of the United States and the West have shifted, the United States still
maintains a Cold War-like foreign-policy posture that was designed to prevent
aggression from the major powers. To solve these new problems, the United
States sometimes uses a .44 Magnum to destroy a gnat, and ends up getting
caught in the crosshairs of its own crossfire. A new era of foreign policy is
needed. The sweeping notions of hegemony and grandiose grand strategy need
to be abandoned entirely. Modern security threats require a modern toolbox of
utility, not an aggressive one-size-fits-all approach applied by the gargantuan
monolith of the U.S. defense establishment's "decisive force."

The status quo or the status quo ante?
On the morning of January 12, 2016, Senator John McCain offered words
in support of the confirmation of General James Mattis, perhaps the least
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controversial cabinet selection of the new administration, to the post of Secretary
of Defense. His characterization of "business as usual" in U.S. foreign policy was
particularly telling:

As we meet today, at a time of increasing global threat and
disorder, for seven decades, the United States has played a unique
role in the world. We've not only put America first but we've done so
by maintaining and advancing a world order that has expanded
security, prosperity, and freedom. This has required our alliances,
our trade, our diplomacy, our values, but most of all, our military, for
when would-be aggressors aspire to threaten world order, it's the
global striking power of America's armed forces that must deter or
thwart their ambitions. Too many Americans seem to have
forgotten this in recent years. Too many have forgotten that our
world order is not self-sustaining. Too many have forgotten that
while the threats we face may not have purely military solutions,
they all have military dimensions. In short, too many have forgotten
that hard power matters. Having it, threatening it, leveraging it for
diplomacy, and, at times, using it. Fairly or not, there is a perception
around the world that America is weak and distracted, and that has
only emboldened our adversaries to challenge the current world
order. The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism continues to
metastasize across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe, and but
for those who remain vigilant, our homeland. It should now be clear
that we will be engaged in a global conflict of varying scope and
intensity for the foreseeable future. Believing otherwise is wishful
thinking. So, if confirmed, General Mattis, you would lead a military
at war. You of all people appreciate what that means and what it
demands. At the same time, our central challenge in the Middle
East is not ISIL. As grave a threat as that is, it is a breakdown of
regional order in which nearly every state is a battlefield for conflict,
a combatant, or both. ISIL is a symptom of this disorder. At the
same time, Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions have been
postponed, but not halted, and it continues to modernize its military,
expand its maligned influence, and seek to remake the region in its
image from Syria to Iraq to Yemen. In Asia, the rise of China is
shifting the balance of power in ways that increasingly challenge
longstanding U.S. interests. We see a new assertiveness in China
to confront U.S. allies and partners, make vast territorial claims with
no basis in international law, carve out spheres of influence, and
revise the current order. North Korea is testing Nuclear weapons

444

and ballistic missiles at an alarming rate. Our intelligence
community publicly assesses that North Korea will soon develop a
nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that is capable of
striking the U.S. homeland. This may become a defining crisis for
the next president. And then there is Russia. Over the past eight
years under Vladimir Putin, Russia has invaded Ukraine, annexed
Crimea, threatened NATO allies, [and] intervened militarily in Syria,
leaving a trail of death and destruction, and broken promises in its
wake. Russia's military has targeted Syrian hospitals and first
responders with precision weapons. Russia supplied the weapons
that shot down a commercial aircraft over Ukraine. Russia's war in
Ukraine has killed thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians.
And in the most flagrant demonstration of Putin's disdain and
disrespect for our nation, Russia deliberately interfered in our
recent election with cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns
designed to weaken America and discredit Western values. Each of
our last three presidents has had great expectations of building a
partnership with the Russian government. Each attempt has failed.
Not for lack of good faith and effort on the U.S. side, but because of
a stubborn fact, that we must finally recognize: Putin wants to be
our enemy. He needs us as his enemy. He will never be our partner
including in fighting ISIL. He believes that strengthening Russia
means weakening America. We must proceed realistically on this
basis. We must build a position of significant strength vis-á-vis
Russia and any other adversary that seeks to undermine our
national interest and challenge the world order; we must reestablish
deterrence, and that is primarily the job of the Department of
Defense. But for too long, the Department of Defense has planned
and optimized itself for short-term episodic contingencies, whether
against great powers or global terrorist movements. We now face a
series of long-term, strategic competitions with clear military
dimensions that often occur below the threshold of armed conflict
(all emphases added). 490

This view hardly seems one of a great power that has not fought a war
against another even middle power for the seven dominant decades celebrated
in the opening line of McCain’s comments. McCain went on to criticize the status
quo of U.S. military spending and administration, citing "less combat power. In
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constant dollars we spend almost the same amount on defense as we did thirty
years ago, but we are fielding 35% fewer combat brigades, 53% fewer ships, and
63% [fewer] future combat aircraft squadrons, all this while overhead costs that
do not add to combat power have steadily increased. In short, we have done
great harm to our military." It is unclear whether McCain has read Kennedy's
book, which points out that costs of maintaining large militaries inevitably
compound—he acknowledges that "overhead costs" rise, but does not account
for the lesser return on constant FY dollars. "Business as usual is not just
misguided, it is dangerous," he argued, attributing less spending to budgetary
constraints: "All of these problems are compounded by the self-inflicted wounds
of the Budget Control Act. For five years, national defense spending has been
arbitrarily capped," leading to what he characterizes as "deferred modernization"
in each branch of the military.
The obvious solution to the Senator, then, would be both ideational and
material replenishment: "We need to stop deterring ourselves and return to
strategy, aligning our ends, ways, and means to address global threats. We need
to resize, and, more importantly, reshape our military." Naturally, this would all
correspond with a substantial increase in spending: "This will not be cheap but it
pales in comparison to the cost of failing to deter a war or, worse, losing one."
But of the major wars fought since 1945, Korea was a stalemate, Vietnam was a
resounding defeat, the 1991 Gulf War was a short-term victory but long-term
stalemate, which led to the 2003 Iraq War, which was a catastrophe; there is also
Afghanistan, which eclipsed Vietnam as America's longest war, and is steadily
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slipping back into Taliban hands. In none of these wars was moral or military
weakness an impediment to victory. As James Fallows and many others have
asked, "Why do the best solders in the world keep losing?" 491 Andrew Bacevich,
scholar, retired U.S. Army colonel, and critic of U.S. foreign policy states simply,
"The global military supremacy that the United States presently enjoys—and is
bent on perpetuating—has become central to our national identity." 492 Figure 11
from the International Institute for Strategic Studies illustrates the scope of
American military spending, which is higher than the next ten countries
combined:

Figure 11: U.S. accounts for more than a third of global military spending
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Figure 12 depicts military spending as a share of total discretionary spending: 493
Figure 12: U.S. Military spending as a share of total discretionary budget

Though McCain is often cited as a "hawk" by the media, this depiction of
the expectations of the U.S. position in the world and the capabilities of U.S.
military power hardly strays from the common interpretation among his fellow
foreign-policy practitioners. In fact, he has been at the forefront of many of the
nation's foreign policies for the three decades he has served in the Senate since
1987, and his rostrum as the Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee
affords him an unrivaled pulpit with which to promulgate viewpoints unfiltered by
the foreign-policy establishment. The irony, however, is that "maverick" McCain
personifies the establishment he prides himself on bucking as well as just about
anyone.
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Contained within his overall perspective, which is much in line with the
prevailing grand strategy over the seven decades his comments open with, are
several implicit and explicit assumptions and contentions that reveal much about
the 1945-onward endurance of preponderance in U.S. foreign affairs. "Unique,"
though accurate, hardly begins to describe the U.S. role in the world. The reason
McCain's assumptions and contentions neither require further explanation nor
invite debate in the confirmation hearing is because they are not controversial in
U.S. foreign-policy discourse. First among these assumptions is the idea that
American military power is directly and primarily credited with maintaining the
postwar global order. Although there is no doubt that American military power
turned the tide of the Second World War and indeed ushered in an era of global
stability, democracy, and free market capitalism, assuming that the U.S. military
is still "most of all" to credit for the "world order" all but disregards the liberal
institutionalism that order is built on (though McCain does provide lip service to
"our alliances, our trade, our diplomacy, our values" in passing). To place U.S.
military power as the overwhelming caretaker of the international order is, in spite
of its regular occurrence in official U.S. foreign-policy discourse, a monumental,
and perhaps impossible, task to charge it with, just as President Bush's assertion
that the United States is responsible for ridding the world of evil bears a cross
contrary to pragmatism.
Second, when McCain problematizes the modern American zeitgeist by
asserting that "too many Americans seem to have forgotten this in recent years,"
he is issuing a rallying call to American militarism that harkens directly back to
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the early neoconservative publications of the 1990's, with striking similarity to
William Kristol and Robert Kagan's 1996 essay in Foreign Affairs referenced in
Chapter 6: "American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a
breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American
foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as
possible." When McCain argues that "we need to stop deterring ourselves," he
echoes the call to arms of Kristol and Kagan two decades earlier when they
looked within to find the strength to destroy the monsters without: "The main
threat the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness." They
too had warned against "flagging will and confusion about our role in the world,"
calling for a "benevolent hegemony" that wields "the capacity to contain or
destroy many of the world's monsters." 494
The refrain remains unchanged: the world is filled with monsters, and only
the United States can destroy them; it cannot do so unless it maintains
hegemony; and it cannot maintain hegemony unless it finds the strength to do so
among the populace. Most strikingly, there is no mention of any historical change
since 1945 with the exception of threats posed that seemingly are meant to
represent a new manifestation of old threats, given that none of them are
contextualized in a modern-historical juxtaposition. Schlesinger may have been
correct in asserting that unilateralism is the most enduring feature of American
foreign relations. But if we look specifically at the seven decades since 1945, the
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language still invoked by our foreign-policy leaders reveals that the most
enduring feature of American foreign relations goes one step further, to
preponderance.
Inherent in this grand strategy is the ideational exceptionalism of the
United States to the extent that no other power can exist alongside it, and states
labeled as threatening such as Iran are not afforded the same rights as the
United States and its allies. If Iran is going to "seek to remake the region in its
image from Syria to Iraq to Yemen," it must be countered en force at every step
of the way; meanwhile, the American way of life ought to be promoted en force
wherever plausible in order to remake the world in its image. In colloquial terms,
McCain's perspective argues that might makes right, although it at least caveats
that approach by defending the "values" that have supposedly made the right
mighty. Here is where realpolitik and values intertwine, although McCain focuses
overwhelmingly on the "hard power" of realpolitik.
Morgenthau's contention that “political realism refuses to identify the moral
aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe"
was invoked by he and others during the escalation phase of the Vietnam War,
the conflict that would call into question whether Americans could indeed claim
the mantle of the moral high ground, as well as material invincibility.
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apparent now than it was in 1968 when the Tet Offensive would signify the
beginning of the end in Vietnam, five full years before the acknowledgement of
failure in the cease-fire.
Third, when McCain quite accurately asserts that "our central challenge in
the Middle East is not ISIL," he exposes the rupture any great power faces
between the "cold" and "hot" threats discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Where
should statesmen focus attention—on the active combatants seeking to destroy
American institutions, allies, and interests, or on the great-power rivalry proxy
battlefields that populate the great-power-conflict hinterlands? Should the focus
be on the existential threats of terrorist groups, environmental issues, and the
like? Or on the balance of power and the rising, revisionist powers that seek to
reorient status-quo international norms, institutions, and leadership? Perhaps it is
unsurprising that so much attention is given to places like Syria, where both
existential and power-rivalry threats can be engaged simultaneously.
The irony there, however, is that without the cooperation of the Russian
menace, waging a war against Bashar al-Assad and Islamist terrorist groups
within Syria becomes impossible, given that the Kurds and weaker Syrian
Democratic Forces are the only other groups capable of challenging the
tyrannical Syrian state, and they are opposed by the Russo-Turkic alliance. The
incredibly convoluted and tenuous interest webs in Syria are so intertwined so as
to render the whole situation relatively hopeless—every enemy is a friend to
some friend and, conversely, every friend is a friend to some enemy. As an
illustration of this complexity, when Vice President Joe Biden lamented the
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support of Salafi jihadists in Syria by Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,
and Saudi Arabia in a speech at Harvard University on October 2, 2014, he was
forced to publicly apologize for making remarks that everyone with two eyes
knew to be true, in order to avoid alienating those allies. 496 As McCain accurately
depicts, the ISIS problem is but a "symptom" of a larger regional malaise
beholden to sectarian, regional, and power-dynamical intricacies.
Fourth, very much in conjunction with the third assumption/contention,
McCain correctly calls into question the ultimate direction of the Department of
Defense. While he recognizes that the U.S. military is not designed to fight the
wars of the 21st century (a contention implicit in the OPM), portraying it as having
"optimized itself for short-term episodic contingencies, whether against great
powers or global terrorist movements," he misses the meta-argumental elephant
in the room: how military power should be organized and applied is indeed an
important question, but whether military power can solve the problems of the 21st
century is quite another. This dissertation has attempted to demonstrate that
sometimes it can, and sometimes it cannot; in the case studies as in many other
cases, U.S. foreign policymakers have greatly overestimated the extent to which
military power can slay the seemingly infinite production of the world's
increasingly amorphous monsters.
It is impossible to hear McCain beseech his audience for more means to
achieve his ever-expanding ends without conjuring up Gaddis and "the gap
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Americans had allowed to develop between aspirations and accomplishments.
We had preached self-determination but objected when others sought to practice
it; we had proclaimed the virtues of economic freedom even as we sought to
impose economic control." 497 If grand strategy is essentially a means-end chain,
in Gaddis' words, then preponderance, by definition, expands the ends beyond
whatever the means become, no matter how much the means expand. A toddler
rationing apple juice could comprehend the paradoxical predicament inherent in
such a philosophy.
Barry Posen offers a depiction of U.S. grand strategy, in addition to a
prescription for its ills, in Restraint:

This undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy has done untold
harm to U.S. national security. It makes enemies almost as fast as it
slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense,
and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose
Washington's plans, further raising the costs of carrying out its
foreign policy. During the 1990s, these consequences were
manageable because the United States enjoyed such a favorable
power position and chose its wars carefully. Over the last decade,
however, the country's relative power has deteriorated, and
policymakers have made dreadful choices concerning which wars to
fight and how to fight them. What's more, the Pentagon has come to
depend on continuous infusions of cash simply to retain its current
force structure—levels of spending that the Great Recession and the
United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable.
It is time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and
replace it with one of restraint. This approach would mean giving up
on global reform and sticking to protecting narrow national security
interests. It would mean transforming the military into a smaller
force that goes to war only when it truly must. It would mean
497 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, No. 1
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removing large numbers of U.S. troops from forward bases,
creating incentives for allies to provide for their own security. And
because such a shift would allow the United States to spend its
resources on only the most pressing international threats, it would
help preserve the country's prosperity and security over the long
run. 498

This diagnosis, as well is its prescription, find concert with the findings of
FPE and OPM contained in the previous chapters. There is always a 'justification'
for intervening and pursuing preponderance. As long as there is a world there will
be monsters, and as long as there are monsters, you can always try to justify
intervening to slay them. The United States vacillated back and forth between
isolationism and hegemony throughout its history because American identity
itself is somewhat confused between hunger for power and moral messianism.
Somewhere in the penumbra of this ineluctable paradox is an irreducible axiom:
if means are not correlated with ends, and ends are not clearly defined, foreign
policy is likely to end in blunder.
If John Quincy Adams did not wish for the United States to parade around
the globe on quests to expurgate monsters, some of his contemporaries did.
Thomas Jefferson promoted the idea of an "Empire of Liberty," just as his
successors would pursue hegemony in Latin America, Western Europe, and Asia
many years later. 499 But while it was always present in American foreign
relations, the real push for preponderance came in the years after 1945.
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Mearsheimer reminds us that "for every neck, there are two hands to choke it."
The United States, no matter how powerful, cannot afford to employ both hands.
It will end up choking itself. This is not to suggest the morality should be entirely
distinguished from statecraft, and that is not what Morgenthau suggested either.
It is merely to acknowledge that morality is but one of many factors in the
international interchange between states and other social groups.

Monster in the closet, monsters at the gates
The monster of restraint in the closet lives only in the American
imagination. But there are real monsters in the world that require our attention,
and the United States and its allies now face a terrifying monster in the form of
Islamist militarism. While this threat does not yet wield the capacity that a great
power would, it does not play by the rules a normal state would either. In making
the contention that applying only a grand-strategic lens to any given policy
problem invites disaster, the OPM does not mean to suggest that a state should
not have any grand strategy, but rather that grand strategy and foreign policy
should take into consideration the constraints of pragmatism and the
particularities of localities in any calculation of means and ends, in addition to
understanding the limits of power and the inherent issues of transforming the
politics of other states. This dissertation has posed research questions relating to
intervention and responded to them with case studies that illustrate the manifold
problems inherent in the exercise of that policy. Its conclusions point to a
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response to Islamist terrorism that would be most effective by employing a
narrowly defined set of national-security interests.
As a response to the 9/11 attacks and the enduring thorn of Islamist
fundamentalism, the war against terrorism seems to have become a neverending feature of American foreign policy. For the most part, other than the two
obvious exceptions (Afghanistan and Iraq), targeted killings, usually from the air,
have become the method of choice for attacking terrorists or would-be terrorists.
In July of 2016, President Obama's White House revealed that between 2,372 to
2,581 combatants and between 64 and 116 civilians had been killed by U.S.
attacks (mostly drones, presumably) in 473 non-specified "strikes" against
"terrorist targets" between January 20, 2009 and December 31, 2015 "outside
areas of active hostilities," which does not include Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria. 500
The number offered for civilian casualties is highly questionable, since there is
often no way to verify with certainty who has been killed afterward. Whether
these targeted attacks do more harm than good by motivating more terrorists
than they kill is an open question, but it is certainly less costly than the alternative
of large-scale military intervention, which itself has been shown to produce a
fierce backlash.
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The war against terrorism has thus far been delineated into three
phases. 501 In the first, personified by Donald Rumsfeld, the buzz words were
“liberation,” “democracy,” “blitzkrieg,” and “shock and awe.” This era saw the
invasions

of

Iraq

and

Afghanistan

and

the

foundations

for

future

counterinsurgencies. The pacification era, personified by General David Petraeus
and later General Stanley McChrystal, advocated engagement with local
populations in the form of COIN and the establishment of an American
civil/military hybrid force to secure the populace and address the needs of the
people, thus aiming at the root causes of hostility to the foreign power. The first
phase led into the second phase as invasion turned into occupation. The paradox
of COIN is the paradox of American identity: it relies both on the "noble cause," in
Reaganite terminology, of winning "hearts and minds," and on "decisive force," in
Bush terminology, which clears the way for civilian 'pacification' in the first place
by attacking hostile actors.
In Vietnam, pacification ultimately failed along with the war, but Robert
Komer and John Paul Vann learned lessons that can be applied today to the war
against terrorism. Recently, there have been voices within U.S. foreign
policymaking circles that have argued for a more human approach to
intervention. One example of this brand of thinking was the Human Terrain
System (HTS). Defined by Kipp as "the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic,
and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating," HTS was
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a program designed to culturally map the people of a given area, with the hope of
better integrating military forces with the local population and thus providing
better security, incurring fewer military casualties and inflicting fewer casualties,
and gathering better intelligence. 502 Operating with a budget of $190 million, HTS
was for a time "among the largest social-science projects in history." 503 But while
the attitude behind such a program is indeed a "noble cause," incorporating
anthropologists into war also incorporated war into anthropologists, which
eventually led to formal disapproval by the American Anthropological
Association's Executive Board, citing the potential for militarizing scientists in
addition to obvious questions of scientific biases. Furthermore, these efforts have
been difficult to implement, and run into many of the same problems as would a
traditional military approach to coercively transforming the politics of other states.
The second phase of the war against terrorism, although achieving some
victories, such as an environment safe enough for democratic elections and the
beginnings of democratic government in Afghanistan and Iraq, nevertheless
failed to achieve lasting security or elimination of the fundamentalist enemy in
either case. The current preference of the policy community informs U.S. foreign
policy to prosecute the war on terrorism perhaps how it should have begun:
partnership with any available local actors and targeted strikes from the air and
Special Forces. This is how the “drone wars” have been fought in Pakistan,
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Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. As Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Michael Vickers put it, “I just want to kill those guys.” 504 While targeted killings will
never adequately address the root causes of Islamist terrorism, and in fact may
exacerbate them, they do act as a stopgap against existential terrorist
formations.
At the same time, not all are satisfied with this approach. Senators such
as John McCain and Lindsey Graham, critical of the withdrawal of troops from
Iraq, now advocate sending brigade-level troops back into Iraq to coordinate the
war against Islamic State, which the American public has little appetite for. We
now appear to be entering—perhaps re-entering is a more appropriate term—the
pursuit of multilateralism in foreign policy and the avoidance of becoming
militarily extended by fighting large-scale wars against states or de-facto states
like the Taliban (ISIS can hardly be considered even a de-facto state, despite its
inclination to describe itself as such). Just as the United States waxed and
waned through fits of unilateral expansion and starts of self-absorbed
isolationism, the current trend may be no more than that—a trend. The
precarious situation in the Middle East now seems a far cry from the aspirations
the region and its onlookers held at the outset of the Arab Spring, an apparently
ephemeral movement many media outlets now characterize as an “Arab Fall” or
the even more melancholy “Arab Winter.”
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Global terrorism is a new problem, and along with nuclear proliferation and
environmental destruction, the most important national-security threat of our
times. It must be viewed as a modern threat and modern tools must be employed
against it. The war machines of the Third Reich and Imperial Japan required
decades of underlying bureaucratic, political, ideational, material and nationalistic
underpinnings. When they were smashed by the “arsenal of democracy,” the Red
Army, and allied forces, an infinite amount of time and effort would never have
put those humpty-dumpties back together. In contrast, terror networks can be
created and morphed on a whim within hours. The circumstances of the Second
World War were unique to those nations and conditions. To fight wars in
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan with the mindset that defeated those bureaucratic
machines is to fail at the task. Terror networks likewise cannot be understood in
the same terms; the analysis and tools required to fight them are distinct from
anything else. The same is true of drug trafficking organizations, environmental
problems, and any of the multitude of 21st-century national-security concerns.
This is not to say that emerging great-power threats or balance-of-power
considerations should be absent the policymaker's mind, but resources must be
directed at "hot" threats, even if preparation for "cold" threats never disappears
from the foreign-policy landscape.
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Possibilities for future research
Analysis of the case studies has helped to answer some questions while
feeding further curiosity in others. Some of these questions follow: These
historical case studies address two events that have come and gone. What
further predictions about the future of IR can be made from their study? How
would the OPM relate to a non-blunder case study or a foreign policy that ended
in success? How do the pursuit of preponderance and the estimation of power to
transform the politics of other states relate to non-military interventions, or largescale efforts at political coercion, such as the war against drugs in the Americas?
The United States is in many ways an exceptional nation, not just in how it
defines itself but also from an objective point of view. To what extent is U.S.
foreign policy simply based on its power endowment, and in what ways does it
behave differently than other states irrespective of power endowment?
Do other states look to the United States as an example, or do they just
fall in line (or not) with international liberal regimes and institutions because they
believe it is in their own best interests to do so? Can attacking hostile states and
nonstate actors serve as a lesson, a form of deterrent terrorism perhaps, to
thwart other hostile actors?
How are changing norms going to affect the future of international
relations? To what extent will the world become globalized, cultures infused,
languages forgotten, and how will this affect the future of international relations?
To what extent are the OPM Indicators active in today's conflicts? For
example, how does Indicator I relate to the overestimation of Syrian rebels to
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challenge Bashar al-Assad, an effort that has been a complete failure by the
United States?
What is the role of the American public in the pursuit of preponderance?
How can we estimate the distinction between support and complacence, for any
policy or ideology?
How hard will the United States attempt to cling to preponderance as
power becomes more globally diffused, and will the world retain the relative
great-power peace it has achieved since 1945 without a global hegemon?
Chapters 1-6 describe a world in which the most powerful state in the
international system fails at its most ambitious foreign-policy projects. What
happens if/when a slightly less powerful United States either becomes more
successful at intervention or abandons intervention altogether?
How will the international community resolve the issues of nuclear
proliferation and environmental destruction, and will these new threats force
states to achieve an unprecedented level of cooperation?
How can this research be utilized to understand other foreign-policy
blunders?
Has there been any major U.S. military intervention in the last seven
decades that can be considered a clear success? How is the stalemate in
Afghanistan to be assessed?
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Concluding reflections and qualifications
This research has implications beyond U.S. foreign policy. While the
domestic social conditions and foreign-policy traditions of the United States
display a multitude of unique behavioral patterns, many of which are unpacked in
the OPM, it also entails lessons for would-be superpowers and foreign
policymaking in general. The OPM asks a fundamental question about the extent
to which one state can affect the politics of another through intervention.
Although it focuses on the most powerful state in the international system
intervening in relatively weak states, it is likely that the conclusion that affecting
the politics of other states in this outlier relationship holds even truer in any other
type of relationship, all of which descend down the power ladder. The ability of an
equal state to control another would likely be even more difficult, and a weaker
state to control a stronger state more difficult still.
From a god's-eye view of the conflict (or a realist view, for that matter), it is
perhaps fortunate that the Vietnam War and Iraq War did not succeed. It would
have set a precedent that one state with a handful of token allies can and should
invade other states that are deemed undesirable by some faction of the
international community. Although this dissertation approached the research
question with the assumption that the American self-image and U.S. foreign
policy are in many ways unique, the finding that power cannot and does not
always translate into the ability to control the politics of other states is relevant to
any state seeking to affect the politics of other states. At the same time,
advocating a narrower definition of the national-security elements of the national
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interest does not preclude substantial diplomacy, cooperation, and progressive
relations between states.
The case studies reveal many findings, some overlapping others, and
some contradicting others. Despite the fact that the grand strategy of
preponderance takes strides to make Americanism ubiquitous, it itself is not
ubiquitous within U.S. grand strategy. Chapter 3, while contending that the
presence of

preponderance since 1945 has been unmistakable, also

acknowledged the more pragmatic and isolationist tendencies in the history of
U.S. foreign relations. Neither preponderance nor isolationism has ever been
completely absent from the American way of foreign relations or the FDPM of
elected leaders. And it must be noted that after the interventions of Chapter 5
and Chapter 6, there was in fact an attitude unsympathetic toward intervention.
"Vietnam Syndrome" prevented any such intervention again on that scale, at
least for a time, and even informed the FPDM of the 1991 Gulf War as well as
the Iraq War.
In 2003, U.S. leaders tried to convince themselves and the public that the
fierce indigenous resistance (buoyed by foreign support) of Vietnam would not be
re-experienced in Iraq a generation later. But for many of the same reasons,
many of the same problems were encountered. It is too early to tell whether an
"Iraq Syndrome" will emerge and what form it will take. The nature of the terrorist
threat, which is very real even though it was invented with the case of Saddam
Hussein, makes solutions to it highly complex and entirely unsavory. But Barack
Obama did ascend to the presidency in part based on his opposition to that
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intervention. Even after smaller episodes, such as Mogadishu, there has been an
isolationist, or at least non-interventionist, response. Characterizing U.S. grand
strategy as one of preponderance must therefore be qualified by the postintervention instances in which the pendulum auto-corrected back to a more
pragmatic stance.
A second important point is that in both Vietnam and Iraq, U.S. foreign
policymakers generally viewed themselves and their actions as a cause for good.
This is not technically a qualification to the OPM, because the OPM does not
contend the opposite. It is, however, a viewpoint common among scholars and
public intellectuals with which there is some overlap with the OPM. This
dissertation has intentionally avoided discussion of oil, imperialism, empire, neocolonialism, and Marxist and critical perspectives because the arguments made
using these parameters and approaches are not compelling. The evidence does
not point in these directions. While the dissertation has contended that the
occurrence of U.S. foreign policymakers (as well as leaders of other states)
pursuing policies contrary to the national interest, even when there is substantial
evidence to make that known to them, is far more prevalent than many observers
would claim, or than the tenets of rational-choice theory would have us believe, it
does not contend that there is some inherently pernicious conspiracy to harm the
national interest or even to profit from cronyism or the military-industrial complex,
at least not in the case of the United States.
While the factors of class, the military-industrial complex, and economic
considerations are of course not entirely absent, these are not core components
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of the grand strategy of preponderance and they were not core components of
the interventions in question. Preponderance is about ideas, security, fear, and
capitalizing on the victories of the Second World War more than it is markets,
empire, and avarice. It is ideational first and material second; indeed, the
previous chapters have referred to it both as a grand strategy and as an
ideology, perhaps the former as the conscious pursuit of the subconscious latter.
The FPDM of the leaders examined herein was imprudent, not nefarious. Certain
aspects of their reign were nefarious, just as certain actions of CEOs, craftsmen,
artists, professors, or any other ordinary citizens are. Selfishness, laziness, and
simple general fallibility are inherent aspects of human nature. To expect our
leaders to never exhibit any of these characteristics is to make a Lego train out of
a 500-ton locomotive—these are no rational-choice models, they are human
beings.
But just as a craftsman would be held accountable if the house he built
were to fall over, so too should the leaders propagating faulty logic and sending
citizen-soldiers into harm's way to endanger the citizens of other states be held
accountable when their FPDM fallacy leads the nation into blunder. And yet, in
spite of this imprudence, these have been truly national blunders, with the full
knowledge, compliance, and support of the American public. A majority of the
American people supported the Vietnam War and the Iraq War years into the
conflicts. Therefore, we cannot attribute these tragedies to imprudent FPDM
alone. This is what George Kennan meant when he said, "People are not always
more reasonable than governments."
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The leader-populace consensus is a sword with two edges: people must
be held accountable for who they elect, just as leaders must be held accountable
to the same standards of success as would anyone of any ordinary trade.
Nevertheless, these were in some ways tragedies with villains, contrary to what
Schlesinger would have us believe. U.S. foreign policymakers time and time
again looked disconfirming evidence in the face and continued down the plank
because they refused to accept the severe truth their preconceived cognitive and
policy-preference biases would not incorporate. They subsequently lied to the
American people about every aspect of the conflicts, even if that public was
being told what it wanted to hear. Absent in all of this madness was leadership of
thought and direction of purpose. Preponderance

is

an

underlying

social

condition as much as it is a grand strategy or ideology; it is not a paradigm or
doctrine or prescription or policy per se and it is not necessary. The nation could
wake up tomorrow and absolve itself of it because it is not only unnecessary for
the survival of the state, but also harming the evolutionary fitness of the state.
Some scholars of the critical persuasion would have us believe that the whole
pursuit of preponderance is an “elite” exercise to sequester resources from
foreigners and from poor Americans. But it is not in the national interest, not even
when viewed from an extremely objective (self-interested) perspective. That
some corporate interest-groups profit from it is not evidence that those groups
control the American way of foreign policy.
The United States is not going anywhere as a great power in this century.
But other great powers are forming, they will expect and demand their fair share
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of world power, and they do not all mean us harm. In fact, as the world becomes
increasingly globalized, interests are becoming increasingly co-determined
across states. Realism informs the basic premise of the contention of this
dissertation that takes aim at the assumption that power can transform the
politics of other states. But realism is a paradigm of the past. It cannot
adequately explain the intricacies of interdependence because it is based on the
empirical evidence of history, and there is no empirical evidence for what has yet
to happen. If the dictations of positivists demand that scholarship remain
confined within the objective world, they can claim no objection to the contents of
this dissertation, but for its penultimate line: this chapter here closes with an
entreaty for scholars, policymakers, and average citizens alike to look to the
better angels of our realist, liberalist, and Constructivist assertions in theory and
praxis in order to promote a pragmatic vision of global good that begins with the
exemplar of a benevolent United States strong enough to defend its values but
smart enough to apply them wisely. If we are to avoid a life that is solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short, we must imagine that life in ontology, understand it in
epistemology, and create it through the regenerative phronesis of method.
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